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PART 1 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
 
The concept of political legitimacy within the European Union has gained considerable 
attention1 since Weiler discussed it in his seminal article2. Its meaning remains elusive3 and 
although “there are many ways to cut the conceptual cake of legitimacy in the European Union” 
4, it has been defined as “the normatively conditioned and voluntary acceptance by the ruled of 
the government of their rulers”5. This definition is a good starting point but the legitimacy 
problematic is compounded by the lack of structure to enable an analysis to be conducted6. This 
thesis will seek to provide a structure for such an analysis through the principles of legal 
rationality, focusing in particular on the European Union’s policy towards third country nationals 
(TCNs). 
 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Beetham D., Lord C., Legitimacy and the European Union, Longman, 1998. 
2 Weiler J.H.H., “The Transformation of Europe”, (1991) 100 YLJ 2403. 
3 Arnull A., “Introduction: The European Union’s Accountability and Legitimacy Deficit”, in Arnull A., Wincott D., 
(Eds.), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union, 2002, OUP at 3. See also de Búrca G., “The Quest for 
Legitimacy in the European Union”, (1996) 59 MLR 349 at 349. 
4 Walker N., “The White Paper in Constitutional Context”, Jean Monnet Working Paper No.6/01, accessed at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/011001.html at 3. 
5 Bellamy R., Castiglione D., “Legitimizing the Euro-‘Polity’ and its ‘Regime’: The Normative Turn in EU 
Studies”, (2003) 2 EJPT 7 at 10. 
6 Beetham, D., The Legitimation of Power, Macmillan, 1991 and Beetham D., Lord C., “Legitimacy and the 
European Union” in Weale A., Nentwich M., (Eds.), Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, 
Constitutional Choice and Citizenship, Routledge, 1998 at 15 use a structure of legality, normative justifiability and 
legitimation to analyse the political legitimacy of the European Union. It is submitted that although a useful 
structure, it can be incorporated within, and then analysed more effectively, through the legal rationality lens. 
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The thesis is divided into five parts. The first comprises this chapter, in which the abstract 
concept of legal rationality is constructed, and Chapter II. This chapter investigates the 
chronological development of policy towards TCNs in the context of the right to free movement 
of persons, the factors that support TCN policy formation and establishes legal rationality as a 
critical rather than scientific tool for assessing the treatment of TCNs from benchmarked policy 
stances. Parts II-IV each consist of two chapters. The first chapter of each of these parts is 
devoted to the examination of the free movement rights of TCNs under the EC Treaty and 
implementing legislation, the AFSJ, and the Association Agreements. The subsequent chapter of 
each part will analyse this legal structure from particular EU policy stances and through the lens 
of formal, instrumental and substantive rationality. In Part V conclusions will be drawn from the 
discussions contained in Parts II-IV. 
 
2. PERSONAL SCOPE OF LEGAL RATIONALITY ANALYSIS 
 
Those ruled in Bellamy and Castiglione’s definition, when considered in the context of the EU, 
include all the peoples resident in the EU. These are made up of citizens of the EU7 and TCNs. 
The position of the individual has been enhanced with the creation of citizenship of the Union 
and the rights that are correspondingly granted especially for free movement. Citizens of the 
European Union are able to determine the extent of their rights to freedom of movement in a 
relatively logical and straightforward manner as the principle of free movement of persons is 
enshrined in the EC Treaty as one of the four fundamental freedoms. The Union, however, is not 
just populated by EU Citizens, with an estimated 12.5 million8 TCNs legally resident in the 
                                                 
7 Article 17EC provides that ‘[e]very person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the 
Union’. 
8 High Level Panel Report on the Free Movement of Persons, delivered 18th March 1997, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/people/hlp/htm at 2. Site accessed 25 November 2002. 
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Union in 1997 that had increased to 16.2 million9 by 2003 and approximately 18.5 million by 
200610. These TCNs do not form a homogenous group as their population is made up of peoples 
with many different national identities spread throughout the European Union. As such, the 
citizens of this so-called twenty-eighth state11 are a disparate group culturally, socially and 
economically with the majority emanating from developing countries. However, from the sheer 
weight of numbers, it can be considered that TCNs have an important effect on, and play an 
important part in, the economy of the Union. They work, provide services, purchase goods, pay 
taxes and in general participate fully in the Europe-wide economy12. Demographic trends 
indicate that the steady population growth in developing countries is paralleled by falling birth 
rates in Western Europe13. This demographic pattern suggests that to ensure economic growth is 
sustained by the necessary workforce in the medium to long term, an increasing level of 
migration from third countries into the European Union will be required14. Therefore the TCN 
population in the European Union is likely to increase in real and proportional terms as it 
increases in importance economically15. With this growing importance of TCNs to the 
                                                 
9 See 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/asylum/statistical/docs/population_by_citizenship_2003_en.pdf 
site accessed 10 June 2007. These are the most up to date figures before the new round of EU accessions on 1 May 
2004 and 1 January 2007. 
10 Commission Communication of the third annual report on migration and integration, COM(2007) 512 final at 3. 
The  Eurostat figures suggest that the figure is actually 18.3 million (see Eurostat, Living Conditions in Europe Data 
2003-2006: 2008 Edition, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2008 at 31) but in 
conversations with Eurostat officials it was explained that these figures are approximate as statistics have not been 
supplied by all MSs. 
11 Cholewinski R., “The Rights of Non-EC Immigrant Workers and their Families in EC Countries of Employment: 
A Case for Integration”, in Dine J., Watt B. (Eds.), Discrimination Law: Concepts, Limitations and Justifications, 
Longman, 1996, 134 at 135. 
12 See Hoogenboom T., “Integration into Society and Free Movement of Non-EC Nationals”, (1992) 3 EJIL 36. 
13 Dell’Olio F., “Immigration after Nice: From ‘Zero Immigration’ to Market Necessity” in Arnull A., Wincott D., 
(Eds.), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union, OUP, 2002 at 469 and Stalker P., “Migration Trends 
and Migration Policy in Europe”, (2002) 40 International Migration 151. 
14 See United Nations, Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Aging Populations? 
ST/ESA/SER.A/206, United Nations Publications, 2000; Commission Communication on a Community immigration 
policy, COM(2000) 757 final, Annex 1; House of Lords EU Select Committee 13th Report of Session 2000-2001, A 
Community Immigration Policy, HMSO, 2001 at paras.21-27; Commission Communication on immigration, 
integration and employment, COM(2003) 336 final at 12; Commission Communication on a policy plan on legal 
migration, COM(2005) 669 final at 4. 
15 Gamberale C., European Citizenship and Political Identity, University of Sheffield unpublished thesis No.9481, 
1998 at 284. 
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Community it would be reasonable to assume that their free movement rights16 would be clearly 
defined, readily accessible and simple. This is not the case17. Moreover, the extent of such rights 
has altered over time, as has their political perception by the Member States (henceforth MSs), 
with certain TCNs receiving more favoured status than others as the political moment swings.  
 
3. MATERIAL SCOPE OF LEGAL RATIONALITY ANALYSIS 
 
Legitimacy is a much debated, contested and elusive concept. We have already considered an 
introductory definition of “the normatively conditioned and voluntary acceptance by the ruled of 
the government of their rulers”. Conventional doctrinal analysis of legitimacy tends to be 
conducted either through political science that looks at political power relationships18 or law that 
considers the law making process19 and its institutional structure20, or a combination of both that 
perceives the existence of a “democratic deficit”21. From this it can be ascertained that there is a 
desire and tendency amongst legitimacy theorists to attempt to merge several layers of the notion 
                                                 
16 See Oliver P., “Non-Community Nationals and the Treaty of Rome”, (1985) 5 YEL 57; Alexander W., “Free 
Movement of Non-EC Nationals: A Review of the Case-Law of the Court of Justice”, (1992) 3 EJIL 53; Cremona 
M., “Citizens of Third Countries: Movement and Employment of Migrant Workers within the European Union”, 
(1995) 2 LIEI 87; Hedemann-Robinson M., “Third-Country Nationals, European Union Citizenship, and Free 
Movement of Persons: a Time for Bridges rather than Divisions”, (1997) 12 YEL 321.  
17 See Peers S., “Towards Equality: Actual and Potential Rights of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union”, 
(1996) 33 CMLRev 7. 
18 Op. Cit. n.6 Beetham. See also Barker R., “Legitimacy, Legitimation, and the European Union: What Crisis?” in 
Craig P., Rawlings R., (Eds.), Law and Administration in Europe: Essays in Honour of Carol Harlow, OUP, 2003 at 
157. 
19 Franck T.M., Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Clarendon Press, 1995 at 26 and “Legitimacy in the 
International System”, (1988) 82 AJIL 705 at 706. 
20 See Majone G., Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth, OUP, 
2005 at 28, criticised by Dougan M., “”And Some Fell on Stony Ground…” A Review of Giandomenico Majone’s 
Dilemmas of European Integration”, (2006) 31 ELR 865. See also Singer M., “Legitimacy Criteria for Legal 
Systems”, (2006) 17 KCLJ 229. 
21 See Moravcsik A., “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union” in 
Begg I., Peterson J., Weiler J.H.H., Reassessing the Fundamentals, Blackwell Publishing, 2003 at 77. The 
“democratic deficit” of the European Union has seen considerable academic debate. For a comprehensive summary 
of the debates see Weiler J.H.H., “European Democracy and its Critics: Polity and System” in The Constitution of 
Europe: “Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?” and other Essays on European Integration, CUP, 1999 at 264; 
Craig P., “the Nature of the Community: Integration, Democracy , and Legitimacy”, in Craig P., de Búrca G., (Eds.), 
The  Evolution of EU Law, OUP, 1999, 1 at 23; Craig P., de Búrca G., EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 4th Ed., 
OUP, 2008 at 133; Chalmers D., Hadjiemmanuil C., Monti G., Tomkins A., European Union Law, CUP, 2006 at 
167. 
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into one overarching theory. This is illustrated in the works of Beetham and Lord22 who suggest 
that for a State to be legitimate it needs to demonstrate the requisite identity, democracy and 
performance in meeting the needs and values of citizens, which they then transpose to the model 
of the EU. These three elements of a single theory can be contrasted with Horeth’s three sources 
of legitimacy23 and Eriksen and Fossum’s three modes of legitimation24. To analyse the single 
concept of legitimacy the theory of legitimacy devised by Lord and Beetham must be broken 
down into the separate elements. Identity itself is a much contested concept that can be viewed 
from an individualistic perspective (how a person views their own position in society) or from a 
community perspective (how society determines who belongs and who does not). Instead of 
being an element of legitimacy it is submitted that it determines the construction of the political 
community, not its legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy25 on the other hand relies on public 
support26 or “public control with political equality”27 that appears to amalgamate the twin 
concepts of legitimacy and accountability into the single benchmark of democracy. The final 
element of performance is considered to require public acquiescence on political objectives and 
the institutional capacity to attain them. This appears to conflate an element of democratic 
legitimacy and the institutional legitimacy espoused by Majone and Moravcsik.  
 
The concept of political legitimacy utilised in this thesis approaches the question of legitimacy 
from an alternative direction. Politics is concerned with power28 and the capacity of social agents 
to maintain or transform their social environment and to create a regulated order for managing 
human conflict and interaction. Law can be considered to be “the enterprise of subjecting human 
                                                 
22 Lord C., Beetham D., “Legitimising the EU: Is there a ‘Post-Parliamentary’ Basis for its Legitimation?” (2001) 39 
JCMS 443. 
23 Horeth M., “No Way Out for the Beast? The Unsolved Legitimacy Problem of European Governance”, (1999) 6 
JEPP 249. 
24 Eriksen E.O., Fossum J.E., “Europe in Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of Legitimation Assessed”, (2004) 25 
IPSR 435 at 438. 
25 Scarpf F., “Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State”, (1997) 4 JEPP 18. 
26 Ehin P., “Competing Models of EU Legitimacy: The Test of Popular Expectations”, (2008) 46 JCMS 619 at 621. 
27 Op. Cit. n.22 at 444. 
28 Held D., Models of Democracy, 2nd Ed., Polity, 1996 at 309. 
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conduct to the governance of rules”29 or “the human attempt to establish social order as a way of 
regulating and managing human conflict”30. As such it deals with human action and human 
social action, is the method used to enact the rules required to regulate this human social action 
and is the final outcome of the political process. From these definitions politics and law are 
inevitably intertwined with the laws and rules of the polity providing the positive evidence of the 
policy stance of the polity. Therefore to assess the legitimacy of the political it is proposed to 
analyse the laws and rules of the polity as the final embodiment of its policy. This thesis breaks 
away from the traditional legal analysis of legitimacy that focuses on the process or the 
institutional structure of the polity and the traditional political science analysis that evaluates 
democracy. It is proposed to scrutinise the law through the lens of legal rationality that is made 
up of three elements, each mutually exclusive and essential: formal; instrumental; and, 
substantive rationality. Formal rationality requires legal doctrine to be free from contradiction 
and for rules to be the same for everyone, instrumental rationality requires these rules and legal 
doctrine to be action guiding whilst substantive rationality necessitates the norms underlying 
legal doctrine to be justified. They are mutually exclusive are they are comprised of different 
factors and have different ends, namely the avoidance of conflict between laws, guidance for 
action and the justification for such action. They are essential as the failure of an element of legal 
rationality creates dislocation between those who rule and the individual who is ruled. In essence 
the failure of a desideratum of rationality leads to a conclusion that the law is defective. Legal 
rationality enables the results of political endeavour, the substantive law in action, to be 
scrutinised for legitimacy utilising practical reason that then reflects on politics. The 
methodology provides a structured analysis that can enables specific recommendations to be 
made for improvement and reform when areas of concern are identified. 
 
                                                 
29 Fuller L.L., The Morality of Law, Yale University Press, 1969 at 96. 
30 Beyleveld D., Brownsword R., Law as a Moral Judgment, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986 at 2. 
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It must be acknowledged however that there are limitations to the extent that rationality can 
measure or enhance the ideas of legitimacy. The first is inherent in the main premise of the 
thesis, namely to assess political rather than democratic legitimacy. This can be criticised as the 
application of the term legitimacy to those who rule appears to require some input from those 
that are ruled. It is conceded that this would be a credible criticism if the focal point of the thesis 
was to legitimise the accountability of the political process to the people. However, the focal 
point utilised in this work is the final output of the political process that are the laws and rules of 
the polity thereby assessing the law against a measurable benchmark. That measurable 
benchmark is the concept of legal rationality but this leads to a further limitation. The notion of 
legal rationality as developed in the remainder of Chapter I can be viewed as an abstract and 
precise scientific tool for analysis in a political world that requires subtlety and acknowledgment 
of a range of factors that support policy formation. This limitation has considerable credence 
unless the method of legitimacy assessment is analysed from the political stance associated with 
specific policies, in this instance the policy towards migration and the treatment of TCNs in the 
EU. To overcome this limitation Chapter II outlines the factors underlining this policy formation 
and locates legal rationality within a chosen policy stance. It must be recognised however that 
the choice of policy stance is one of many that are available and it is possible that using an 
alternative position, although possibly unjustified, could lead to different outcomes for an 
assessment through legal rationality. 
 
4. LEGAL RATIONALITY AS A TOOL FOR ANALYSIS 
 
The justification for using legal rationality as a tool for analysis will now be explored. As such 
the origins of the concept of rationality will be discussed, followed by a detailed examination of 
the factors involved in the rationality analysis, before considering alternatives and the reasons for 
employing legal rationality. 
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a. Philosophical Rationality 
Rationality is an extremely complex idea that could be considered to mean all things to all men31. 
Rationality conveys a two-dimensional notion in philosophical terms. The first is the broad or 
general view that all philosophers aspire to using reason to provide force for arguments and 
placing special emphasis on man’s rational capacities32. Rationalism in the strict or narrow sense 
has caused considerably more debate as it has conflicted directly with the ideas of empiricism. 
Rationalists believe in the possibility of a priori knowledge, where a proposition is a priori if its 
truth can be established independently of any sensory observation33. The acquisition of this 
knowledge is achieved by employing reason. To establish pure truth, free from experiences, 
emotions and sensory input, pure reason needed to be applied. This position was attacked by 
empiricists who questioned the isolation of facts and truth and developed the belief that all 
human knowledge derived from the senses34. Rationalism approached human knowledge from a 
purely objective stance whilst empiricists employed a purely subjective approach. Following 
Hume philosophers have attempted to synthesise empiricism within rationality. Kant35 attempted 
to achieve this with his synthetic a priori truth, involving a transcendental deduction, that every 
event is determined by a cause so long as it is related to the empirical world of phenomena. In 
more recent times the search has turned to the use of practical reason rather than pure reason. 
The acquisition of knowledge is still considered to be a good, not in itself but as knowledge of 
human action. Reason is used to establish belief rather than pure truth and is shaped by the 
evidential nature of empirical facts36. As Nozick37 states this is a fusion of concepts allowing a 
priori knowledge to be supported by evidential facts. Modern day philosophical rationality then 
                                                 
31 See Simpson J.A, Weiner E.S.C., (Prepared), The Oxford English Dictionary Vol.XIII, 2nd Ed., Clarendon Press, 
1989 at 220 for a multifaceted definition. 
32 Cottingham J., Rationalism, Thoemmes Press, 1984 at 2. 
33 Ibid. at 7; see e.g.  the philosophical stance of René Descartes collected together in Haldane E.S., Ross G.T.R., 
The Philosophical Works of Descartes, CUP, 1911. 
34 See e.g. Hume D., (Selby-Bigge L.A. (Ed.)), A Treatise of Human Nature, 3rd Ed., OUP, 1975. 
35 Kant I., (Kemp Smith N. (Ed.)), The Critique of Pure Reason, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1929. 
36 Nozick R., The Nature of Rationality, Princeton University Press, 1993 at 112. 
37 Ibid. at 108. 
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looks at practical reasons for human action. This has allowed philosophers to develop rational 
principles from human action38. 
 
b. Sociological Rationality 
Rationality as advanced in sociology has its origins in the works of Max Weber. It is unfortunate, 
however, that Weber’s thoughts are complex, dense and at times appear to be contradictory. 
Brubaker39 identifies Weber’s social thought on rationality as a relational concept where a thing 
can only be rational from a certain point of view and this thing cannot contain inherent 
rationality. Rationality as a relational notion is then applied to an analysis of social structure. 
Thus formal rationality is a matter of fact referring primarily to the calculability of means and 
procedures. The action of calculation requires facts to be without contradiction to avoid the 
possibility of an irrational situation. Substantive rationality on the other hand is a matter of value 
referring principally to the worth of ends or results40. As this concept is value-laden, substantive 
rationality must be underpinned by morality. 
 
In Economy and Society41 Weber suggests that human social action may be orientated in four 
ways42. The first is ‘instrumental rationality’ determined by expectations as to the behaviour of 
objects and other humans and used as conditions for the attainment of an individual’s rationally 
pursued and calculated ends. This then is action guiding and can be connected to but not 
incorporate formal rationality43. The second is ‘value-rationality’ determined by a conscious 
belief in an absolute value and its implementation independently of the prospects for its 
                                                 
38 See Gewirth A., Reason and Morality, University of Chicago Press, 1978. 
39 Brubaker R., The Limits of Rationality, George Allen and Unwin, 1984 at 35. 
40 Ibid. at 36. 
41 Weber M., (Roth G., Wittich C., (Eds.)), Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, University 
of California Press, 1968 at 24. 
42 See Elster J., “Rationality, Economy, and Society” in Turner S. (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Max Weber, 
CUP, 2000, 21 at 31. 
43 Weber equated legal legitimacy with this concept of formal rationality in Op. Cit. n.41 at 34 but this has been 
criticised by Grafstein R., “The Failure of Weber's Conception of Legitimacy: Its Causes and Implications”, (1981) 
43 The Journal of Politics 456 at 467. 
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successful realisation. As with substantive rationality, value rationality is value-laden and is thus 
imbued with moral concerns. The third is ‘affectual orientation’ determined by an individual’s 
specific effects and states of feeling, and fourth is ‘traditional orientation’ determined by 
ingrained habituation. These latter two orientations are not considered rational as they lie on the 
borderline, often on the wrong side, of meaningfully orientated action44. So from Weber’s ideas 
on rationality we can identify three specific types: formal; instrumental; and, substantive 
(equating this with value rationality). Other sociologists have attempted to add other kinds45 but 
Weber’s three rationalities remain dominant. 
 
c. Legal Rationality 
As already observed, law can be considered to be “the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to 
the governance of rules”46 or “the human attempt to establish social order as a way of regulating 
and managing human conflict”47. As such it deals with human action and human social action. 
Nozick48 states that “to term something rational is to make an evaluation; its reasons are good 
ones (of a certain sort), and it meets the standards (of a certain sort) that it should meet”. Law is 
built on judgment rather than chance49 and thus the evaluation of the legal enterprise must be 
grounded by practical reason50. Academic writers, with the supposed advent of a political, and 
thus legal, legitimation crisis51 across the western world, have begun to explore rationality52. An 
                                                 
44 Op. Cit. n.41 at 25. 
45 See e.g. Habermas J., Communication and the Evolution of Society, Heineman Educational, 1979; The Theory of 
Communicative Action Volume One, Polity Press, 1984 in which Habermas identifies perceived gaps left by Weber 
and attempts to fill them in by developing the concept of communicative rationality from human communicative 
action. Although an attractive theory, cogently argued, it is submitted that this simply takes elements of formal and 
substantive rationality to apply them to an ideal speech situation. 
46 Fuller L.L., The Morality of Law, Yale University Press, 1969 at 96. 
47 Beyleveld D., Brownsword R., Law as a Moral Judgment, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986 at 2. 
48 Op. Cit. n.36 at 98. 
49 Brownsword R., Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-First Century, Butterworths, 2000 (henceforth CL) at 209. 
50 See Toddington S., Rationality, Social Action and Moral Judgment, Edinburgh University Press, 1993, chapter 6 
in which he confirms the claim of John Finnis (Finnis J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, Clarendon Press, 1980, 
chapters 1 & 2) that the practically reasonable point of view is the required viewpoint for social science. He goes on 
to agree with Finnis that this practically reasonable point of view can be shown to be a moral point of view but 
dismisses, it is submitted correctly, Finnis’ attempts to do so. 
51 Habermas J., Legitimation Crisis, Heineman, 1976. 
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important participant in the debate is Professor Roger Brownsword53 with his use of rationality 
as an instrument of analysis of contract law under the heads of formal, instrumental and 
substantive54 rationality that represent “the standards that we judge that [the law] should meet 
and the reasons that we count as good ones”55, where the “we” is society in general56. 
 
The practical application of legal rationality could be considered to be somewhat vague and 
uncertain57. Irrationality in English law is one of the grounds for judicial review in administrative 
law and is often used interchangeably with unreasonableness, although it is only one aspect of 
unreasonableness. In the GCHQ58 case an irrational decision was one “so outrageous in its 
defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his 
mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it”. In ex parte Smith59 it was held to be 
one which was “beyond the range of responses open to a reasonable decision-maker”. From 
these two judgments we can glean that irrationality involves the lack of logic, reason, and 
comprehensible justification for a decision made by a body with legislative powers that operates 
on the human social order.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
52 Weber considered rationality of law but only approached this from the position of formal rationality – see Op. Cit. 
n.41 at 656. 
53 Op. Cit. n.49 ch.9; Brownsword R., “Towards a Rational Law of Contract” in Wilhelmson T. (Ed.), Perspectives 
of Critical Contract Law, Dartmouth, 1993 at 241; Adams J., Brownsword R., Key Issues in Contract, Butterworths, 
1995, ch.10 (henceforth TRLC and KIC respectively). 
54 See Teubner G. “Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law” (1983) 17 Law & Society Review 239 at 
252 where he proffers the alternative labels of internal, system and norm rationality. 
55 Op. Cit. n.49 at 209. 
56 See Gardner J., Macklem T., “Reasons”, in Coleman J., Shapiro S., (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, OUP, 2002 at 440 who have questioned the existence of legal rationality as a 
separate concept. Their position, however, originates firmly within the area of philosophical rationality, considering 
the broad view of providing reasons in a narrow context that is grounded within empiricism. 
57 See e.g. Collins H., Regulating Contracts, OUP, 1999, ch.6 entitled “Rationality of Contractual Behaviour” in 
which no definition or explanation of the term ‘rationality’ is provided. 
58 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at 410 per Lord Diplock. 
59 R v. Ministry of Defence ex parte Smith [1996] 1 All ER 257 at 263 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 
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In the USA there is a constitutional doctrine that legislative action must be rationally related to 
the accomplishment of some legitimate state purpose60. As Sunstein61 notes this only expressly 
prohibits the exercise of raw political power, as the review does not attempt to establish a 
separate category of impermissible government ends. However, some justification of legislative 
action is required that must be of some public value. Sunstein62 identifies that a public value 
justifying the exercise of government power “acts as a check on the danger of factional tyranny” 
and “that the role of government is not to implement or trade off pre-existing private interests, 
but to select public values”. Once again rationality would appear to require the justification of a 
legislative political decision based on some value-laden societal norm. 
 
The EU has been slow to elaborate a deliberately labelled concept of rationality63. Article 253EC 
requires Community acts to “state the reasons on which they are based”. Article 230EC allows 
the ECJ to review the legality of legislative acts with paragraph 2 containing the grounds for 
review. These include infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the 
EC Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of power. Again a concept 
of legal rationality could be constructed that requires legislative political action to be justified by 
reasons64 with correct procedural fairness, under the rule of law and without the abuse of power. 
General principles of EC law are also applied by the Court and can be considered to provide an 
equivalent of the societal moral norm apparent in both English and US review. 
1. Formal Rationality 
Formal rationality states the requirement that legal doctrine must be free from contradiction and 
that the rules should be the same for everyone. At first blush this would appear to repeat a 
                                                 
60 Bennett R.W., “”Mere” rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory”, (1979) 67 
California Law Review 1029. 
61 Sunstein C.R., “Naked Preferences and the Constitution”, (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 1689 at 1697. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Op. Cit. n.14, COM(2000) 757 final, para.3.4.2, in which the concept of rationality is equated with transparency. 
64 Joined Cases C-71, 155 & 271/95 Belgium v. Commission [1997] ECR I-687, para.53, “It must show clearly and 
unequivocally the reasoning of the institution which adopted the measure so as to inform the persons concerned of 
the justification of the measure adopted…”. 
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traditional view of legal scholarship in which laws should be interpreted consistently and the 
irreconcilable avoided, provided laws apply to all. However, elevating boundaries between 
different legal disciplines (e.g. between rules in EU and international law or criminal and civil 
law) will not satisfy the requirements of formal rationality as the two legal positions may 
contradict one another. Furthermore, tension between two principles may not be contradictory 
where they complement decision making rather than contradict it. Thus a principle, for example, 
that stated that TCNs must not be discriminated against on the basis of their nationality would 
contradict a principle that TCNs, because of their nationality, were not included within the scope 
of the EC Treaty. However, if the second principle provided that discrimination provisions 
would only apply when the rights of free movement were invoked then this would simply create 
tension between the two principles rather than contradictions. 
 
Formal irrationality then may arise in one of three ways65. First, doctrinal positions from outside 
Community law may contradict those within. Second, different doctrines within European law 
may be contradictory. Third, situations within an area of EU law may be inconsistent. 
2. Instrumental Rationality 
Instrumental rationality can be sub-divided into two types, generic and specific. Generic 
instrumental rationality requires legal doctrine to be capable of guiding action and so, as Fuller 
observes, certain minimum principles must be presupposed66. This so-called “inner morality of 
law” is made up of legal rules that should be general, promulgated, prospective, clear, non-
contradictory, and relatively constant. They should not require the impossible and there should 
be congruence between the law as officially declared and the law as administered. The Fullerian 
principles can be categorised as procedural matters as they are not underpinned by a moral 
conception and can be equated with the concept of the rule of law67. Brownsword and 
                                                 
65 Op. Cit. n.49 at 211. 
66 Op. Cit. n.46 at 39. 
67 See Hayek F.A., The Road to Serfdom, London, 1944 at 54. 
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Beyleveld68, Allan69, Simmonds70, Boyle71 and Murphy72 have attempted to construct a 
substantive conception of the rule of law, with Fuller’s procedural requirements infused with 
moral values, a position Fuller himself advocated. It is submitted that moral values may be 
sufficient but not necessary requirements for instrumental rationality, for which instrumentality 
is the key73. As legal rationality requires all three elements for justification of legislative action, 
the moral issues can be analysed under the substantive element of rationality thereby removing 
controversy and confusion74 from the debate on the rule of law. 
 
It must be noted that the principle of non-contradiction plays an important role in instrumental 
rationality, as well as being the basis of formal rationality, when it is set alongside the principles 
of clarity, constancy and promulgation. Furthermore the distinction between contradiction and 
tension observed in formal rationality is of no importance in instrumental rationality as a legal 
matter will be clear or unclear without considering why the problem exists. 
 
Generic instrumental rationality is a necessary, if not always sufficient, condition of action-
guidance and is complemented by specific instrumental rationality. Legal intervention, either by 
legislation or by the judiciary, must display an informed and competent attempt at promoting 
given ends. Legislative officials must consider which legal technique, or combination of 
techniques, would be most effective to achieve the task. Furthermore if the legal act is intended 
to facilitate then it should do so, if it is intended to provide protection then it should protect. 
                                                 
68 Op. Cit. n.47 at 314. 
69 Allan T.R.S., Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law, OUP, 2001. 
70 Simmonds N.E., Central Issues in Jurisprudence, 2nd Ed., London, 2002 and “Straightforwardly False: The 
Collapse of Kramer’s Positivism”, (2004) 63 CLJ 98. 
71 Boyle J., “Legal Realism and the Social Contract: Fuller’s Public Jurisprudence of Form, Private Jurisprudence of 
Substance”, (1993) 78 Cornell Law Review 371. 
72 Murphy C., “Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law”, (2005) 24 Law & Philosophy 239. 
73 For an interesting academic discussion on whether the rule of law is infused with morality see the debate between 
Simmonds, Op. Cit. n.70, who argues for the infusion, and Kramer M.H., In Defense of Legal Positivism, OUP, 
1999 and Kramer M.H., “On the Moral Status of the Rule of Law”, (2004) 63 CLJ 65 who argues against. For the 
purposes of this thesis the question of the moral underpinning of the rule of law is negated by the necessary 
requirement of substantive legal rationality. 
74 See Lord Bingham, “The Rule of Law”, (2007) 66 CLJ 67 at 75 who includes the protection of fundamental 
human rights in his list of elements for the rule of law. 
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Finally, the judiciary will employ different ideologies, based on personal or normative beliefs, 
when interpreting legal instruments. 
3. Substantive Rationality 
Substantive rationality requires that all rules of law should be based on good reasons. It is here 
that we encounter again the ideas of practical reason. First, there is a requirement that the 
empirical facts sustaining particular legal doctrines should be plausible. Second, and moving 
beyond empirical plausibility, the principle underpinning the doctrine must itself be defensible as 
legitimate. However, this requirement that the substance of legal doctrine should be justified or 
legitimate can be interpreted in at least three ways75. First, law may be substantively rational if 
its norms are by and large accepted as justified and legitimate. Problems occur if legal norms are 
not considered legitimate and so either have to be amended or public perception adjusted. Law 
may certainly be used to mould public opinion over time but it is extremely difficult to change 
public perception swiftly, unless in an emergency situation, and thus the acceptance of the law. 
Second, law is substantively rational if norms follow the first requirement but can also be shown 
to be a consistent set. This interpretation raises the same problems as the first but even if legal 
norms are considered to be legitimate they may fail the requirement of consistency. However, 
Brownsword76 suggests that so long as this inconsistency is only noted by legal theorists then the 
law can still be effective. Third, law to be substantively rational does not depend upon 
acceptance. If, and only if, its norms form a justified and legitimate set may law display 
substantive rationality. Thus problems occur on this view when the legal norms cannot be 
coherently defended and justified, regardless of their acceptance. The interpretations involving 
acceptance include a substantial subjective element. It is submitted that if one is attempting to 
base rules of law on good reasons, the dictates of practical reason require an entirely objective 
approach. Thus the only logical meaning of substantive rationality is that of the third 
                                                 
75 Op. Cit. n.53 TRLC at 250; KIC at 338. 
76 Ibid. 
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interpretation. However, the justification of norms underlying legal doctrine is by definition 
value-laden and as such suffused with moral considerations. 
 
Three options are available to establish how the determination of the moral criterion of 
substantive rationality is to be achieved77. First, it could be left to be determined by the judiciary 
to interpret the law, without outside direction on the positions to be taken. Judges with their 
training in fairness and impartiality combined with their separation from the legislative, political 
process could be considered to be an august and ideal body of moral deliberation78. However, as 
Griffith79 has argued, the judiciary’s social and educational background combined with their age 
and awareness of their position tend to make most judges susceptible to the adoption of highly 
conservative attitudes when faced with hard cases80. Dworkin81 has answered Griffith by 
claiming that a rights culture would change the social base of the legal profession and that a 
professional judiciary steeped in such a culture would consider cases on the basis of social 
justice rather than social status quo. This is adequate as a general social observation and ideal but 
as Griffith points out the “principal function of the judiciary is to support the institutions of 
government as established by law”82 or to uphold the rule of law83. As such the principal value of 
the judiciary specifically and the legal profession in general is to “preserve and protect the 
existing order”84 thereby perpetuating the social status quo. Without some form of external moral 
guidance it is difficult to see how the judiciary could provide a socially just moral criterion for 
                                                 
77 Op. Cit. n.49 at 223. 
78 See Browne-Wilkinson, Lord, “The Infiltration of a Bill of Rights”, [1992] PL 397; Laws J., “Is the High Court 
the Guardian of Fundamental Constitutional Rights?” [1993] PL 59. 
79 Griffith J.A.G., The Politics of the Judiciary, 5th Ed., Fontana, 1997, ch.9. 
80 Cf. Dworkin R., Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, 1978, ch.4. 
81 Dworkin R., A Matter of Principle, Clarendon Press, 1985 at 28-31. 
82 Op. Cit. n.79 at 343. 
83 A constitution would provide the external moral guidelines to direct the moral guidelines for substantive 
rationality. See Mancini G.F., “Politics and the Judges – The European Perspective” (1980) 43 MLR 1 for a 
consideration of European judicial law making in the shadow of a constitution and without a practicing background, 
especially in the Italian legal system. 
84 Op. Cit. n.79 at 342. 
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substantive rationality85. The equivalent position to that being advanced here is the situation in 
the UK before the Human Rights Act 1998 (henceforth HRA) came into force with the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in ex parte Smith86 epitomising the limitations without an external moral 
guide. Dickson87 highlights a similar situation in the House of Lords since the HRA in regard to 
international human rights standards that are unincorporated in UK law. 
 
That external guidance could be provided by the second option88, the standards of fairness 
already recognised, either expressly or impliedly, in positive legal doctrine. Thus Sir John Laws 
suggests that by following common law precedent, UK judges are able to uphold fundamental 
constitutional rights without a written constitution89. A system of precedent may limit judicial 
idiosyncrasy, indeed conforming to the requirements of formal rationality by limiting 
contradictions within the law, but substantive rationality is designed to evaluate the defensibility 
of legal doctrine. Establishing that a rule or procedure through precedent is employed at a 
particular time cannot be the reason for justifying that legal doctrine - that is, doctrine cannot 
validate itself as legitimate. Furthermore the development of strict precedent, combined with the 
apparent conservative nature of the judiciary, leads to a diminution in the standards of fairness in 
recognised legal doctrine as the use of existing doctrine as the standard of legitimacy would 
curtail any proposal for reform or revision. If this were to be modified to allow some small 
improvements to existing doctrine then this suggests that there is a form of legitimacy outside the 
existing doctrine that can recognise such improvements and the need for them. 
 
                                                 
85 Op. Cit. n.65 at 30 where Dworkin appears to be suggesting such a situation with a conservative judge having to 
apply a principle of political morality if it is included in a legislative act. 
86 Op. Cit. n.81. Cf. A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68 at 129 per Lord 
Hoffman. 
87 Dickson B., “Safe in their Hands? Britain’s Law Lords and Human Rights”, (2006) 26 LS 329 at 335. 
88 Op. Cit. n.49 at 224. 
89 Op. Cit. n.78 Laws J. For a critical analysis of Laws position see Griffiths J.A.G., “The Brave New World of Sir 
John Laws”, (2000) 63 MLR 159. See also Poole T., “Questioning Common Law Constitutionalism”, (2005) 25 LS 
142. 
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The third option is to invoke the standards of fairness recognised by the community90. This 
option raises two questions. What are the ‘standards of fairness’ and within which community 
are they to be recognised? Standards of fairness require some form of definitional elucidation. It 
is submitted that as the community is an arena for human social action then this is achieved 
through philosophical analysis using practical reason. As fairness is value-laden then the 
standards envisaged must be moral values91 that are universal in nature, developed from a 
transcendental deduction, that can themselves be rationally justified and be grounded in practical 
reason. A modern neo-Kantian moral theory that answers these requirements is that advanced by 
Gewirth92. It is outside the scope of this thesis to consider his theory in depth93 but he argues 
from human action to a supreme principle of morality that he calls the Principle of Generic 
Consistency (PGC). In essence this states that on pain of contradiction of being a human being, 
every human being must act in accordance with the generic rights of other human beings as well 
as themselves, where the generic rights are freedom and well-being. As these generic rights are 
held equally by all human beings then they are human rights94. It is submitted that, even if 
Gewirth’s argument to the PGC is disputed, the moral concept that underpins the principle of 
fairness is one that is embodied by the concept of human rights. Furthermore if Gewirth's 
argument95 of a supreme principle of morality derived from human action by practical reason is 
employed then legal doctrine may be rationally justified using the PGC as the basis of human 
rights. The second question involving the determination of the community is as difficult as the 
first. Human rights are considered to be universal and so one could posit the notion that the 
community encompasses the whole of human kind. However, where legal doctrine is territorially 
delineated then it is logical to presume that the community will be likewise. Thus European 
                                                 
90 Op. Cit. n.49 at 225. 
91 See Op. Cit. n.50 where Toddington establishes that practical reason must be viewed from the moral point of view 
when used to analyse human social action. 
92 See Op. Cit. n.38. 
93 See Regis Jr. E., (Ed.), Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism: Critical Essays with a Reply by Alan Gewirth, University 
of Chicago Press, 1984; Beyleveld D., The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and Defence of Alan 
Gewirth’s Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency, University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
94 Gewirth A., The Community of Rights, University of Chicago Press, 1986, ch.1. 
95 Op. Cit. n.38. 
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Union law will be confined to the territory of the current twenty-seven Member States. External 
agreements may extend this community reach in certain defined areas such as trade and 
immigration. 
4. Reflexive Rationality 
It must be queried, following the analysis of formal, instrumental and substantive rationality, 
whether any other type of legal rationality exists. Gunther Teubner96 has argued that as there is 
scepticism over substantive rationality and a lack of desire for formal rationality then reflexive 
rationality may prevail. Reflexive rationality is used interchangeably by Teubner with procedural 
rationality97 (or justice) and according to John Rawls98 there are three types of procedural justice: 
pure; perfect; and, imperfect. Pure procedural justice goes further than the ideas of formal 
rationality that rules are the same for all, so that the rules are not obviously for or against anyone. 
This is achieved by the ideas of equality of opportunity, chance or risk. However, pure 
procedural justice is not driven by any independent conception of a just outcome. Perfect and 
imperfect procedural justice, on the other hand, are driven by the issue of outcomes. Perfect 
procedural justice deals with procedure guaranteed to generate a substantive, just outcome, and 
imperfect procedural justice with procedures that are blameworthy. A weak version of reflexive 
rationality can be equated with pure procedural justice and as there are no conceptions of 
substantively just outcomes as to the design of procedural conditions, then this topples into 
formal rationality. A strong version will be equated with the twin concepts of perfect and 
imperfect procedural justice. An independent theory of just outcomes will drive procedural 
conditions in a certain way, thus collapsing strong reflexive rationality into substantive 
rationality. As reflexive rationality attempts to chart a middle way between formal and 
substantive rationality it soon becomes apparent that it fails the very test of rationality that it 
attempts to resolve. 
                                                 
96 Op. Cit. n.54. 
97 Op. Cit. n.53 TRLC at 242. 
98 Rawls J., A Theory of Justice, 2nd Ed., OUP, 1999, ch.14. 
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5. SUMMARY OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGAL RATIONALITY 
 
Formal legal rationality requires legal principles not to contradict one another. For a legal 
principle of EU law contradictions may arise from international law, other areas of EU law and 
situations within the specific area of law. 
 
Instrumental legal rationality has two elements. Generic instrumental rationality requires the law 
to be action guiding and so legal rules should be general, promulgated, perspective, clear, non-
contradictory, relatively constant, not impossible and congruent. Specific instrumental rationality 
necessitates legislative officials to use appropriate means to achieve specific aims. Thus the legal 
instrument used must be effective, it must do what it says it is going to and individuals must act 
as objectively as possible. 
 
Both formal and instrumental legal rationality are value-neutral. 
 
Substantive legal rationality requires the norms underlying legal doctrine to be justified by 
standards of fairness recognised by the community that are embodied by the concept of human 
rights. Unlike formal and instrumental legal rationality, substantive legal rationality is value-
laden. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AND THE EVOLVING 
POLICY CONTEXT 
 
The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. The first is to provide a chronological overview of the 
development of the EU1 to ground the context of world, regional and domestic changes in the 
movement of persons. It is this historical context, and corresponding changing attitudes, 
especially at the regional level, that have shaped the EU’s policy towards TCNs. The second 
objective is to analyse these attitudes towards the movement of persons to determine the 
predominant policy considerations when dealing with TCNs. It is from this policy position that 
the legal rights of TCNs flow. Finally this chapter will attempt to position the precise scientific 
tool of legal rationality within this policy context to enable legal rationality to be a credible, 
critical tool capable of delivering useful insights. This transforms legal rationality from an 
abstract construct to a practical instrument. 
 
1. CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF FACTORS IN ATTITUDES TO FMP 
 
a. 1945 – 1973 
Europe was the principal arena of conflict during World War II and, for the second time in thirty 
years, the infrastructure of civilised society had to be reconstructed after the devastation wrought 
upon it. The traditional concepts of the labour market and family life had to be recast as many of 
                                                 
1 See Craig P, de Búrca G., EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 4th Ed., OUP, 2008, Chapter 1. 
22 
 
those killed were young men of working age, the second time in three decades that a generation 
of working men had been markedly diminished, and women had moved into the labour market 
during the war to fill the gaps. 
 
Post-war, the economic reconstruction of Europe was an immediate aim, with the founding of 
the European Economic Community (hereafter the EEC) by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. This 
turned into an economic boom through the 1960s for which the developed capitalist countries of 
north-western Europe (particularly five of the six MSs of the EEC – Germany, France, 
Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands, the sixth being Italy) necessitated an accelerating 
demand for workers. The domestic labour market of these countries, diminished already by war 
losses and the social demands for women to return to a more traditional domestic role in 
peacetime, struggled with this demand exceeding supply capacities. The attempted solution to 
this labour market imbalance was threefold operating in the short, medium and long terms. First, 
labour market inequalities were smoothed between men and women through Article 141EC (ex-
Article 119EEC) and then secondary legislation2 thereby encouraging and supporting women 
into employment3. Second, intra-European immigration was actively pursued. The need for 
increased labour in the more developed European countries saw a flow of workers within Europe 
from southern countries to those in the north-west. 
 
Third, extra-European immigration, although not as actively pursued as intra-European, was not 
discouraged. Those countries with the remnants of empire or colonies were able to exploit their 
colonial links to obtain a supply of labour with lower expectations of pay than those of domestic 
                                                 
2 Including in particular Council Directive 75/117/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the MSs relating to the 
application of the principle of equal pay for men and women, O.J. 1975 L45/19 and Council Directive 76/207/EEC 
on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, 
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, O.J. 1976 L39/40. 
3 See Ellis E., EU Anti-Discrimination Law, OUP, 2005. 
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workers4. These post-colonial immigrants moved as citizens of the country to which they were 
migrating and were able to enjoy all of the rights available to such citizens5. Other States without 
the advantage of former empires or colonies to exploit again agreed bilateral recruitment 
agreements with non-European countries. Non-colonial immigrants arrived as “guest workers”, 
which embodied the idea of temporary residential status, in order to fulfil the labour market 
demands of the time6. As soon as those conditions changed then the guest worker could be 
returned to their country of origin as determined, often arbitrarily, by the immigrant country’s 
authorities7. 
 
b. 1973 – 1985 
In the early 1970s, Europe’s economic boom turned to bust, caused principally by the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system and the OPEC oil crisis of 1973. With economic 
growth slowing down, so unemployment increased rapidly across the EEC. A corresponding 
increase occurred territorially as the six MSs became nine with the accession of the UK, Ireland 
and Denmark in 1973 and then became ten with the addition of Greece in 1981. The MSs’ 
individual response to this unemployment crisis was to tighten national immigration laws, 
especially from former colonial territories, and although limitations were imposed on primary 
immigration, secondary immigration continued through family reunification. At the EEC level 
rights of guest workers from the more popular migratory non-European countries were 
formalised Community-wide by a series of Association Agreements thereby attempting to 
socially integrate settled immigrants. Intra-European immigration from southern to northern 
                                                 
4 Thus France found a ready recruiting ground in the Maghreb countries and the Netherlands looked to Surinam and 
Indonesia. The UK, although not a member of the EEC at this point, took full advantage of its position as the former 
owner of the world’s largest empire by admitting migrants from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the former colonies 
of the Caribbean. 
5 For example, although the UK was not at this point a member of the EEC, the British Nationality Act 1948 enabled 
citizens of the British Empire to migrate to the UK. 
6 For an analysis of the guest-worker phenomenon see Castles S., “The Guest-Worker in Western Europe: An 
Obituary”, (1986) 20 IMR 761. 
7 For example the West German Aliens Law 1965, Article 2(1) stated that “A residence permit may be issued if the 
presence of the foreigner does not impair the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany”. 
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Europe was brought into the fold of EEC law with the accession of Greece in 19818 and Spain 
and Portugal in 19869, with further enlargement to fifteen MSs in 1995 with the accession of 
Finland, Austria and Sweden10. 
 
The political attitude to intra and extra-European migrants during this period was markedly 
different. European migration within the EEC was actively encouraged and supported and 
migration within Europe from non-EEC countries in Western Europe that aspired to EEC 
membership was tolerated as a pan-European duty towards fellow Europeans leading to these 
States acceding to the EEC. Extra-European migration, however, was accepted as an economic 
necessity during periods of economic reconstruction, regeneration and subsequent boom but 
resisted in times of recession or economic slowdown. The political perspective was that these 
guest workers were of purely economic value – economic objects rather than human beings. 
However this clashed with the emerging rights based politics. Thus throughout this period 
immigration and rights of TCNs remained firmly within the domain of national law, subject to 
international human rights standards, in particular the European Convention on Human Rights 
(hereafter ECHR). However, rights of certain TCNs were brought within EEC competence by a 
series of Association Agreements with non-EEC countries (see Chapter VII of this thesis). Thus 
immigration remained within domestic legal competence but the EEC attempted to harmonise 
some rights for TCNs when they became residents within the EEC. 
 
c. 1985 – 1997 
After the economic downturn in the 1970s the Community in the 1980s appeared to be 
stagnating, the legislative processes moribund. The establishment of the common market during 
a transitional period of twelve years (i.e. by 1969) as required by Article 8(1)EEC failed to 
                                                 
8 O.J. 1979 L291. 
9 O.J. 1985 L302. 
10 O.J. 1994 C241. 
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materialise. As a result of the “Luxembourg Compromise” of 196611, legislation, required to 
implement the common market, continued to need unanimous approval of the members of the 
Council under ex-Article 100EEC (now Article 94EC). Decisions that proved too difficult 
politically to register such unanimous approval were often shunted up to the unofficial European 
Council of Heads of State or Government where they could be diluted to the lowest common 
denominator. This was driven by the economic recession and the historical response to such a 
situation of national protectionism12 along with the traditional view of international politics. The 
Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 introduced a new concept of the internal market13 alongside 
the idea of the common market that was to be established by 1992. The British Commissioner, 
Lord Cockfield, had put forward a White Paper14 in 1985 that had set out a precise timetable for 
the completion of the internal market in the timescale. To enable this to be achieved Article 
95EC (ex-Article 100aEC) was introduced that allowed the use of Qualified Majority Voting 
(henceforth QMV) when adopting internal market measures. 
 
Coupled with the concept of a common market was the free movement of persons between MSs. 
Different views developed between two blocs of MSs in the early 1980s. The UK and Ireland, 
with support from the continent in the form of Denmark, believed that free movement should be 
the preserve of nationals of MSs. As such immigration control should remain at the borders of 
each MS. In contrast, continental countries, boosted by the accession of Spain and Portugal to 
the Community in 1986, favoured the removal of all border controls between MSs. Immigration 
control would then move to the external frontiers of the Community with random internal checks 
                                                 
11 A crisis had erupted in 1965, instigated by General de Gaulle, the French president, over Commission proposals 
for self-financing agricultural levies. It coincided with the automatic implementation of the transitional provisions of 
the Treaty to qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council from unanimity. After a period of time in which the 
French refused to sit in the Council (the “empty-chair” policy) a compromise solution was reached that allowed a 
MS to plead ‘very important interests’. In effect this was treated as a veto and so the status quo of unanimous voting 
in Council was maintained. 
12 Shaw J., Law of the European Union, 3rd Ed., Palgrave, 2000 at 52. 
13 See Chapter III of this thesis for detailed analysis. 
14 “Completing the Internal Market”, COM(85) 310. 
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on people by the immigration authorities within Community territory. To achieve this, identity 
cards were required as had been in operation on the continent but not within the island States. It 
was clear that a Community solution to this problem would not be forthcoming and so an 
intergovernmental route was chosen, outside the Community institutional structures, leading to 
the 1985 Schengen Agreement (henceforth Schengen), coinciding with Lord Cockfield’s White 
Paper that led to the SEA. The juxtaposition of Schengen and the White Paper emphasised the 
intergovernmental nature of the project, although the Commission was granted observer status at 
meetings. Schengen set out a very general agenda for the liberalisation and eventual abolition of 
internal frontier controls between the signatory States of France, Germany and the Benelux 
countries15. After Schengen was concluded the Contracting States created four working groups 
of experts on police and security, free movement of persons, transport and checks on goods16, 
which led to the Schengen Implementing Convention17 (hereafter the SIC) of 1990 providing the 
flesh on the Schengen bones. Its objective was to regulate TCNs who were economic migrants, 
asylum seekers or refugees. 
 
Since the inception of the EEC the ability to migrate had accelerated through a revolution in 
transport and communications that led to globalisation. Air transport18 had taken off both in the 
ability to transport large numbers of people (especially with the introduction of wide-bodied 
passenger aircraft such as the Boeing 747) at great speeds (e.g. Concorde) between an ever-
expanding number of airports. The introduction of satellite communications allowed all parts of 
the world’s surface to have instantaneous communications, whether by telephone, television or 
eventually computer. The good life in the western world could be presented to any potential 
                                                 
15 O.J. 2000 L239/13. Italy signed in 1990 (O.J. 2000 L239/63), followed by Spain (O.J. 2000 L239/63) and 
Portugal (O.J. 2000 L239/76) in 1991 and Greece in 1992 (O.J. 2000 L239/83).  
16 Schutte J.J.E., “Schengen: Its Meaning for the Free Movement of Persons in Europe”, (1991) 28 CMLRev 549 at 
550. 
17 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 15 June 1985, O.J.2000 L239/19. 
18 The first passenger jet aircraft flight took place on 2 May 1952 when a de Havilland Comet flew from London to 
Johannesburg – see The Times, 3 May 2002 at 4.  
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migrant in an instant and over a sustained period of time. Not least amongst this communication 
revolution was the exportation of the western lifestyle in films, books, magazines, television and 
advertising images. 
 
A momentous development in both global and European politics began in November 1989 with 
the dismantling of the Berlin Wall. The resulting unravelling of the Warsaw Pact, the 
reclamation of democracy by the former Soviet satellite States and the reformation of Russia 
from the ruins of the USSR led to a major shift in the dynamics of the Community’s external 
relationships. Germany, one half of the Franco-German engine of the European project, turned 
its attentions inwards with East Germany, liberated from communist rule, reuniting with West 
Germany in October 1990. The new evolving Eastern democracies looked to the Community for 
their models and so a strong dialogue was initiated between Brussels and Eastern European 
capitals. 
 
The process of the completion of the internal market initiated by the SEA proved to be extremely 
successful with 218 of the 282 proposals in the White Paper being adopted by February 1992. In 
1984 the European Parliament had adopted a Decision on the Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union19 that had proposed a constitution based on a federal model. The MSs did not 
pursue this but in 1990, under a common initiative of the German and French governments and 
driven by the Delors led Commission, two intergovernmental conferences were convened to 
consider economic and monetary union (EMU), and political union. If the SEA had deepened 
and had itself been an indication of political intent by the MSs, then there was a strong political 
feeling that opportunities for even greater integration were available. This momentum towards 
supranational integration was tempered though by an increasing tendency towards protecting 
                                                 
19 O.J. 1984 C77/33. 
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national interests. The result was the Treaty on European Union (TEU) or Maastricht Treaty in 
1992. 
 
The TEU created a new legal and political organisation, that of the European Union (EU). The 
structure was constructed on three pillars. The first, consisting of the three original Communities, 
was supranational in nature. The second incorporating the old European Political Community, 
was purely intergovernmental and concerned the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
the scope of which lies outside the range of this thesis. The third pillar, brought the ad hoc 
arrangements on immigration, asylum, visas, police co-operation and TCNs into a formalised 
structure, albeit intergovernmental, under the title Co-Operation in the Fields of Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA). Thus the TEU amended and introduced new measures in pillar one, and 
formalised ad hoc areas of MS co-operation in pillars two and three. 
 
Part of the problem with the EC was the top-down decision making process that presented 
European legislation or Treaty amendments as a fait accompli to the nationals of the MSs. The 
lack of involvement of the peoples of Europe had been identified as far back as 1975 by the 
Tindemans Report20 and despite the introduction of elections to the European Parliament in 
1979, there was a political concern at the lack of involvement in European matters by the people. 
This in turn led to a growing concern over the supposed democratic deficit and lack of 
legitimacy of the European project. 
 
This was exacerbated in the intergovernmental ad hoc arrangements on asylum, immigration, 
visas and free movement of persons, the latter supposedly being one of the fundamental 
freedoms of the EC. The decision making process was considered to be inadequate, whether at 
the Schengen level where it was secret, or at the Community wide level where it was not only 
                                                 
20Tindemans Report on European Union, Towards a Europe for Citizens, Bull EC(8) 1975 II no.7/8 at 12. 
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secret but also slow, long-winded and uncertain as to the outcome. The very secretive and ad hoc 
nature of the institutions deepened the democratic deficit. The subject matter of the organisations 
and the significant lack of transparency gave rise to human rights concerns. 
  
The dialogue between Brussels and the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe began to 
develop. The Community was offered as a vision to aspire to, which many of the former 
Communist States embraced, seeking accession. For the Community this had advantages on 
several fronts. Economically the opportunities for trade through enlargement to the east, the 
expansion of the internal market and the potential size of these new markets were attractive. 
Furthermore by enlarging to the east, the external frontiers of the Community could be 
established further from the Community heartland. However, it was feared that the attraction of 
the western countries, in which the gross domestic product and the potential wage earning power 
of employees was considerably greater than that in the CEECs, could see large population 
migrations through the use of the fundamental freedom of free movement of persons. 
 
One of the original functions of creating the EEC had been to end wars in Europe by creating a 
single economic market, thereby tying MSs’ economies together and negating the inequalities 
that fostered the possibility of military conflict. Throughout the 1990s warfare engulfed the 
newly declared nations of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). From the start the settling 
of former hatreds and scores, many centuries old, were considered by the combatants to be 
legitimate war aims. Communities divided on racial, ethnic and religious lines with “ethnic 
cleansing” and genocide returning to the European continent. Mass movement of people within 
the borders of the FRY led to refugees fleeing the war zone with the EU being the main area of 
reception. Another was Albania, a desperately poor country that was unable to cope with the 
sudden influx. As a result Albanians in ever increasing numbers, attracted by the opportunities of 
a better life in the EU, attempted to enter the Union illegally as economic migrants. 
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This influx of migrants to the Union was utilised by right wing political parties across Europe, 
especially when conjoined with crime, to exacerbate people’s fears of the outsider and unknown. 
Many of the immigrants were Muslims and the position of their religion in every day life was a 
concept few could understand with respect to Christianity, thereby leading to “islamophobia”. 
This was further inflamed by the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre building on 11 
September 2001 (hereafter 9/11). The far right began to enjoy increased popular support with 
Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party being part of the coalition government in Austria (up to 11 
September 2001), Jean Marie le Pen’s National Front contesting the final round of presidential 
elections in France and Pim Fortuyn’s List entering coalition government with the Christian 
Democrats in the Netherlands in 2002. 
 
d. 1997 – 2008 
The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997, came into force in 1999 and swiftly became 
apparent that it had failed to resolve the three critical challenges that were essential for EU 
enlargement: institutional composition, especially the size of the Commission; the Council 
weighting of votes; and, the extension of QMV in the co-decision decision-making process. 
Another IGC was convened with the Treaty of Nice being concluded in 2001 and although the 
ratification process again proved controversial, with a negative vote in the referendum in Ireland, 
it entered into force in 2003. 
 
Although there were significant political problems with both the Treaty of Amsterdam and 
Treaty of Nice, the former did change the structure of the TEU and create the opportunity to 
establish free movement rights for TCNs within the Community decision-making framework. 
The free movement provisions of Title VI TEU were moved into a new Title IV of the EC Treaty 
called “Visa, Asylum, Immigration and other Policies Related to Free Movement of Persons” 
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whilst Title VI TEU retained police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters. The objectives 
of the EU were amended from the close co-operation on justice and home affairs to the 
maintenance and development of the “Union as an area of freedom, security and justice” 
(hereafter an AFSJ). Free movement of persons was to be assured “in conjunction with 
appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the 
prevention and combating of crime”. A Protocol annexed to both the TEU and EC Treaty laid 
out the process of integrating the Schengen acquis21. The UK and Ireland had not signed or 
subsequently joined Schengen and so Article 4 of the Protocol established their opt-out from the 
acquis. A further Protocol22 ensured an opt-out for the UK and Ireland from the deconstruction 
of internal borders required by Article 14EC and a final Protocol23 enabled the UK and Ireland to 
opt-out of measures implementing Title IV. However, the two States did have the option to opt-
in if they chose and the other MSs let them24. The position of Denmark was even more complex 
than the UK and Ireland and was set out in Article 3 of the Schengen Protocol and another 
Protocol25 that explained Denmark’s position vis-à-vis Title IV and any implementing 
legislation. 
 
The political concerns over the treatment of TCNs were discussed at the meeting of the European 
Council at Tampere in October 1999. In the Presidency Conclusions26 it was declared that 
European integration was to be underpinned by the common values of “freedom based on human 
rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law” that had proven “necessary for securing peace 
and developing prosperity in the European Union” and would “serve as a cornerstone for the 
                                                 
21 See Protocol Integrating the Schengen acquis into the Framework of the European Union, attached to the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. The acquis is defined in the annex to the Protocol as the Schengen Agreement, the Schengen 
Implementing Convention, the Accession Protocols and Agreements to the Schengen Agreement and the Decisions 
and Declarations of the Schengen Executive Committee. These have now been published in O.J. 2000 L239. 
22 Protocol on the Application of Certain Aspects of Article 14EC to the UK and Ireland. 
23 Protocol on the Position of the UK and Ireland. 
24 See Chapter V for a more detailed analysis. 
25 Protocol on the Position of Denmark. 
26 Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, SN 200/99. 
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enlarging Union”27. This freedom, that included the right to move freely throughout the Union, 
was not to be regarded as the exclusive preserve of the Union’s own citizens and that it “would 
be in contradiction with Europe’s traditions to deny such freedom to those whose circumstances 
lead them justifiably to seek access to our territory”28. To this end a common approach had to be 
developed to ensure the integration into the MSs’ societies of TCNs lawfully resident in the 
Union. Further on in the Tampere Conclusions a section was dedicated to the fair treatment of 
TCNs. The EU had to “ensure fair treatment of TCNs who reside legally on the territory of its 
MSs” through a “more vigorous integration policy” with the aim of “granting them rights and 
obligations comparable to those of EU citizens”29. Furthermore, “[t]he legal status of TCNs 
should be approximated to that of MSs’ nationals” and a set of uniform rights granted for those 
who have resided in a MS for a specified time period whilst holding a long-term residence 
permit. Finally the European Council supported the ability of a long-term TCN being able to 
obtain nationality of that MS by naturalisation30. 
 
The Tampere Conclusions31 drew a link between the AFSJ and the drawing up of a Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. The Cologne European Council meeting in June 1999 had decided32 to 
establish a body to consider the drafting of a Charter of Fundamental Rights, the composition33 
of which was agreed at Tampere four months later. The body, that renamed itself the 
Convention, was a new type of institutional structure that was constituted with delegates from 
national parliaments, the European Parliament, the executive of MSs and the Commission whilst 
being observed by representatives from the ECJ and the Council of Europe, including the 
                                                 
27 Ibid. at 1, para.1. 
28 Ibid. at 1, para.3. 
29 Ibid. at 5, para.18. 
30 Ibid. at 5, para.21. 
31 Ibid. Recital 4. 
32 Conclusions of the European Council in Cologne, 3 and 4 June 1999, Annex IV.   
33 Op. Cit. n.24, Annex. 
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European Court of Human Rights (henceforth ECtHR). At the Nice IGC on 7 December 200034 
the European Parliament, Council and Commission were able to “solemnly proclaim” the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (henceforth the Charter). As the Charter is 
only “solemnly proclaimed” it is not legally binding and cannot be used as the basis for legal 
action, although as its objectives are the consolidation of existing rights into one document and 
the creation of a visible Charter that can be relevant to the individual35 then it could be used to 
back up and provide evidence for legal argument36. The ECJ has recently found a right to be 
“enshrined”37 in the Charter and neither the ECJ nor the CFI have mentioned the legally non-
binding nature of the Charter. 
 
A Declaration38 was also annexed to the Treaty of Nice providing that an IGC would be held in 
2004 to discuss the future of Europe with a debate preceding the IGC to be held across Europe 
on key issues. These key issues included: the limits of power of the EU and MSs; the status of 
the Charter; simplification of the Treaties; and, the role of national Parliaments in the 
institutional structure of the EU. This was an open admission by the MSs that the Treaties of 
Amsterdam and Nice had failed to achieve the necessary reforms required for the governance of 
the EU in the twenty-first Century with a considerably greater number of MSs than the original 
six for which the institutional structure had been designed. Furthermore the IGC structure had 
contributed to this problem and the call for a Europe-wide debate reflected this. 
 
                                                 
34 O.J. 2000 C364/1. 
35 Ibid. in the Preamble. 
36 A position supported by the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-173/99 Broadcasting, 
Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (BECTU) [2001] 
ECR I-4881 at paras.26-27 and the Court of First Instance (CFI) in Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v. 
Commission [2002] ECR II-2365 at para.42. 
37 Case C-491/01 R. v. Secretary of State for Health ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd. & Others 
[2002] ECR I-11453 at para.144. 
38 Declaration 23 on the Future of Europe. 
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Therefore a model was required for the debate that the Declaration had suggested would take 
place before the IGC and the Convention model used for the drafting of the Charter appeared to 
be inclusive, efficient, successful and reasonably democratic as it met in open session, decided 
matters by consensus rather than voting and received considerable representations from civil 
society. The European Council meeting in December 2001 produced the Laeken Declaration on 
the Future of Europe39 that outlined the composition and the forum for the Convention on the 
Future of Europe, modelled on the Charter Convention. It also expanded on the key issues for 
debate in the Convention to include enlargement, democracy, globalisation and the expectations 
of Europe’s Citizens. The resulting Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed in 
Rome on 29 October 200440, before commencing the ratification process according to the MSs’ 
domestic process. In May 2005 a referendum held in France rejected the Constitution, as did the 
Dutch people in a referendum a few days later in June 2005. 
 
The necessity of a revised Treaty was further evident in 2004 with the accession to the EU41 of 
ten new MSs42, many of which were the old Eastern and Central European States that had thrown 
off the shackles of communism and embraced democracy in the 1990s. A further enlargement to 
twenty-seven MSs occurred on 1 January 2007 with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania43. 
The decision-making process and institutional structure, already cumbersome with fifteen MSs, 
was likely to become even more so with twenty-seven MSs as was the possibility of institutional 
inertia leading to legislative stagnation. The concerns of the old MSs over the free movement of 
persons from the accession countries led to limitations being placed on free movement during the 
seven years of the transition arrangements for the new MSs. 
 
                                                 
39 Laeken Declaration on the Future of Europe, SN 300/1/01. 
40 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, O.J. 2004 C310/1. 
41 O.J. 2004 L236. 
42 The Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta. 
43 O.J. 2005 L157. 
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The development of the AFSJ and EU policy towards asylum and immigration, that appeared to 
conflate the two concepts, meant that six years after the Tampere European Council Conclusions 
the Hague Programme was agreed by the European Council44 with similar objectives and topics 
to those of the Tampere Conclusions. However, the common values of the Tampere Conclusions 
encountered a marked shift in emphasis in the Hague Programme. The cornerstone of the Union 
of “freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law” was not now a 
cornerstone of the Union in the Hague Programme45, as the starting point now was for the AFSJ 
to respond “to a central concern of the peoples of the States brought together in the Union”. This 
central concern was then spelt out as security, replacing the accent on freedom in the Tampere 
Conclusions. It could be considered that this high priority on security is understandable with the 
increased terrorist threat following 9/11, the Madrid train bombings on 11 March 2004 and the 
London attacks of 7 July 2005, but the shift is noted with concern by the House of Lords46. 
Security47 means that the citizens of Europe expect the Union, “while guaranteeing respect for 
fundamental freedoms and rights, to take a more effective, joint approach to cross border 
problems”, such as illegal migration, human trafficking, terrorism and organised crime48, with 
the internal dimension linked to the external. In the Tampere Conclusions the rule of law 
appeared in the first paragraph and was linked to the idea of freedom whilst in the Hague 
Programme, the rule of law was relegated to paragraph 949 and was linked to security with the 
AFSJ being “vital to securing safe communities, mutual trust and the rule of law throughout the 
Union”. 
                                                 
44 The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, O.J. 2005 C53/1. 
See Elsen C., “From Maastricht to The Hague: The Politics of Judicial and Police Cooperation”, (2007) 8 ERA 
Forum 13. 
45 Balzacq T., Carrera S., “The Hague Programme: The Long Road to Freedom, Security and Justice”, in Balzacq T., 
Carrera S., (Eds.), Security Versus Freedom? A Challenge for Europe’s Future, Ashgate, 2006, 1 at 5. 
46 House of Lords EU Committee 10th Report of Session 2004-2005, The Hague Programme: A Five Year Agenda 
for EU Justice and Home Affairs, HMSO, 2005 at 11. 
47 Op. Cit. n.37 at 1, para.4 
48 Pratt A.N., “Human Trafficking: The Nadir of an Unholy Trinity”, (2007) 13 European Security 55 amalgamates 
these four elements into three in what he describes as a very “unholy trinity” – terrorism, corruption and 
international organised crime. 
49 Op. Cit. n.37 at 2. 
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After the blow of the rejection of the Constitution by the peoples of France and Holland, the 
German Council presidency put forward a report50 in June 2007 setting forward proposals for a 
more traditional Reform Treaty that would merely reform and maintain the Treaties, rather than 
replace them all. The Presidency Conclusions of the European Council meeting in June 200751 
approved the German proposal, considered that the time for reflection was over after the 
rejection of the Constitution and decided to convene a new IGC by the end of July 2007 to 
debate the Reform Treaty so that it would be ready for signature at the end of 200752. The 
resulting Lisbon Treaty53 does not replace the former Treaties but, instead, reforms them. Many 
of the changes envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty are carried over into the Lisbon Treaty, 
especially with much of Title VI TEU being transferred into communitarianist legal process, 
although the more emblematic issues have been removed (e.g. no mention of a flag, motto, 
anthem or holiday). As such this thesis will discuss the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty where 
they are relevant. 
 
The latest development in concerning immigration and asylum is the French Presidency’s 
initiative in the latter half of 2008 to create the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum54, 
adopted at the Brussels European Council meeting55 in October 2008 as a prelude to the third 
programme for the AFSJ after Tampere and the Hague. The document is a noticeably strong 
statement on the management of migration flows with five basic commitments56 centred on: 
legal migration based on integration of migrants; illegal migration based on the removal of 
illegal immigrants; effective border controls; construction of a Europe of asylum; and, 
                                                 
50 Council Document 10659/07. 
51 Council Document 11177/1/07. 
52 Ibid. at 2, paras.8-11. 
53 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
[2007] O.J. C306/1. 
54 Council Document 13440/08. 
55 Council Document 14368/08 at 8. 
56 Op. Cit. n.54 at 4. 
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partnerships with third countries to “encourage the synergy between migration and 
development”57. Like the Hague Programme before, there is much spoken about security but 
little freedom or justice. 
 
2. UNDERLYING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS TOWARDS TCNs 
 
The immediate conclusion that can be taken from this historical analysis is that the underlying 
policy towards TCNs is highly complex and secondly that it has changed over time. Furthermore 
the factors that feed into this policy matrix are not controlled solely by the European Union but 
can be dictated by global, regional and national events and indeed an individual’s actions. Policy 
formation when dealing with TCNs must manage two concerns: the movement of TCNs into the 
EU from a third country (the migration issue); and, the position of TCNs once they have entered 
the EU (the rights issue). A further complication arises over the fact that the EU is not a State, 
although it is acting with State-like qualities when it is conducting policy towards TCNs. 
Furthermore, the fractured nature58 of TCN policy within the AFSJ with the opt-outs of the UK 
and Ireland, and the difficult position of Denmark, adds an additional layer of difficulty to policy 
formation. As such a mere critical analysis of migration policy formation at the State level59 does 
not consider all the factors that have to be taken into account when dealing with TCNs at a 
supranational level, although some elements will be consistent. It is suggested that the following 
factors are involved in policy formation towards the treatment of TCNs. 
 
a. Legal 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 See Curtin D., “The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces”, (1993) 30 CMLRev 17. 
59 For example Castles S., “Why Migration Policies Fail”, (2004) 2 ERS 205 and Castles S., “The Factors that Make 
and Unmake Migration Policies”, (2004) 38 IMR 852. 
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The legal position for TCNs is highly complex, involving the interaction of international, 
regional and national questions. At the international level, the legal question that is central to the 
position of TCNs is whether there is a general right to free movement for individuals or not. The 
question of ‘open borders’60 has become a much debated issue in recent years with 
philosophical61, historical62, ethical63, including human rights64, and economic65 arguments 
deployed for the right to free movement of persons across borders. Indeed freedom of movement 
has been described as “the first and most fundamental of man’s liberties”66. However, the legal 
position is clear and at odds with the pro-open borders position. Article 13(2) of the Universal 
                                                 
60 See Pécoud A., de Guchteniere P., (Eds.), Migration Without Borders: Essays on the Free Movement of People, 
UNESCO Publishing/Berghahn Books, 2007 for a recent comprehensive collection on this subject. See also Johnson 
K.R., “Open Borders?” (2003) 51 UCLA L. Rev. 193. 
61 See in particular Carens J.H., “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders”, (1987) 49 Review of Politics 
250, Carens J.H.,  “Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective” in Barry B., Goodin R.E., (Eds.), 
Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the transnational Migration of People and of Money, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1992, 25, Carens J.H., “Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of Migration”, (1996) 30 IMR 156, Carens 
J.H., Culture, Citizenship and Community, OUP, 2000, Carens J.H., “Who  Should Get In? The Ethics of 
Immigration Admissions”, (2003) 17 Ethics & International Affairs 95 who has argued consistently for open borders 
from a liberal egalitarian perspective that considers the interests of individuals prior to community or society. An 
alternative argument where the interests of the community are considered prior to those of individuals and thus 
supporting closed borders was put forward by Walzer M., Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality, 
Basic Books, 1983 and more recently by Meilaender P.C., Toward a Theory of Immigration, Palgrave, 2001. 
62 Nafzinger J.A.R., “The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law”, (1983) 77 AJIL 804. 
63 See Weiner M., “Ethics, National Sovereignty and the Control of Immigration”, (1996) 30 IMR 171, Hayter T., 
Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls, Pluto Press, 2000, Juss S.S. International Migration and 
Global Justice, Ashgate, 2006 and Ugur M., “The Ethics, Economics and Governance of Free Movement” in Op. 
Cit. n.56 at 65. For a review of Seglow J., “The Ethics of Immigration”, (2005) 3 Political Studies Review 317. 
64 See Juss S.S., “Free Movement and the World Order”, (2004) 16 IJRL 289, Pécoud A., de Guchteniere P., 
“International Migration, Border Controls and Human Rights: Assessing the Relevance of a Right to Mobility”, 
(2006) 21 Journal of Borderlands Studies 69 and Nett R., “The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of 
Free Movement of People on the Face of the Earth”, (1971) 81 Ethics 212. 
65 See Hamilton B., Whalley J., “Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Global Restrictions on Labour 
Mobility: Calculations of Policy Implications”, (1984) 14 Journal of Development Economics 61 who calculated 
estimated worldwide efficiency gains ranging from $4.7 trillion to $16 trillion (worldwide GNP at that time was 
$7.82 trillion). This study has recently been reworked using updated figures by Moses W.J., Letnes B., “If People 
were Money: Estimating the Gains and Scope of Free Movement” in Borjas G.J., Crisp J., (Eds.), Poverty, 
International Migration and Asylum, Palgrave, 2005, 188 and Moses W.J., Letnes B., “The Economic Costs to 
International Labor Restrictions: Revisiting the Empirical Discussion”, (2004) 32 World Development 1609 who 
come to a figure of $34.08 trillion. A similar position has been suggested by other economists – see Borjas G.J., 
“Economic Theory and International Migration”, (1989) 23 IMR 457, Borjas G.J., “The Economics of 
Immigration”, (1994) 32 Journal of Economic Literature 1667, Borjas G.J., “The Economic Benefits from 
Immigration”, (1995) 9 Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 and Wolf M., Why Globalisation Works, Yale 
University Press, 2004 at 117. Open borders have also been suggested by Trebilcock M.J., “The Law and 
Economics of Immigration Policy”, (2003) 5 American Law & Economics Review 271 but with mandatory private 
insurance to protect social welfare schemes and the raising of revenues through tariffs by Chang H.F., “Migration as 
International Trade: The Economic Gains from the Liberalized Movement of Labor”, (1998) 3 UCLA J. Int’l L. & 
For. Aff. 371, Chang H.F., “The Economics of International Labor Migration and the Case for Global Distributive 
Justice in Liberal Political Theory”, (2008) 41 Cornell Int’l L.J. 1. 
66 Cranston M., What are Human Rights? 2nd Ed., Bodley Head, 1973, 31 at 33. 
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Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) specifies that “[e]veryone has the right to leave any 
country, including his own, and to return to his country”67. This is a right to emigration but there 
is no complimentary right to immigration and thus there is no human right to free movement of 
persons at the international level,  notwithstanding the logical “absurdity”68 of a human right to 
leave a State that fails to be complimented by a right of entry to another State creating a 
“fundamental contradiction between the notion that emigration is widely regarded as a matter of 
human rights while immigration is regarded as a matter of national sovereignty”69. 
 
National sovereignty is the key legal factor in the policy matrix for the treatment of TCNs. There 
is no specific provision of international law that specifies that it is the State that determines the 
entry and exit of persons from that State although it is recognised and accepted by the 
international community70. The European Union though is a unique international organisation 
where sovereignty has been voluntarily pooled or transferred by the Member States thereby 
enabling the EU to act in certain specified policy areas. A difficulty then is to determine if the 
EU should be classified as a State for international law purposes when dealing with the migration 
issue. If the EU does act in such a way (see Chapter III and V of this thesis) then the legal 
position of TCNs is complicated by Article 13(1) of the UDHR that “[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State”71. It should be noted here 
that Article 13(1) differs from Article 13(2) by specifying State rather than country. This it is 
submitted appears to focus on the political construct that is the State enabling a wide definition 
                                                 
67 See also Article 12(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and Article 2(2) of 
Protocol 4 to the ECHR. 
68 Dummett A., “The Transnational Migration of People Seen from Within a Natural Law Tradition” in Barry B., 
Goodin R.E., (Eds.), Op. Cit. n.57, 169 at 173. 
69 Weiner M., Op. Cit. n.59 at 171. 
70 See Anan K., “International Migration and Development: Report of the Secretary General”,  A/60/871, 18 May 
2006, http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/hld/Text/ReportoftheSGJune2006_English.pdf , accessed 18 
November 2008, para 76, “States have the sovereign right to decide who enters and stays in their territory, subject to 
treaty obligations and obligations deriving from customary international law.” See also GCIM, “Migration in an 
Interconnected World: New Directions for Action – Report of the Global Commission on International Migration”, 
GCIM, 2005, http://www.gcim.org, accessed 18 November 2008 at 66.  
71 See also Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and Article 2(1) of 
Protocol 4 to the ECHR. 
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to be applied that could possibly include the EU which would mean that TCNs would have the 
right of freedom of movement within the EU. However, the opt-outs of the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark from the AFSJ create a further complication in the basic legal position as these 
Member States have not agreed to transfer their sovereignty on such matters to the supranational 
EU except in certain areas (see Chapter V). 
 
b. Economic 
The second policy consideration is the economic factor of the migration issue of immigration 
into the EU and then the rights issue involving migration within the Union. The open borders 
debate has produced a raft of economic reports72 suggesting that global free movement of 
persons would produce considerable advantages not just for developed countries but also for 
developing and least developed countries. However, this debate is a sterile one when applied to 
the EU as it calls for a global commitment not regional. Thus the economic factors for 
immigration into the EU are more nuanced. The key to this economic policy component is the 
perceived necessity in the modern capitalist world for economies to at least maintain if not 
increase economic growth rates. In the EU the projected population for 206073 will see total 
numbers falling, the average age increasing and birth rates continuing to decline. The result is 
that the working age population is expected to be reduced by 50 million people if historical 
immigration rates are maintained or by 110 million if this immigration was curtailed. This loss of 
the working age population coupled with the expected tendency for people to live longer will 
have a significant impact on the EU’s economic performance74 and public expenditure on 
                                                 
72 Op. Cit. n.61. 
73 Giannakouris K., “Ageing Characterises the Demographic Perspectives of the European Societies”, Eurostat 
Statistics in Focus 72/2008, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-08-072/EN/KS-SF-08-
072-EN.PDF, accessed 3 January 2009.  
74 Commission Communication on a common immigration policy for Europe: principles, actions and tools, 
(COM)2008 359 final. 
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pensions, long-term care, health and education75. The policy implication from these statistics is 
that the EU will need to allow significant immigration from third countries to enable the 
continuing growth of the region and ensure that sufficient resources are produced to manage the 
care of the aging population. 
 
The migration of third country nationals within the EU provides another dimension to the 
economic factor, this time one dominated by the right to freedom of movement for persons and 
the internal market. The economic logic of the internal market views individuals as labour and 
thus factors of production that can move anywhere within the EU so that supply can satisfy 
demand for labour. From a purely economic perspective all units of labour are simply that, 
devoid of other characteristics such as nationality, race, sex or indeed humanity.  The reality 
however is far more complex and one that is explored in Chapter III. 
 
A related economic feature, supporting the previous two, is the effect of migration on the cost of 
MSs’ social welfare systems. It is considered that large scale immigration from third countries 
could cause significant problems for the working of the welfare state76 particularly if this 
immigration was indiscriminate77. However, if this immigration was targeted and managed then 
the impact on the welfare state could be beneficial rather than negative with TCNs working, 
providing services, purchasing goods, paying taxes and fully participating in the host MS’s 
economy78. This positive aspect of TCN involvement in the host MS is reflected in the position 
of TCNs migrating between MSs where migration would enable available labour to move to 
                                                 
75 Economic Policy Committee and the European Commission (DG ECFIN), “The Impact of Ageing on Public 
Expenditure: Projections for the EU25 Member States on Pensions, Health Care, Long Term Care, Education and 
Unemployment Transfers (2004-2050), Special Report 1/2006, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication6654_en.pdf, accessed 3 January 2009.  
76 Gibney M., The Ethics and the Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees, CUP, 2004 
at 69. 
77 Entzinger H., “Open Borders and the Welfare State” in Pécoud A., de Guchteniere P., (Eds.), Op. Cit. n.56, 119 at 
132. 
78 Ibid. at 127. 
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MSs, or indeed specific regions within MSs, to satisfy the demand for labour. The fact that TCNs 
had already migrated from outside the EU would suggest that social, cultural and economic ties 
to a host community would be less strong than those of citizens of the host MS and thus TCNs 
would have a greater propensity to embrace such movement. 
 
c. Status 
The status of TCNs, or their classification, when compared to that of nationals of MSs is another 
strong factor that underpins policy formation of treatment of TCNs, particularly when dealing 
with the rights issue. Peers79 suggests there are three models for the classification of TCNs. The 
citizen, or human, model would see immigrants granted the same rights and assimilated to EU 
citizens whilst the alien model would be at the opposite end of the spectrum with few rights 
granted with little assimilation. The third model is that of the worker where the TCN is equated 
with, and granted the rights equivalent to, a guest-worker. Classifying TCNs into alien, citizen or 
worker would help determine the formation of policy towards TCNs and their level of rights. 
 
A fourth model of status classification, entitled denizenship by Hammar80, could also be utilised 
to determine policy formation over the treatment of TCNs. By being considered as denizens, 
TCNs could be granted rights as a form of ‘half-way house’ status between worker and citizen 
that could encourage greater integration of TCNs into the host society with the added advantage 
of providing the opportunity for TCNs to step up through the status classifications81. 
 
d. Security 
                                                 
79 Peers S., “Aliens, Workers, Citizens or Humans? Models for Community Immigration Law” in Guild E., Harlow 
C., (Eds.), Implementing Amsterdam: Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law, Hart Publishing, 2001 at 291. 
80 Hammar T., Democracy and the Nation State, Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World of International 
Migration, Avebury, 1990. 
81 For a consideration of the effect of denizenship on the future of the EU see Walker N., “Denizenship and the 
Deterritorialization in the EU”, EUI Working Paper Law 2008/08. 
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The Hague Programme saw a shift in the factors underpinning policy formation from the 
Tampere Conclusions with the introduction of securitisation of migration. As Huysmans82 notes 
much debate over large scale migration has centred on the destabilising effect of this 
immigration on integrated communities, public order through the increased threat of terrorism 
from third country sources and the need to control this new perceived danger. The result is to 
create an identity in the migrant that is removed from the centre83, in contrast with the model of 
the European Citizen84 and capable of being marginalised through minimal rights, which is 
capable of raising claims of racialisation85. The ultimate result of such marginalisation is to 
dehumanise the individual and to lead to elimination of ‘the other’ as a form of survival86. 
 
A more positive slant on the securitisation of migration is possible if the definition of security is 
expanded so that the concept moves from national security to human security87. Afzal notes that 
the term human security has been used in an ad hoc manner88 with disagreement about its precise 
scope89. However, two general approaches can be observed. The first is a narrow one90 that 
categorises human security as the protection of the individual against violent threats such as war, 
genocide and terrorism. The broad approach91 instead seeks to protect people from threats that 
include hunger, disease and natural disasters and can encompass economic deprivation and 
threats to human dignity92. Either way, by considering security as including human security, 
instead of just national security, switches the emphasis towards protection of the individual 
                                                 
82 Huysmans J., “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, (2000) 38 JCMS 751. 
83 Huysmans J., “Migrants as a Security problem: Dangers of ‘Securitizing’ Societal Issues” in Miles R., Thränhardt 
D., (Eds.), Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion, Pinter Publishers, 1995, 
53 at 59. 
84 Ward I., “Identifying the European Other”, (2002) 14 IJRL 219. 
85 Ibrahim M., “The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse”, (2005) 43 International Migration 163. 
86 Op. Cit. n.79 at 64. 
87 King G., Murray C.J.L., “Rethinking Human Security”, (2002) 116 Political Science Quarterly 585. 
88 Afzal M., “Rethinking Asylum: The Feasibility of Human Security as New Ratione Personae Protection”, (2005) 
3 Journal of International Law & Policy 2:1 at 2:24. 
89 Ibid. at 2:27. 
90 See Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century, OUP, 2005. 
91 See the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New Dimensions of Human Security, OUP, 1994 and 
the Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, Commission on Human Security, 2003. 
92 van Ginkel H., Newman E., “In Quest of “Human Security””, (2000) 14 Japan Review of International Affairs 79. 
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rather than just that of the State. The effect of such a switch is to, at the least, require the 
protection of an individual’s human rights to ensure their security. 
 
e. Human Rights 
Some supporters of open borders deploy an ethical or humanitarian argument for the free 
movement of persons across all frontiers. The human rights factor in policy formation in the 
treatment of TCNs has a more limited role than this but equally as significant and important. 
There are again two layers, the international and the internal. At the international level dealing 
with immigration or movement of persons into the EU, the UDHR provides the basis for any 
human rights considerations. However, as we have seen above there is no right of immigration 
under the UDHR, or equivalent international treaties. For refugees the basis of international 
protection is provided by the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees 1951 and the 1967 
Protocol (henceforth Geneva Convention)93. It must be noted that this is only directed at a 
limited category of TCNs and therefore only affects policy formation dealing with refugees. 
 
Once a TCN has entered a MS, whether that is by legal or illegal means, human rights are 
protected at the domestic level by the ECHR and national policy formation must take account of 
the rights protected by the ECHR. In the EU the Charter of Fundamental Rights that, although 
not legally enforceable, does influence the formation of legal measures and policy objectives. 
When the Lisbon Treaty comes into force a new Article 6(1)TEU gives the Charter the “same 
legal value as the Treaties”, thereby ensuring that the Charter is likely to become the dominant 
instrument determining policy formation. However, it must also be noted that Article 6(2)TEU 
provides authority for the EU to accede to the ECHR, thereby enabling the ECHR to influence 
policy formation at the Community level as it does presently at the national level. 
 
                                                 
93 Examined further in Chapter V of this thesis. 
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f. Cultural 
The final major policy formation factor is the cultural dimension and the idea of identity 
formation. Nationals of third countries have diverse cultural backgrounds that can range from 
educated, Christian and relatively wealthy individuals (for example citizens of the former UK 
Dominions, Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand) to uneducated, Muslim and poor 
(for example Afghan or Somalian refugees or asylum-seekers). The former individuals could be 
considered to be closer to the dominant European culture to that of the latter and as such it is 
possible to perceive the immigration of the former more favourably to the latter. Indeed the 
migration of significantly culturally diverse individuals could be seen as a threat to the stability 
of the host society and the perception of the society’s identity formation. Once the TCN has 
entered the EU this perceived threat can be dealt with in one of two ways. The first is to require 
assimilation of the culture of the TCN to that of the culture of the host State, or the dominant 
European culture. The second is to respect the culture of the TCN and to accommodate a 
multicultural94 approach to cultural diversification. Article 15(1)(a) of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 recognises that everyone has the right to “take 
part in cultural life” but this could be interpreted to provide for assimilation or multiculturalism. 
 
A further element in the cultural consideration is the issue of family reunification. The right to 
found a family is stated in Article 16(1) of the UDHR with the limitation of arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with the family by Article 17(1) of the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) as it is the “natural and fundamental group unit of society”95. An 
actual right to family reunification can be found in two international conventions. The first is the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC) where Article 8(1) creates an 
obligation on States to preserve “family relations, as recognized by law without unlawful 
                                                 
94 See in particular Kymlicka W., Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, OUP, 1995 and 
Raz J., “Multiculturalism”, (1998) 11 Ratio Juris 193. 
95 Article 23(1)ICCPR. 
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interference” and to ensure that a child is not separated from his or her parents against their will96 
and that “applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party for the 
purpose of family reunification shall be dealt with by States’ Parties in a positive, humane and 
expeditious manner”97. The second is in Article 44 of the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 1990. 
Paragraph 1 requires States to “take appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the unity of 
the families of migrant workers” whilst in paragraph 2 States must “facilitate the reunification of 
migrant workers with their spouses... as well as with their minor dependent unmarried children”. 
From these international conventions a factor to be considered when formulating policy for the 
treatment of TCNs is family reunification. 
 
3. LEGAL RATIONALITY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF POLICY 
 
The factors affecting policy formation towards the treatment of TCNs over the migration and 
rights issue must now be considered to determine the particular policy stance from which legal 
rationality can be applied. From Chapter I we can usefully conclude that the elements of formal 
and instrumental rationality are value-neutral. They both need to take account of the six factors 
above but they do so in a way that is strictly neutral and so some factors are likely to be of 
greater importance than others, such as the legal, economic, status, ‘national’ security and the 
‘assimilation’ model of culture elements. However, substantive rationality in comparison is 
value-laden as it determined by the protection of human rights within the Community, which for 
the abstract form of legal rationality is a sufficient statement of the requirement of the law. 
However, for this abstract concept to be capable of providing valuable insights for policy 
formation and for assessing the achievements of policy towards TCNs it has to be benchmarked 
                                                 
96 Article 9(1)CRC. 
97 Article 10(1)CRC. 
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against a policy stance within the Community. The difficulty here is to determine the policy 
stance benchmark from which assessment can be made. This of course is a difficult 
determination as the chosen policy stance can lead to wholly different conclusions. It is 
submitted that the aim is to choose the benchmark that provides the best fit for TCNs in general 
and not just for specific categories. Thus a purely economic benchmark would fail to adequately 
consider asylum-seekers or refugees, or indeed illegal immigrants. It is submitted that the value-
laden elements of policy formation will be significantly more important with human rights, 
‘human’ security and multiculturalism as the dominant elements for policy formation. However, 
these factors do not provide a sufficiently concrete statement for assessment to be measured. 
 
The main policy stance announced by the EU has been the Tampere Conclusions. The Hague 
Programme has added a further layer to this position but the main value-laden benchmark, laid 
down by the Tampere Conclusions, as a voluntary commitment by the EU to improve the 
position of TCNs provides a legitimate benchmark for assessing achievements in this field. Thus 
substantive rationality is a value laden assessment of the protection of human rights in the 
Community assessed from the policy stance benchmark provided by the Tampere Conclusions. 
 
The question of migration policy has recently been examined by Boswell98 for legitimacy 
through four criteria that she claims are the vital elements of legitimacy: fairness; accumulation 
of wealth; security, and institutional legitimacy. This is a welcome development but it is 
submitted the analysis us fundamentally flawed. It can be observed that two of the criteria can be 
equated with two of the legal rationality desiderata, namely fairness with substantive legitimacy 
and institutional legitimacy with institutional rationality. However, the other two criteria of 
accumulation of wealth and security are not elements of legitimacy but are factors that are to be 
taken into consideration when developing a policy stance. The result is to confuse the basis on 
                                                 
98 Boswell C., “Theorizing Migration Policy: Is there a Third Way?” (2007) 41 IMR 75. 
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which an examination of migration policy can be conducted by including two factors in 
determining that policy in the concept of legitimacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 2 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
FREE MOVEMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE EC TREATY AND 
ITS IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 
 
A right to be capable of being claimed by an individual must be clearly identifiable, not only in 
its position within a legislative instrument but also who can claim it and its extent. The right to 
free movement is no exception to this rule. Chapter I established the economic importance of 
TCNs to the EU, now and in the future, and as the free movement of persons is an economic 
right then it would be logical to presume that the right should apply to TCNs on an equal footing 
to that of nationals of MSs. Indeed as TCNs have already moved from a third country to a MS in 
the EU then it is highly likely that they would be more willing to exercise a right of free 
movement within the EU than nationals of MSs because they are not as constrained by social, 
cultural or familial ties. Therefore it would be reasonable to presume that the free movement 
provisions of the EC Treaty or their implementing legislation should either outline the specific 
free movement rights for TCNs or should determine that the free movement provisions apply to 
both TCNs and MS nationals. It is further reasonable to presume that such important rights 
should be clearly defined, readily accessible and simple.  
 
This Chapter outlines the objectives and principles of the Community applicable to free 
movement of persons set out in the EC Treaty and its implementing legislation. It then examines 
the concepts of discrimination, citizenship and the three free movement provisions of workers, 
establishment and services, and how they apply to TCNs.  
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1. OBJECTIVES OF THE EC TREATY  
 
The policies or activities of the Community are set out in Article 3EC. Article 3(1)(c)EC requires 
the creation of ‘an internal market characterised by the abolition, as between Member States, of 
obstacles to the free movement of…persons…’. This policy is considered to be of a 
predominantly economic nature and TCNs, legally resident in the Community, are economically 
active persons so the reasonable expectations of TCNs would be for the Community to remove 
barriers to their own free movement within the Community. However, these expectations must 
be considered in the light of the policy contained in Article 3(1)(d)EC that requires ‘measures 
concerning the entry and residence of persons as provided for in Title IV’ to be enacted. This 
question will be examined in more detail below when examining Article 14EC and in Chapter V. 
 
Article 14EC, inserted by the SEA introduced the concept of the internal market and prescribed 
that ‘[t]he Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the 
internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992…without prejudice to the other 
provisions of this Treaty’. Article 14(2)EC defined the internal market as ‘an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of…persons…is ensured in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty’. Article 14EC sat in juxtaposition with ex-Article 8EEC’s requirement 
for the progressive establishment of the common market by 19691. Wyatt and Dashwood2 
suggest that “common market” was just a term of art with “internal market” being a more 
specific notion having a clearly defined objective. This objective of an internal market in Article 
                                                 
1 The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a third paragraph to Article 14 that reads ‘[t]he Council, acting by qualified 
majority voting on a proposal from the Commission, shall determine the guidelines and conditions necessary to 
ensure balanced progress in all the sectors concerned’. These provisions were contained in ex-Article 7bEEC, 
repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
2 Arnull A.M., Dashwood A.A., Dougan M., Ross M.G., Spaventa E., Wyatt D.A., Wyatt & Dashwood’s European 
Union Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2006 at 921. 
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14(2)EC contains two elements3. The first is a measurable objective for the Community 
institutions of procuring the abolition of all frontier controls for intra-MS movement of, inter 
alia, persons. The second, the realisation of the four freedoms, is more ethereal as the project has 
no immediate end.  
 
The literal, and wide, reading of Article 14(2)EC implies the abolition of all frontier controls on 
all persons, irrespective of nationality4, although this is without prejudice to the other provisions 
of the EC Treaty. The narrow view therefore would be that it must be interpreted in accordance 
with the Community free movement of persons’ provisions and would only apply to migrant MS 
nationals. Wyatt and Dashwood5 suggest that the wider interpretation is to be preferred as this 
not only corresponds to the letter of Article 14(2)EC but “is also necessary for the effet utile of 
the removal of internal frontiers since, if controls are retained for any categories of travellers, 
they are liable to be applied to all”. It would appear, therefore, if this supposition is correct, that 
Article 14EC may provide a route for free movement rights across internal Community borders 
for all persons, including TCNs. 
 
However, it must be determined what legal effects Article 14EC has both on the Community 
institutions and MSs, thereby establishing the ability of individuals to prosecute a legal action. 
The Declaration on Article 14EC, annexed to the Final Act of the SEA, appears to suggest that 
the commitment to the date in the provision was purely political. It states that ‘[t]he Conference 
wishes…to express its firm political will to take before 1 January 1993 the decisions necessary to 
complete the internal market…’ and ‘[s]etting the date of 31 December 1992 does not create an 
automatic legal effect’.  
                                                 
3 Ibid. at 920. 
4 See Toth A.G., “The Legal Effects of the Protocols Relating to the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark”, in 
Heukels T., Blokker N., Brus M., (Eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam, Kluwer Law International, 1998, 
227 at 249. 
5 Op. Cit. n.2 at 921. 
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Wyatt and Dashwood6 suggest that for Community institutions the Declaration has no effect on 
their obligations7, as Declarations are not legally binding. The expression “does not create an 
automatic legal effect” was addressed to the effects of Article 14EC if the necessary 
implementing legislation had not been enacted by 31 December 1992. The ECJ in Reyners8 held 
that a similar provision in ex-Article 52EEC (now Article 43EC) left the obligation intact beyond 
the period provided for its fulfilment as the progression required in ex-Article 52EEC had not 
been adhered to. This was extended in the case of van Binsbergen9 where the Court held that ex-
Article 59EEC (now Article 48EC) became unconditional following the expiry of the transition 
period and thus became directly effective. As such the mandatory obligation in Article 14(1)EC 
must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, although the question of direct effect is more 
complex.  
 
Article 14(2)EC contains two elements. The first provides a positive obligation to abolish 
internal frontier controls that is mandatory and precise. However, to abolish frontier controls for 
free movement of persons requires a considerable range of measures on asylum, immigration, 
visas, police matters, TCN rights etc. to be implemented. Although, therefore, the original 
measure was mandatory, the implementing or flanking measures required to regulate it involve 
policy choices and the use of discretionary power. Furthermore the second element of Article 
14(2)EC ensuring the four freedoms is too general in its substance for the Court to be able to 
determine with precision the necessary legislative steps required. 
                                                 
6 Ibid. at 922. 
7 To determine if an action could be brought against either the Commission or Council under Article 232EC for 
failure to act, then the measures must be capable of being defined with such precision as to be identified 
individually, and could be adopted in accordance with Article 233EC (Case 13/83 European Parliament v. Council 
[1985] ECR 1513 paras.66-69). Where a provision provides a Community institution with discretionary power over 
the content of any implementing measures that require policy choices not included in the provision, then the subject-
matter and nature of the provision cannot be determined with such a sufficient degree of precision. 
8 Case 2/74 Reyners v. Belgium [1974] ECR 631 at para.27. 
9 Case 33/74 Johannes Henricus Maria van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de 
Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299 at paras.24-27. 
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Legal effects on the MSs need to be ascertained by determining whether Article 14EC is capable 
of direct effect. For an individual to commence legal proceedings in a national court to enforce 
an individual right granted by a provision, that provision must be sufficiently clear, precise and 
unconditional10. From the foregoing discussion it is clear that to abolish internal frontiers and to 
ensure the four freedoms, implementing legislation will be required and until that is in place then 
the provision will remain conditional, thereby distinguishing ex-Article 59EEC that van 
Binsbergen had found to have direct effect, and Article 14(1)EC. Furthermore it appears that this 
is consistent with the Declaration on Article 14EC in which the MSs did not intend to be legally 
bound by the provision if implementing legislation had not been enacted by 31 December 1992. 
The Commission held the view for a period of time that, following 31 December 1992, the 
maintenance of internal frontier controls was absolutely prohibited11. As Wyatt and Dashwood12 
point out, this is an over-simplified position. Domestic border controls on free movement of 
persons could legitimately remain in place if they were required to safeguard interests sanctioned 
by the EC Treaty. However, where measures had been implemented then Article 14EC, Article 
10EC and the principle of proportionality, would only permit retention of border controls if they 
were truly indispensable after 1 January 1993 and leaving the burden of proof on MSs to justify 
the retention of these controls13. 
 
In Wijsenbeek14 the ECJ was asked to consider this situation when a Dutch national refused to 
show a passport, or any other means of identification, on re-entry to Holland. Mr Wijsenbeek 
claimed that following 1 January 1993 he had a directly effective right of free movement across 
the Community’s internal borders and any frontier controls were prohibited. The Court rejected 
                                                 
10 See Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337. 
11 See the Commission’s Communication of 18 May 1992, SEC(92) 877 final. 
12 Op. Cit. n.2 at 925. 
13 Ibid at 926.  
14 Case C-378/97 Criminal proceedings against Florus Ariël Wijsenbeck [1999] ECR I-6207; noted Martin D., 
“Case Note”, (2000) 2 EJML 101. 
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his claim and held that Article 14EC “cannot be interpreted as meaning that, in the absence of 
measures adopted by the Council before 31 December 1992 requiring the Member States to 
abolish controls of persons at the internal frontiers of the Community, that obligation arises from 
expiry of that period”15. Such an obligation would require the full harmonisation of the MSs’ 
laws in this area. The Court went on to emphasise that even if there was “an unconditional right 
to move freely within the territory of the Member States, the Member States retained the right to 
carry out identity checks at the internal frontiers of the Community, requiring persons to present 
a valid identity card or passport…in order to be able to establish whether the person concerned is 
a national of a Member State, thus having the right to move freely within the territory of the 
Member States, or a national of a non-member country, not having that right”16. Wijsenbeek 
extinguished the possibility of TCNs being able to claim free movement rights through Article 
14EC. 
 
Regulation 562/2006/EC17 provides the legislation abolishing internal border controls. In Article 
20 persons are authorised, whatever their nationality, to cross the internal borders of the EU at 
any point without checks being carried. This does not provide a right of free movement across 
borders for everybody, including TCNs but merely the abolition of checks at the internal borders. 
This is reinforced by Recital 5 providing that these rules on the movement of persons across 
borders do not call into question nor affect free movement rights. Furthermore the legal base is 
Title IV EC Treaty rather than Article 14EC, and so Chapter V of this thesis will carry a more in 
depth analysis of the Regulation. However, it is submitted that these provisions do not create, nor 
extend, any free movement rights for TCNs. The rights provided are more subtle and are only 
directed at removing checks at the internal frontiers. 
                                                 
15 Ibid. at para.40. 
16 Ibid. at para.43. 
17 European Parliament and Council Regulation 562/2006/EC establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), O.J. 2006 L105/1 (henceforth SBC). 
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2. THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION18 
 
The principle of non-discrimination has been included in the concept of free movement since the 
original Treaty of Rome in 1957. The specific enunciations of this general notion will be 
considered below in sections 4-6 and so this section is designed to consider the general 
proposition and how it applies to free movement of TCNs as a stand alone concept. The position 
today of TCNs is that there are a significant number who are legally resident in the EU, living 
and working side by side with nationals of MSs. The integration19 of TCNs “has gained 
increasing importance on the European agenda in recent years”20 and Cholewinski advocates 
integration in order to achieve social justice, economic efficiency with the successful completion 
of the internal market and a vital element in the elimination of racial and ethnic discrimination21. 
One of the key ways of integrating TCNs into society, or at least those resident for a long period 
of time, would be to ensure TCNs were able to enforce rights of non-discrimination, particularly 
as they apply to free movement. 
  
Article 12EC prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality but is ‘merely a specific 
enunciation of the general principle of equality’22. It prohibits both direct and indirect 
discrimination23 although it is not absolute. The material scope of Article 12EC must be ‘without 
prejudice to any special provisions contained [in the Treaty]’ and has been interpreted by the 
                                                 
18 See in particular Ellis E., EU Anti-Discrimination Law, OUP, 2005 for a comprehensive analysis of the principle 
of non-discrimination. 
19 Commission Communication on immigration, integration and employment, COM(2003) 336 final. 
20 Commission Communication on a common agenda for integration: framework for the integration of third-country 
nationals in the European Union, COM(2005) 389 final at 3. 
21 Cholewinski R., “The Rights of Non-EC Immigrant Workers and Their Families in EC Countries of Employment: 
A Case for Integration” in Dine J., Watt B., Discrimination Law: Concepts, Limitations and Justifications, 
Longman, 1996, 134 at 136. 
22 Case 810/79 Uberschar [1980] ECR 2747 at para.16. 
23 Case C-237/94 O’Flynn v. Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I-2617. Case C-274/96 Criminal proceedings against 
Horst Otto Bickel and Ulrich Franz [1998] ECR I-7637; noted Martin D., “Case Note”, (1999) 1 EJML 149 and 
Bulterman M., “Case Note”, (1999) 36 CMLRev 1325. For a recent UK case involving indirect discrimination see 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v. Bobezes [2005] 3 AER 497. 
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ECJ as applying ‘independently only to situations governed by Community law in regard to 
which the Treaty lays down no specific rules prohibiting discrimination’24. The personal scope of 
Article 12EC is such that the subject matter of the dispute must be brought ‘within the scope of 
application of [the Treaty]’. In Cowan25 the ECJ held that ‘[w]hen Community law guarantees a 
natural person the freedom to go to another Member State the protection of that person from 
harm in the Member State in question, on the same basis as that of nationals and persons residing 
there, is a corollary of that freedom of movement’26. Thus a national provision that refused 
criminal injury compensation to a national of another MS who had exercised his free movement 
right was incompatible with Article 12EC. Furthermore, the Court in Collins27, a case involving 
intellectual property rights, found that Article 12EC required that ‘persons in a situation 
governed by Community law be placed on a completely equal footing with nationals of the 
Member State concerned’28. Continuing, the ECJ confirmed that the first paragraph of Article 
12EC was directly effective29.  
 
Khalil30 involved a number of immigrants fleeing to MSs from third countries and settling in the 
host MS but being refused recognition as political refugees. However, they were stateless 
persons and as such they claimed child benefit on the basis that they came within the personal 
scope of Reg. 1408/71. The ECJ pointed out that the legal base of Reg. 1408/71 in 1971 was 
Article 12EC (and Article 51EC)31 and that Article 12EC “prohibits discrimination against 
Community nationals on the ground of nationality”32 although in this case Article 12EC “is not 
relevant”. The statement in paragraph 39 could be interpreted as limiting the scope of Article 
                                                 
24 Case C-379/92 Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453 at para.18. 
25 Case 186/87 Cowan v. Le Trésor  Public [1989] ECR 195. 
26 Ibid. at para.17. 
27 Joined Cases C-92/92 & 326/92 Collins and Others v. Imrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH [1993] ECR I-5145. 
28 Ibid. at para.32. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Joined Cases C-95-98 & 180/99 Khalil, Chaaban, Osseili v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Nasser v. Landeshauptstadt 
Stuttgart, Addou v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [2001] ECR I-7413 at para.25; noted Peers S., “Case Note”, (2002) 
39 CMLRev 1395. 
31 Ibid. at para.39. 
32 Ibid. at para.40. 
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12EC to the legal position in 1971 but the tense used in paragraph 40 is the present and it is 
submitted that this is the extant position. Therefore it would appear that Article 12EC does not 
provide direct rights for TCNs at the present time. However, if rights can be established within 
the EC Treaty, or implementing secondary legislation, that can be taken advantage of by a 
national of a MS who has sufficient connection to the TCN then they may be able to take 
advantage of this non-discrimination provision. This has, up to now, proven to be difficult33. 
With the introduction of Title IV into the EC Treaty (see Chapter V of this thesis) and the 
entering into force of the implementing measures, it is submitted that TCNs may be brought 
under the personal scope of Article 12EC and so would be able to rely on it as a directly effective 
provision, unless limited to Community nationals by the ECJ. This has yet to be tested before the 
Court. 
 
A new general non-discrimination provision was introduced into the EC Treaty by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam that has already been described by one commentator as an “enigma”34. It specifies 
that ‘[w]ithout prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the powers 
conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to 
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation’. This provision has attracted considerable attention from a number of 
commentators who have analysed the background to its introduction35. As Bell notes36, one of 
the principal reasons for Article 13EC was to eliminate racism throughout the Community. As 
                                                 
33 Case C-105/89 Haji [1990] ECR I-4211. 
34 Szyszczak E., “The New Parameters of Labour Law” in O’Keeffe D., Twomey P., (Eds.), Legal Issues of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, Hart Publishing, 1999, 141 at 152. 
35 See Waddington L., “Article 13EC: Mere Rhetoric or a Harbinger of Change?” (1999) 1 CYBELS 175 at 176; 
Bell M., “The New Article 13EC: A Sound Basis for European Anti-discrimination Law?” (1999) 6 MJ 5 at 6. See 
also Flynn L., “The Implications of Article 13EC – After Amsterdam, will some Forms of Discrimination be More 
Equal than Others?” (1999) 36 CMLRev 1127 for a comprehensive analysis of the implications of Article 13EC. 
36Ibid. Bell at 19. 
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such the Kahn Committee37 recommended that the new provision should apply to all the peoples 
of the Community “whether citizens of the European Union or not” but Article 13EC fails to 
mention the legal position of TCNs. The forms of discrimination covered are ‘sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’ and this list is closed. The 
provision is not directly applicable38, unlike Article 12EC, as it does not actually prohibit 
anything although it may inform the general principle of equality39. From the exhaustive list in 
the Article, it can be deduced that measures may be adopted to protect all persons resident in the 
Community, including TCNs, against racial discrimination. However, discrimination on the basis 
of nationality is not covered by Article 13EC40. This is covered by Article 12EC, but unlike the 
potential personal scope of Article 13EC, TCNs are currently excluded. 
 
The Commission issued a racism Action Plan41 before the Treaty of Amsterdam came into 
force42 stating its intention to make “early use of Article 13EC, with a view to ensuring that 
concrete proposals are on the table for adoption before the end of 1999”43. To this end the 
Commission brought forward three proposals for implementing the discrimination provisions in 
Article 13EC on 25 November 199944. It was thought45 that the requirement of a unanimous vote 
in the Council would limit the “practical utility of this measure”46. However, within just over a 
                                                 
37 European Council Consultative Commission on Racism and Xenophobia ‘Final Report’ ref.6906/1/95 Rev 1 
Limite RAXEN 24, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 1995 at 59 
38 Langrish S., “The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected Highlights”, (1998) 23 ELR 3 at 15; Op. Cit. n.35 Waddington 
at 182. 
39 Case C-144/04 Mangold v. Helm [2005] ECR I-9981. 
40 Op. Cit. n.35 Bell at 20. 
41 Commission Communication concerning a racism action plan, COM(1998) 183 final. 
42 On 1 May 1999. 
43 Op. Cit. n.41 para.2.2.2. 
44 Commission proposal for a Council Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, COM(1999) 565 final; Commission proposal for a Council Directive implementing the 
principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, COM(1999) 566 final; 
Commission proposal for a Council Decision establishing a Community Action Programme to combat 
discrimination 2001-2006, COM(1999) 567 final. 
45 Barnard C., “Article 13: Through the Looking Glass of Union Citizenship”, in Op. Cit. n.34, 375 at 393. 
46 Ellis E., “Recent Developments in European Community Sex Equality Law”, (1998) 35 CMLRev 379 at 381. 
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year, the Council had concluded all three: the Race Directive47; the Employment Directive48; 
and, the Action Programme Decision49.  
 
Article 1 of the Race Directive states: ‘[t]he purpose of this Directive is to lay down a framework 
for combating discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, with a view to putting into 
effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment.’ As Ellis notes, no definition of 
racial or ethnic origin is provided in the Directive although “a few textual clues about its 
intended meaning can be garnered from the lengthy Preamble”50. She notes that Recital 6 rejects 
any theoretical attempts to establish the existence of separate human races and Recitals 7, 10 and 
11 link the concept of racial origin with xenophobia. She suggests that the Directive is primarily 
focused on discrimination against racial groups “whose origin is outside the EU”51. It is 
submitted that this is too narrow a reading and that the Directive is actually targeted at 
discrimination against racial groups of whatever origin. ‘Ethnic origin’ is perhaps an even more 
enigmatic term. Recital 8 refers to combating discrimination against groups such as ethnic 
minorities and Ellis reads “ethnic origin” as pertaining to minorities within a State’s 
population52. Thus “race” refers to discrimination against individuals because of their origin 
external of the EU, whilst “ethnic origin” is the EU internal dimension that corresponds to it. 
However, the vague nature of the term “racial and ethnic origin” gives a wide margin of 
                                                 
47 Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin, O.J. 2000 L180/22. 
48 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation, O.J. 2000 L303/16. 
49 Council Decision 2000/750/EC Establishing a Community Action Programme to Combat Discrimination (2001 to 
2006), O.J. 2000 L303/23. 
50 Op. Cit. n.18 at 30. See also Guild E., “The EC Directive on Race Discrimination: Surprises, Possibilities and 
Limitations”, (2000) 29 ILJ 416 at 418. 
51 Ibid. Ellis. 
52 Ibid. 
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discretion to the ECJ to define the term53. The UK’s case law in this area is, as Ellis notes, the 
most advanced across the EU and could therefore provide guidance to the ECJ54.  
 
Article 2(1) determines that the principle of equal treatment means there must be no direct or 
indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin. Direct discrimination is defined as 
‘where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a 
comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin’55. Indirect discrimination is defined as 
‘where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or 
ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, 
criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that 
aim are appropriate and necessary’56. Harassment57 and instructing someone to discriminate on 
the basis of racial or ethnic origin58 are also brought under the meaning of discrimination in 
Article 2(1). Article 3(1) establishes an inclusive personal and expansive material scope, with the 
Race Directive applying to ‘all persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, including 
public bodies, in relation to:’ workplace practices59; social protection, including social security 
and healthcare; social advantages; education; and, access to and supply of goods and services 
which are available to the public, including housing. Article 3(2), however, limits the 
inclusiveness of the personal scope such that the Directive does not apply to ‘difference of 
treatment based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions and conditions relating to 
the entry into and residence of third-country nationals and stateless persons on the territory of 
Member States, and to any treatment which arises from the legal status of the third-country 
                                                 
53 Ibid. at 31. See also Barbera M., “Not the Same? The Judicial Role in the New Community Anti-Discrimination 
Law Context”, (2002) 31 ILJ 82. 
54 See in particular Mandla v. Dowell Lee [1983] AC 548 at 558 per Lord Fraser, Gwynedd Council v. Jones [1986] 
ICR 833, and Crown Suppliers v. Dawkins [1993] ICR 517. 
55 Op. Cit. n.47 Article 2(2)(a). 
56 Ibid. Article 2(2)(b). 
57 Ibid. Article 2(2)(c) with harassment defined as ‘when an unwanted conduct related to racial or ethnic origin takes 
place with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, 
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.’ 
58 Ibid. Article 2(2)(d). 
59 Ibid. Article 3(1)(a)-(d). 
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nationals and stateless persons concerned.’ This is supported by Recital 1360 but appears to run 
counter to the statement in Recital 16 that ‘[i]t is important to protect all natural persons against 
discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin.’ It has been estimated that two-thirds of the 
EU’s ethnic minorities are TCNs61. By limiting the scope of the Race Directive so that it does 
not apply to the entry, residence or status of TCNs, then by implication, it excludes the non-
discrimination principle from a significant number of ethnic minorities in three particularly 
important areas of policy. Furthermore, Hepple62 argues that the exclusion of nationality from 
the scope of the Race Directive, and as Article 12EC does not apply to TCNs, then this 
undermines the fundamental human right to be free from discrimination. An individual who is a 
member of an ethnic minority or a racial group but who is a TCN, cannot claim discrimination 
on the basis of his or her nationality, nor in the three policy areas that are likely to concern him 
or her in a significant manner. By limiting the scope of the Directive with the exclusion of 
nationality discrimination and certain aspects of policy towards TCNs, combined with the 
exclusion of TCNs from the scope of Article 12EC, the principle of non-discrimination shifts 
from a human right to a citizen right63. As Chalmers points out64, this provision permits 
discrimination against, and negates the effects of the Directive for, TCNs. 
 
The Employment Directive presents a framework for ‘combating discrimination on the grounds 
of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation, 
                                                 
60 ‘This prohibition of discrimination should also apply to nationals of third countries, but does not cover differences 
of treatment based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions governing the entry and residence of third-
country nationals and their access to employment and to occupation.’ 
61 Hervey T.K., “Migrant Workers and their Families in the European Union: the Pervasive Market Ideology of 
Community Law” in Shaw J., More G., (Eds.), New Legal Dynamics of European Union, Clarendon Press, 1995 at 
101 and Bell M., “Article 13EC: The European Commission’s Anti-Discrimination Proposals”, (2000) 29 ILJ 79 at 
84. 
62 Hepple B., “Race and Law in Fortress Europe”, (2004) 67 MLR 1 at 7. 
63 See Bell M., “Beyond European Labour Law? Reflections on the EU Racial Equality Directive”, (2002) 8 ELJ 
384 at 388, Whittle R., Bell M., “Between Social Policy and Union Citizenship: The Framework Directive on Equal 
Treatment in Employment”, (2002) 27 ELR 677 at 688, op. cit. n.152. In Barnard C., “The United Kingdom, the 
‘Social Chapter’ and the Amsterdam Treaty”, (1997) 26 ILJ 275 at 280, Barnard describes the introduction of 
Article 13EC into the EC Treaty as the creation of a “social dimension of Union citizenship”. 
64 Chalmers D., “The Mistakes of the Good European?” in Fredman S. (Ed.), Discrimination and Human Rights: 
The Case of Racism, OUP, 2001, 193 at 219. 
62 
 
with a view to putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment’65. It 
follows a similar pattern to the Race Directive but with the concept of indirect discrimination 
slightly modified for individuals with a disability66 and the material scope limited to workplace 
practices67. Article 3(2) replicates Article 3(2) of the Race Directive but Recital 12 excludes 
nationality discrimination, provisions governing entry and residence of TCNs, and access by 
TCNs to employment and occupation from the scope of the Employment Directive. 
 
The path of fundamental rights might prove to be a route that could open up for TCNs to claim a 
human right to the principle of non-discrimination. Article 14ECHR prohibits any 
“discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status” but this is only complimentary to securing the other rights in the ECHR and cannot be 
used as a stand alone legal ground for a discrimination complaint. Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the 
ECHR does provide this stand alone general non-discrimination clause with the same grounds of 
discrimination as Article 14ECHR but a number of States, including the UK68, have yet to ratify 
it, even though it has been open for ratification since 200069 and so it is unlikely to be used as the 
basis of human rights judgments until it is ratified. Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights prohibits discrimination on grounds “such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, 
genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a 
national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation”. It should be noted first 
that the list is non-exhaustive and so further grounds could be added in the future. Second, the 
                                                 
65 Op. Cit. n.48 Article 1. It does not cover racial or ethnic origin discrimination in the work place as the Race 
Directive already covers this (Recital 10). 
66 Ibid. Articles 2(2)(b)(ii), 5 and Recitals 20 & 21. 
67 Ibid. Article 3(1)(a)-(d). 
68 Grief N., “Non Discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Critique of the United 
Kingdom Government's Refusal to Sign and Ratify Protocol 12”, (2002) 27 ELR (Human Rights Survey) 3. 
69 See Wintamute R., “”Within the Ambit”: How Big is the “Gap” in Article 14 European Convention on Human 
Rights? Part 1”, [2004] EHRLR 366 and “Filling the Article 14 “Gap”: Government Ratification and Judicial 
Control of Protocol No.12 ECHR: Part 2”, [2004] EHRLR 484. 
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provision is clear, precise and unconditional and it is submitted that if the Charter had legal 
effect then it would be directly effective. Third nationality discrimination is not included but is 
provided for in Article 21(2). Unfortunately a caveat is applied so nationality discrimination is 
only prohibited within the scope of application of the EC Treaty and TEU and without prejudice 
to the special provisions of those two Treaties. Until the Charter gains legal effect the ECJ 
utilises it simply to reaffirm the provisions of the ECHR70 and other human rights law 
instruments71. Thus, for now, the fundamental rights route for a TCN to claim a right to non-
discrimination on the basis of his or her nationality appears to be closed. However, the Lisbon 
Treaty, in a new Article 6TEU, provides for the Charter to “have the same legal values as the 
Treaties” without extending the competences of the Union and interpreted in accordance with the 
general provisions in Chapter VII of the Charter and the explanations setting out the sources of 
the Charter provisions. Furthermore new Article 6(2)TEU authorises the Union to accede to the 
ECHR. Finally, new Article 6(3)TEU would ensure fundamental rights could still protected as 
general principles of Union law as in the current Article 6(2)TEU. The ECJ’s interpretation of 
this Article will be crucial to any possible non-discrimination rights for TCNs. 
 
An alternative model to claims based on the general non-discrimination clause could be to 
introduce further protection of non-discrimination into the EC Treaty based on the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) provisions on most-favoured-nation (MFN)72 and 
national73 treatments. MFN treatment requires any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted to products originating in one country must be granted immediately and unconditionally 
to like products originating in the territories of all other WTO MSs, whereas national treatment 
necessitates a MS to treat imported goods no less favourably than it treats domestic goods. These 
                                                 
70 Case C-432/05 Unibet v. Justitiekanslern [2007] ECR I-2271. 
71 Case C-540/03 European Parliament v. Council [2006] ECR I-5769. 
72 Article I. 
73 Article III. 
64 
 
principles are replicated in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)74, although with 
more exceptions than that in the GATT75. The effect of the MFN treatment should be to 
accelerate the process of trade barrier elimination76, although, as well as the GATT exceptions, 
MSs have developed policies as means to avoid their GATT obligations77, whilst the national 
treatment provision ensures that goods once they have entered the State are subjected to the same 
policy as domestic goods78. The advantage of such an approach would be two fold. First MFN 
treatment would ensure that immigration policies were standardised across the EU and second 
national treatment would ensure that a TCN upon entry to the EU would receive the same rights 
as Union citizens, including the right to freedom of movement. This is similar to the position of 
the free movement of goods in EU law79 and if people were simply factors production, from an 
economic viewpoint, then it is submitted this approach could be justified and could create a 
beneficial position for TCNs. However, people are not just factors of production and as such the 
situation becomes far more complex. 
 
3. CITIZENSHIP 
 
The first fifty years of the twentieth century were lean times for the study of citizenship until 
Marshall’s 1949 seminal treatise80. Over the last twenty years citizenship has experienced a 
                                                 
74 For a discussion on the GATS coverage of temporary migration measures in bilateral labour and economic 
integration agreements see Grynberg R., Qalo V., “Migration and the World Trade Organisation”, (2007) 41 Journal 
of World Trade 751. 
75 See Wang Y., “Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment under the General Agreement on Trade in Services – And Its 
Application in Financial Services”, (1996) 30 Journal of World Trade 91 and Abu-Akeel A.K., “The MFN as it 
Applies to Service Trade: New Problems for an Old Concept”, (1999) 33 Journal of World Trade 103. 
76 Abbott F.M., “The North American Integration Regime and its Implications for the World Trading System” in 
Weiler J.H.H., (Ed.), The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade, OUP, 
2000, 169 at 173. 
77 Jackson J.H., The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations, CUP, 
2000 at 59. 
78 Hoekman B.M., Kostecki M.M., The Political Economy of the World Trading System, OUP, 1995 at 26. 
79 Ehrling L., “De Facto Discrimination in World Trade Law: National and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment – or 
Equal Treatment?” (2002) 36 Journal of World Trade 921 at 948. 
80 Marshall T.H., Citizenship and Social Class, CUP, 1949 reprinted in Marshall T.H., Bottomore T., Citizenship 
and Social Class, Pluto Press, 1992. 
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remarkable upsurge in popularity amongst policy makers and academic commentators of many 
different disciplines, which is even more remarkable when it is considered how elusive the 
concept has been to define and to contain within set parameters and boundaries. This ephemeral 
nature means that there is a danger of viewing citizenship as purely symbolic and the concept 
incoherent81. Lack of conceptual clarity though is countered, and it is submitted ‘trumped’82, by 
the normative value of citizenship. Indeed Bosniak suggests that because of this normative value, 
and it’s resonance with people, citizenship creates such profound disagreements, arguments and 
discussions over its meaning, application and implications for normal life. 
 
Citizenship of the Union, as a form of postnationalism83 or transnationalism84, offers an 
opportunity to cast citizenship in an alternative way to that envisaged in traditional citizenship 
dialogue where citizenship has become inexorably linked to nationality85, and the nation to the 
State. Nationality is the “ideological glue”86 that binds a group of individuals around a set of 
shared institutions and a common political culture with sovereignty over a specific territorial 
area87. The resultant identity includes citizens and excludes non-citizens, with rights being 
granted to citizens by the nation-State. The formation of citizenship of the Union, a form of 
citizenship external to the nation-State, provided an opportunity to “re-imagine communities”88 
and to delineate the nation, constituted by an affinity group with shared genealogical origins, 
language, historic myths and culture, from the State, constituted by a civil society, politics and 
                                                 
81 Bosniak L., “Citizenship”, in Cane P., Tushnet M., (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, 2003, OUP at 
183. 
82 Dworkin R. Taking Rights Seriously, 1977, Duckworth at 85. 
83 Shaw J., “Citizenship of the Union: Towards Post-National Membership?” in European University Institute (Ed.), 
Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law Vol. VI-1, Nijhoff, 1998, 237 and “Postnational 
Constitutionalism in the European Union”, (1999) 6 JEPP 579. 
84 Soysal Y., Limits of Citizenship – Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe, University of Chicago, 1994 
at 148. 
85 Miller D., “Bounded Communities” in Citizenship and National Identities, Polity Press, 2000 at 81. 
86 Curtin D., Postnational Democracy: The European Union in Search of a Political Philosophy, Kluwer Law 
International, 1997 at 52. 
87 Bellamy R., Castiglione D., “The Communitarian Ghost in the Cosmopolitan Machine: Constitutionalism, 
Democracy, and the Reconfiguration of Politics in the New Europe” in Bellamy R., (Ed.), Constitutionalism, 
Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives, Avebury, 1996 at 111. 
88 The phrase is adapted from Anderson B., Imagined Communities, Verso, 1991. 
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the law89. This would enable an alternative European identity to be forged to create “an ever 
closer Union among the peoples of Europe”, complimentary to national identity90 and inclusive 
of all the “peoples of Europe” including legally resident TCNs. If this new citizenship was truly 
novel, inclusive and postnational then this could be demonstrated by the application of the right 
to freedom of movement to all legally resident people in the Union, regardless of nationality. 
 
Part II of the EC Treaty is entitled Citizenship of the Union, a concept established by Article 
17EC, which declares ‘[e]very person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a 
citizen of the Union’. This is an area that caused Denmark serious concerns during its first 
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, so to ease these concerns and complement the provision a 
unilateral Declaration by Denmark was added to the TEU. This stated that Union citizenship was 
a political and legal concept that was different to the Danish concept of citizenship and did not 
equate to citizenship of a nation-state, which meant that a national of another MS could not use 
citizenship of the Union to claim Danish citizenship or the attendant rights. The MSs retain the 
right to define who complies with the MS’s nationality provisions91. This has been confirmed by 
the ECJ in Micheletti92 so that the MSs retain the exclusive competence to determine who may 
be one of their nationals93. However, in the recitals of the judgment94, the ECJ inserted a proviso 
or obiter dictum that the MSs must exercise this power “having due regard to Community law”. 
                                                 
89 Franck T.M., “Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice”, (1996) 90 AJIL 359 
at 362. 
90 See Aron R., “Is Multinational Citizenship Possible?” (1974) 41 Social Research 638 who argued that an 
individual could not belong to several polities and enjoy multiple identities. The situation has moved on since 1974 
and Benhabib now describes “a dialectic of rights and identities” across multiple polities, Benhabib S., The Rights of 
Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens, CUP, 2004 at 168. 
91 See Declarations on nationality made by several states (e.g. Germany and the United Kingdom) at the time of the 
signing of the EC Treaty or on accession, and their subsequent alterations with the changes in domestic nationality 
laws. Also see the Declaration on nationality attached to the Treaty on European Union that reserved the 
determination of nationality exclusively to the Member States. 
92 Case C-369/90 M.V. Micheletti and others v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-4239 at 
para.10, noted by d’Oliveira H.U.J., “Case Note”, (1993) 30 CMLRev 623, see Chapter VII of this thesis for 
discussion of Micheletti as it applies to the EEC-Maghreb Agreements. 
93 O’Leary S., The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship, Kluwer Law International, 1996 at 57; O’Leary S., 
“Nationality Law and Community Competence: A Tale of Two Uneasy Bedfellows”, (1992) 12 YEL 353 at 378. 
94 Op. Cit. n.92 at para.10. 
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O’Leary95 claims that this, when coupled with the principle of sincere co-operation in Article 
10EC, could have a considerable impact on the MSs’ competence to determine European 
Citizenship through domestic nationality law, thereby theoretically allowing TCNs to obtain 
direct citizenship rights. In Kaur96, it was argued that the Community could intercede in the 
determination of nationality if there was a breach of fundamental rights, a suggestion first put 
forward by Hall97. As fundamental rights were part of the general principles of EC law then if 
the MS failed to respect them, power would not have been exercised in accordance with 
Community law and the Community could enter this field of competence. The Advocate General 
and the Court chose not to address this point, deciding the matter on a separate issue. In 
subsequent cases the ECJ has held that “it is for each Member State, having due regard to 
Community law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality”98 but that 
“it is not permissible for a Member State to restrict the effects of the grant of the nationality of 
another Member State by imposing an additional condition for recognition of that nationality 
with a view to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms provided for in the Treaty”99. The MSs 
therefore retain their competence to determine the nationality of their own citizens but they are 
not able to impose any unilateral restrictions on the Community rights that are attached to 
nationality of a MS, in particular freedom of movement. The ECJ’s judgment in Chen negatively 
resolved any possibility of TCNs being able to claim direct national citizenship status through a 
Community route and, as it could be argued, the determination of national citizenship is a matter 
solely within the competence of the MSs any claims on the basis of a breach of fundamental 
rights as general principles of Community law would have no purchase on which to bite. 
Therefore, instead of being an inclusive concept separating nationality from citizenship, Union 
                                                 
95 Op. Cit. n.92. 
96 Case C-192/99 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Manjit Kaur [2001] ECR I-1237, noted 
Shah P., “British Nationals under Community Law: The Kaur Case”, (2001) 3 EJML 271 and Toner H., “Case 
Note”, (2002) 39 CMLRev 881. 
97 Hall S., “Loss of Union Citizenship in Breach of Fundamental Rights”, (1996) 21 ELR 129. 
98 Case C-200/02 Zhu & Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] ECR I-9925 at para.37. 
99 Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello v. Belgium [2003] ECR I-11613 at para.28 (noted Ackerman T., “Case Note”, 
(2007) 44 CMLRev 141) and Ibid. at para.39. 
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citizenship could be characterised as a derived “condition of nationality”100. However, the 
retention of the phrase “having due regard to Community law” in the judgment in Kaur that was 
used in Micheletti would appear to maintain some element of Community competence in the 
determination by the MSs of their citizen’s nationality but as yet this remains unresolved101. 
 
The second paragraph of Article 17EC ensures that ‘[c]itizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights 
conferred by the Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby’. Articles 18-21EC 
provide a catalogue of rights for EU citizens with Article 18(1)EC stating that “[e]very citizen of 
the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures 
adopted to give it effect”. These measures could be adopted by the codecision procedure, if the 
Treaty had not provided the necessary powers to attain the objective in Article 18(1)EC (Article 
18(2)EC), although it could not be used for measures involving passports, identity cards, 
residence permits, social security or social protection (Article 18(3)EC). By linking citizenship 
of the Union to nationality of a MS, TCNs are excluded from any rights that could arise as a 
consequence, in particular those concerning freedom of movement. Furthermore by limiting the 
determination of nationality solely to the competence of the MSs, any refinement of a 
Community concept of citizenship is curtailed although its effects on Community nationals has 
been clarified by the ECJ’s jurisprudence. This has created two types of resident within the 
Union: those with access to the full range of Community rights through citizenship of the Union; 
and, those with extremely limited access to Community rights as a TCN.  
 
                                                 
100 Closa C., “Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of the Member States”, (1995) 32 CMLRev 487 at 510. 
101 Jacqueson C., “Union Citizenship and the Court of Justice: Something New Under the Sun? Towards Social 
Citizenship” (2002) 27 ELR 260 at 261. 
69 
 
The Court has developed links between Articles 17 and 18EC and Article 12EC, advancing the 
status of citizens102 of the Union and correspondingly diminishing that of TCNs. In Martínez 
Sala103 a child-raising allowance was denied to a Spanish woman legally resident in Germany, 
but without a residence permit, on the basis that she was not a worker. She had not worked for 
seven years. The ECJ held, inter alia, that such a refusal was direct discrimination on grounds of 
nationality and “a citizen of the European Union, such as the appellant in the main proceedings, 
lawfully resident in the territory of the host Member State, can rely on Article [12EC] in all 
situations which fall within the scope ratione materiae of Community law”104. Bickel and 
Franz105 concerned a German and Austrian national involved in criminal proceedings in the 
province of Bolzano in Italy106. Court proceedings were conducted in Italian although residents 
of Bolzano could opt for German as an alternative. However, being non-residents of Bolzano, 
this right was not extended to Mr Bickel or Mr Franz. In holding that this constituted 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality, the Court stressed not only that the accused were 
the potential recipients of services, but also that they were exercising their free movement rights 
as citizens of the Union107. In Grzelczyk108 a French national worked in Belgium to pay for his 
                                                 
102 It is not intended to expand on the definition and concept of citizenship in this thesis. Suffice to say that 
“citizenship” implies a process of inclusion and exclusion of rights to individuals commonly on the basis of 
nationality. See Elsmore M.J., Starup P., “Union Citizenship – Background, Jurisprudence, and Perspective: The 
Past, Present, and Future of Law and Policy”, (2007) 26 YEL 57. 
103 Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala (Maria) v. Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691; noted O’Leary S., “Putting Flesh on 
the Bones of European Union Citizenship”, (1999) 24 ELR 68 and Tomuschat C., “Case Note”, (2000) 37 CMLRev 
449. See also Fries S., Shaw J., “Citizenship of the Union: First Steps in the European Court of Justice”, (1998) 4 
EPL 533. 
104 Ibid. at para.61. 
105 Case C-274/96 Criminal proceedings against Horst Otto Bickel and Ulrich Franz [1998] ECR I-7637; noted 
Martin D., “Case Note”, (1999) 1 EJML 149 and Bulterman M., “Case Note”, (1999) 36 CMLRev 1325. 
106 In Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmo di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECR-I 4139, an Italian resident 
of Bolzano, bilingual in both German and Italian, was studying in Austria when he applied to take part in a 
competition for a post with a bank in Bolzano. A requirement for the post was a certificate of bilingualism issued by 
the authorities of Bolzano after an examination conducted only within the region. The Court, finding for Mr 
Angonese, held that the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality in Article 39EC applied to 
private persons (para.36) and that grounds for entering an employment competition relied exclusively on a particular 
diploma issued by a particular region of a Member State constituted that discrimination (para.45). Interestingly the 
Court made no attempt to link the prohibition of discrimination in Article 39EC with the Treaty’s citizenship 
provisions. Noted Martin D., “Case Note”, (2000) 2 EJML 431 and Lane R., Shuibhne N.N., “Case Note”, (2000) 37 
CMLRev 1237. 
107 Ibid. at para.15. 
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studies there. In his final year he ceased work to concentrate on his studies and applied for a 
maintenance grant, that was only available to Belgian nationals and aliens if covered by Reg. 
1612/68, and was refused. The Court decided that to determine the scope of application of 
Article 12EC it would have to be read in conjunction with the citizenship provisions of the EC 
Treaty109. By pursuing university studies in a MS other than the State of which he is a national, a 
citizen of the Union is exercising his Community free movement right and cannot be deprived of 
the possibility of relying on Article 12EC. The ECJ found that the conditions imposed upon non-
Belgian MS nationals for the maintenance grant violated both Articles 12 and 17EC. In a bold 
statement the Court declared that “Union Citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to 
enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality” although this was “subject to 
such exceptions as are expressly provided for”110. This was repeated in D’Hoop111 where a 
Belgian national was refused a tideover allowance by the Belgian authorities because she had 
completed her secondary education in France. The ECJ held that national legislation that placed 
some of a State’s own nationals at a disadvantage compared to the State’s remaining nationals 
simply because they exercised their right to freedom of movement to pursue education in another 
                                                                                                                                                             
108 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide D’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193; noted van 
der Mei A.P., “Freedom of Movement and Financial Aid for Students”, (2001) 3 EJSS 181, Martin D., “Case Note”, 
(2002) 4 EJML 127 and Iliopoulou A., Toner H., “Case Note”, (2002) 39 CMLRev 609. 
109 Ibid. at para.30. 
110 Ibid. at para.31. 
111 Case C-224/98 D’Hoop v. Office National d’Emploi [2002] ECR I-6191 at para.28 (noted Martin D., “Case 
Note”, (2003) EJML 143 and Iliopoulou A., Toner H., “A New Approach to Discrimination Against Free Movers”, 
(2003) 28 ELR 389). The statement that “citizenship of the Union is destined to be the fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States” has appeared frequently since in the ECJ’s case law on Union citizenship. See Case 
C-413/99 Baumbast v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091 at para.82 (noted Martin D., 
“Case Note”, (2003) 5 EJML 155 and van der Mei A.P., “Residence and the Evolving Notion of European Union 
Citizenship”, (2003) 5 EJML 419. For more in depth analysis see Dougan M., Spaventa E., “Educating Rudy and the 
Non-English Patient: A Double Bill on Residency Rights under Article 18EC”, (2003) 28 ELR 699, Golynker O., 
“Partial Migration in the EU after the Baumbast Case: Bringing Social and Legal Perspectives Together”, (2004) 15 
KCLJ 367, and Dougan M., “The Constitutional Dimension to the Case Law on Union Citizenship”, (2006) 31 ELR 
613), Case C-138/02 Collins v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] ECR I-2703 at para.61 (noted 
Golynker O., “Jobseekers’ Rights in the European Union: Challenges of Changing the Paradigm of Social 
Solidarity” (2005) 30 ELR 111 and Dougan M., “The Court Helps Those Who Help Themselves…The Legal Status 
of Migrant Work-Seekers under Community Law in the Light of the Collins Judgment”, (2005) 7 EJSS 7), Op. Cit. 
n.98 at para.25, Op. Cit. n.99 Garcia Avello at para.22, Case C-224/02 Pusa v. Osuuspankkien Keskinäinen 
Vakuutusyhtiö [2003] ECR I-5763 at para.16, Case C-524/06 Huber v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, judgment of 
16 December 2008, nyr at para.69. 
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MS, was discriminatory. It was contrary to the principles that underpinned citizenship of the 
Union, namely the “guarantee of the same treatment in law in the exercise of the citizen’s 
freedom to move”112. 
 
The case law of the ECJ on the relationship between citizenship and discrimination has 
continued to develop since these early cases and a clear strategy has now become apparent. The 
first stage of the Court’s analysis is to determine if the facts of the case fall within the material 
scope of Community law and whether the individuals concerned are covered by its personal 
scope. If so then Article 18(1)’s right to freedom of movement and residence can be exercised, 
“subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted 
to give it effect.” At this point Article 12EC is engaged requiring this freedom to be exercised 
without discrimination on the basis of nationality. The Court’s approach has been striking, 
imaginative and inclusive. In Garcia Avello113, it was held that a MS could not stop a married 
couple, both with Union citizenship and living in another MS, from changing the surname of 
their children to be in accordance with the law and tradition of the second MS. In Trojani114, Mr 
Trojani worked in a hostel for the reward of benefits in kind and did not come under Articles 43 
or 49EC. It was for the national court to determine if the paid activity that he carried out was real 
and genuine so that he could be classified as a worker under Article 39EC. However, he could 
enjoy a right of residence in the host MS as a consequence of the direct application of Article 
18(1)EC and as he was in possession of residence permit issued by Belgium then he could rely 
on Article 12EC in order to claim a social assistance benefit. In Zhu and Chen115, Mr Chen, a 
Chinese national, was a director and majority shareholder of a Chinese company whose wife 
                                                 
112 Ibid. at paras.34-35. 
113 Op. cit. n.99. 
114 Case C-456/02 Trojani v. CPAS [2004] ECR I-7573. See van der Mei A.P., “Union Citizenship and the ‘De-
Nationalisation’ of the Territorial Welfare State”, (2005) 7 EJML 203. 
115 Op. Cit. n.99; noted Carlier J-Y., “Case Note”, (2005) 42 CMLRev 1121 and Velluti S., “Case Note”, (2005) 
45(Sum) SLR 35. For more detailed analysis see Tryfonidou A., “Further Cracks in the ‘Great Wall’ of the 
European Union?” (2005) 11 EPL 527 and Kunoy B., “A Union of National Citizens: The Origins of the Court’s 
Lack of Avant-Gardisme in the Chen Case”, (2006) 43 CMLRev 179. 
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worked with him. They frequently travelled to and within the EU on business, particularly the 
UK. They had a child, born in China, but Mrs Chen decided to give birth to her second child in 
Belfast. Upon her birth, Catherine Zhu was granted Irish nationality, in accordance with the law 
of the Irish Republic, and Mrs Chen, with Catherine, returned to the UK and settled in Cardiff. 
Mrs Chen claimed that Catherine was a Union citizen and therefore had the right to freedom of 
movement and residence and she had a similar right to residence as Catherine’s primary carer. 
The Court agreed with Mrs Chen that if Catherine was covered by appropriate sickness insurance 
and remained in the care of a TCN with sufficient resources for Catherine so as not to be a 
burden on the public finances of the host MS then she had a right of residence as a Union citizen 
in accordance with Article 18(1)EC. Furthermore the same provisions allowed the child’s 
primary carer, which in this instance was Mrs Chen, to reside with the child. There is not, 
however, an absolute right to reside anywhere in the EU of the EU citizen’s choosing. The right 
of residence is dependent on the provisions of the EC Treaty and implementing legislation 
(Article 18(1)EC) and so must comply with these requirements116. In W and X117 two Chinese 
nationals entered the UK illegally from Holland. X moved to Ireland, followed by W, to give 
birth to their baby Q before returning to the UK. As in Chen, Q was an Irish citizen as she was 
born in Ireland, and so the parents claimed a right of residence in the UK derived from Article 
18EC and a derivative right for W and X as Q’s carers. The Court of Appeal held that W and X 
did not have sufficient resources to look after their child as, because they were illegal 
immigrants, they were unable to work. Thus the parents had no right of residence with their 
child, who also had no right of residence in the UK as the carers could not satisfy the 
requirement that they had sufficient resources. 
 
                                                 
116 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Vitale [1996] 2 CMLR 587 and Ali v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2006] 3 CMLR 10. 
117 W (China) & X (China) v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 1 CMLR 17. See also the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment in Liu v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 1 CMLR 27 where in 
similar circumstances to W & X, the income of the parents was precarious as the permission granted to work was 
dependent on the outcome of the case. 
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The result of these cases is the transformation of the right to non-discrimination as a right in 
itself into a right dependent upon citizenship of the Union118 thereby developing it as a citizen 
rather than a human right and confirming the conclusion reached on the Race Directive above. 
Such a right is granted to a Union citizen but not to a TCN, unless a sufficient connection to a 
Union citizen can be established. This undermines the principle of non-discrimination, a 
principle designed to give substantive effect to the right to equality119, so that TCNs are denied 
access to protection when they are in a similar situation to citizens of the Union. 
 
The cases of Spain v. UK120 and Eman and Sevinger121 appear to have opened a chink in the door 
of Union citizenship to TCNs. In 1999 the ECtHR in Matthews v. UK122 had found that the 
decision of the UK to exclude British citizens resident in Gibraltar from voting in elections to the 
European Parliament was an infringement of Article 3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, that 
requires States to conduct free elections for their people to choose representatives for the 
national legislature. The UK enabled Gibraltar residents to vote in European Parliamentary 
elections with the enactment of the European Parliament (Representation) Act 2003. Although 
Spain and the UK had come to a bilateral agreement over this matter, Spain brought an action 
against the UK, under Article 227EC, before the ECJ. In a similar action, Mr Eman and Mr 
Sevinger objected to the Dutch rejection of their application to vote in European Parliamentary 
elections, even though they were Dutch nationals resident in Aruba. The ECJ found, inter alia, 
that although Article 17(2)EC provides that Union citizens are to enjoy the rights conferred by 
the Treaty, the Treaty also recognises rights that are not linked to Union citizenship or even to 
                                                 
118 Bell M., Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union, OUP, 2002 at 39. 
119 See Barnard C., “The Principle of Equality in the Community Context: P, Grant, Kalanke and Marschall: Four 
Uneasy Bedfellows?” (1998) 57 CLJ 352, who argues that the principle of non-discrimination provides the 
substantive filling for the vacuum of formal equality suggested by Westen P., “The Empty Idea of Equality”, (1982) 
95 HLR 537. 
120 Case C-145/04 Spain v. UK [2006] ECR I-7917. 
121 Case C-300/04 Eman & Sevinger v. College van burgemeester en wethouders van Den Haag [2006] ECR I-8055. 
122 Matthews v. UK (1999) 28 EHRR 361; noted Schermers H.G., “Case Note” (1999) 36 CMLRev 673. See also 
Reid A.S., Doherty M., “Voting Rights for the European Parliament: Whose Responsibility?” [1999] EHRLR 420, 
King T., “Ensuring Human Rights Review of Intergovernmental Acts in Europe”, (2000) 25 ELR 79, and Canor I., 
“Primus Inter Pares. Who is the Ultimate Guardian of Fundamental Rights in Europe?” (2000) 25 ELR 3. 
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nationality of the MSs. Thus the rights identified in the EC Treaty are not limited to Union 
citizens123. Furthermore it is for the MS to decide who is to vote in European Parliamentary 
elections124, and does not exclude an individual who is not a Union citizen from voting or indeed 
standing for election125. It is submitted however that this is a narrow chink in the door that can 
only apply if the EC Treaty either specifies that the right is applicable to any person, whether 
they are EU citizens or TCNs, or if the Treaty is ambiguous and the ECJ subsequently interpret it 
broadly to encompass both TCNs and EU citizens. The right of free movement and residence in 
Article 18(1)EC is clearly limited to “every citizen of the Union” and thus TCNs are specifically 
excluded from the right. 
 
The inclusive nature of the citizenship provisions, and with it the corollary exclusion of TCNs, is 
likely to become more marked following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Although the 
substantive elements of both citizenship and non-discrimination will remain little changed, Part 
II of, what is now going to be called, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is to 
be re-titled ‘Non-Discrimination and Citizenship’, thereby legislatively linking the two 
principles. 
 
In 2004 EU Citizenship developed a new phase with the enactment of Directive 2004/38/EC126. 
This provides a single legislative instrument to regulate the free movement rights of citizens of 
the Union but importantly for TCNs it also provides rights for family members as well. The 
recitals begin by providing the rationale for the Directive. First, it is confirmed that ‘[c]itizenship 
of the Union confers on every citizen of the Union a primary and individual right to move and 
                                                 
123 Op. Cit. n.120 at paras.73 & 74. 
124 Op. Cit. n.121 at para.45 
125 Op. Cit. n.120 at para.70. 
126 European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, O.J. 2004 L158/77. See White R.C.A., 
“Free Movement, Equal Treatment, and Citizenship of the Union”, (2005) 54 ICLQ 885 and Hailbronner K., “Union 
Citizenship and Access to Social Benefits”, (2005) 42 CMLRev 1245. 
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reside freely within the territory of the Member States’ but that is subject to limitations and 
conditions in the EC Treaty and secondary legislation (Recital 1). Furthermore free movement of 
persons is one of the fundamental freedoms of the internal market and that when people exercise 
this fundamental freedom and the right to reside, their fundamental status should be citizens of 
the Union (Recitals 2 & 3). Importantly for TCNs, Recital 5 declares that for the right of Union 
citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of the MSs to be exercised under objective 
conditions of freedom and dignity, then the right to free movement and residence must also be 
granted to their family members, irrespective of nationality127. The right to family reunification 
is an important principle in Europe128, let alone the Community, evidenced by the Family 
Reunification Directive129, although family members of Union citizens are outside its personal 
scope (Article 3(3)). In Commission v. Germany130 it was held that the facilitation of freedom of 
movement contained two elements. First, “the importance, from a human point of view, of 
having his entire family with him”, and second, “the importance, from all points of view, of the 
integration of the worker and his family into the host Member State without any difference in 
treatment in relation to nationals of that State”. Family reunion therefore has an individual and 
Community importance. In Commission v. Spain131 the latter importance was stressed when the 
Court stated “that the Community legislature has recognised the importance of ensuring 
protection for the family life of nationals of the Member States in order to eliminate obstacles to 
the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty”. In this case two Community 
nationals were exercising their right of freedom of movement from their home MSs to Spain. 
Spain refused residence permits for their TCN spouses on the basis that they should have applied 
for visas at the Spanish Consulate in the home MS. The Court stated that “the right of entry into 
                                                 
127 Recital 5, emphasis added. 
128 See Article 8ECHR. For commentary on this right to family life and the ECtHR case law see Lambert H., “The 
European Court of Human Rights and the Right of Refugees and Other Persons in Need of Protection to Family 
Reunion”, (2000) 11 IJRL 427. 
129 Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, O.J. 2003 L251/12. See Chapter V of this 
thesis for a detailed analysis. 
130 Case 249/86 Commission v. Germany [1989] ECR 1263 at para. 11. 
131 Case C-157/03 Commission v. Spain [2005] ECR I-2911 at para.26. 
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the territory of a Member State granted to a third country national who is the spouse of a national 
of a Member State derives from the family relationship alone”132. Thus the right of entry is 
derived from a TCN’s status as a family member of a MS national133, not as a right owned by the 
TCN in their own right. 
 
Two sets of definitions of family members are provided in Articles 2(2)134 and 3(2) of Dir. 
2004/38. The difference between the two is that the Directive applies in full to EU citizens and 
their family members as defined in Article 2(2) who move to or reside in another MS (Article 
3(1)), whereas MSs must only facilitate entry and residence for family members in Article 3(2) 
in accordance with that MS’s domestic law. Therefore there is no right of entry or residence in 
the Directive for persons covered by Article 3(2) as this is a matter for national law135. Article 
2(2) family members are: (a) the spouse; (b) the partner136 with whom the Union citizen has 
contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a MS, if the legislation of 
the host MS treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the 
conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host MS137; (c) the direct descendants who 
are under the age of 21 or are dependants and those of the spouse or partner138; and, (d) the 
                                                 
132 Ibid. at para.28. 
133 Case C-503/03 Commission v. Spain [2006] ECR I-1097 (noted Brouwer E., “Case Note”, (2008) 45 CMLRev 
1251) at para.42. 
134 For previous definitions see Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC on freedom of movement for workers within the 
Community, O.J.Sp.Ed. 1968 L257/2, Article 10; Council Directive 73/148/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on 
movement and residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the 
provision of service, O.J. 1973 L172/14, Article 1(1); Council Directive 90/364/EEC on the right of residence, O.J. 
1990 L180/26, Article 1(2); Council Directive 90/365/EEC on the right of residence for employees and self-
employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity, O.J. 1990 L180/28, Article 1(2); and, Council 
Directive 93/96/EEC on the right of residence for students, O.J. 1993 L317/59, Article 1(2). 
135 See the three UK Asylum and Immigration Tribunal cases clarifying this point: AF & FP v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2007] UKAIT 48, AK v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKAIT 74, and 
ST v. The Entry Clearance Officer, Mumbai [2007] UKAIT 78. 
136 Incorporating the judgment in Case 59/85 Netherlands v. Reed [1986] ECR 1283. 
137 It is worth noting that in the UK the Civil Partnership Act 2004 established the legal framework for civil 
partnerships of same sex couples (s.1) but not for those of non-same sex couples (s.3(1)(a)). Thus a homosexual 
civil partner may now be considered a partner under Article 2(2) Dir. 2004/38 if they have registered their 
relationship, but a heterosexual partner would not fall within the definition. See Bell M., “Employment Law 
Consequences of the Civil Partnership Act 2004”, (2006) 35 ILJ 179 for an analysis of the legislation. 
138 The ECJ held in Case C-291/05 Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v. Eind [2007] ECR I-10719 
(noted Martin D., “Case Note”, (2008) 10 EJML 365 at 373) that this includes TCNs who did not have a right of 
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dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or partner. Article 3(2) 
includes person who are: (a) any other family members, irrespective of their nationality, not 
falling under the definition in Article 2(2) who, in the country from which they have come, are 
dependants or members of the household of the Union citizen having the primary right of 
residence, or where serious health grounds strictly require the personal care139 of the family 
member by the Union citizen; and, (b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable 
relationship, duly attested. ‘Dependent’ as defined in Jia140 is determined by “having regard to 
their financial and social conditions, [when] they are not in a position to support themselves. The 
need for material support must exist in the State of origin of those relatives or the State whence 
they came at the time when they apply to join the Community national”. The host MS must carry 
out an extensive examination of their personal circumstances and any refusal of entry must be 
justified. 
 
The personal scope of Dir. 2004/38 ensures that the rights prescribed for TCNs are not enjoyed 
on the basis of their own individual capacity but are derived from, or piggybacked on, the rights 
of another person where the right holder must have exercised a freedom of movement 
Community right for the derivative right to be claimed. In Morson and Jhanjan141, two Dutch 
nationals of Surinamese extraction were working in the Netherlands. They brought their 
Surinamese mothers to visit them as tourists and asked the Dutch authorities for permission for 
them to stay as the women were dependent on their sons. The Dutch authorities refused and the 
mothers sought to rely on ex-Article 7EEC (now Article 12EC) to take advantage of Article 
                                                                                                                                                             
residence in the Union citizen’s home MS and was not affected by the fact that the Union citizen was not 
economically active. 
139 The terms “serious health grounds”, “strictly” and “personal care” have been interpreted reasonably generously 
by the UK Asylum and Immigration Tribunal in TR v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKAIT 
4. 
140 Case C-1/05 Yunying Jia v. Migrationsverket [2007] ECR I-1 at para.37; noted Martin D., “Case Note”, (2007) 9 
EJML 457, Olivier B., Reestman J.H., “Case Note”, (2007) 3 EuConst 463, Elsmore M., Starup P., “Case Note”, 
(2007) 44 CMLRev 787 and Currie S., “Case Note”, (2007) 51(Sum) SLR 28. 
141 Joined Cases 35 & 36/82 Morson and Jhanjan v. Netherlands [1982] ECR 3723 at paras.14-16. 
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10(1)(b) of Reg. 1612/68 (now replaced by Article 2(2)(d) of Dir. 2004/38) which permitted 
‘dependent relatives in the ascending line of the worker’ to install themselves with nationals of a 
MS, irrespective of their own nationality. The ECJ held that the objective of Reg. 1612/68 was to 
facilitate free movement of workers as an essential factor in the establishment of a common 
market and unfortunately Article 10(1) of Reg. 1612/68 only applies where “a worker who is a 
national of one Member State…is employed in the territory of another Member State”. The ECJ 
thus concluded that there was no factor linking the women with Community law, as their sons, 
on whom they were dependent, had not exercised their right to free movement within the EC142. 
It can be claimed that these persons become subordinated to the will of the right holder and the 
polity as a whole and, as Weiler143 has observed, they become a “thing” “which serves the 
purpose of ensuring free movement”. Therefore a claim to an indirect right requires the two 
elements of a Community relationship and movement of the primary right holder144. 
 
Article 5 of Dir. 2004/38 governs the right of entry to a MS, although it is without prejudice to 
the provisions on travel documents applicable to national border controls145. Union citizens must 
be granted leave to enter a MS’s territory with a valid identity card or passport, and without the 
requirement of an entry visa, or an equivalent formality. Family members who are TCNs must 
also be granted leave to enter a MS’s territory with a valid passport. However, family member 
TCNs will be required to have an entry visa in accordance with Reg. 539/01146 or, where 
appropriate, in accordance with national law. In such circumstances the MSs must grant every 
                                                 
142 See also Cases Joined C-64/96 & 65/96 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Uecker and Jacquet v. Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen [1997] ECR I-3171. 
143 Weiler, J.H.H., “Thou Shalt not Oppress a Stranger: On the Judicial Protection of the Human Rights of non-EC 
Nationals”, (1992) 3 EJIL 65 at 90. 
144 Cremona M. “Citizens of Third Countries: Movement and Employment of Migrant Workers within the European 
Union”, (1995) 2 LIEI 87. 
145 See Op. Cit. n.17. 
146 Council Regulation 539/2001/EC listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, (subsequently amended 
by Regs. 2414/2001/EC, 453/2003/EC and 851/2005/EC), O.J. 2001 L81/1. See Chapter V of this thesis. 
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facility to obtain the necessary visas147, free of charge and as soon as possible through an 
accelerated procedure. Where an individual in this situation presents a valid residence card in 
accordance with Article 10 of Dir. 2004/38 then they will be exempted from the visa requirement 
and their passports will not be stamped with an entry or exit stamp. If a Union citizen or a family 
member TCN does not have the necessary travel documentation then they must be given every 
reasonable opportunity to obtain them, have them brought to them in a reasonable time period, or 
to prove by other means that they are covered by the right of free movement, before the MS 
refuses them entry. However, a family member accompanying a Community worker without a 
valid identity card or passport or, where necessary, a visa cannot be denied entry to a MS where 
they can prove their identity and conjugal ties148. Article 5(5) sanctions the MS to require an 
individual to report their presence on the MS’s territory within a reasonable and non-
discriminatory time period. If the individual fails to comply with this requirement then the MS 
can impose proportionate and non-discriminatory sanctions149. A complimentary right to exit the 
territory of a MS is included in Article 4 for Union citizens with a valid passport or identity card 
and family member TCNs holding a valid passport but without the imposition of an exit visa or 
equivalent formality. MSs must issue and renew identity cards and passports to their own 
nationals, stating their nationality, in accordance with their national laws. The passport must be 
valid for a minimum renewal period of five years for all MSs and countries that a passport holder 
must transit when travelling between MSs, and for States that do not issue identity cards. 
 
The right of entry creates a distinction between nationals of a MS, who can move either as Union 
citizens in their own right or as family members of an EU citizen, and TCN family members, 
                                                 
147 Op. Cit. n.131 at para.33. 
148 Case C-459/99 Mouvement contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie ABSL (MRAX) v. Belgium 
[2002] ECR I-6591 at para.62. 
149 In Case 159/79 R v. Pieck [1980] ECR 2171 and Case 118/75 Italy v. Watson and Belmann [1976] ECR 1185, 
the ECJ found that the proportionate and non-discriminatory sanctions should be administrative and the equivalent 
to that for minor offences. A penalty of deportation was disproportionate. 
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who must hold or be given every opportunity to obtain a visa150. Although, after MRAX, the 
possession of a visa is a purely administrative requirement if there are alternative ways to prove 
a TCN’s identity and relationship with the EU citizen, it nevertheless creates a perception of 
difference or exclusion based purely on nationality151. 
 
Chapter III of Dir. 2004/38 provides details of the complex system for establishing an 
individual’s right of residence. The right of residence is accompanied by the issuing of a 
residence permit, card or certificate by the national authorities. This is a purely administrative 
measure that does not provide rights for the holder and only establishes the position of the 
individual with regard to provisions of Community law152. The effect is that if a person can 
prove their identity and nationality unequivocally by other means other than a valid identity card 
or passport then failure to present the passport or identity card cannot lead to their residence 
application being refused153. A MS cannot refuse to issue a residence permit and to issue an 
expulsion order on the sole reason that the TCN family member has entered the MS unlawfully 
where they are able to prove their identity and relationship with a national of a MS154. 
Furthermore a MS cannot refuse to issue a residence permit to a TCN family member who has 
entered the territory of that MS lawfully, nor issue an expulsion order, on the sole ground that 
their visa has expired before they applied for a residence permit155. 
 
The conditions for residence now apply to three types of residence: short term; long term; and, 
permanent. Article 6 applies to short term residency of up to three months156 so that a Union 
                                                 
150 Carrera S., “What Does Free Movement Mean in Theory and Practice in an Enlarged EU?” (2005) 11 ELJ 699 at 
716. 
151 Barber N.W., “Citizenship, Nationalism and the European Union”, (2002) 27 ELR 241. 
152 Op. Cit. n.132 at para.28. 
153 Case C-215/03 Oulane v. Minister voor Vreemdelinganzaken en Integratie [2005] ECR I-1215 at paras.25-26. 
154 Ibid. at para.80. 
155 Ibid. at para.91. 
156 This three month period commences from the date of entry to the host MS, not from when the initial leave to 
remain expires. See EA v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKAIT 17. 
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citizen and his/her TCN family members have a right of residence on the territory of another MS 
without any conditions or formalities other than holding a valid passport or identity card, so long 
as they do not become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host MS 
(Article 14(1)). However, recourse to the social assistance system of the host MS is not to lead to 
expulsion as the automatic consequence (Article 14(3)). 
 
Articles 7-11 deal with the right of residence for longer term residency of greater than three 
months and the administrative formalities associated with that stay. Article 7(1) provides that 
right of residence for Union citizens on the territory of another MS so long as they satisfy the 
criteria in that Article. These are that they are workers, individuals with sufficient resources157 
and comprehensive sickness insurance not to become a burden on the host MS, students with 
sufficient resources and comprehensive sickness insurance, and their family members. For this 
longer term of residency, the host MS may require Union citizens to register with the relevant 
national authorities (Article 8(1)). Article 9 provides the right to a residence card for TCN family 
members of a Union citizen to be issued no later than six months after the application 
submission, with a certificate of application being issued immediately (Article 10(1)) that will be 
valid for five years from the date of issue or for the length of residence of the Union citizen if it 
is less than five years (Article 11(1)). Its validity cannot be affected by temporary absences of 
less than six months in a year, longer absences for compulsory military service or one absence of 
a maximum twelve month period for important reasons158. 
 
                                                 
157 Article 8(4) provides: ‘Member States may not lay down a fixed amount which they regard as “sufficient 
resources”, but they must take into account the personal situation of the person concerned. In all cases this amount 
shall not be higher than the threshold below which nationals of the host Member State become eligible for social 
assistance, or, where this criterion is not applicable, higher than the minimum social security pension paid by the 
host Member State.’ 
158 Article 11(2) gives a non-exhaustive list of examples such as ‘pregnancy and childbirth, serious illness, study or 
vocational training, or a posting in another Member State or a third country’. 
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The right of residence for family members can now be retained on the death or departure of the 
Union citizen, or in the event of divorce, annulment of the marriage or the termination of the 
registered partnership (henceforth collectively known as divorce). Article 12 deals with the 
former and Article 13 the latter with paragraph 1 of both Articles providing this right for family 
members who are themselves nationals of a MS although they must meet the conditions set out 
in Article 7(1). Where the Union citizen dies and the TCN family member has been resident in 
the host MS for at least a year, then he/she retains the right of residence (Article 12(3)) that can 
be permanent if the TCN can meet the conditions in Article 12(1). Furthermore if the Union 
citizen dies or departs the host MS then the right of residence will be retained for the Union 
citizen’s children, and the parent with custody of the children, whilst the children are in full time 
education, regardless of nationality159. Where the Union citizen divorces then a TCN family 
member as defined in Article 2(2) will retain the right of residence where: (a) prior to initiation 
of the divorce the marriage has lasted at least three years, including one year in the host MS; or 
(b) by agreement or court order the TCN spouse has custody of the Union citizen's children; or 
(c) this is warranted by particularly difficult circumstances, such as having been a victim of 
domestic violence during the marriage; or (d) by agreement or court order, the TCN spouse has 
the right of access to a minor child in the host MS (as ordered by the  court) and for as long as is 
required. The right of permanent residence for TCN family members upon the divorce, death or 
departure of a Union citizen is conditional on them continuing to show that they are a worker or 
self-employed person, they are self-sufficient or they are a member of the family, already 
constituted in the host MS, of a person satisfying these requirements. The right of residence for 
family members is retained exclusively on a personal basis so this becomes a directly owned 
                                                 
159 It should be noted that Article 12(3) is not expressly premised on the condition of self-sufficiency, unlike Article 
12(2), a question about which the Court of Appeal has referred a case to the ECJ under Article 234EC. See London 
Borough of Harrow v. Ibrahim & Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 2 CMLR 30, Case C-310/08 
London Borough of Harrow v. Ibrahim & Secretary of State for the Home Department O.J. 2008 C247/8. See also 
Teixeira v. London Borough of Lambeth & Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 1088, 
Case C-480/08 Teixeira v. London Borough of Lambeth & Secretary of State for the Home Department O.J. 2009 
C32/14. 
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right by that person. TCN family members, to whom Article 12(2) and 13(2) apply, acquire the 
right of permanent residence after living legally for five consecutive years in the host MS160.  
 
Where the conditions for the right to remain in Article 12 and 13 are not satisfied, the residence 
document of the TCN can be withdrawn by the host MS. This is because the purpose for the 
TCN family member’s presence in the host MS is to ensure the freedom of movement of the EU 
citizen and does not provide a primary or direct right for the TCN family member but merely a 
derivative or indirect right161. However, where the marriage is intact, even though the 
relationship has ended, the couple have separated and even not living together anymore, the right 
of residence remains. In Diatta v. Land Berlin162 a Senegalese national had married a French 
national and both lived and worked in Berlin. After a period of time the marriage broke down 
and the Senegalese wife moved out of the matrimonial home. The German authorities refused 
her a residence permit on the basis that she was no longer a family member of an EC national. 
The ECJ held that the spouse’s right of residence was not lost where the couple separated as long 
as they remained married. There was no requirement that residence had to be under the same 
roof. However, the ECJ made clear that there was no independent right of residence for a TCN if 
the relationship with the EC worker failed. In Singh163 an Indian national had married a UK 
national and they had both moved to Germany to work. They remained for a number of years 
before returning to the UK. The ECJ held that an individual may be deterred from leaving their 
own State to undertake economic activities in another MS if they were treated less favourably on 
their return than they would have been if they had entered another MS. Thus a TCN family 
member could enter a MS as a family member of a Union citizen under Community rather than 
                                                 
160 Article 18, which is in Chapter IV of Dir. 2004/38. 
161 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Sandhu [1983] 3 CMLR 131. See also UK Asylum 
and Immigration Tribunal judgments in LB & MB v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKAIT 15 
and DA v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKAIT 27. 
162 Case 267/83 Diatta v. Land Berlin [1985] ECR 567; noted Woods L., “Family Rights in the EU – Disadvantaging 
the Disadvantaged?” (1999) 11 Child & Family LQ 17. 
163 Case C-370/90 R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Secretary of State for the Home Department (Surinder 
Singh) [1992] ECR I-4265. 
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national law. In Akrich164, Mr Akrich was a Moroccan national who entered the UK on a tourist 
visa, was denied leave to remain as a student and a few months later was convicted of criminal 
offences and deported. He returned illegally, married Mrs Akrich and applied for leave to remain 
that was refused. He asked to be deported to Dublin where Mrs Akrich had moved to work in 
order to then move back to the UK and take advantage of the Singh ruling. The Court held, in a 
somewhat elliptical judgment, that “[i]n order to benefit in a situation such as that at issue in the 
main proceedings from the rights provided for in Article 10 of Reg. 1612/68 [and now Article 
2(2) of Dir. 2004/38], the national of a non-Member State, who is the spouse of a citizen of the 
Union, must be lawfully resident in a Member State when he moves to another Member State to 
which the citizen of the Union is migrating or has migrated”165. Where the Union citizen, 
established in a MS and married to a TCN with a right to remain in that MS, moves to another 
MS to work, that move must not result in the loss of the opportunity lawfully to live together. 
This is the reason why Reg. 1612/68 Article 10 (and now Dir. 2004/38 Article 2(2)) conferred on 
a spouse the right to install themselves in that other MS166.  The motives for the Union citizen to 
exercise their right to free movement are irrelevant, and they cannot be taken into account when 
assessing the legal situation of the couple. However, a marriage of convenience would constitute 
an abuse of Community law167. When considering a Union citizen returning to their home State 
after exercising their free movement rights, accompanied by their TCN spouse with whom they 
have resided in the other MS, and the marriage is genuine although the residence of the TCN 
spouse has not been lawful, due regard must be had to the right to family life in Article 
8ECHR168.  
 
                                                 
164 Case C-109/01 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607; noted van der Mei 
A.P., “Case Note”, (2004) 6 EJML 277 and Spaventa E., “Case Note”, (2005) 42 CMLRev 225. 
165 Ibid. at para.50. 
166 Ibid. at para.52. 
167 Ibid. at paras.55-57. 
168 Ibid. at para.58 
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Unsurprisingly this difficult judgment has resulted in further cases coming before the Court, the 
first focusing on the meaning of a dependent and the term ‘lawfully resident’. Mrs Jia169 was a 
retired Chinese national whose Chinese son lived with his German wife in Sweden. Mrs Jia’s 
German daughter-in-law was self-employed in Sweden, had exercised her right to free 
movement under Article 43EC and was in possession of a valid residence permit, as was Mrs 
Jia’s son as her spouse. Mrs Jia entered Sweden on a visitor’s permit and, before its expiry, 
applied for a residence permit on the basis of her family member status, particular that of a 
dependent. The Court distinguished Mrs Jia’s position from that of Mr Akrich by finding that 
Mrs Jia was residing lawfully in Sweden and had submitted her application for a residence 
permit in a perfectly correct manner170. The Court reaffirmed previous case law as to the 
definition of ‘dependent’. “The status of ‘dependent’ family member is the result of a factual 
situation characterised by the fact that material support for that family member is provided by the 
Community national who has exercised his[/her] right of free movement or by his[/her] 
spouse”171. As the right to free movement must be interpreted broadly and uniformly, the status 
of dependent family member does not presuppose the existence of a right to maintenance, the 
need to determine the reasons for recourse to that support nor to question if that individual is able 
to support themselves by taking up paid employment172. 
 
Akrich has recently been examined again in Metock173 where the ECJ held that the judgement in 
Akrich requiring a TCN spouse of an EU citizen to be lawfully resident in a MS when the Union 
                                                 
169 Op. Cit. n.140. 
170 Ibid. at para.31. 
171 Ibid. at para.35. See Case 316/85 Centre public d’aide sociale de Courcelles v. Lebon [1987] ECR 2811, 
paras.20-22 and Op. Cit. n.98 at para.43. 
172 Ibid. at para.36. 
173 Case C-127/08 Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] 3 CMLR 39; noted 
Berkowitz N., “Case Comment”, (2008) 22 JIANL 371. See also HB v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2008] UKAIT 69 where the UK Asylum and Immigration Tribunal interpreted the Metock judgment widely. It 
should also be noted that the Court of Appeal in KG (Sri Lanka) & AK (Sri Lanka) v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 13, a case decided before the Metock judgment, used the restrictive finding in 
Akrich. It should also be noted that the UK Asylum and Immigration Tribunal’s decision in KA v. Entry Clearance 
Officer, Khartoum [2008] UKAIT 52 that a TCN family member must be lawfully resident in another MS before 
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citizen exercise their right of freedom of movement had to be reconsidered. In a straight 
overruling of the Akrich case the Court found that prior lawful residence of a TCN spouse of an 
EU citizen in another MS was not required for establishing rights under Dir. 2004/38174. 
 
The right to permanent residence is outlined in Chapter IV of Dir. 2004/38 and is not subject to 
the conditions in Chapter III. A Union citizen, and a TCN family member legally residing with 
him/her, acquires this after residing legally in the host MS for five continuous years (Article 
16(1)&(2)) or shorter if the criteria in Article 17(1) are fulfilled. The continuous period (Article 
16(3)) is not broken by temporary absences and once acquired, permanent residence can only be 
lost by an absence from the host MS exceeding two continuous years. Article 17(4) confronts the 
dilemma for family members if the worker or self-employed person dies before the permanent 
residence conditions have been achieved. In such a situation family members gain the right to 
permanent residence if: (a) the worker or self-employed person had, at the time of death, resided 
continuously on the territory of that MS for two years; or (b) the death resulted from an accident 
at work or an occupational disease; or (c) the surviving spouse lost the nationality of that MS 
following marriage to the worker or self-employed person. A certification document of the right 
to permanent residence must be issued to a Union citizen as soon as possible upon (Article 19) 
with a permanent residence card issued to TCN family members within six months of an 
application, renewable automatically every ten years (Article 20(1)). 
 
The right of residence has been transformed by Dir. 2004/38 from a mere compliment to the 
right of entry to containing significant elements and providing a substantive right to the person it 
                                                                                                                                                             
applying to join her spouse, a Swedish doctor, in the UK is also wrongly decided. The UK has been particularly 
concerned over the effect of the Metock judgment (Council Document 15903/08) although the other MSs do not 
appear to share these concerns (Council Document 16151/1/08), confirmed in the November 2008 JHA Council’s 
Conclusions (Council Document 16325/08). See now the Commission Communication of the report on the 
application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States, COM(2008) 840 final. 
174 Ibid. at para.58. 
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is granted to. There is a notable delineation again between citizens of the Union, who are granted 
the right directly and therefore hold it in their own right, and TCN family members, who are 
granted their right on a derivative basis as belonging to the EU citizen’s family. However, the 
retention of the right of residence upon the death of a Union citizen or divorce and the right to 
permanent residence after five years residing with the EU citizen in the host State are advances 
for TCN family members. Furthermore the fact that these are personal rights, owned by the 
TCN, even though they derive originally from the relationship of the TCN and the EU citizen, 
creates a more inclusive spirit, if not a significant substantive effect, to the concept of Union 
citizenship. 
 
Article 23 provides that the family members of Union citizens, regardless of nationality, who 
have the right of residence or permanent residence, are entitled to take up employment or self-
employment there. 
 
A right to equality for Union citizens and family members is included in Article 24(1) but Article 
24(2) allows the host MS to refuse to provide social assistance during the first three months of 
residence, or, where appropriate, during the long term period of residence provided for in Article 
14(4)(b). Furthermore, prior to acquisition of the right of permanent residence, the host MS is 
not obliged to grant maintenance aid for studies, including vocational training, in the form of 
student grants or loans, to individuals other than workers or self-employed persons, those who 
retain such status, and their family members. 
 
Article 24(1) links the right to equality, and thus the principle of non-discrimination, with the 
concept of citizenship and puts the ECJ’s case law on citizenship and non-discrimination into 
legislative effect. However, the Directive goes further by providing a general equal treatment 
provision and, it is submitted, thereby requiring all forms of non-discrimination between 
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nationals of MSs and citizens of the EU in all areas of EC competence to be eliminated. This 
could have a major effect not only citizenship, but also on the equal treatment of persons in host 
MSs, and can be equated to the national treatment provision of GATT, discussed above. It is also 
significant for TCNs as well, although only for family members of EU citizens, as they must not 
be discriminated against in comparison to a MS national. It should be noted that it is an equality 
provision and so covers all forms of discrimination, especially as the term ‘equal treatment’ is 
not defined and only limited by Article 24(2), that as a derogation from the general right would 
have to be interpreted narrowly. However, there is only a requirement of equal treatment in 
comparison with nationals of the host MS and so there is no obligation on the host MS to respect 
any higher standard right that the individual could possess in his or her home MS before 
exercising their free movement right if the national standard is lower. Article 24(2) also appears 
not to be consistent with the ECJ’s case law in this area. Collins175 concerned an Irishman with 
dual American nationality who spent one semester in the UK in 1978 as part of his college 
studies and returned for a little less than a year in 1980 where he did part-time and casual work. 
He then went to the USA and worked there and in Africa before he returned to the UK in 1988 to 
seek work in the social services sector, but after a week he claimed jobseekers allowance, a 
benefit classified as social assistance. The ECJ held that following the introduction of citizenship 
of the Union and the interpretation by the case law of the ECJ of the right to equal treatment, it 
was no longer possible to exclude from the scope of equal treatment a benefit of a financial 
nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the labour market of a MS176. The UK’s 
legislation was indirectly discriminatory but could be objectively justified by requiring that a 
genuine link exists between the person seeking work and the employment market of that State177. 
 
                                                 
175 Op. Cit. n.111 Case C-138/02. 
176 Ibid. at para.63. 
177 Ibid. at para.69. 
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The rights of MS nationals to enter and reside on another MS’s territory, and the same 
complementary rights for TCN family members, are not unconditional178. Chapter VI of Dir. 
2004/38 outlines the derogations from, or restrictions on, the right to freedom of movement that, 
as they are derogations from a general right, must be applied narrowly179. Thus Article 27(1) 
provides the exhaustive list of grounds of public health, public security and public health, as set 
out in Articles 39(3) and 46(1)EC, that can be used to restrict the right to freedom of movement 
and residence for a Union citizen and a family member, irrespective of nationality. Again these 
grounds cannot be invoked ‘to serve economic ends’. Restrictions based on public policy or 
public security (Article 27(2))180 must be proportionate181 and based exclusively on the personal 
conduct of the individual182, and previous criminal convictions183 cannot in themselves constitute 
grounds for taking measures. The personal conduct of the person must ‘represent a genuine, 
present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. 
Justifications that are isolated from the particulars of the case or that rely on considerations of 
general prevention shall not be accepted’ 184. Article 28 provides for a three-part hierarchy of 
tests for expulsion185 with a non-exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account before the MS 
takes any expulsion decision (Article 28(1)), a permanently resident Union citizen or family 
                                                 
178 Op. Cit. n.133 at para.43 and Case C-441/02 Commission v. Germany [2006] ECR I-3449 at para.32. 
179 Ibid. Case C-441/02 at para.34. 
180 The ground of public health is covered by Article 29. 
181 This is an additional requirement to the same provision in the previous legislation, Article 3(1) of Directive 
64/221/EEC on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals 
which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, O.J. Sp. Ed. 1964 850/64/117. In 
Case C-33/07 Ministerul Administraţiei şi Internelor – Direcţia Generală de Paşapoarte Bucureşti v. Jipa [2008] 3 
CMLR 23 at para.29, the ECJ did not expand any further. 
182 The definition of individual personal conduct has been fleshed out by the ECJ in a series of cases, although this is 
outside the area of this thesis. See Case 67/74 Bonsignore v. Oberstadtdirektor der Stadt Köln [1975] ECR 297, 
Case 30/77 R. v. Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, Case 131/79 R. v Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex parte 
Santillo [1980] ECR 1585, and Case C-348/96 Criminal Proceedings against Calfa [1999] ECR I-11, noted 
Doppelhammer M., “Expulsion: A Test Case for European Union Citizenship”, (1999) 24 ELR 621, Rotaeche C.G., 
Lloréns F.B., “Case Note”, (1999) 1 EJML 357 and Costello C., “Case Note”, (2000) 37 CMLRev 817. 
183 Article 17(3) allows the host Member State to request the individual’s police record from the original country or 
other Member States in certain circumstances. However, such an enquiry is not to be a matter of routine. 
184 This is a new provision not previously included in Dir. 64/221 and amalgamates the previous case law of the 
ECJ. The position in the UK (see R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Marchon [1993] 2 
CMLR 132) where particularly disgraceful criminal conduct could itself merit the deportation of an individual, 
without reference to any propensity to re-offend is not now compatible with Article 27. See MG and VC v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKAIT 53 and LC v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, judgment of 17 August 2007, nyr. 
185 LG (Italy) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 190 at para.19. 
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member, irrespective of nationality, only to be expelled if there are serious grounds of public 
policy or public security (Article 28(2)), or a minor or a Union citizen resident for more than ten 
years only to be expelled if there are imperative grounds of national security (Article 28(3)). The 
term ‘serious’186 is not defined in the Directive and neither are ‘imperative grounds’ as MSs are 
given the competence to determine these. Individuals excluded on the grounds of public policy 
or public security can apply for the lifting of the exclusion order after a reasonable period, 
depending on the circumstances, and in any event after three years from the valid enforcement of 
the final exclusion order by arguing that there has been a material change in the circumstances 
that justified the original decision (Article 32). The MS must reach a decision within six months 
of the submission of the application and during this period the individual has no right of entry to 
the host MS. 
 
Chapter VI represents a significant advancement on the provisions of Dir. 64/221 for the 
protection of individuals, that includes TCN family members, from disproportionate and unfair 
restrictions on the right of free movement, more commonly known as expulsion, imposed by the 
host MS, although much of the improved Articles are based on ECJ jurisprudence. The guidance 
provided on personal conduct and on the protections against expulsion in Article 28 clarify the 
factors to be considered by a national court and give some legal certainty to individuals. The 
inclusion of the requirement of seriousness, although undefined, for the grounds of expulsion for 
those having the right of permanent residence creates a higher threshold that reflects the 
implications for an individual if permanence is rescinded. The final material addition, and one 
that reflects the more inclusive nature of Union citizenship and the prevention of MSs excluding 
persons from their territory for life (Recital 27), is the duration limitation of three years imposed 
                                                 
186 The Court of Appeal in HB v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 3 CMLR 24 was invited to 
make a reference to the ECJ under Article 234EC to clarify the term ‘serious’ but decided against it on the basis that 
the legislation was designed only to provide general guidance, leaving the question to be determined by national 
courts on a case by case basis (at para.31 per Buxton LJ). 
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upon an exclusion order. There is no indication as to how this is to be analysed by the national 
authorities, and ultimately the courts, other than there must be a “material change in the 
circumstances”, which justified the exclusion, and this term is not defined. However, in Article 
33(2) if an exclusion order is not enforced two years after it was issued then the MS must check 
to see if the individual is still a genuine threat to public policy or security and if there has been 
any material change in the circumstances. Therefore it is submitted the “material change in 
circumstances” must be such that the person is not currently, or likely to be in the future, a 
genuine threat to public policy or security. 
 
A final provision in Dir. 2004/38 that may affect TCNs is Article 35, supported by Recital 28, 
that enables MSs to adopt measures to remove any rights provided under the Directive in cases 
of fraud or abuse of rights with the specific example given of marriages of convenience187. 
 
4. FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS 
 
The first paragraph of Article 39EC, stipulates ‘[f]reedom of movement for workers shall be 
secured within the Community’ without any mention of nationality or European Citizenship188. It 
had been considered by some commentators that this may have provided a legal base for direct 
rights for TCNs189 and indeed Plender190 suggested that this was the intention of the founding 
fathers. However, secondary legislation implementing Article 39EC limited this direct free 
                                                 
187 See IS v Entry Clearance Officer, Skopje [2008] UKAIT 31. 
188 O’Leary S., “Nationality Law and Community Competence: A Tale of Two Uneasy Bedfellows” (1992) 12 YEL 
353 at 356. This can be contrasted with Article 43EC where the right to freedom of establishment is limited to 
‘nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State’. 
189 Plender R., “Competence, European Community Law and Nationals of Non-Member States”, (1990) 39 ICLQ 
599 at 604. 
190 Ibid. 
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movement right to nationals of the MSs191, subsequently confirmed by the ECJ in Meade192 in a 
somewhat ambiguous judgment. The ECJ conclusively decided the matter in favour of nationals 
of MSs in Awoyemi193. In comparison to the first paragraph, the second paragraph of Article 
39EC specifically states that this freedom of movement is to entail the prohibition of 
discrimination based on nationality ‘between workers of the Member States’. Article 39(3)EC 
lays out the more specific rights included within the general right of freedom of movement of 
workers. These are the rights to accept and move freely to take up offers of employment, and to 
reside in a MS during and following employment. Limitations to these rights can only be 
justified by recourse to public policy, public security or public health, the details of which are 
provided in Chapter VI of Dir. 2004/38. 
 
Reg. 1612/68 was one of the first pieces of secondary legislation that implemented the principle 
of free movement of workers enunciated in Article 39EC. The principal aim of Reg. 1612/68 is 
to ensure that in each MS workers from other MSs receive treatment which is not discriminatory 
by comparison with that of national workers by providing for the systematic application of the 
rule of national treatment as far as all conditions of employment and work are concerned194. 
Many of the clauses in Reg. 1612/68 provided exclusive rights for nationals of MSs and 
therefore only a small number of the provisions affected TCNs and their free movement. These 
were those dealing with family members of workers (Article 10), the right to employment 
(Article 11), the right to education (Article 12) and the right to equal treatment contained in 
Article 7(2) with Dir. 2004/38 now repealing Articles 10 and 11. 
 
                                                 
191 See e.g. Op. Cit. n.134 Reg. 1612/68 Article 1; Council Directive 68/360/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on 
movement and residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families, O.J.Sp.Ed. 1968 
L253/13, Article 1. 
192 Case 238/83 Caisse d’Allocations Familiales v. Meade [1984] ECR 2631. 
193 Case C-230/97 Awoyemi [1998] ECR I-6781 at para.29. 
194 Case 11/79 Coonan [1980] ECR 1445. 
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Article 12 of Reg. 1612/68 provides that migrant Community workers’ children, resident in the 
host State, have a right to be admitted to that State’s ‘general educational, apprenticeship and 
vocational training courses’. Indeed MSs are exhorted to take ‘steps allowing such children to 
follow the above mentioned courses under the best conditions’. As Oliver195 remarks, the ECJ 
has interpreted Article 12 broadly196, both in the kinds of course covered and in the definition of 
‘access to courses’ to include such facilitative measures as grants197. In Gaal198 the ECJ held that 
Article 12 had a wider remit than Article 10199 so that non-dependent children over the age of 21 
could complete their education successfully. Although most cases in this area have dealt with 
family members who were Community nationals, the ECJ stated in Baumbast200 that TCNs, 
coming within the definition of Article [2(2) of Dir. 2004/38], could also rely on Article 12. 
However, with the introduction of Dir. 2004/38 and the introduction of the condition of self-
sufficiency for continuing residence of TCN family members if the Union citizen departs from 
the host MS, the UK Court of Appeal201 has submitted a reference to the ECJ under Article 
234EC asking if Article 12 includes a criterion for self-sufficiency for TCN family members. 
 
There is no mention in the EC Treaty or secondary legislation of a right to education for family 
members other than children. In Forcheri202 the Italian wife of an Italian Commission official, 
who worked and resided in Belgium, enrolled for a vocational course and was required to pay a 
                                                 
195 Oliver P., “Non-Community Nationals and the Treaty of Rome”, (1985) 5 YEL 57 at 69. 
196 See Case 76/72 Michel S v. Fonds National de Reclassement Social des Handicapes [1973] ECR 457. 
197 Case 9/74 Casagrande v. Landeshaupstatdt Munchen [1974] ECR 773. 
198 Case C-7/94 Landesamt fur Ausbildungsforderung Nordrhein-Wesfalen v. Lubor Gaal [1996] ECR I-1031. 
199 Article 10 stated: ‘1. The following shall, irrespective of their nationality, have the right to install themselves 
with a worker who is a national of one Member State and who is employed in the territory of another Member State:  
(a) his spouse and their descendants who are under the age of 21 years or are dependants;  
(b) dependent relatives in the ascending line of the worker and his spouse.  
2. Member States shall facilitate the admission of any member of the family not coming within the provisions of 
paragraph 1 if dependent on the worker referred to above or living under his roof in the country whence he comes.  
3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the worker must have available for his family housing considered as 
normal for national workers in the region where he is employed ; this provision, however must not give rise to 
discrimination between national workers and workers from the other Member States. 
200 Op. Cit. n.111 Baumbast at para.56. 
201 Op. Cit. n.159. See also MJ and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKAIT 34 where 
the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal came to the conclusion that Article 12 did require a condition of self-
sufficiency, without making a reference to the Court. 
202 Case 152/82 Forcheri v. Belgium [1983] ECR 2323. 
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special fee demanded from all foreign students but not Belgian students. Mrs Forcheri’s status 
was not included in Article 12 of Reg. 1612/68. The ECJ held that “to require a national of 
another Member State lawfully established in the first Member State to pay an enrolment fee 
which is not required of its own nationals…constitutes discrimination by reason of nationality, 
which is prohibited by Article [12] of the Treaty”203 (emphasis added). In Gravier204 the ECJ 
extended this approach. Ms Gravier was a French student studying at a Belgian art college and, 
like Mrs Forcheri, she had to pay an enrolment fee that Belgian nationals did not. The Court 
found the Community had competence in the field of education and vocational training on a 
basis that included Articles 7 and 12 of Reg. 1612/68. Moreover, access to vocational training 
was directly linked to the promotion of the free movement of persons205 and so fell within the 
scope of the Treaty. Ms Gravier’s treatment was held to discriminate against her on the basis of 
her nationality as prohibited by Article 12EC. In Blaizot206 this was extended to the majority of 
university courses207 and Humbel208 concluded that secondary education must be treated as 
vocational if it forms an integral part of an overall programme of vocational education, even with 
an element of general education209. It was argued before, but not commented on by, the Court in 
Gravier that as Ms Gravier was not a worker nor the spouse or a child of a migrant worker then 
she could not be lawfully established in Belgium. In Raulin210 the ECJ utilised the principle of 
non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality to establish a right of entry to another MS for 
students admitted to a course of vocational training. A right of residence for the duration of the 
course complemented this right of entry. A TCN lawfully established in a MS would find it 
difficult to employ this ECJ jurisprudence to establish a right to education complemented by 
                                                 
203 Ibid. at para.18. 
204 Case 293/83 Gravier v. City of Liège [1985] ECR 593. 
205 Ibid. at para.24. 
206 Case 24/86 Blaizot v. University of Liège and Others [1988] ECR 379. 
207 Ibid. at para.20 for exceptions. 
208 Case 263/86 Belgium v. Humbel [1988] ECR 5365. 
209 See Op. Cit. n.2 at 96. The introduction of Articles 149 & 150EC, provisions dealing with education and 
vocational training, would appear to have removed any distinction between general education and vocational 
training. They are both now within the scope of the EC Treaty and subject to the application of Article 12EC. 
210 Case C-357/89 Raulin v. Netherlands Ministry for Education and Science [1992] ECR I-1027 at para.34. 
95 
 
rights of entry and residence in another MS, as the right to non-discrimination on the basis of 
nationality is not available to TCNs211.  
 
An alternative way to establish a right to education for the worker’s family members has been 
suggested by Oliver212 by utilising Article 7(2) of Reg. 1612/68213. The ECJ has not so far 
followed this approach. However, an indirect path to establish rights to social security may be 
available under Article 7(2), as may a right to social assistance for education214. This provision 
entitles the migrant worker to “the same social and tax advantages as national workers”. The 
Court held in Even215 that the social advantages encompassed by Article 7(2) were ‘…all 
advantages which, whether or not linked to a contract of employment, are generally granted to 
national workers primarily because of their objective status as workers or by virtue of the mere 
fact of their residence on the national territory and the extension of which to workers who are 
nationals of other Member States therefore seems suitable to facilitate their mobility within the 
Community’. This is known as the Even formula and has been applied subsequently by the 
Court. In Deak216 it was held that although Mr Deak, a Hungarian national living with his Italian 
mother, could not claim unemployment benefit under Reg. 1408/71 the principle of equal 
treatment in Article 7(2) of Reg. 1612/68 was designed to prevent discrimination against 
descendants of a worker who were dependent on him, regardless of their nationality. He could 
therefore claim the special unemployment benefit under Article 7(2) as the benefit was also 
available to Belgian nationals. In Taghavi217, however, the handicapped persons’ allowance was 
only available to Belgians resident in Belgium. As a Belgian worker’s spouse who was a TCN 
                                                 
211 See section 2 above. 
212 Op. Cit. n.197 at 72. 
213 In the territory of a MS, a worker who is a national of another MS ‘shall enjoy the same social and tax 
advantages as national workers’. 
214 See Ellis E., “Social Advantages: A New Lease of Life?” (2003) 40 CMLRev 639 for a comprehensive analysis 
of the concept of social advantages. 
215 Case 207/78 Ministere Public v. Even and ONPTS [1979] ECR 2019 at para.22. 
216 Case 94/84 Office Nationale de l’Emploi v. Deak [1985] ECR 1873 at paras.22-25. 
217 Case C-243/91 Belgian State v. Taghavi [1992] ECR I-4401 at paras. 10-11. 
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could not claim the allowance then there was no social advantage for national workers for Article 
7(2) to attach to and so Mr Taghavi, an Iranian married to an Italian residing in Belgium, could 
not claim. 
 
Rights of access to education and vocational training were considered above. However, the ECJ 
has created a more complex and contrived position over rights to the payment of maintenance 
and training grants for students who are MS nationals. The ECJ in Brown218 considered that the 
payment of maintenance grants to students fell outside the scope of Article 12EC as it was a 
matter of combined educational policy, which was not as such included in the Community’s 
competence, and social policy that remained within the MSs’ competence. However they could 
be considered to be a social advantage and thus fall within the ambit of Article 7(2) of Reg. 
1612/68, so long as the student had been employed in the state where he was to attend university 
in a manner that was not ancillary to the studies219. Moreover the host MS could not impose 
conditions requiring the student to undertake a minimum period of employment there before 
taking up a study position220. The ambit of Article 7(2) includes grants for study abroad221 and, 
unlike Article 12 of Reg. 1612/68, is not confined to children of migrant workers who are 
resident in the host Member State. Thus in Meeusen222 a Belgian student resident in Belgium, 
whose Belgian parents were also resident in Belgium, could claim study finance to study in the 
Netherlands from the Netherlands authorities. This was based on the fact that her father was the 
director and sole shareholder of a company established in the Netherlands, for whom her mother 
worked. An alternative way of reading the two cases of Brown and Meeusen is to consider the 
relationship of the claimant to the right. In Brown the individual was claiming a direct right 
himself, which was a primary right, whilst in Meeusen the right was based on the relationship of 
                                                 
218 Case 197/86 Brown v. Secretary of State for Scotland [1988] ECR 3205 at para.18. 
219 Ibid. at para.27. 
220 Case C-3/90 Bernini v. Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen [1992] ECR I-1071. 
221 Case 235/87 Matteucci v. Communauté Français de Belgique [1988] ECR 5589. 
222 Case C-337/97 C.P.M. Meeusen v. Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep [1999] ECR I-3289. 
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the child with a migrant worker who was her mother. Therefore Miss Meeusen had an indirect or 
secondary right that enabled the worker to exercise her right to freedom of movement.  
 
With the establishment of Union citizenship, the ECJ’s ruling in Martinez Sala223, and the 
extension of the Community’s competence at Maastricht to include a chapter on education and 
vocational training in the EC Treaty224 calls were made225 for the position in Brown to be 
reviewed by the ECJ, which it has been in Grzelczyk226. A French national, studying in Belgium, 
had worked there to pay for his studies. In his final year he gave up work to concentrate on those 
studies and claimed a maintenance grant available to Belgian nationals and citizens of the Union 
to whom Reg. 1612/68 applied, for which he was refused. The ECJ held, inter alia, ‘[t]he fact 
that a Union citizen pursues university studies in a Member State other than the State of which 
he is a national cannot, of itself, deprive him of the possibility of relying on the prohibition of all 
discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in Article [12] of the Treaty’227. Thus Union 
citizenship, as the ‘fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’228, provided the basis 
for Article 12EC to bite and thus excluded any direct rights for TCNs. However, if a TCN family 
member of a migrant worker, who is a national of a MS, is installed with that worker in 
accordance with Article 2 of Dir. 2004/38, then the worker may claim a maintenance grant on 
their behalf if it is available to nationals of the host state.  
 
                                                 
223 Op. Cit. n.103. 
224 See Dougan M., “Fees, Grants, Loans and Dole Cheques: Who Covers the Costs of Migrant Education within the 
EU?” (2005) 42 CMLRev 943 for a comprehensive analysis of migrant education. 
225 Arnull A.M., Dashwood A.A., Ross M.G., Wyatt D.A., Wyatt & Dashwood’s European Union Law, 4th Ed., 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2000 at 783; Shaw J., “From the Margins to the Centre: Education and Training Law and 
Policy”, in Craig P., de Burca G., (Eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, OUP, 1999, 555 at 569. 
226 Op. Cit. n.108. 
227 Ibid. at para.36. 
228 Ibid. at para.31. 
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The position was reconsidered again in the case of Bidar229, with Brown being looked at 
specifically. Bidar was a French national, who came with his sick French mother, when he was a 
boy, to live in the UK with his grandmother. His mother died soon after they arrived and his 
grandmother supported him, as he pursued and completed his secondary education, on the basis 
that he was her dependent. On completion of his secondary education he started a university 
course and applied for a student loan but his application was rejected. The ECJ first held that 
maintenance costs, whether in the form of grants or loans, fell within the scope of application of 
the EC Treaty230 and therefore it had to be determined if the refusal of an application for such 
costs was discriminatory under Article 12EC. The Court pointed out that there was a requirement 
for a MS, in the organisation and application of their social assistance systems, to show a certain 
amount of financial solidarity with nationals of other MSs but that should not become an 
unreasonable burden on the MS’s finances231. As such it was legitimate for a MS to only grant 
assistance to students who had demonstrated a certain degree of integration into the society of 
the State232, that could be evidenced either by a link with the employment market233 or by a 
certain period of residence234. Thus as Barnard comments235, “Bidar makes clear that migrant 
citizens can in principle have access to maintenance loans and grants on the same terms as 
nationals but only if they have been lawfully resident in the host State for a certain time or have a 
residence permit”. Thus if students move to another MS not as students but in some other 
capacity then maintenance grants or loans are available to migrants and the situation in Brown is 
overturned. However, if a student moves to another MS to study at university236, or to take 
                                                 
229 Case C-209/03 R. v. London Borough of Ealing & Secretary of State for Education, ex parte Bidar [2005] ECR 
I-2119; noted Barnard C., “Case Note”, (2005) 42 CMLRev 1465 and Golynker O., “Student Loans: The European 
Concept of Social Justice According to Bidar”, (2006) 31 ELR 390. See also Op. Cit. n.115, van der Mei. 
230 Ibid. at para.48. 
231 Ibid. at para.56. 
232 Ibid. at para.57. 
233 Ibid. at para.58 where the ECJ observes that this cannot be required for a student whose university course does 
not assign him/her to a particular geographical market. 
234 Ibid. at para.59. 
235 Op. Cit. n.229 Barnard at 1473. For confirmation of Barnard’s comments see Case C-158/07 Förster v. 
Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep, judgment of 18 November 2008, nyr. 
236 Op. Cit. n.104, para.45. 
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preparatory courses to prepare for university, then they will not satisfy the requirement of 
integration into society and so will not qualify for assistance with maintenance costs, although 
they will with maintenance fees. As such “the legacy of Brown/Lair lives on”237. For a TCN, this 
case appears to confirm the position established in Grzelczyk. 
 
A further stage in the development of the case law involving education and EU citizenship 
appears to have started with the joined cases of Morgan & Bucher238 that is of benefit to citizens 
of the Union but of little assistance to TCNs. German rules provided financial assistance to 
students to study at a university in another MS and was awarded to all students resident in 
Germany so long as the student had studied for one year at a German university and was now 
undertaking the same education or training abroad. Morgan was studying in the UK and Bucher 
was studying at university in Holland but had moved closer to the Dutch border whilst retaining 
resident in Germany. Both students were denied the financial assistance they applied for. In 
Morgan’s case this was because she had not completed a year’s university education in Germany 
and for Bucher it was the same reason but supplemented by the fact that she had moved 
residence purely for educational reasons and therefore she could not take advantage of the 
generous assistance for students who commuted. The ECJ found that this rule was contrary to 
Article 18EC, especially as Article 18EC prohibits measures that disadvantage the MS’s own 
nationals for exercising their right to freedom of movement239, of even more relevance in the 
field of education as Articles 3(1)(q) and 149(2)EC refer to the objective of encouraging the free 
movement of students and teachers240. As such, where a MS provided a system of financial 
assistance to pursue studies in another MS, it had to ensure that the detailed rules for their award 
                                                 
237 Op. Cit. n.229 Barnard at 1473. 
238 Joined Cases C-11 & 12/06 Morgan v. Bezirksregierung Köln; Bucher v. Landrat des Kreises Düren [2007] ECR 
I-9161; noted Dougan M., “Cross-Border Educational Mobility and the Exportation of Student Financial 
Assistance”, (2008) 33 ELR 723. 
239 Ibid. at paras.25-26. 
240 Ibid. at para.27. 
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did not create an unjustified restriction to the right to free movement241. The German rules were, 
because of personal inconvenience, additional costs and possible delays, liable to discourage 
Union citizens from leaving Germany to study at university in another MS and therefore stop 
them from availing themselves of their right to freedom of movement conferred by Article 
18(1)EC242. This was even more pronounced when the year studying in Germany was not taken 
into account for calculating the duration of studies in other MSs243. Thus only through objective 
justification based on considerations of public interest independent of the nationality of the 
persons concerned and the satisfaction of the proportionality criteria could the German rules be 
acceptable244, which in the facts of these cases they were found not to245. As Dougan246 
establishes, the finding in this case suggests “a real prospect of enhancing the practical value of 
EU citizenship for a broader category of its potential beneficiaries”, those beneficiaries though 
would not include TCNs. 
 
Measures in the field of social security to facilitate freedom of movement for ‘workers’ were to 
be adopted by the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, under 
Article 42EC. Again there appears to be no differentiation between TCNs and nationals of MSs. 
However, Regulation 1408/71/EEC247, implementing Article 42EC, limited its personal scope to 
employed or self-employed persons ‘who are nationals of one of the Member States or who are 
stateless persons or refugees residing within the territory of one of the Member States’ (Article 
2). Thus stateless persons or refugees were able to take advantage of the rights enunciated in 
Regulation 1408/71, but other TCNs were excluded. However, the ECtHR in the far-reaching 
                                                 
241 Ibid. at para.28. 
242 Ibid. at para.30. 
243 Ibid. at para.31. 
244 Ibid. at para.33. 
245 Ibid. at paras.35-50. 
246 Op. Cit. n.238 at 726. 
247 Council Regulation 1408/71/EEC on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-
employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community, O.J. 1971 L149/2. 
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case of Gaygusuz248, held that a social security provision was a pecuniary right for the purpose of 
Article 1 of Protocol No.1249 and that denying the applicant this right on the grounds of 
nationality was in breach of Article 14ECHR250. As a consequence the Commission submitted 
proposals in 1998 for a new regulation to replace Reg. 1408/71251, with the aim of simplifying 
and modernising the law. The personal scope was extended in Article 1 to ‘persons who are or 
have been subject to the social security legislation of one or more Member States’ and Recital 13 
of the preamble outlined the aim of extending equality of treatment to ‘all persons occupied in 
the territory of a Member State’, thereby incorporating legally resident TCNs within the personal 
scope of the new regulation. This was a “radical and comprehensive attempt to extend the scope 
of the Regulation”252 but the Council did not adopt this proposal. 
 
The problems with the 1998 Proposal were significant, both politically253 and legally. First 
Article 42EC itself presented difficulty as agreement in the Council on secondary legislation had 
to be unanimous and both the UK254 and Denmark voiced considerable objections. Second 
decision-making under Article 42EC followed the co-decision procedure under Article 251EC 
that ensured the European Parliament had a considerable input into the process, adopting 47 
amendments to the 1998 Proposal255. It was, however, the intervention of the ECJ that ensured 
                                                 
248 Gaygusuz v. Austria (1996) 23 EHRR 364; see Verschueren H., “EC Social Security Co-ordination Excluding 
Third Country Nationals: Still in Line with Fundamental Rights after the Gaygusuz Judgment?” (1997) 34 CMLRev 
991. This has recently been confirmed, and extended, by the ECtHR in Poirrez v. France (2005) 40 EHRR 2. The 
ECHR extended the concept of a pecuniary right from paid contributions to non-contributory social benefits. 
249 ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived 
of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law’. 
250 ‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on 
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status’. 
251 Commission proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on co-ordination of social security systems, COM(1998) 
779 final, O.J. 1999 C38/10. 
252 Pennings F., “Inclusion and Exclusion of Persons and Benefits in the New Co-ordination Regulation” in Dougan 
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253 See Pennings P., “The European Commission Proposal to Simplify Regulation 1408/71”, (2001) 3 EJSS 45. 
254 Roberts S., “”Our View has not Changed”: The UK’s Response to the Proposal to Extend the Co-ordination of 
Social Security to Third Country Nationals”, (2000) 2 EJSS 189. 
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that the 1998 Proposal was abandoned. In Khalil256, the Court was asked if Reg. 1408/71 applied 
to stateless persons and members of their families if they had no right to free movement under 
the EC Treaty. The ECJ recast this to enquire if Reg. 1408/71 was valid by including stateless 
persons and refugees resident in the territory of a Member State and their family members within 
the personal scope of Reg. 1408/71, even though they did not enjoy the right to freedom of 
movement under the EC Treaty257. The Court answered this question in the timeframe of 1971, 
when the Regulation was created, conducting an historic analysis of the international obligations 
towards stateless persons and refugees of the MSs at that time, and finding that Reg. 1408/71 
was not invalid258. The ECJ then considered the second question asked by the German court, 
holding that the Regulation only applied to refugees and stateless persons who had moved within 
the Community259, rather than from a non-MS to a MS. As a result of this case the Council260 
concluded that Article 42EC would not be a suitable legal basis for the new regulation. 
 
In 2002 the Commission tried an alternative approach to rectify this conflict by putting forward a 
new proposal261 to bring TCNs within the coverage of Reg. 1408/71. This has been enacted as 
Reg. 859/03/EC262 with Article 1 extending the provisions of Reg. 1408/71 to all TCNs, their 
family members and survivors who were not already covered solely on the ground of their 
nationality. Reg. 859/03 only governs co-ordination of social security and the radical equal 
treatment for TCNs in the original proposal has been removed263. The recipients of these new 
rights must be legally resident in a MS and must be in a situation, which is not confined in all 
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respects within a single MS (Article 1). It is submitted therefore that a cross-border Community 
nexus must be established before the provisions of Reg. 859/03 can bite (Recital 12) and as such 
it fails to fully implement the Gaygusuz judgment. Furthermore, the legal basis chosen is Article 
63(4)EC of Title IV264, and although the UK and Ireland have opted in (Recital 18), Denmark 
has chosen not to take part (Recital 19). The outcome means that, in MSs where the Regulation 
applies, TCNs must move between MSs for the provisions of Reg. 859/03 to take effect, a 
particularly difficult criterion to achieve where there is a lack of a general right to free movement 
for TCNs265. 
 
Reg. 1408/71, with Reg. 574/72/EEC266 implementing and supplementing it, was introduced to 
achieve the objectives of Article 42EC267. Social security provisions of the Member States are 
not harmonised but co-ordinated to ensure that claimants’ contributions are aggregated for the 
purposes of Article 42(a)EC and able to be collected wherever they are resident in the 
Community. Family members of employed or self-employed persons are included in the personal 
scope of Reg. 1408/71 as defined in Article 2(1). Furthermore, Article 3(1) articulates a non-
discrimination provision for persons covered by Reg. 1408/71 and resident in the territory of a 
Member State, subject to the special provisions in it. However, the ECJ in Kermaschek268 
distinguished between social security benefits granted by domestic law as a personal right and 
derived rights, acquired only as a consequence of the claimant’s position as a member of the 
worker’s family. Only the latter could be claimed by family members on the basis of the non-
                                                 
264 See Chapter V of this thesis. 
265 Op. Cit. n.30 Peers at 1401. See also Martinson D. S., “Who has the Right to Intra European Social Security? 
From Market Citizens to European Citizens and Beyond”, EUI Working Paper, Law, 2003/13 at 33. 
266 Council Regulation 574/72/EEC laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation 1408/71/EEC on the 
application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to their families moving 
within the Community, O.J. 1972 L74/1. 
267 See now Parliament and Council Regulation 883/2004/EC on the coordination of social security systems, O.J. 
2004 L166/1 that replaces Reg. 1408/71 when an Implementing Regulation is passed to replace Reg. 574/72.  
268 Case 40/76 Kermaschek v.Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit [1976] ECR 1669. The case involved a Yugoslav national 
married to a German working and residing in Germany who attempted to aggregate periods of insurance or 
employment to claim unemployment benefit. 
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discrimination provision of Reg. 1408/71. In Deak269 a Hungarian national living with his Italian 
mother who worked and resided in Belgium claimed a special unemployment benefit available to 
Belgian nationals but not to Mr Deak on the basis of his nationality. The ECJ held that 
unemployment benefit was a personal right and could not be claimed by Mr Deak through his 
position as a member of the worker’s family. Taghavi270 concerned an Iranian national married 
to an Italian residing in Belgium, claiming his entitlement to handicapped person’ allowances. 
The Court found that these handicapped persons’ allowances were classified by Belgian 
domestic law as a personal right and so Mr Taghavi could not claim them on the basis of his 
membership of a worker’s family. The ECJ reconsidered this case law in Cabanis-Issarte271. Mrs 
Cabanis-Issarte was a French national who had never worked but who had lived with her late 
husband in Holland for a period of time before returning to France. She claimed the right to pay 
voluntary social security contributions at the same rate as Dutch nationals, which was clearly a 
personal right as classified by Dutch domestic law. The ECJ held that maintaining the distinction 
between personal and derived rights would “adversely affect freedom of movement of 
workers”272. Moreover it would “undermine the fundamental Community law requirement that 
its rules should be applied uniformly, by making their applicability to individuals depend on 
whether the national law relating to the benefits in question treats the rights concerned as rights 
in person or derived rights, in the light of specific features of the domestic social security 
scheme”273. Finally the Court considered that national social security systems tended to blur the 
distinction “in view of the tendency for social security cover to be universal”274. Thus the earlier 
jurisprudence was specifically limited to personal rights that were aimed at the worker, such as 
                                                 
269 Op. Cit. n.216. 
270 Op. Cit. n.217. 
271 Case C-308/93 Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank v. J.M. Cabanis-Issarte [1996] ECR I-2097. See Moore 
M., “Case Note”, (1997) 34 CMLRev 727. 
272 Ibid. at para.30. 
273 Ibid. at para.31. 
274 Ibid. at para.33. 
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those in Articles 67-71 of Reg. 1408/71 concerning unemployment benefits275. At first blush the 
consequences for TCNs do not appear significant as these consequences seem to be equivalent to 
those of citizens of the Union. However, the ability to claim an “owned” direct right to non-
discrimination on the grounds of nationality, which is the logical effect of Cabanis-Issarte, is a 
step towards the establishment of universal social security across the Community based on need 
and residence rather than nationality. Thus national social security systems, that tended to 
exclude TCNs from the benefits of social security through inventive drafting of rights, now have 
to comply with the requirement of non-discrimination. 
 
The new Reg. 883/04 that replaces Reg. 1408/71 appears to provide full equal treatment in the 
field of social security co-ordination for TCNs. Although the new Regulation is in force it will 
only become applicable when the implementing legislation276 is adopted according to Article 91 
of Reg. 883/04. The scope of the new Reg. 883/04 remains the same as Reg. 1408/71 (Article 
2(1) of Reg. 883/04) but it is considerably updated and improved when compared to Reg. 
1408/71. However, TCNs are about to be left behind again with the old and flawed system as 
Article 90(1) of the new Regulation states that Reg. 1408/71 will remain in force for the 
purposes of Reg. 859/03 until Reg. 859/03 is repealed or modified. On the positive side, 
however, the Commission has presented a proposal277 to extend the scope of Reg. 883/04 and the 
new implementing Regulation to TCNs not covered but there will remain a lacuna between the 
application of Reg. 883/04 and the adoption of this proposal. 
 
5. FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT 
 
                                                 
275 Ibid. at paras.23-24 & 34. 
276 Commission proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation laying down the procedure for 
implementing Regulation 883/04/EC on the coordination of social security systems, COM(2006) 16 final. 
277 Commission proposal for a Council Regulation extending the provisions of Regulation 883/2004/EC and 
Regulation […]/EC to nationals of third countries who are not already covered by these provisions solely on the 
ground of their nationality, COM(2007) 439 final. 
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The wording of Article 43EC may be contrasted with that in Article 39ECas the right to freedom 
of establishment is limited to ‘nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member 
State’ and specifically excluding TCNs from the Article’s scope. Furthermore, there is no 
equivalent provision to the second paragraph of Article 49EC enabling the extension of this right 
to TCNs through secondary legislation. However, if a citizen of the Union exercises their right to 
establish themselves in another MS then their family, regardless of their nationality, will be able 
to accompany or join that person in accordance with Dir. 2004/38. 
 
6. FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES 
 
The right to provide services in another MS, other than their own, is specified in Article 49EC 
and, similar to Article 43EC, is limited to nationals of MSs. However, unlike Article 43EC, the 
Council, acting by QMV on a Commission proposal, may extend this right to TCNs established 
in the Community and who provide services.  
 
Companies or firms when exercising their rights to provide cross-border services under Article 
49EC are entitled to use their own employees in this process even if they are not Community 
nationals278. Article 49 “requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of 
nationality against service providers who are established in another Member State, but also the 
abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services 
and to those of other Member states, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less 
advantageous the activities of a service provider established in another Member State, where he 
lawfully provides similar services”279. If, though, a national legislative measure applied equally 
to all persons and undertakings operating in that MS’s territory in a legislative area that was not 
                                                 
278 Case C-113/89 Rush Portugesa Lda v. Office National d’Immigration [1990] ECR I-1417. 
279 Case C-244/04 Commission v. Germany [2006] ECR I-885 at para. 30. 
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harmonised by Community law, then it may “be justified where it meets an overriding 
requirement relating to the public interest and that interest is not already safeguarded by the rules 
to which the service provider is subject in the [home] Member State”280. However, it must 
comply with the requirement of proportionality so that “it is appropriate for securing the 
attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain it”281. Thus it is contrary to Article 49EC for the host MS to require the employer to obtain 
work permits282, to set the duration of employment with the company prior to posting to the host 
MS283, to require the service providers to provide a bank guarantee284, or to pay social security 
contributions where they have already been paid in the home MS285. Indeed, the ECJ held in 
Commission v. Germany286 that a simple prior declaration by the service provider certifying the 
legality of the workers concerned would be enough to satisfy any checks that the host MS may 
be justified in conducting287. 
 
Two Commission proposals288 for Directives attempted to clarify and formalise the position of 
TCNs in this field, although, somewhat confusingly, the first, on the posting of workers who are 
TCNs for the provision of cross-border services, had a legal basis of Article 47EC. In both 
proposals, the MS in which the service provider was established would have had to issue an “EC 
Service Provision Card” at the request of the service provider when it was wished to post an 
                                                 
280 Ibid. at 31. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Case C-43/93 Vander Elst v. Office des Migrations Internationales [1994] ECR I-3803 where Moroccan 
nationals legally resident, with work permits, in Belgium had already obtained entry visas to carry out services in 
France. See Peers S., “Indirect Rights for Third-Country Service Providers Confirmed”, [1994] 19 ELR 303. See 
also Case C-445/03 Commision v. Luxembourg [2004] ECR I-10191. 
283 Ibid. Case C-445/03 and Op. Cit. n.279. 
284 Ibid. Case C-445/03. 
285 Joined Cases 62 & 63/81 Seco and Desquenne & Giral v. Establissement d’Assurance contre la Vieillesse et 
l’Invalidite [1982] ECR 223 where it was discriminatory for French construction companies working in 
Luxembourg to pay employer’s social security contributions in Luxembourg when already paying similar in France. 
286 Op. Cit. n.279 at para. 41. 
287 See Op. Cit. n.278 at para. 17. 
288 Commission proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council on the posting of workers who are 
third country nationals for the provision of cross-border services and Commission proposal for a Council Directive 
extending the freedom to provide cross-border services to third country nationals established within the Community, 
COM (1999) 3 final/2. Now amended COM(2000)271 final. 
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employed worker who was a TCN to another MS (Article 2(1)). The recipient MS would have 
provided a right of entry and residence on production of the card, an identity card or passport, 
and a statement from the service provider detailing the probable duration of stay (Article 3(1)). 
Visas, residence permits or work permits would not have been required (Article 3(2)). 
Unfortunately these proposals have not progressed any further. 
 
The Community has passed secondary legislation to harmonise some aspects of the cross-border 
provision of services. The first was the Posting of Workers Directive289 that as Davies290 points 
out does not specifically apply to TCNs, but nor does it exclude them, and, so it is suggested, 
Article 49 case law continues to apply. The second is the Services Directive291, the scope of 
which applies to services supplied by providers established in a MS (Article 2(1)). The extensive 
and exhaustive list (Article 2(2)292) of activities that the Directive does not apply to and the list 
(Article 3) of legislation that takes precedent over the Directive, do not mention TCNs and thus 
by implication does not exclude TCNs from the scope of the Directive. Furthermore, the 
application of the Directive by the MSs is to comply with the free movement of establishment 
and services Treaty rules (Article 3(3)) thereby again suggesting that the Article 49EC case law 
will apply.  
 
The ECJ has recently given a striking and possibly far-reaching judgment, particularly for TCNs, 
on the interpretation of Article 49EC. In Carpenter293, Mrs Carpenter was a Philippine national 
                                                 
289 Parliament and Council Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision 
of services, O.J. 1997 L18/1. 
290 Davies P., “Posted Workers: Single Market or Protection of National Labour Law Systems?” (1997) 34 CMLRev 
571 at 589. 
291 Parliament and Council Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market, O.J. 2006 L376/36. See Davies 
G., “The Services Directive: Extending the Country of Origin Principle, and Reforming Public Administration”, 
(2007) 32 ELR 232 for a comprehensive analysis of the new measure. 
292 See also Article 17. 
293 Case C-60/00 Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279; noted Toner H., 
“Case Note”, (2003) 5 EJML 163, Tryfonidou A., “The Beginning of a New Era in the European Union?” (2003) 14 
KCLJ 81, Editorial, “Freedoms Unlimited? Reflections on Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State”, (2003) 40 
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who entered the UK on a six month visitor’s permit, overstayed her leave to remain and, twenty 
months after her initial entry, married Mr Carpenter. She applied for leave to remain in the UK 
as a spouse of a UK national but this was refused and she was served a deportation notice. Upon 
referral to the ECJ, it was found that Mr Carpenter ran a business, established in the UK, selling 
advertising space in journals in which a significant proportion of his business was conducted 
with advertisers established in other MSs of the EU and that Mr Carpenter travelled often in 
Europe on business. The Court held that Mr Carpenter was exercising his right freely to provide 
services under Article 49EC by offering cross-border services and thus fell under the material 
scope of the EC Treaty, even though he had not actually moved. The importance of ensuring the 
protection of the family life of nationals of the MSs in order to eliminate obstacles to the exercise 
of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty, was apparent from the provisions of 
the free movement implementing legislation (see now Dir. 2004/38).  The effect of deporting 
Mrs Carpenter would be to separate Mr and Mrs Carpenter which would be detrimental to their 
family life and “to the conditions under which Mr Carpenter exercises a fundamental freedom. 
That freedom could not be fully effective if Mr Carpenter were to be deterred from exercising it 
by obstacles raised in his country of origin to the entry and residence of his spouse”294. A MS 
could not justify a national measure to obstruct the exercise of the freedom to provide services 
for reasons of public interest if it was not compatible with fundamental rights. The right to 
family life was a fundamental right, as outlined in Article 8ECHR and the decision to deport Mrs 
Carpenter was disproportionate to the aim of maintenance of public order and public safety. It 
must be noted that although the ECJ constructed an argument against the deportation of Mrs 
Carpenter on the basis of fundamental rights and Article 8ECHR, the right that was protected 
was that of Mr Carpenter. Therefore Mrs Carpenter held a secondary or derived right only on the 
basis of her relationship with a Union citizen who was exercising a free movement right. 
                                                                                                                                                             
CMLRev 537, and Acierno S., “The Carpenter Judgment: Fundamental Rights and the Limits of the Community 
Legal Order”, (2003) 28 ELR 398. 
294 Ibid. at para.39. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
TCNs are not granted any direct free movement rights under the EC Treaty, or the implementing 
legislation. The rights that have been granted are derivative, secondary or indirect rights based 
on the relationship that the TCN has with a citizen of the Union and the fact that the citizen of 
the Union has exercised their free movement rights. The principle of non-discrimination on the 
basis of nationality can only apply if there is a Community nexus, a condition that a TCN who 
does not have free movement rights will find difficult to satisfy. It is possible that the inclusion 
of TCNs within Title IV of the EC Treaty could see, at least some, TCNs able to bring 
themselves within the Community criterion but that has yet to be tested before the ECJ. The 
Race and Ethnic Origin Directive adopted under Article 13EC is, it is submitted, significantly 
flawed through the failure to include the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality. 
An example from recent European history can illustrate this: a TCN who was a Bosnian Serb 
living in an EU MS could gain protection if he was discriminated against on the basis of his Serb 
ethnicity but not on the basis of his Bosnian nationality. European citizenship has garnered few 
advantages for TCNs, especially as the basis for citizenship of the Union is nationality of a 
MS295, creating a citizenship that is predominantly formulated on inclusion and exclusion, 
entrenching the “pre-existing status between EU nationals and third country nationals”296. Dir. 
2004/38 provides some major advances for TCNs when they are family members of citizens of 
the Union although once again the rights are derivative of the relationship with an EU citizen and 
the exercising of their free movement right. These derivative rights have been furthered by the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, particularly in Singh, Akrich, Jia, Chen, Baumbast and Carpenter. It 
                                                 
295 Shaw J., “The Interpretation of European Union Citizenship”, (1998) 61 MLR 293. 
296 Bell M., “Civic Citizenship and migrant Integration”, (2007) 13 EPL 311 at 314. 
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should be noted though that the rights provided were secondary rights designed to enhance the 
position of the Union citizen and their ability to move freely. 
 
Free movement rights for TCNs must now be subjected to the lens of legal rationality to 
determine the legitimacy of the law. 
112 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
LEGAL RATIONALITY 
 
1. FORMAL LEGAL RATIONALITY 
 
Formal rationality requires the law to be consistent. Inconsistency can occur in any combination 
of three ways: doctrinal positions from outside Community law; different doctrinal positions 
within Community law; and, cases within a particular area of Community law. All three of these 
elements of formal rationality appear to be relevant for this area of law as it applies to TCNs and 
any finding of a failure of rationality in one element can lead to a finding of the law being 
formally irrational in the abstract sense. Following the abstract analysis the position must be 
viewed from the factors that underpin policy so that the abstract, scientific product can be 
reconstructed as a critical tool providing useful insights, recommendations and suggestions.  
 
The first issue involves contradiction between an international legal system, namely that of the 
ECHR and the judgments of the ECtHR, which co-exists with this substantive area of EU law, 
and creates a separate and possibly contradictory legal doctrine. In Chapter III of this thesis it 
was established that Reg. 1408/711, implementing Article 42EC, included stateless persons and 
refugees within its scope of application but other TCNs were excluded. The ECtHR in 
Gaygusuz2, held that a social security provision was a pecuniary right for the purpose of Article 
1 of Protocol No.1 and that denying the applicant this right on the grounds of nationality was in 
                                                 
1 Council Regulation 1408/71/EEC on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-
employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community, O.J. 1971 L149/2. 
2 Gaygusuz v. Austria (1996) 23 EHRR 364. 
113 
 
breach of Article 14ECHR. It is certainly the case that MSs as signatories to Protocol No.1 
would be bound to comply with this ruling under international law. The contradictory position 
between the two legal positions of the Community and the ECHR appears to have been resolved 
with the enactment of Reg. 859/03/EC3. However, a cross-border Community nexus must be 
established before its provisions can bite and thus it fails to fully implement the Gaygusuz 
judgment. Moreover, with a legal basis of Article 64(3)EC and Denmark’s decision to opt out of 
the Regulation’s adoption, inconsistency is retained. It is the case that for Reg. 1408/71 to bite 
there must be a cross border element4. It could therefore be argued that TCNs and European 
citizens are treated the same without contradiction. However, the contradiction lies between the 
ECHR judgment and the scope of Reg. 1408/71 and Reg. 859/03. A person whose situation is 
confined in all respects within a single MS may still be discriminated against on the basis of 
nationality over the allocation of a social security provision under EU legislation but not in 
accordance with the ECHR. As such the two legal doctrines are contradictory. 
 
The factors underpinning the policy formation in this area provide a complex structure of 
interests that need to be balanced. The legal element itself comprises three factors: the necessary 
requirement for the MSs to comply with judgments of the ECtHR; the legal fact that the EU has 
yet to accede to the ECHR and therefore has no binding commitment to comply with the ECHR: 
and, the question of national sovereignty. The latter point is a difficult area, particularly when 
considering the position of social security. The MSs have transferred their sovereignty over 
social security for citizens of the EU to the extent that Reg. 1408/71 co-ordinates the social 
security schemes of MSs and have agreed to do so for Reg. 859/03. However, the lacuna, 
identified by the ECtHR, remains and can only be resolved by loosening sovereignty further by 
                                                 
3 Council Regulation 859/03/EC extending the provisions of Reg. 1408/71/EEC and Reg. 574/72/EEC to nationals 
of third countries who are not already covered by these provisions solely on the ground of their nationality, O.J. 
2003, L124/1. 
4 Case C-153/91 Camille Petit v. Office National des Pensions [1992] ECR I-4973 at para.10. 
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enabling TCNs to be able to claim social security without taking into account nationality, in 
accordance with the Gaygusuz judgment. The question of social security leads to the second 
factor effecting policy, the economic element. The full implication of the Gaygusuz judgment 
could have a significant impact on the social welfare schemes of MSs as all TCNs migrating into 
the EU without then moving from MS to MS would be able to claim. Figures for these TCNs are 
unknown but it can be assumed, based on the limited ability of TCNs to move freely within the 
EU, that a significant amount of the estimated 18.5 million TCNs resident in the EU would be 
able to claim. This is also likely to affect certain MSs to a greater extent than others, particularly 
those with significant TCN populations, such as Germany, Spain and the UK. However, the 
economic rationale behind both the free movement of persons and the internal market is such 
that TCN migration should be encouraged as immigration from third countries is essential to 
enable continued economic growth and the production of sufficient resources to manage the care 
of an aging population. The ability to be able to access social welfare systems is a factor in 
encouraging such an inflow of TCNs. The suggestions to alleviate the contradiction are stark; 
either comply with the Gaygusuz judgment or to continue to ignore it. From a purely value-
neutral position the only option is to remove the contradiction but the policy judgments make 
this a more complex issue. 
 
The second issue lies in the area of contradiction within European law between different 
doctrinal positions in the Community legal pantheon, in this instance between the principle of 
non-discrimination and both citizenship of the Union and right to free movement of workers. At 
the present time Article12EC provides for the right to non-discrimination on the basis of 
nationality and by its wording if TCNs can bring themselves within the scope of application of 
the EC Treaty then they could expect to rely on its protection. However, the scope of 
Community law does not include TCNs as they are not citizens of the Union or workers within 
the parameters of Article 39EC and so they cannot enjoy the rights conferred by the EC Treaty 
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through the possession of the status of worker or EU citizen. They thus suffer discrimination on 
the basis of their nationality. There is, therefore, contradiction between two legal doctrines twice, 
first the principle of non-discrimination and Union citizenship and second non-discrimination 
and free movement of workers. The recent citizenship jurisprudence of the ECJ has exacerbated 
this contradiction by transforming the right to non-discrimination as a right in itself and a human 
right into a right linked to citizenship of the Union, and thus a citizen right. Title IV of the EC 
Treaty (see Chapter V of this thesis) now brings TCNs within the scope of Community law and 
so they may fall within the scope ratione personae of Article 12EC, depending on the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, in which case the contradiction between the two doctrines would be 
removed. However, the contradiction would be retained between free movement of workers and 
TCNs. This does not constitute tensions between the two doctrines as TCNs do not have free 
movement rights on the basis of their nationality, not because they have failed to exercise their 
right of freedom of movement. 
 
A further contradiction exists between two forms of the non-discrimination principle. It could 
also be argued that this is a contradictory position within a single area of Community law, 
namely non-discrimination. The two are the prohibitions on race and ethnic origin, and 
nationality discrimination. The Race and Ethnic Origin Directive5 limits its material scope so 
that discrimination on the basis of nationality is not included and it does not apply to the entry, 
residence or status of TCNs. It therefore excludes the non-discrimination principle from a 
significant number of ethnic minorities in three particularly important areas of policy and permits 
MSs to discriminate against TCNs on the basis of their nationality in these policy areas, 
effectively discriminating on the basis of race or ethnic origin. This is a contradiction both 
between doctrines and within a single area of Community law. 
                                                 
5 Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial 
or ethnic origin, O.J. 2000 L180/22. 
116 
 
 
Article 6(1)TEU of the Lisbon Treaty provides that the Charter of Fundamental Rights will have 
the same legal value as the Treaties and its provisions will be capable of being utilised by 
persons as the basis of a legal action. Article 21(1) is a general non-discrimination clause that is 
clear, precise and unconditional and, it is submitted, capable of having direct effect. The non-
discrimination grounds are extensive, non-exhaustive and appear to be without restriction. This 
contradicts the more limited and non-directly effective Article 13EC, that remains virtually 
unchanged in the Lisbon Treaty. It could also contradict the limited scope of the Race Directive 
and the Employment Directive6. These provisions of the Charter must however comply with the 
horizontal provisions of the Charter found in Chapter VII and especially Article 52(2) that 
requires Charter rights based on the Treaties to be “exercised under the conditions and within the 
limits defined by those Treaties”. It is uncertain until the ECJ rules on these provisions the extent 
of this limitation but it is conceivable that instead of contradictions within the principle of non-
discrimination there are merely tensions between different legal instruments that require 
interpreting by the Court. 
 
When considering the principle of non-discrimination of TCNs on the basis of nationality, policy 
formation again involves a careful weighing up of a number of non-complimentary factors. The 
first is a question of culture and in particular the question over whether TCNs should assimilate 
to the dominant European culture or whether Europe should accept the culture of TCNs on a 
multiculturalist basis. The integration of TCNs “has gained increasing importance on the 
European agenda in recent years”7 but whether this integration should be by assimilation or 
multiculturalism is not addressed and is a highly controversial issue. It is submitted that a less 
                                                 
6 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation, O.J. 2000 L303/16. 
7 Commission Communication on a common agenda for integration: framework for the integration of third-country 
nationals in the European Union, COM(2005) 389 final at 3. 
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controversial way of looking at the cultural issue would be to focus on the issue of integration of 
TCNs with a key way of integrating TCNs into society, or at least those resident for a long 
period of time, being to ensure TCNs were able to enforce rights of non-discrimination, 
particularly as they apply to free movement. In Cholewinski’s opinion8 this would aid the 
achievement of social justice, economic efficiency with the successful completion of the internal 
market and would be a vital element in the elimination of racial and ethnic discrimination. 
Furthermore integration is seen as particular important within the Tampere Conclusions, that 
juxtaposes integration and the principle of non-discrimination9. This leads onto the second 
factor, that of status. If integration of TCNs is a key issue on the policy agenda then their 
classification must also be an important question. Discriminating on the basis of nationality 
when compared to citizens of the EU immediately bestows an inferior status to TCNs. The 
question then turns on the type of status and the rights that flow from it. If it accepted that by 
definition TCNs cannot be citizens of the EU then they could be aliens or workers. For alien 
status there is little incentive to grant rights to individuals as there is no intention for integration 
to take place, clearly at odds with EU policy. Granting worker status would enable individuals to 
be granted rights and to enable integration. However, for individuals to achieve the full benefits 
of worker status they must be able to enjoy the benefits of the principle of non-discrimination. It 
could be that TCNs can be classified as denizens without the right to non-discrimination but 
again this at appears to be at odds with the aim of integration. The final factor is the status of the 
principle non-discrimination itself. The principle of non-discrimination is designed to give 
                                                 
8 Cholewinski R., “The Rights of Non-EC Immigrant Workers and Their Families in EC Countries of Employment: 
A Case for Integration” in Dine J., Watt B., Discrimination Law: Concepts, Limitations and Justifications, 
Longman, 1996, 134 at 136. 
9 Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, SN 200/99 at 5, para.18: “The 
European Union must ensure fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally on the territory of its 
Member States. A more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting them rights and obligations comparable 
to those of EU citizens. It should also enhance non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural life and develop 
measures against racism and xenophobia.” 
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substantive effect to the right to equality10. As such it is a human right that should be available to 
all individuals to enable them to claim their right to equality. The case law of the ECJ has 
removed the universality of the principle through the link created between citizenship and non-
discrimination and re-crafted it as a citizen right taking it away from its actual purpose. 
Suggestions for removing the contradictory positions must take these factors into consideration 
but must also be aware of the value-neutral condition of formal rationality such that the removal 
of contrary scenarios may not lead to the benefit of TCNs. However, the two recommendations 
in this instance do benefit TCNs with the first being to return the principle of non-discrimination 
back to a human rather than a citizen right. The second is to remove the limitations of nationality 
on the right to free movement so that the right does not operate through discrimination on the 
basis of nationality (see Chapter II for greater discussion on the right of free movement of 
persons). 
 
The third issue involves the principle of the freedom of movement of persons, either with 
another principle or within the doctrine itself. The establishment of the internal market is a major 
policy objective of the Community that is characterised by the removal of barriers to the free 
movement of persons between MSs (Article 3(1)(c)EC). The literal, and wide, reading of Article 
14(2)EC implies the abolition of all frontier controls on all persons, irrespective of nationality, to 
create the internal market. However, the requirement of free movement of workers within the 
Community as specified by Article 39EC, in which the term workers was intended to similarly 
encompass all persons irrespective of nationality, has been narrowed to nationals of MSs by 
secondary legislation and the ECJ. Thus the wide interpretation of persons in the doctrine of the 
internal market is in contradiction to that employed for the freedom of movement of workers. 
                                                 
10 See Barnard C., “The Principle of Equality in the Community Context: P, Grant, Kalanke and Marschall: Four 
Uneasy Bedfellows?” (1998) 57 CLJ 352, who argues that the principle of non-discrimination provides the 
substantive filling for the vacuum of formal equality suggested by Westen P., “The Empty Idea of Equality”, (1982) 
95 HLR 537. 
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However, there is a strong argument that there is no contradiction, just tension between two 
doctrinal positions and that the initial meaning of ‘persons’ has been limited by secondary 
legislation and the ECJ, thereby pulling in the same direction but in a more narrow vein. 
 
The limitation of the definition of workers to nationals of MSs within the doctrine of freedom of 
movement of workers, first by secondary legislation and then more recently by the ECJ’s case 
law, appears to contradict the meaning intended by the EC Treaty’s founding fathers. The delay 
by the Court in confirming this limitation, even though it had opportunities to do so in the past, 
would appear to indicate a concern within the ECJ over this apparently contradictory definition 
in the secondary legislation with the intentions of the founding fathers. This, it is submitted, 
illustrates a contradiction at the heart of the freedom of movement principle. 
 
There appears to be inconsistency in the use of the term “freely” in Article 18EC. If a citizen of 
the Union has a right to move and reside freely, then adopting legislative measures, and 
interpreting such a right of free residence, so that the right to reside is not a stand alone principle 
but limited by the requirement of sickness insurance and sufficient resources not to be a burden 
on the host MS contradicts the term “freely”.  
 
Article 24(2) of the Citizens’ Directive11 permits MSs not to confer the entitlement of social 
assistance on applicants within the scope of the Directive for the first three months of residence 
or longer where the individual is seeking employment. This social assistance is equivalent to the 
jobseekers allowance granted to those searching for employment in the UK. However, the Court 
in Collins12 held that, following the introduction of Union citizenship and its interpretation by the 
ECJ, it was no longer possible to exclude from the scope of equal treatment a benefit of a 
                                                 
11 European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, O.J. 2004 L158/77. 
12 Case C-138/02 Collins v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] ECR I-2703. 
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financial nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the labour market of a MS, which 
included jobseekers allowance. Therefore there is a contradiction between the Directive and the 
ECJ case law on the same subject matter. 
 
The policy factors here lie in the issue of the freedom of movement of persons. As such this has 
been analysed in detail in Chapter II and therefore this thesis will go straight to providing 
suggestions and recommendations. The first is to confirm a recommendation from above that the 
limitations of nationality on the right to free movement should be removed. This would 
effectively remove three contradictions: the point on non-discrimination above; the possible 
contradictory stance between the internal market and the free movement of persons; and, the 
contradiction within the principle of freedom of movement of persons itself. The two further 
recommendations do not actually involve the treatment of TCNs but would tidy up the legal 
framework. First the word “freely” should be removed from Article 18EC and second the ECJ 
should bring its case law into line with the Citizens’ Directive. 
 
2. INSTRUMENTAL LEGAL RATIONALITY 
 
Instrumental rationality is constituted by two elements, generic and specific. The Fullerian 
procedural principles provide the framework for the investigation of the generic element of 
instrumental rationality. It requires legal doctrine to be capable of guiding action for which the 
generic qualities of instrumental rationality are necessary but not sufficient. Sufficiency is 
provided by the inclusion of specific instrumental rationality. As such generic instrumental 
rationality is compatible with the concept of the rule of law, relying on the principle of 
effectiveness rather than morality. In a similar way to formal rationality, the abstract evaluation 
provides considerations of certain specific matters that need to be viewed from their policy 
perspective to provide useful suggestions.  
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The first matter deals with the treatment of TCNs in comparison to that of citizens of the EU. 
The difference in the general treatment of TCNs by EU law in comparison to EU citizens could 
suggest that the law fails the requirement of generality, such that the law is inconsistent, and that 
individuals in similar positions are treated differently. This could be especially the case where 
TCNs are economically active in the host MS through employment and paying taxes as well as 
enjoying the benefits of society and so it could be thought that TCNs are treated unfairly as they 
are treated in a different manner to citizens of the Union. It is submitted however that 
Community law is applied consistently and TCNs are treated equally to other individuals in a 
similar position as the individuals to whom TCNs must be compared are their fellow TCNs. 
Furthermore, both primary and secondary legislation is of general application throughout the 
Union so a case in one MS will be treated in a similar manner across the Community.  
 
The second issue deals with congruence such that the law as it is officially declared is 
compatible with the law as it is administered. The principles of non-discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality and citizenship of the Union appear to be problematic areas. The law as it 
is stated in Article 12EC is specific that ‘any discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall 
be prohibited’ so long as the matter can be brought within the scope of the EC Treaty. Although 
TCNs had difficulty bringing themselves within the scope ratione personae of Article 12EC, as 
they were outside the scope of the EC Treaty, it is clear from the wording of the provision that if 
this hurdle could be cleared then Article 12EC could be relied upon. The development of Union 
citizenship, and the subsequent ECJ case law, has though shifted the principle from a human 
right to a citizen right, dependent on possession of the nationality of a MS. Therefore to rely on 
the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality there is a requirement for 
individuals to be discriminated against on the basis of their nationality. There is also a cause for 
concern here in the way the law has been applied in practice and as the law specified at the time 
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of the Treaty of Rome. The EC Treaty has undergone frequent Treaty amendments and policy 
areas have developed over time.  However the principle of the freedom of movement of workers 
as originally stated in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and as now enunciated in Article 39EC, has 
not been amended. Through the introduction of secondary legislation limiting this freedom of 
movement to nationals of MSs, and with the ECJ now confirming this limitation, the law in 
practice apparently contradicts the law as originally declared and a state of incongruence exists. 
 
A further necessary element contained within instrumental rationality is that of specific 
instrumental rationality which creates sufficiency for action-guidance when complementing the 
generic version. Three factors constitute specific instrumental rationality, of which two are 
applicable in this Part. The first is that legitimate ends or goals must be promoted in a good faith 
manner or attempt by the legislative bodies or judiciary when acting within the legal enterprise. 
Thus the “law abiding citizen …does not apply legal rules to serve specific ends set by the law-
giver, but rather follows them in the conduct of his own affairs, the interests he is presumed to 
serve in following legal rules being those of society generally”13. The ends that European legal 
doctrines are meant to promote are those laid down in Articles3EC and 2TEU. These do not 
mention TCNs specifically although Article 3(1)(c)EC provides for the establishment of an 
internal market with the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of persons, Article 3(1)(d) 
for measures concerning the entry and movement of persons as provided for in Title IV14 and 
Article 2(4)TEU assures the  free movement of persons. Moreover aspirational societal goals are 
included in the preambles to the EC Treaty and TEU. These include “an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe” and, for the TEU, the facilitation of the free movement of persons in an 
area of freedom, security and justice. Thus although not mentioned in the ends of the Community 
or Union, TCNs legally resident within the EU could legitimately infer an expectation to be 
                                                 
13 Fuller L.L., The Morality of Law, Yale University Press, 1969 at 207 (Fuller’s emphasis). 
14 See Chapter V of this thesis. 
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included within the personal scope of the EC Treaty by being included in the term “persons” and 
“peoples”. The exclusion of TCNs from the right to freedom of movement for workers by 
secondary legislation and the ECJ’s subsequent curtailment of the rights in Article 39EC to 
nationals of MSs, which apparently contradicted the intentions of the EEC’s founding fathers, 
would appear to fail to promote the societal goals or ends of both the Community and Union. 
 
The second factor is that legal officials must utilise the most effective legal technique to achieve 
societal ends, ensuring that the function of the legal act matches its effect. For example the 
function of Article 12EC is to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of nationality and thereby 
protect the individual. The development of Article 12EC as a citizen right through the ECJ’s 
interpretation of it with reference to Articles 17 and 18EC, rather than a human right, and the 
Race Directive’s exclusion of nationality discrimination from its material scope along with its 
lack of application to the entry, residence or status of TCNs, ensure that discrimination for TCNs 
on the grounds of nationality remains possible. The effect of Article 12EC fails to match its 
function. 
 
The factors affecting policy formation in the areas covered by instrumental rationality has been 
analysed above in the section on formal rationality and suggestions made to ensure the limitation 
of contradiction. It is submitted those suggestions apply to similar effect here. 
 
3. SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL RATIONALITY 
 
Substantive rationality requires that all rules of law must be based on good reasons so that legal 
doctrine can be sustained on plausible empirical facts and that the underlying principle can be 
justifiable or legitimate. Such justification takes place through the application of standards of 
fairness recognised by the community. As fairness is value-laden then the standards envisaged 
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must be moral through the application of human rights norms within the Community. Such 
human rights norms are possessed by individuals on the basis of their innate humanity.  
 
The rights that a TCN enjoys from the EC Treaty or secondary legislation implementing the EC 
Treaty’s provisions are subsidiary or derivative rights. These rights are not granted directly to 
TCNs on the basis of their own individual capacity, nor are they possessed personally, but they 
depend upon the specific relationship between the TCN and the right holder who has to be a 
Union citizen. Directive 2004/38 does now enable TCNs who suffer divorce from, or the death 
of, their EU citizen spouse to retain the right of residence already granted if certain conditions 
are met. Indeed this can be turned into a permanent right of residence. This is a significant 
improvement on the position before where if the relationship failed or ceased to exist then the 
protection afforded to the TCN through such derived rights was removed immediately from the 
time of the failure. In fact this can still occur if the criteria for retained residence are not 
satisfied. However, the right of retained residence is still dependent upon the initial relationship 
with an EU citizen, and as the ECJ made clear in Carpenter15 the EU citizen’s wife was able to 
remain with her husband because to separate the couple would have negatively affected Mr 
Carpenter’s rights to freedom of movement, not Mrs Carpenter’s. Such subordination of TCNs to 
the will of the right holder, or the polity, objectifies non-MS nationals and in effect dehumanises 
them16. Legal doctrine is substantively justified or legitimised through human rights norms that 
require the individual to be subjectified. Community legal doctrine on the right of free movement 
for TCNs by objectifying human beings breaches the requirement of the standards of fairness in 
the community and must therefore be substantively irrational. 
 
                                                 
15 Case C-60/00 Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279. 
16 Weiler, J.H.H., “Thou Shalt not Oppress a Stranger: On the Judicial Protection of the Human Rights of non-EC 
Nationals”, (1992) 3 EJIL 65. 
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As was seen in Chapter I, the concept of substantive rationality is controversial as it applies a 
value-laden judgement as to the standard by which law is to be analysed. The abstract evaluation 
above must therefore be considered from a policy stance to enable useful insights to be that can 
lead to recommendations or suggestions. The policy stance chosen for this is that of the Tampere 
Conclusions’ voluntary commitment by the EU and its MSs to improve the position of TCNs. 
The difficulty here is that TCNs can claim fundamental rights but they are derived rights and 
thus rights pertaining to the TCN’s relationship with the actual right holder. There is therefore a 
dislocation between the ability to claim the right and the ownership of the right that resides on 
the question of principle. The best solution would be to enable TCNs to claim rights that their 
own rights and would remove the difficulty identified. However, from a practical perspective 
there appears little point in enabling this if it can be obtained by an alternative route. The 
position that is seen today of rights slowly being transferred into the hands of TCNs after a 
period of time appears to be a pragmatic and sensible development that will bear fruit over time. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
The result of the legal rationality analysis is that the law is found to be irrational. Furthermore 
when these findings are inserted into the policy formation matrix certain suggestions can be 
made to overcome these problems. However, it can be further deduced that there are two themes 
in particular that emerge, those of discrimination and human rights, that if rectified as suggested 
could lead to significant improvement in the rationality of the law. As it stands significant 
questions arise from the analysis over the EU’s political legitimacy in general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 3 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
FREE MOVEMENT RIGHTS BASED ON THE AREA OF 
FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE 
 
The second area of examination for this thesis is the AFSJ1 and the free movement rights 
provided within it for TCNs. The AFSJ was introduced into the EC Treaty at the Treaty of 
Amsterdam by moving the provisions concerning free movement of persons from pillar three 
(Title VI TEU) into pillar one (Title IV EC). It required measures to be introduced by 1 May 
2004 to ensure the free movement of persons in accordance with Article 14EC in conjunction 
with directly related flanking measures (Article 61(a)EC). Article 62EC split the legislation to be 
adopted into measures concerning internal free movement and measures involving the crossing 
of external borders, whilst Article 63EC outlined three different types of TCNs, those claiming 
asylum, refugees and immigrants. 
 
The two principle international legal instruments that are relevant when dealing with TCNs in 
the AFSJ, particularly asylum-seekers and refugees, are the Geneva Convention on the Status of 
Refugees 1951 and the 1967 Protocol (henceforth Geneva Convention), and the ECHR. Article 
33(1) of the Geneva Convention prevents the refoulement of a refugee to a State where his or life 
                                                 
1 See Boeles P., “Introduction: Freedom, Security and Justice for All”, in Guild E., Harlow C. (Eds.), Implementing 
Amsterdam: Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law, Hart Publishing, 2001, 1 for an analysis of the meaning of 
the term AFSJ. For a comprehensive description of the development of the AFSJ and of the EU’s asylum policy see 
Boccardi I., Europe and Refugees: Towards an EU Asylum Policy, Kluwer Law International, 2002. 
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or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion. This must be coupled in Europe with Article 3ECHR 
that prevents anyone being subjected to torture or to inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment. The ECtHR has held that this provides a similar protection to Article 33(1) of the 
Geneva Convention as refoulement must be prevented if there is a real risk of being subjected to 
treatment contrary to Article 3ECHR in the receiving country2. Furthermore it has been argued3 
that this Article 3ECHR right is an absolute right, without any derogation4, particularly for 
extradition5 so long as there is a real risk rather than a mere possibility of ill-treatment6, and thus 
extends further than Article 33(1) of the Geneva Convention7. It is also incumbent upon each 
Contracting State of the ECHR, in accordance with Article 13ECHR, to ensure that an 
investigation of a risk of breach of Article 3ECHR can be carried out rigorously and 
independently8 so that it can have suspensive effect of the extradition process9, particularly 
where the effect of the extradition, where it was contrary to the ECHR, was potentially 
                                                 
2 Chahal v. UK (1997) 23 EHRR 413; noted Anon, “Case Comment”, [1997] EHRLR 172, Foster S., “Case 
Comment”, (1997) 31 Law Teacher 238 and Harvey C.J., “Expulsion, National Security and the European 
Convention”, (1997) 22 ELR 626. Chahal was recently confirmed in strong language by the ECtHR in Saadi v. Italy 
(2008) 24 BHRC 123; noted Anon, “Case Comment”, [2008] EHRLR 422; Feldman D., “Deporting Suspected 
Terrorists to Face Torture”, (2008) 67 CLJ 225; Cernic J.L., “National Security and Expulsion to a Risk of Torture”, 
(2008) 12 Edin LR 486. See also NA v. UK (2009) 48 EHRR 15. 
3 Addo M.K., Grief N., “Does Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Enshrine Absolute Rights?” 
(1998) 9 EJIL 510, Addo M.K., Grief N., “Some Practical Issues Affecting the Notion of Absolute Right in Article 3 
ECHR”, (1998) 23 Supp (Human Rights Survey) ELR 17 and Addo M.K., Grief N., “Is there a Policy Behind the 
Decisions and Judgments Relating to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights?” (1995) 20 ELR 178. 
4 Ireland v. UK (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25. 
5 Soering v. UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439. See Yorke J., “Europe’s Judicial Inquiry in Extradition Cases: Closing the 
Door on the Death Penalty”, (2004) 29 ELR 546 and Lester A., Beattie K., “Risking Torture”, [2005] EHRLR 565. 
For an in depth analysis of the Soering case see den Haijer M., “Whose Rights and Which Rights? The Continuing 
Story of Non-Refoulement under the European Convention on Human Rights”, (2008) 10 EJML 277. 
6 Vilvarajah v. UK (1992) 14 EHRR 248. See Sherlock A., “Asylum Seekers and the Convention”, (1992) 17 ELR 
281. 
7 Op. Cit. n.2 at para.80: ‘protection afforded by Article 3 is…wider than that provided by Articles 32 and 33 of the 
United Nation’s 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees’ and supported by Lambert H., “Protection Against 
Refoulement from Europe: Human Rights Law Comes to the Rescue”, (1999) 48 ICLQ 515. See also Duffy A., 
“Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-Refoulement in International Law”, (2008) 20 IJRL 373 at 379. 
8 Assenov v. Bulgaria (1999) EHRR 652; noted Anon, “Case Comment”, [1999] EHRLR 225 (for a more in depth 
analysis see Goldston J.A., “Race Discrimination in Europe: Problems and Prospects”, [1999] EHRLR 462). See 
also Nasseri v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 1 All ER 411, although overturned on appeal in 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Nasseri [2009] 1 All ER 116. 
9 Jabari v. Turkey [2001] INLR 136. 
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irreversible10. Indeed, in cases involving Article 3ECHR, the importance that the ECtHR attaches 
to Article 3ECHR and the potential for irreversible consequences if the individual is extradited 
despite the extradition contravening Article 3ECHR, the ECtHR has held that Article 13ECHR 
requires appeals to be suspensive as a matter of law11. Finally, an individual has the right to 
family life as outlined in Article 8ECHR and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence12. 
 
This Chapter picks up the investigation of free movement of persons in Chapter III but considers 
the entitlement to free movement of TCNs as specifically detailed in Title IV EC Treaty and also 
cross-over provisions in Title VI TEU. The aim of Title IV is ‘to establish progressively an area 
of freedom, security and justice’ (Article 61EC) and as Toth13 points out free movement of 
persons has moved away from a purely economic purpose to become the foundation on which 
the AFSJ is based. The Chapter will commence with a short overview of the introduction of the 
AFSJ, that includes an analysis of the different positions of the UK, Ireland and Denmark, before 
                                                 
10 Conka v. Belgium (2002) 34 EHRR 54; noted Anon, “Case Comment”, [2002] EHRLR 691. 
11 Gebremedhin (Gabermadhien) v. France (Application No.25389/05), judgment of 26 April 2007, nyr; noted 
Anon, “Case Comment”, [2007] EHRLR 468 and Boeles P., “Case Reports of the European Court of Human Rights, 
the Human Rights Committee and the Committee Against Torture”, (2008) 10 EJML 105 at 112. 
12 See Cholewinski R., “The Protection of the Right of Economic Migrants to Family Reunion in Europe”, (1994) 43 
ICLQ 568, Lambert H., “The European Court of Human Rights and the Right of Refugees and Other Persons in 
Need of Protection to Family Reunion”, (2000) 11 IJRL 427 and Thym D., “Respect for Private and Family Life 
under Article 8ECHR in Immigration Cases: A Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay?” (2008) 57 ICLQ 87. For 
the principles involving Article 8 and the expulsion of long-term immigrants see Boultif v. Switzerland (2001) 33 
EHRR 50 (see Anon, “Case Comment”, [2002] EHRLR 276, Rogers N., “Immigration and the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Are New Principles Emerging?” [2003] EHRLR 53), recently expanded in Üner v. 
Netherlands (2007) 45 EHRR 14 (noted Berkowitz N., “Case Comment”, (2007) 27 JIANL 43, Anon, “Case 
Comment”, [2007] EHRLR 103, Boeles P., Bruins M., “Case Reports of the European Court of Human Rights and 
the Human Rights Committee”, (2007) 9 EJML 253 at 263 and Steinorth C., “Case Comment”, (2008) 8 HRLR 
185) and applied in Keles v. Germany (2007) 44 EHRR 12 and Maslov v. Germany (2008) 47 EHRR 20. See also 
Yeo C., “Protecting the Family Members”, (2008) 22 JIANL 147 for a critical evaluation of the UK’s approach to 
the rights of family members but see now Beoku-Betts v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 4 All 
ER 1146 (noted Seddon D., “Case Comment”, (2008) 22 JIANL 358), Chikwamba v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2009] 1 All ER 363 (noted Seddon D., “Case Comment”, (2008) 22 JIANL 366), EB (Kosovo) 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 4 All ER 28 (noted Seddon D., “Case Comment”, (2008) 22 
JIANL 360) and EM (Lebanon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 3 WLR 931. For a more in 
depth analysis see Macdonald I., “ECHR article 8: bringing the UK courts back in step with Strasbourg”, (2008) 22 
JIANL 293. 
13 Toth A.G., “The Legal Effects of the Protocols Relating to the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark in Heukels 
T., Blokker., Brus M., (Eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam, Kluwer Law International, 1998, 227 at 248 
and Wiener A., “Forging Flexibility – The British ‘No’ to Schengen”, (2000) 1 EJML 441. 
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then considering the positions of asylum-seekers, refugees, and immigrants and their free 
movement rights14. 
 
1. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE AFSJ 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam attempted to rationalise the labyrinthine structure that had been 
created through the intergovernmental structures of Schengen and the SIC and to communitarise 
the decision-making process without resorting to supranationalism15. The objectives of the EU 
were amended from the close co-operation on justice and home affairs to the maintenance and 
development of the ‘Union as an area of freedom, security and justice’ (Article 2TEU). Free 
movement of persons was to be assured ‘in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect 
to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime’. 
This was compatible with the main premise of the SIC which was to establish an area among the 
Schengen signatory States that had fully implemented free movement of persons such that 
‘[i]nternal borders may be crossed at any point without any checks on persons being carried out’ 
(Article 2(1)SIC). The Schengen Protocol annexed to both the TEU and EC Treaty laid out the 
                                                 
14 Note the adoption and development of the Global Approach to Migration in Council Document 15914/1/05 at 2 & 
9, Commission Communication on priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration: First follow-up to 
Hampton Court, COM(2005) 621 final, Commission Communication on The Global Approach to Migration one 
year on: Towards a comprehensive European migration policy, COM(2005) 735, Commission Communication on 
applying the Global Approach to Migration to the Eastern and South-Eastern regions neighbouring the European 
Union, COM(2007) 247 and Commission Communication on strengthening the Global Approach to Migration: 
Increasing coordination, coherence and synergies, COM(2008) 611 final. 
15 See Wagner E., “The Integration of Schengen into the Framework of the European Union”, (1998) 25 LIEI 1, 
Kuijper P.J., “Some Legal Problems Associated with the Communitarisation of Policy on Visas, Asylum and 
Immigration under the Amsterdam Treaty and Incorporation of the Schengen acquis”, (2000) 37 CMLRev 345 and 
den Boer M., Corrado L., “For the Record or Off the Record: Comments About the Incorporation of Schengen into 
the EU”, (1999) 1 EJML 397. 
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process of integrating the Schengen acquis16 with Council Decisions 1999/435/EC17 and 
1999/436/EC18 defining it and assigning the legal base for each provision.  
 
The Schengen Protocol and a series of other Protocols attached to the EC Treaty and/or the TEU 
regulate the complex position of the UK, Ireland and Denmark in reference to Schengen, Article 
14EC and Title IV EC Treaty whilst Article 69EC limits the application of Title IV EC to the 
UK, Ireland and Denmark in accordance with these Protocols. Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol 
establishes the opt-out position of the UK and Ireland from the Schengen acquis with the 
possibility to opt-in to some or all of the provisions with the approval of the unanimous vote in 
the Council, and the UK and Ireland have taken up that option19. Article 5 specifies that any 
proposals or initiatives to build on the Schengen acquis are to be subject to the Treaties’ 
provisions and if Ireland and the UK have not notified the President of the Council, in writing, in 
a reasonable period of time, then enhanced co-operation authorisation to go ahead with the 
legislation will have been granted, as required in Article 11EC and Article 40TEU. This then 
grants a right of choice to the UK and Ireland to opt in to the development of new legal measures 
of the Schengen acquis20 if the legislative measure falls into the category of Schengen measures 
agreed under Article 4 of the Protocol, i.e. those included in Decisions 2000/365 and 2002/192. 
                                                 
16 See Protocol Integrating the Schengen acquis into the Framework of the European Union, attached to the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. The acquis is defined in the annex to the Protocol as the Schengen Agreement, the Schengen 
Implementing Convention, the Accession Protocols and Agreements to the Schengen Agreement and the Decisions 
and Declarations of the Schengen Executive Committee. These are published in O.J. 2000 L239. 
17 O.J. 1999 L176/1. 
18 O.J. 1999 L176/17. 
19 Council Decision 2000/365/EC concerning the request of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, O.J. 2000 L131/43 and Council Decision 
2002/192/EC concerning Ireland’s request to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, O.J. 2002 
L64/20. See Tayleur T., “Schengen: Opting in – but how far?” (2001) 151 NLJ 482. The UK’s participation has 
been put into effect by Council Decision 2004/926/EC on the putting into effect parts of the Schengen acquis by the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, O.J. 2004 L395/70 but it should be noted that Ireland’s 
participation has not yet been put into effect. 
20 Cases C-137/05 UK v. Council [2007] ECR I-11593 at para. 50 and C-77/05 UK v. Council [2007] ECR I-11459 
at para.68, where the UK brought two Article 230EC actions for annulment of two Schengen legal measures. See 
Rijpma J.J., “Case Note”, (2008) 45 CMLRev 835. 
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If, however, the new Schengen acquis measure is not within that category the UK and Ireland 
can only opt in to develop it if it can be applied autonomously21. 
 
Two further Protocols elaborate the position of the UK and Ireland with respect to immigration. 
In the first Protocol22, Article 1 entitles the UK, notwithstanding the absolute statement in Article 
14EC, any other provision of the EC Treaty or the TEU, or any international convention, to 
maintain external border controls to verify and determine whether to grant the right of entry to 
the UK. This is extended to Ireland by Article 2 maintaining the Common Travel Area, the 
bilateral arrangement founded upon administrative agreements between the two countries 
relating to the movement of persons between them23. As a consequence Article 3 allows the 
other MSs to maintain border controls between “Schengenland” 24 and the UK and Ireland. 
Article 1 and 2 of the second Protocol25 secures an opt-out for the UK and Ireland from the 
provisions of Title IV and any implementing measures. However, if within three months after a 
proposal or initiative for a Title IV implementing measure, the UK or Ireland notify the Council 
in writing that they wish to take part in the adoption and application of this measure, then they 
will be entitled to do so (Article 3). It is clear that this may not be used by the UK or Ireland to 
block the implementation of the measure as the Council is authorised to adopt measures on its 
own if agreement cannot be reached with the UK or Ireland within ‘a reasonable time’ (Article 
3(2)). If after a measure has been adopted by the Council the UK or Ireland notify the Council 
and Commission that it wishes to accept that measure then the Commission will decide within 
four months whether it can or not and determine the arrangements required (Article 4). Under 
                                                 
21 Ibid. Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Case C-137/05 at para. 101 and Case C-77/05 at para.107. 
22 Protocol on the Application of Certain Aspects of Article 14EC to the UK and Ireland. 
23 See Ryan B., “The Common Travel Area between Britain and Ireland”, (2001) 64 MLR 855. 
24 The term is used in Hailbronner K., Thiery C., “Schengen II and Dublin: Responsibility for Asylum Applications 
in Europe”, 34 (1997) CMLRev 957 at 959. 
25 Protocol on the Position of the UK and Ireland. 
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Article 8, Ireland has the possibility of unilaterally withdrawing from this protocol, further 
emphasised by Ireland’s Declaration attached to the Final Act26, which declared its intention to 
engage fully in Title IV developments as far as the Common Travel Area with the UK allowed. 
In general the provisions of the acquis that the UK and Ireland have opted into are the restrictive, 
control and order flanking measures in the areas of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, the Title IV TEU aspects of the Schengen Information System (henceforth SIS), the 
fight against drugs, asylum and air carrier sanctions (Articles 26 and 27SIC), rather than the 
liberalising free movement of persons provisions. Thus in an area of freedom, security and 
justice the UK and Ireland participate in security and justice but opt out of freedom. 
 
Article 3 of the Schengen Protocol creates an even more complex position for Denmark. The 
first paragraph states that Denmark is to retain the same rights and obligations in relation to the 
other Schengen States as before the Treaty of Amsterdam in regard to those provisions of the 
Schengen acquis that are assigned to Title IV EC. Thus measures implementing Title IV for 
Denmark will continue to have public international legal obligations, as they would have done 
under the intergovernmental arrangements of Schengen, rather than those of the EC, thus 
circumventing ECJ jurisdiction, although this is limited anyway under Article 68EC. Paragraph 
two, however, specifies that Denmark shall continue to have the same rights and obligations, in 
regard to provisions assigned to Title VI TEU, as the other Schengen States, which creates the 
effect of Denmark being bound to ECJ interpretation of Title VI TEU measures but not for those 
under Title IV EC27. In a Protocol28 similar to that for the UK and Ireland, Denmark also 
attempted to secure a politically acceptable opt-out to Title IV EC (Article 2) and measures 
                                                 
26 Declaration (No.4) by Ireland on Article 3 of the Protocol on the Position of the UK and Ireland. 
27 Hedemann-Robinson M., “The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice with Regard to the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark: The ‘Opt-in Opt-Outs’ under the Treaty of Amsterdam”, in O’Keeffe D., Twomey P, (Eds.), Legal Issues 
of the Amsterdam Treaty, Hart Publishing, 1999, 289 at 300. 
28 Protocol on the Position of Denmark. 
133 
 
implemented under it (Article 1) although Article 4 provides for Denmark’s participation in 
measures dealing with visas. Denmark has no opt-in option to Title IV measures at the proposal 
stage. Rather it may decide, within six months of the Council deciding on the initiative or 
proposal, to implement the provision in domestic law and it would create a public international 
law obligation, not a Community duty (Article 5(1)). There is a heavy incentive to implement 
these decisions, however, as Article 5(2) allows the Schengen States to take “appropriate 
measures” that is effectively a justification for the erection of border controls at the Danish 
border29. Article 7 allows Denmark to withdraw at any time from the protocol thereby applying a 
Community legal obligation with immediate effect. The effect of this Protocol on Denmark has 
been slight as Denmark has chosen within a short period of time to sign up to all the measures 
that have been passed under Title IV EC. The position of review by the ECJ is however far more 
concerning as there does not appear to be the possibility of individuals being able to clarify the 
law, question the law or rely on their rights before the ECJ. 
 
2. ASYLUM-SEEKERS 
 
The EU policy on asylum has been in development since Schengen in 1985, through the 
Tampere Conclusions and Hague Programme to the creation of a future Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS) as a constituent part of the AFSJ as formulated in the Commission’s 
Green Paper on the future CEAS30. The authority for the adoption of legislative measures dealing 
with asylum are set out in Article 63(1)EC and must comply with the Geneva Convention. A 
                                                 
29 Op. Cit. n.27 at 299. 
30 Commission Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum System, COM(2007) 301 final. See also the 
Commission Communication on a policy plan on asylum: An integrated approach to protection across the EU, 
COM(2008) 360 final. 
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debate on asylum was originally initiated through a Communication31 in which the Commission 
set out its policy on asylum32 for a common procedure and a uniform status of asylum-seekers. In 
a forward thinking assessment it raised the issue of the integration of asylum-seekers with the 
possibility of access to MS nationality or in the alternative the development of a concept of civic 
citizenship33. The asylum policy of the EU has now been encapsulated in the three objectives set 
out in the 2003 Commission Communication34: “(1) the orderly and managed arrival of persons 
in need of international protection in the EU from the region of origin; (2) burden and 
responsibility sharing within the EU as well as with regions of origin enabling them to provide 
effective protection as soon as possible and as closely as possible to the needs of persons in need 
of international protection; and, (3) the development of an integrated approach to efficient and 
enforceable asylum decision-making and return procedures”. The emphasis therefore of this 
asylum policy is on the movement of TCNs across the external borders of the EU rather than the 
internal movement of such persons. However, the legislative measures that have been adopted 
have an impact on the internal dimension and must therefore be considered when analysing the 
free movement rights of TCNs and in particular asylum-seekers. The difference between an 
asylum-seeker and an individual with refugee status is hard to determine as the international 
community has determined the meaning and regulated refugees through the Geneva Convention 
but no international agreement has been forthcoming on asylum-seekers. The clearest 
international statement on asylum is that laid down in Article 18 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, that ‘the right of asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules 
of the Geneva Convention and in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European 
                                                 
31 Commission Communication towards a common asylum procedure and a uniform status, valid throughout the 
Union, for persons granted asylum, COM(2000)755 final. 
32 For a discussion of the theories on asylum see Nathwani N., “The Purpose of Asylum”, (2000) 12 IJRL 354. 
33 Op. Cit. n.31 at para.3.4. See Bell M., “Civic Citizenship and Migrant Integration”, (2007) 13 EPL 311. 
34 Commission Communication towards more accessible, equitable and managed asylum systems”, COM(2003) 315 
at 13. 
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Community’35, although Article 14(1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated 
that ‘[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. Its 
inclusion in the Charter imbues the right with fundamental rights status and the Lisbon Treaty 
inserts a new Article 6(1)TEU that will give the Charter the same legal value as the Treaties. It is 
submitted that the provision, when the ECJ considers it, is likely to be found to be sufficiently 
clear, precise and unconditional, when compared to a provision such as Article 141EC, for the 
Court to find it directly effective. The effect of such a right on TCNs is uncertain, particularly 
with the restrictive implementing legislation that has been adopted. It is also uncertain with 
reference to citizens of the Union as the Protocol on Asylum36 affords safe country of origin 
status to all MSs. 
 
An asylum-seeker will travel to the EU and make an application in a specific State on the basis 
of subjective reasons applicable to that particular applicant. It may be that the person applies at 
the first opportunity as soon as he or she has arrived in the EU, or the applicant may favour a 
particular EU MS because of family connections or a supportive community, cultural, linguistic 
or historical connections or individual preference that the applicant has for the receiving 
country37. The EU has, however, created a system of allocating the MS responsible for assessing 
the applicant’s claim in a one-stop-shop objective system. This was originally laid down in 
Articles 28-38SIC and then replaced by the Dublin Convention38 of 1990. This 
intergovernmental arrangement had the objective of ensuring not only that one MS was 
responsible for the investigation of an asylum application from a TCN but that a MS did actually 
                                                 
35 Harvey C., “The Right to Seek Asylum in the European Union”, [2004] EHRLR 17 at 32. 
36 Protocol on Asylum for Nationals of Member States of the European Union. 
37 Blake N., “The Dublin Convention and Rights of Asylum Seekers in the European Union” in Op. Cit. n.1, 95 at 
99. 
38 Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member 
States of the European Communities, O.J. 1997 C254/1. 
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take responsibility for processing the asylum application and so asylum-seekers did not ‘orbit’39 
from country to country in a process known as asylum shopping. Article 2 required it to be 
applied in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Article 3(1) required MSs ‘to examine the 
application of any alien who applies at the border or in the territory to any one of them for 
asylum’ with a hierarchical catalogue of conflict rules determining the MS with responsibility for 
examining the asylum application. These rules were applied in descending priority of: the MS 
where refugee status had already been granted to a specified family member who was legally 
resident in the MS40; the MS that had already issued a residence permit or a visa; the MS where 
the applicant had first entered illegally from outside the EU; the MS with responsibility for 
controlling the entry of the applicant across the external borders of the MSs; and, in all other 
cases, the MS where the first application for asylum made in the EU, including any previous 
applications for asylum that had been refused (Articles 4-8). Thus the default position for 
application examination was for the “first country of entry” in Article 8 unless the applicant 
could bring themselves within Articles 4-7. A sovereignty clause, Article 3(4), enabled a MS to 
examine the asylum application where the MS did not have responsibility under the conflict rules 
and a negative decision had already been determined in another MS, and Article 9 enabled 
another State to take the application by mutual consent. However, Article 3(5) provided that a 
MS could decide that a non-Community country was responsible for the application in 
accordance with the State’s own laws and practices.  
 
In 1992, at the London Council meeting of the ministers responsible for immigration, the “safe 
third country” concept required for Article 3(5) of the Dublin Convention was fleshed out, to be 
                                                 
39 Byrne R., Shacknove A., “The Safe Third Country Notion in European Asylum Law”, (1996) 9 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 185 at 207 and Marx R., “Adjusting the Dublin Convention: New Approaches to Member State 
Responsibility for Asylum Applications”, (2001) 3 EJML 7 at 10. 
40 The concept of “family member” in Article 4 was narrowly defined to include only the reunification of spouses 
and of parents with their unmarried children under eighteen years of age. 
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incorporated into national law as soon as possible. Thus: the life and freedom of the asylum 
applicant could not be threatened within the meaning of Article 33 of the Geneva Convention; 
there must be no risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment; the applicant must either 
have been granted protection or had an opportunity to claim protection in the third country 
before entering the EU, or there is clear evidence of his admissibility to a third country; and, 
there must be effective protection available within the meaning of the Geneva Convention41. 
 
The Dublin Convention and the use of the safe third country concept aroused considerable 
criticism. First the Dublin Convention did not achieve its objective as a MS would not 
substantively assess and process the application. A MS would first determine if the asylum 
applicant had passed through a non-MS before entering the EU. If so then that country would be 
assessed on the safe third country criteria in the London Resolutions and if it fulfilled the criteria 
then the person would be returned to that third country without considering the actual 
application42. Second if the asylum applicant had passed through a number of third countries, 
particularly as third countries followed the EU example and incorporated the safe third country 
definition into their own domestic law, or passed through several MSs then the individual could 
remain in orbit without their application being assessed43. Third there was evidence that the end 
                                                 
41 Council Document 10579/92. The three non-legally binding instruments in this document became known as the 
London Resolutions. See van Selm J., “Access to Procedures: ‘Safe Third Countries’, ‘Safe Countries of Origin’ and 
‘Time Limits’”, 2001, UNHCR, available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b39a2403.pdf, accessed 
5 September 2008, at 10. 
42 Achermann A., Gattiker M., “Safe Third Countries: European Developments”, (1995) 7 IJRL 19 at 22 and 
Borchelt G., “The Safe Third Country Practice in the European Union: A Misguided Approach to Asylum Law and 
a Violation of International Human Rights Standards (2001-2002) 33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 473 at 497. 
43 Ibid. Borchelt at 501 and Coman G.I., “European Union Policy on Asylum and its Inherent Human Rights 
Violations”, (1998) 64 Brooklyn Law Review 1217 at 1235. See also Dunstan R., “Playing Human Pinball: The 
Amnesty International United Kingdom Section Report on UK Home Office ‘Safe Third Country’ Practice”, (1995) 
7 IJRL 606. 
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of the chain resulted in refoulement in breach of Article 33(1)44 of the Geneva Convention45 
(“chain refoulement”). Fourth, the Geneva Convention obligates each signatory State46 to make 
its own judgment about the recognition or refusal and eventual deportation of individual 
applicants for asylum. By failing to assess an application a MS was thereby in breach of the 
Geneva Convention47. Fifth applications for asylum on humanitarian grounds that are not based 
on the Geneva Convention were not considered and the family reunification provisions (Article 
4) were too strict48. Furthermore the evidential rules that required proof of the travel route of 
asylum-seekers were often impossible to satisfy that, in Hurwitz’ opinion49, rendered the Dublin 
Convention virtually useless in many cases. Seventh the MSs applied different standards for the 
determination of “protection” within Article 33 Geneva Convention with the UK following the 
“internal protection” approach in which an individual can fear persecution from non-State actors 
as well as State actors, and Germany and France following the “accountability theory” that only 
considered State actors50. In TI v. UK51 a Sri Lankan Tamil travelled from Sri Lanka to Germany 
and then entered the UK, claiming asylum in the UK. He claimed that he feared persecution from 
the Tamil Tigers, a non-State terrorist group, and that if he was returned to Germany in 
accordance with the Dublin Convention the UK would be in breach of Article 3ECHR as he 
would be returned to Sri Lanka where he would be tortured or suffer inhumane treatment. The 
                                                 
44 Article 33(1) Geneva Convention: “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” 
45 Op. Cit. n.42 Borchelt at 502, Joly D., “The Porous Dam: European Harmonisation on Asylum in the Nineties”, 
(1994) 6 IJRL 159 at 170 and Weidlich S., “First Instance Asylum Proceedings in Europe: Do Bona Fide Refugees 
Find Protection?” (2000) 14 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 643 at 657. 
46 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1, 2nd Ed., 1992, Forward.  
47 Foblets M.C., “Europe and Its Aliens after Maastricht. The Painful Move to Substantive Harmonisation of 
Member States’ Policies Towards Third Country Nationals, 42 (1994) Am. J. Com. L. 783 at 794. 
48 Hurwitz A., “The 1990 Dublin Convention: A Comprehensive Assessment”, (2000) 11 IJRL 464. 
49 Ibid. 
50 See Moore J., “Whither the Accountability Theory: Second-Class Status for Third-Party Refugees as a Threat to 
International Refugee Protection”, (2001) 13 IJRL 32 and Wilsher D., “Non-State Actors and the Definition of a 
Refugee in the United Kingdom: Protection, Accountability or Culpability?” (2003) 15 IJRL 68. 
51 TI v. UK [2000] INLR 211. 
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ECtHR held that by returning TI to Germany the UK would be in breach of Article 3ECHR if 
there was a real risk that that he would be removed to Sri Lanka where he would be subjected to 
treatment contrary to Article 3ECHR. As there were alternative methods for assessing his return 
other than that for asylum then TI could be returned to Germany, even though there was previous 
evidence of refoulement of Tamils in fear of Tamil Tiger persecution. In Adan and Aitseguer52 
the House of Lords held that returning two asylum seekers to France and Germany in accordance 
with the Dublin Convention would be in breach of Article 33 Geneva Convention as the French 
and German courts did not accept non-State agents as agents of persecution. The two asylum-
seekers could ultimately be returned to their country of origin and face persecution there53. The 
result of the failure to take into account the MSs’ different definitions of protection54 meant that 
“the system is fundamentally flawed as the same individual who seeks asylum in different 
Member States is likely to have a different outcome as regards protection”55. 
 
Probably the most damning flaw of the Dublin Convention was that it simply did not work56. 
This was confirmed in two working papers the Commission issued on the operation of the 
Dublin Convention57. The result was the replacement of the intergovernmental Dublin 
Convention with Regulation 343/2003/EC58 that has become known either as the Dublin 
                                                 
52 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept., ex parte Adan, R v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept., ex parte 
Aitsegeur [2001] 2 AC 477.  
53 Ibid. at 515 per Lord Steyn: “It is accepted, and rightly accepted, by the Secretary of State that it is a long standing 
principle in English law that if it would be unlawful to return the asylum seeker directly to his country of origin 
where he is subject to persecution in the relevant sense, it would be unlawful to return him to a third country which 
is known will return him to his country of origin…”. 
54 Noll G., “Formalism v. Empiricism: Some Reflections on the Dublin Convention on the Occasion of Recent 
European Case Law”, (2001) 70 NJIL 161. 
55 Guild E., “Seeking Asylum: Storm Clouds between International Commitments and EU Legislative Measures”, 
(2004) 29 ELR 198 at 207. 
56 Op. Cit. n.37 at 95. 
57 Revisiting the Dublin Convention: developing Community legislation for determining which Member State is 
responsible for considering an asylum application submitted in one of the Member States, SEC(2000)522 final, and 
Evaluation of the Dublin Convention SEC(2001)756 final. 
58 Council Regulation 343/2003/EC establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, 
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Regulation or Dublin II. Dublin II did not apply to Denmark, which continued to follow the 
Dublin Convention procedures59, until Decision 2006/188/EC60 was adopted. Much of the 
Dublin Regulation mirrors the Dublin Convention. Article 3 continues to require MSs to 
examine an asylum application of a TCN, the examination being carried out by a single State 
determined by the criteria laid down in Chapter III of the Regulation. Article 3(2) also enables a 
MS to examine an application even if it is not the responsible State as determined by the Chapter 
III criteria. This is coupled with Article 15 that sanctions any MS, on humanitarian grounds, to 
bring together family members, as well as other dependent relatives, based in particular on 
family or cultural considerations and with the consent of the persons concerned. Special cases 
where the person concerned is dependent on assistance of another person because of pregnancy, 
a new-born child, serious illness, severe handicap or old age, should normally be kept or brought 
together with another relative in a MS, so long as there were family ties in the country of origin. 
If an unaccompanied minor has relatives in a MS who can care for him or her then there should 
be reunification if possible and if it is in the best interests of the child. Article 3(3) still enables a 
MS under domestic law to return an asylum-seeker to a third country, so long as the Geneva 
Convention is complied with. The hierarchy of criteria for the allocation of the State responsible 
for examining the asylum claim are set out in Chapter III, are similar to the Dublin Convention 
criteria with some additions and still have a descending order of priority. By default if the criteria 
cannot designate the MS responsible, the first MS in which the asylum application was lodged 
shall be responsible (Article 13). Where a number of family members lodge asylum applications 
at a similar time they are to be assessed together by the MS who is responsible for examining the 
                                                                                                                                                             
O.J. 2003 L50/1. A further Regulation has been adopted fleshing out the detail of Dublin II – Council Regulation 
1560/2003/EC laying down detailed rules for the application of Reg. 343/2003, O.J. 2003 L222/3. 
59 Adamo S., “The Legal Position of Migrants in Denmark: Assessing the Context around the ‘Cartoon Crisis’”, 
(2007) 9 EJML 1. 
60 Council Decision 2006/188/EC on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and 
Denmark extending to Denmark the provisions of Reg. 343/2003 and Reg. 2725/2000, O.J. 2006 L66/37. The 
Agreement is at O.J. 2006 L66/38. 
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applications of the largest number of them or failing this, is responsible for examining the 
application of the oldest of them (Article 14). Chapter V outlines the procedures for taking 
charge and taking back, an important matter as the two processes involve different time limits. 
For both take charge and take back the request must be made within three months of the asylum 
application and the asylum-seeker will be transferred within six months of the acceptance of 
responsibility61. However, a decision must be made within two months of the request for the take 
charge procedure whilst for take back the decision will be made within a month of the request, or 
a fortnight if the request is based on Eurodac information. If a MS establishes through the 
hierarchical criteria that another MS is responsible for determining the application, then it can 
request the latter MS to take back or take charge of the asylum-seeker. The request to take 
charge occurs where the asylum-seeker did not make an application in the MS that is considered 
to be responsible in accordance with the criteria whilst a request to take back means that an 
application had previously been lodged, withdrawn or rejected in another MS. 
 
The Dublin Regulation maintains “the same hereditary weaknesses which bedevilled the Dublin 
Convention”62. In particular the possibility of “chain refoulement”, asylum-seekers in orbit and 
the return of an asylum-seeker to a safe third country without assessing the safety of the third 
country or the asylum-seeker if returned there. However, although the weaknesses remain there 
are improvements. The first is that the legislative measure is a Regulation and so has direct 
applicability in the MSs. Domestic courts can rely directly on it and are able to refer questions of 
interpretation to the ECJ under Article 234EC. As a consequence the ECJ can provide the 
harmonisation that Guild63 calls for on definitional issues, in particular the determination of the 
                                                 
61 See now Case C-19/08 Migrationsverket v. Petrosian, judgment of 29 January 2009, nyr for the first ECJ 
judgment clarifying the time limits. 
62 Op. Cit. n.55 at 207. 
63 Ibid. at 208. 
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meaning of protection in the Geneva Convention. Indeed the issue of the difference of protection 
may now have receded with the House of Lords’ acceptance that Germany does indeed provide 
sufficient guarantees over the level of protection required for the Geneva Convention64 and the 
ECHR65, and evidence by Phuong66 that French legislation and case law has now come into line 
with the British position. Battjes67 suggests that the position that a MS does not have to consider 
the merits of an asylum application before an applicant is returned to either another MS or a safe 
third country is in compliance with the MS’s obligations under Article 33(1) of the Geneva 
Convention, so long as the applicant is given the opportunity upon application to present 
evidence specific to his or her case that could rebut that presumption. The introduction of a 
humanitarian clause alongside the “sovereignty clause” of Article 3(2) provides some greater 
protection for family members and more vulnerable persons over the examination of the asylum 
application and transfer to another MS. Also the family reunification criteria at the head of the 
hierarchy of criteria emphasises the importance of family reunification within the EU. 
 
However, problems remain with the new Dublin Regulation. The first is that there is an 
automatic presumption that all EU MSs are safe for the return of asylum applicants (Recital 2). 
Thus it is possible that domestic courts and immigration authorities will ignore the specific 
circumstances of the individual68. Second, the definition of family member in Article 2(i) is 
limited to an asylum applicant’s spouse (or partner if the national law recognises this), their 
                                                 
64 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept., ex parte Zeqiri [2002] INLR 291 and R v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Dept., ex parte Yogathas, R v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept., ex parte Thangarasa [2003] 1 AC 920. 
65 Ibid. Yogathas & Thangarasa at 819 per Lord Hutton where his Lordship equated the protection under Article 
3ECHR with the scope of protection required under Article 33(1) of the Geneva Convention. See R v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Dept., ex parte Razgar [2004] 2 AC 368 where a similar position was adopted for Article 
8ECHR. 
66 Phuong C., “Persecution By Non-State Agents: Comparative Judicial Interpretation of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention”, (2003) 4 EJML 521. 
67 Battjes H., “A Balance Between Fairness and Efficiency? The Directive on International Protection and the 
Dublin Regulation”, (2002) 4 EJML 159 at 188. 
68 See Op. Cit. n.8 Nasseri. 
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minor children as long as they are unmarried and dependent, and the father, mother or guardian 
when the applicant is a minor and unmarried. This is considerably truncated when compared to 
the definition for family members of an EU citizen in Article 2(2) of Dir. 2004/38. In a research 
paper for the UNHCR in 200669, Kok investigated the operation of the Dublin Regulation and 
found three significant issues of concern. The first70 was that some MSs do not conduct a full 
and fair assessment of a returnee’s asylum application, treating certain claims as implicitly 
withdrawn and failing to comply with the non-refoulement principle. Second71 some asylum-
seekers are returned or deported to a safe third country before the full legal process is completed 
as the right to suspensive effect of appeals is not automatic. Third72 there is an inconsistent 
approach to family reunification that does not give full effect to the right to family life in Article 
8ECHR. Furthermore the limited definition of “family member” creates significant hardships for 
some families and difficulties for MSs when processing asylum applications. The first 
Commission Report73 on the evaluation of the Dublin Regulation confirmed the first and third of 
Kok’s findings74 whilst also noting the increased use of custodial measures before the transfer of 
the asylum-seeker and procedural irregularities, particularly with time limits75. 
 
The position of Greece in relation to the Dublin Regulation has caused considerable concern 
with low rates of granting refugee status to applicants76 as well as allegations of persecution of 
                                                 
69 Kok L., The Dublin II Regulation, UNHCR, 2006. 
70 Ibid. at 2. 
71 Ibid. at 3. 
72 Ibid. at 3. 
73 Commission Report on the evaluation of the Dublin system, COM(2007) 299 final. See now the Commission 
proposal for a Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national 
or a stateless person (Recast), COM(2008) 820 final, which is aimed at increasing the efficiency of the system. 
74 Ibid. at 6. 
75 Ibid. at 8. 
76 Skordas A., Sitaropoulos N., “Why Greece is not a Safe Host Country for Refugees”, (2004) 16 IJRL 25 at 27. 
144 
 
asylum-seekers by non-State actors77 and indeed State actors78. However, of more concern are 
the procedures for assessing applications for asylum79 and the possibility of the refoulement of 
TCNs. In particular where an asylum-seeker applies for asylum in Greece but then leaves for 
another MS before the assessment procedure is concluded, then the application will be 
withdrawn and the applicant notified as a person whose whereabouts are unknown. That 
individual, if returned to Greece under the Dublin Regulation, will be unable to have the process 
reopened unless the TCN presents themselves to the authorities within three months of the 
notification and can adduce evidence that any absence was as the result of force majeure80. The 
problems with Greece have been addressed by the UK courts81 that with the Court of Appeal 
refusing to stay the removal of TCNs to Greece until the outcome of a House of Lords or ECtHR 
judgment. In KRS v. UK82, the ECtHR held that despite some concerns the Dublin Regulation 
provided a satisfactory system for processing asylum applications and any human rights’ 
complaints could be raised in Greece. Therefore the UK could remove TCNs to Greece legally. 
 
Probably the most serious criticism of the Dublin Regulation is the same as that identified by 
Blake over the Dublin Convention, in that it does not work effectively or efficiently. In a recent 
                                                 
77 Ibid. at 32. 
78 Pro Asyl, “The Truth May be Bitter, but it Must be Told: The Situation of Refugees in the Aegean and the 
Practices of the Greek Coast Guard”, October 2007, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/oct/greece-proasyl-
refugees.pdf, accessed 5 September 2008. See also Pro Asyl, “The Situation in Greece is Out of Control”, October 
2008, 
http://www.proasyl.de/fileadmin/proasyl/fm_redakteure/Asyl_in_Europa/Griechenland/Out_of_contol_Eng_END.p
df, accessed 10 January 2009.  
79 Amnesty International, “Out of the Spotlight: The Rights of Foreigners and Minorities are Still a Grey Area”, 
EUR 25/005/2006, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR25/016/2005/en/dom-EUR250162005en.html, 
accessed 5 September 2008. 
80 See UNHCR, “UNHCR Position on the Return of Asylum-Seekers to Greece Under the “Dublin Regulation””, 15 
April 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4805bde42, accessed 5 September 
2008. 
81 Op. Cit. n.8 Nasseri (HC) and (CA), R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Zego [2008] 
EWHC 302 (Admin), AH (Iran), Zego (Eritrea) & Kadir (Iraq) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2008] EWCA Civ 985, R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Malik [2008] EWHC 888 
(Admin) and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hardini [2008] EWHC 1942 (Admin). 
82 KRS v. UK (2009) 48 EHRR SE8. 
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ECRE report83, low transfer rates84, the continuance of multiple asylum applications85 and the 
lengthy and cumbersome nature of the Dublin procedure at the beginning of an asylum 
application86, were identified as establishing the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the system 
leading to concerns over the best use of public money87. ECRE also examined the 
disproportionate effect of the Dublin Regulation on Southern and Eastern MSs compared to 
Northern and Western countries88, and the negative effect on applicants for refugee status 
themselves in the EU’s ‘asylum lottery’89. 
 
Complimentary to Dublin II, Eurodac90 was established to compare the fingerprints of asylum-
seekers91 and was designed to combat the problem of asylum-seekers arriving in the EU without 
any documentation92. Article 4 requires all MSs to take the fingerprints of all the fingers of every 
asylum-seeker of at least fourteen years of age and persons suspected of irregularly crossing the 
border and transmit the data93 to a central database where a comparison is made with other 
fingerprints held on the database. If there is a “hit” then that asylum-seeker can be returned to the 
                                                 
83 ECRE, “Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered”, March 2008, 
http://www.ecre.org/files/Sharing%20Responsibility_Dublin%20Reconsidered.pdf, accessed 10 September 2008. 
84 Ibid. at 10. 
85 Ibid. at 11. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. at 12. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. at 14. 
90 Council Regulation 2725/2000/EC concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints 
for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, O.J. 2000 L316/1 Article 1. Further details of the system are 
set out in Council Regulation 407/2002/EC laying down certain rules to implement Reg. 2725/2000, O.J. 2002 
L62/1. The Eurodac provisions have been extended to Denmark by Council Decision 2006/188/EC, O.J. 2006 
L66/37. See now Commission proposal for a Regulation concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the 
comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Regulation (Recast), COM(2008) 825/3 final 
for the Commission’s plans to update the Eurodac Regulation. 
91 See Brouwer E.R., “Eurodac: Its Limitations and Temptations”, (2002) 4 EJML 231 and Aus J.P., “Eurodac: A 
Solution Looking for a Problem?” ARENA Working Paper 9/06. 
92 Op. Cit. n.55 at 209. 
93 Article 5(1) provides an exhaustive list of data to be stored in the central database: “(a) Member State of origin, 
place and date of the application for asylum; (b) fingerprint data; (c) sex; (d) reference number used by the Member 
State of origin; (e) date on which the fingerprints were taken; (f) date on which the data were transmitted to the 
Central Unit; (g) date on which the data were entered in the central database; (h) details in respect of the recipient(s) 
of the data transmitted and the date(s) of transmission(s)”. 
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MS from where the hit came from94. Fingerprint data of asylum-seekers is stored for ten years, 
whilst that from those illegally crossing the external border for two years and can only be used 
for future comparisons. Fingerprints from persons illegally present in the MSs is not stored. If a 
person is given refugee status then data relating to that person is to be blocked in the Central 
Unit but not erased until the time limit is reached. 
 
Guild95 has criticised Eurodac for failing to comply with the requirements of Directive 
95/46/EC96 on the grounds of a failure of the principle of proportionality and not including the 
concerns of Article 6(1). In accordance with Article 6(1), data can only be stored on an 
individual if it is for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and the data retained is not 
excessive in relation to the purposes for which it is collected. Furthermore the storage of data for 
ten years could be seen as excessive under Article 8ECHR. Brouwer97 has also criticised 
Eurodac as this data taken and then stored from an asylum-seeker appears to criminalise that 
person, thereby possibly breaching Article 31 of the Geneva Convention. 
 
Once it has been clarified which MS has responsibility to determine the asylum application, there 
must be at least minimum reception conditions and rights provided for asylum-seekers. Directive 
2003/9/EC98, applies to all TCNs and stateless persons who apply for asylum either at the border 
or in the MS’s territory as long as they are allowed to remain on that territory as asylum-seekers 
                                                 
94 For an example of the working of the system see RZ v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 
UKAIT 7. 
95 Op. Cit. n.55 at 210. 
96 Council Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, O.J. 1995 L281/31. 
97 Op. Cit. n.91 at 243. 
98 Council Directive 2003/9/EC laying down the minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, O.J. 2003 
L31/18 Article 3. See now the Commission proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive laying down 
the minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (Recast), COM(2008) 215 final following the 
Commission Communication of the report on the application of Directive 2003/9/EC laying down the minimum 
standards for the reception of asylum seekers, COM(2007) 745 final. 
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and to family members, if they are covered by the same asylum application according to national 
law. When asylum-seekers apply for asylum the MS, according to Article 13(1), must grant the 
right to material reception conditions from when their asylum applications are made, to ensure a 
standard of living that is adequate for the health of the applicant and is capable of ensuring their 
subsistence (Article 13(2)), the aim being to secure the human dignity of the asylum-seeker99. 
These material reception conditions include housing, food and clothing, provided in kind, or as 
financial allowances or in vouchers, and a daily expenses allowance (Article 2(j)). Where 
housing is provided “in kind” Article 14 ensures that it must be: (a) premises used to house 
applicants during the examination of an asylum application lodged at the border; (b) 
accommodation centres which guarantee an adequate standard of living; (c) private properties 
adapted for housing applicants. The housing must protect the applicant’s family life, including 
the current family unity if the asylum-seeker agrees, ensure safety from assault within the 
premises and enable communications with relatives, legal advisers, representatives of the 
UNHCR and non-governmental organisations. Alongside these ‘material reception conditions’ 
MSs must ensure asylum-seekers receive adequate health care that includes at least emergency 
care, essential treatment of illness and the protection of special needs (Article 15) although 
asylum-seekers may be required to be medically screened on public health grounds (Article 9).  
 
After providing for the ‘material reception conditions’ the Directive considers other rights for 
asylum-seekers, including the right to free movement. Article 7(1) states that asylum-seekers 
may move freely within the host MS’s territory, or within an area assigned to them by that MS. 
The scope of this assigned area is not defined in the Directive but it cannot affect the unalienable 
sphere of private life nor impinge upon access to all the benefits under the Directive. Applicants 
                                                 
99 See the Explanatory Memorandum in the Commission proposal for a Council Directive laying down the minimum 
standards for the reception of asylum seekers, COM(2001) 181 final at 3, 4, 15 and 16.  
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must inform the competent authorities of their current address and notify any change as soon as 
possible (Article 7(6)). Article 7(2) provides that MSs can decide on the residence for the 
asylum-seeker because of public interest, public order or for the swift processing and effective 
monitoring of the application. MSs may also, when it proves necessary (e.g. legal reasons or 
reasons of public order), confine an applicant to a particular place in accordance with domestic 
law (Article 7(3))100. However, Article 7(5) enables MSs to provide for the possibility of 
granting applicants temporary permission to leave their place of residence or assigned area, with 
decisions taken individually, objectively and impartially and reasons provided if the decision is 
negative. MSs must also specify a time period, from the date of application, during which time 
an applicant is not able to work (Article 11(1)) but after a year without an initial decision on the 
application the MS must provide conditions for granting access to the labour market, a right that 
cannot be lost during an appeal process. However, MSs can prioritise jobs to EU citizens and 
other legally resident TCNs if the labour market demands (Article 11(4)). 
 
The “material reception conditions” appear, from Article 13(1) and (2), to be concrete rights 
essential for the human dignity of the asylum-seeker. However, MSs can make the provision of 
the material reception conditions subject to actual residence by the applicants in a specific place, 
as determined by the MS (Article 7(4)). Furthermore, they may be reduced or withdrawn where 
the asylum-seeker inter alia abandons the subscribed place of residence without informing the 
competent authorities, or without gaining permission if the move had been requested (Article 
16(1)(a)). The only benefit that the MSs cannot withdraw is an asylum-seeker’s access to 
emergency health care (Article 16(4)). 
 
                                                 
100 See Hailbronner K., “Detention of Asylum Seekers”, (2007) 9 EJML 159. 
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It should be noted from the outset that the standards outlined are the minimum101 required and 
MSs can choose to retain higher standards (Article 4). However, these minimum norms are 
markedly “minimum”102 and MSs have the option to lower them further if the asylum-seeker is 
found to be in breach of the Directive’s requirements. As the material reception conditions are 
supposedly the minimum standards required to enable an asylum-seeker to retain his or her 
human dignity, their withdrawal must breach the requirement that “[h]uman dignity is 
inviolable” (Article 1 Charter) and could lead to the risk of the individual becoming destitute in 
breach of Article 3ECHR103. This is particularly so where an asylum-seeker moves from their 
place of residence without informing or receiving  permission from the authorities, especially, as 
Rogers104 notes, only Germany restricted the freedom of asylum-seekers in such a way before the 
Directive was adopted and the German Basic Law protects the human dignity of individuals. The 
restriction of the free movement of asylum-seekers, at least within the territory of the host MS, 
appears to be unnecessary, affects significantly the quality of life of the individual concerned, 
and requesting permission to move residence is demeaning and likely to cause even more 
stigmatisation of asylum-seekers105. Furthermore an asylum-seeker’s free movement can be 
totally curtailed by their confinement to a particular place. Even though this is an exception to 
the norm106, must be justified on the grounds in the Directive and would be interpreted by the 
                                                 
101 Kuijper P.J., “The Evolution of the Third Pillar from Maastricht to the European Constitution: Institutional 
Aspects”, (2004) 41 CMLRev 609 at 614 notes that a minimum standards Directive “does exactly what the title 
announces, namely laying down rather minimal standards”. 
102 O’Keefe D., “Can the Leopard Change its Spots? Visas, Immigration and Asylum Following Amsterdam” in 
O’Keefe D., Twomey P., Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty, Hart Publishing, 1999, 271 at 272. 
103 Rogers N., “Minimum Standards for Reception” (2002) 4 EJML 215 at 228. See R v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department ex parte Limbuela, Tesema & Adam [2006] 1 AC 396; noted Mackenzie A., “Case Comment”, 
[2006] EHRLR 67 and Hardiman-McCartney A., “Absolutely Right: Providing Asylum Seekers with Food and 
Shelter under Article 3”, (2006) 65 CLJ 4. See also Puttick K., “Strangers at the Welfare Gate: Asylum Seekers, 
“Welfare” and Convention Rights after Adam”, (2005) 19 IANL 214, Palmer S., “A Wrong Turning: Article 3 
ECHR and Proportionality”, (2006) 65 CLJ 438 and York S., Fancott N., “Enforced Destitution: Impediments to 
Return and Access Section 4 “Hard Cases” Support”, (2008) 22 JIANL 5. 
104 Ibid. Rogers at 227. 
105 Ibid. Rogers at 229. 
106 Op. Cit. n.55 at 214. 
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ECJ narrowly, there are no minimum conditions or safeguards on the use of detention by MSs in 
the Directive107. 
 
Asylum-seekers, as the first class of TCNs covered by the AFSJ, are granted little in the way of 
free movement rights. Under the Dublin Regulation they have limited choice as to which MS can 
assess their application as the default position is that the first country of entry is the responsible 
MS. The exceptions to this are narrow, and narrowed further by the use of a truncated definition 
of family member. As will be explained later, air carrier sanctions limit the movement of 
asylum-seekers into the EU and therefore necessity drives opportunity with asylum-seekers 
either crossing the EU external borders clandestinely by road or by boat from nearby States. As 
the majority of neighbour countries are safe third countries then the asylum-seeker can be 
returned there. The alternative is to entrust entry into the EU into the hands of human traffickers 
or human smugglers, entering the EU illegally and without documentation or a travel evidence 
trail. The provision of minimum reception standards in Directive 2003/9, the restriction of free 
movement to the host MS or to part of the territory or an assigned place, the detention of asylum-
seekers and the withdrawal of the material reception conditions for exercising free movement, 
demeans, stigmatises and breaches the human dignity of asylum-seekers. It is submitted that the 
effect on people who have left their country of origin in desperation is likely to be severe and 
could lead to asylum-seekers choosing to remain covertly in the EU rather than claiming asylum. 
 
3. REFUGEES 
 
                                                 
107 Op. Cit. n.103 at 229. 
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The difference between asylum and refugee law is not easy to determine. As was considered 
above, there is international recognition of refugee status and the rights associated with it, but no 
international treaty has been adopted on international protection on the basis of asylum (the 
international conference designed to do this was abandoned in 1977 when no agreement could be 
found between the participating States). It is certainly the case that they are “intimately 
connected”108 but the refugee regime is centrally concerned with humanitarian concerns whilst 
the asylum system tends to be more of a balancing exercise that includes humanitarian issues, 
costs, systemic abuse and equity between MSs. 
 
Community refugee law protects three groups of persons, two of which, those with refugee and 
subsidiary protection status, are covered by the Qualifications Directive 2004/83/EC109 and the 
other, the temporary mass influx of persons, is detailed in the Temporary Protection Directive 
2001/55/EC110. The Qualifications Directive lays down minimum standards for the qualification 
of TCNs as refugees such that MSs can choose to retain or introduce more favourable standards 
(Article 3). A TCN or stateless person has the right to be granted refugee status if they qualify as 
a refugee in accordance with Chapter II and III of Dir. 2004/83 (Article 13). A refugee is defined 
as a TCN who ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race111, 
religion112, nationality113, political opinion114 or membership of a particular social group115, is 
                                                 
108 Chalmers D., Hadjiemmanuil C., Monti G., Tomkins A., European Union Law, CUP, 2006 at 649. 
109 Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or 
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted, O.J. 2004 L304/12 Article 1. 
110 Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass 
influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving 
such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, O.J. 2001 L212/12. 
111 Article 10(1)(a) “the concept of race shall in particular include considerations of colour, descent, or membership 
of a particular ethnic group”. 
112 Article 10(1)(b) “the concept of religion shall in particular include the holding of theistic, non-theistic and 
atheistic beliefs, the participation in, or abstention from, formal worship in private or in public, either alone or in 
community with others, other religious acts or expressions of view, or forms of personal or communal conduct 
based on or mandated by any religious belief”. 
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outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of that country, or a stateless person, who, being outside of 
the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned above, is unable or, 
owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it’. According to Article 9, acts of persecution as 
defined by Article 1A of the Geneva Convention must: ‘(a) be sufficiently serious by their nature 
or repetition as to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights, in particular the rights from 
which derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2) of the [ECHR]; or (b) be an accumulation 
of various measures, including violations of human rights which is sufficiently severe as to affect 
an individual in a similar manner as mentioned in (a)’. These can include: physical or mental 
violence including sexual violence; discriminatory legal, administrative, police and/or judicial 
measures; disproportionate or discriminatory prosecution or punishment or denial of judicial 
redress resulting in this; prosecution of punishment for refusal to perform military service in a 
conflict where acts in such a situation would fall under the Article 12(2) exclusion clauses; and, 
acts of a gender or child-specific nature (Article 9(2)).  
 
Dir. 2004/83 also introduces a right to subsidiary protection status (Article 18) if a TCN or 
stateless person is eligible according to the assessment criteria in Chapter II, that is the same for 
refugee status, and the qualification criteria in Chapter V. Recital 24 specifies that the aim of 
                                                                                                                                                             
113 Article 10(1)(c) “ the concept of nationality shall not be confined to citizenship or lack thereof but shall in 
particular include membership of a group determined by its cultural, ethnic, or linguistic identity, common 
geographical or political origins or its relationship with the population of another State”. 
114 Article 10(1)(e) “the concept of political opinion shall in particular include the holding of an opinion, thought or 
belief on a matter related to the potential actors of persecution mentioned in Article 6 and to their policies or 
methods, whether or not that opinion, thought or belief has been acted upon by the applicant”. 
115 Article 10(1)(d) “a group shall be considered to form a particular social group where in particular: — members of 
that group share an innate characteristic, or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic 
or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it, and —  
that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding 
society; depending on the circumstances in the country of origin, a particular social group might include a group 
based on a common characteristic of sexual orientation. Sexual orientation cannot be understood to include acts 
considered to be criminal in accordance with national law of the Member States: Gender related aspects might be 
considered, without by themselves alone creating a presumption for the applicability of this Article”. 
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subsidiary protection is complimentary and additional to the refugee protection enshrined in the 
Geneva Convention. A person eligible for subsidiary protection is defined as a TCN or stateless 
person ‘who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been 
shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in 
the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a 
real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15…and is unable, or, owing to such risk, 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country’. The definition of serious 
harm in Article 15 consists of: ‘(a) death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or (c) serious and 
individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of 
international or internal armed conflict’. Article 15(a) replicates Protocols 6 and 13 of the ECHR 
and Article 15(b) is almost an exact replica of Article 3ECHR116 but Article 15(c) appears to be 
something new. McAdam117 has argued that Article 15(c) is a type of serious harm additional in 
scope to Article 15(b) and thus an extension to Article 3ECHR. Battjes118 has also suggested 
that, as Article 15(c) requires only that a person must face a ‘threat’, then this is wider in scope 
than the substantial grounds required for Article 15(a) and (b). Storey119, however, contends that 
this was not the intention of the MSs during the adoption process, when they wished to confine 
Article 15 to the scope of Article 3ECHR. The question of interpretation of Article 15(c) has 
arisen in a number of Member States’ courts120 and a preliminary reference has now been made 
                                                 
116 Storey H., “EU Refugee Qualification Directive: A Brave New World?” (2008) 19 IJRL 1 at 32. 
117 McAdam J., Complimentary Protection in International Refugee Law, OUP, 2007 at 83 
118 Battjes H., European Asylum Law and International Law, Brill, 2006 at 239. 
119 Op. Cit. n.116 at 34. 
120 See UNHCR, “UNHCR Statement on Subsidiary Protection Under the EC Qualification Directive for People 
Threatened by Indiscriminate Violence”, January 2008 at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/479df7472.html, 
accessed 27 August 2008 for an overview of cases before domestic courts of the Member States. In the UK three 
cases have interpreted Article 15(c), HH v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKAIT 22, KH v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKAIT 23 and AM & AM v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2008] UKAIT 91, and in Germany the Federal Administrative Court has also interpreted Article 15(c), 
Decision of the German Federal Administrative Court of 24 June 2008, BVerwG 10 C 43.07. 
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from the Dutch Raad van State121 to the ECJ. At the end of the day it will be the ECJ that 
determines the scope of Article 15. 
 
The two types of protection share common elements. First the fear of harm or persecution 
according to Article 5 may be based on events that take place or activities that have been 
engaged in122 after the individual has left the country of origin, unless by the applicant’s own 
decision. Actors of persecution or serious harm include: (a) the State; (b) parties or organisations 
controlling the, or a substantial part of the, State; (c) non-State actors if the actors in (a) and (b), 
including international organisations, are unwilling or unable to provide the protection against 
persecution or serious harm. Actors of protection are those in (a) and (b), the latter including 
international organisations (Article 7(1)) so long as they have taken reasonable steps to prevent 
the persecution or harm by operating an effective legal system for the detection and punishment 
of the acts causing harm or persecution (Article 7(2)). If there is a part of the country of origin 
where the claimant would not be in danger then this can lead to a finding that there will not be a 
need for international protection (Article 8(1)) as assessed in accordance with the criteria in 
Article 4. 
 
An individual with refugee or subsidiary protection status can suffer from the cessation and 
exclusion of both as well as having the status revoked, ended or refused to be renewed. For those 
with refugee status the circumstances leading to the grant of that status must have changed so 
                                                 
121 Case 200702174/1 M & N Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, (2008) 19 IJRL 765. Advocate General 
Poiares Maduro has now delivered his Opinion (Case C-465/07 M & N Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 
Opinion of 9 September 2008, nyr) that is remarkable for the very careful “fence sitting” that takes place. The gist of 
his Opinion is that the interpretation of Article 15(c) is a matter of Community law and should be interpreted as such 
but does not draw a distinction between situations of war peace and the different applications of human rights in 
each situation. For these reasons SIJ Storey in AM & AM chose not to follow the Advocate General’s Opinion. 
122 In particular if they constitute the expression and continuation of convictions or orientations held in the country 
of origin. 
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significantly and permanently that the well-founded fear of persecution does not exist anymore. 
These circumstances are: ‘(a) has voluntarily re-availed himself or herself of the protection of the 
country of nationality; (b) having lost his or her nationality, has voluntarily reacquired it; (c) has 
acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his or her new nationality; 
(d) has voluntarily re-established himself or herself in the country which he or she left or outside 
which he or she remained owing to fear of persecution; (e) can no longer, because the 
circumstances in connection with which he or she has been recognised as a refugee have ceased 
to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself or herself of the protection of the country of 
nationality; or (f) being a stateless person with no nationality, he or she is able, because the 
circumstances in connection with which he or she has been recognised as a refugee have ceased 
to exist, to return to the country of former habitual residence’. Article 12 outlines the 
circumstances when a TCN or stateless person is excluded from refugee status. Paragraph 1 
provides this exclusion for individuals who fall within the scope of Article 1D of the Geneva 
Convention, relating to protection of assistance from UN agencies or organs other than the 
UNHCR, and persons who attain citizenship of the MS, along with the associated rights and 
duties. Paragraph 2 applies to persons who commit or instigate: (a) a crime against peace, war 
crime or crime against humanity; (b) a serious non-political crime123 outside the country of 
refuge prior to admission as a refugee124; (c) acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
UN. Refugee status will be revoked, ended or refused to be renewed if the person has ceased to 
be a refugee in accordance with Article 11 (Article 14(1)) with the burden of proof on the State 
that granted protection to establish that refugee status has ceased or should never have been 
granted (Article 14(2)). The status will also be withdrawn if the person was excluded from being 
a refugee in accordance with Article 12 or had misrepresented, or omitted, facts decisive to the 
                                                 
123 Particularly cruel acts, even if committed with an allegedly political objective, may be classified as serious non-
political crimes.  
124 Classed as the time a residence permit was issued confirming refugee status. 
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grant of refugee status (Article 14(3)). MSs may withdraw the status if there are reasonable 
grounds for believing they are a danger to the security of the host MS or, having been convicted 
of a particularly serious crime, they constitute a danger to the community of that MS (Article 
14(4)). Article 14(5) then introduces Article 14(4) as a further exclusion for granting the right. 
 
For persons benefiting from subsidiary protection the right ceases, according to Article 16, once 
the circumstances leading to the grant of the right abate or change, significantly and 
permanently, such that the protection is no longer required. An individual will be excluded from 
the benefit of subsidiary protection if they commit or instigate: (a) a crime against peace, war 
crime or crime against humanity; (b) a serious crime; (c) acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the UN; and, (d) are a danger to the community or the security of the host MS 
(Article 17(1)). Furthermore the person can be excluded if a crime was committed before 
entering the host MS that would be punishable by imprisonment if it had been committed in the 
MS concerned (Article 17(3)). Subsidiary protection status will be revoked, ended or refused to 
be renewed if the person has ceased to be eligible for subsidiary protection in accordance with 
Article 16 (Article 19(1)). The status will also be withdrawn if the person was excluded from 
being a refugee in accordance with Article 17(1) and (2) or had misrepresented, or omitted, facts 
decisive to the grant of refugee status (Article 19(3)). Article 19(2) allows MSs, at their 
discretion, to withdraw subsidiary protection status if the individual should have been excluded 
in accordance with Article 17(3). The burden of proof is on the State that granted protection to 
establish that subsidiary protection status has ceased or the person was not eligible for such 
status (Article 19(4)). 
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Once the right to refugee status or subsidiary protection status has been granted, further rights 
and benefits flow. Article 32 provides the right to freedom of movement within the territory of 
the host MS under the same conditions and restrictions as those provided for other TCNs legally 
resident in the MS.  Refugees have the right to obtain travel documents to travel outside the 
MS’s territories and a similar right for persons with subsidiary protection status if they are 
unable to obtain a national passport, at least when serious humanitarian reasons occur that 
require their presence in another State (Article 25). Article 24 provides the right to a renewable 
residence permit of at least three years for refugees, a renewable residence permit of less than 
three years for family members and a renewable one year residence permit for persons with 
subsidiary protection status. According to Article 23, MSs should ensure the maintenance of 
family unity, where the family member is the spouse, or partner as recognised under domestic 
law, and the unmarried and dependent minor children, present in the same MS as the refugee or 
beneficiary of subsidiary protection. Beneficiaries of both refugee and subsidiary protection 
status must be authorised to engage in employed or self-employed activity although MSs can 
take into account the situation of the labour market to possibly prioritise access to the labour 
market for a limited period of time for persons with subsidiary protection (Article 26). MSs must 
also respect the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with their international obligations 
(Article 21). Where international obligations do not prohibit, a MS may refoule refugees if there 
are reasonable grounds for considering they are a danger to the security of the host MS or they 
have been convicted of a particularly serious crime that constitutes a danger to the community of 
that MS. 
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The Refugee Procedures Directive, Directive 2005/85/EC125, provides detailed rules and 
procedures for the application of Dir. 2004/83 but does not impact upon the procedures 
contained in Reg. 343/2003. Article 6 ensures a right to apply for asylum for each adult having 
legal capacity on their own behalf and a possible right, depending on whether a MS allows it, for 
the applicant to also claim for his/her dependents. Article 7 provides the right to remain in the 
MS, for the sole purpose of the procedure, until at least the completion of the application 
procedure, unless a subsequent application will not be further examined under Article 32 or 
where the person will be surrendered or extradited to another MS in accordance with the 
European Arrest Warrant (henceforth EAW)126, to a third country or to international criminal 
courts or tribunals (Article 34). This right to remain does not constitute an entitlement to a 
residence permit. Article 18 details a right to not be held in detention for the sole purpose that the 
applicant is an asylum applicant. 
 
The Directive does not contain any provisions on free movement of persons and does not 
delineate between an asylum-seeker and a refugee but it does define four particularly important 
concepts that are common in all Community asylum and immigration measures: the first country 
of asylum; the safe third country; the safe country of origin; and, the European safe third 
country. According to Article 26, an individual can have a country considered to be a first 
country of asylum based on personal circumstances if that applicant: (a) has been recognised in 
that country as a refugee and protection is still available there; or (b) otherwise enjoys sufficient 
protection in that country, including benefiting from the principle of non-refoulement, and may 
take into account the safe third country concept in Article 27. This safe third country concept 
                                                 
125 Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status, O.J. 2005 L326/13. 
126 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States, O.J. 2002 L190/1. 
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applies to a country so long as: (a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; (b) the principle of non-
refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is respected; (c) the prohibition of 
removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment as laid down in international law, is respected; and (d) the possibility exists to request 
refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention are available to a claimant in it127. These two concepts of “first country of asylum” 
and “safe third country” are utilised in the criteria for determining if the asylum application is 
admissible in Article 25(2). It will be inadmissible if: (a) another MS has granted refugee status; 
(b) a country which is not a MS is considered as a first country of asylum for the applicant; (c) a 
country which is not a MS is considered as a safe third country for the applicant; (d) the 
applicant is allowed to remain in the MS concerned on some other grounds and as result of this 
he/she has been granted a status equivalent to the rights and benefits of refugee status by virtue 
of Dir. 2004/83; (e) the applicant is allowed to remain in the territory of the MS concerned on 
some other grounds which protect him/her against refoulement pending the outcome of a 
procedure for the determination of status pursuant to point (d); (f) the applicant has lodged an 
identical application after a final decision; (g) a dependant of the applicant lodges an application, 
after he/she has, in accordance with Article 6(3), consented to have his/her case be part of an 
application made on his/her behalf, and there are no facts relating to the dependant’s situation, 
which justify a separate application. 
 
                                                 
127 Article 27(2) also requires the concept to be subject to rules laid down in national legislation that include a nexus 
between the applicant and the third country, methodology for applying the safe third country concept to the third 
country and the applicant, and methodology for determining the safety of the third country for that particular 
applicant. 
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Article 29128 enables the Council, acting by QMV and using the consultation decision-making 
procedure, to adopt a minimum common list of third countries that are considered to be safe 
countries of origin when examining asylum applications. However, Article 30 allows MSs to 
maintain their own list, over and above the minimum common list. A country of origin will only 
be safe for a particular applicant in Article 31 if the applicant is a national of that country, or 
he/she is a stateless person who was formally habitually resident in that country, and no grounds 
have been submitted that the country is not safe in the applicant’s particular case. Article 36 
takes the “safe country of origin” concept one stage further, by introducing the “European safe 
third country” concept if the country has ratified and observes the Geneva Convention without 
geographical limitations, has an asylum procedure in national law, has ratified the ECHR and 
observes its provisions and the Council has designated it as a safe country of origin. According 
to Article 36(1), this applies where the asylum-seeker has entered or attempted to enter the MS 
illegally and means that it is at the MSs’ discretion whether to examine the asylum application, 
in full, in part or at all.  
 
The war in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, and in particular the ethnic 
cleansing of Bosnian Muslims and Croats by Bosnian Serbs (and the more limited ethnic 
cleansing of Bosnian Muslims by Bosnian Croats) within Bosnia and Herzegovina, created a 
sudden movement of significant numbers of persons into the EU129. In 1997 two separate 
articles130 called for the revision of the international protection regime to replace the “existing 
                                                 
128 The ECJ in Case C-133/06 European Parliament v. Council [2008] 2 CMLR 54 annulled the adoption by the 
Council of lists of countries in Articles 29(1)&(2) and 36(3) on the basis that secondary legal bases were tantamount 
to according that institution a legislative power which exceeds powers provided for by the EC Treaty. See Ball R., 
Dadomo C., “Case Comment”, (2009) 15 EPL (forthcoming). 
129 Koser K., Walsh M., Black R., “Temporary Protection and the Assisted Return of Refugees from the European 
Union”, (1998) 10 IJRL 444. 
130 Hathaway J.C., Neve R.A., “Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivised 
and Solution-Orientated Protection”, (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 115 and Schuck P.H., “Refugee 
Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal”, (1997) 22 Yale Journal of International Law 243. 
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individualised system for assessing and granting claims for refugee protection and its 
replacement by a collective framework emphasising temporary protection in the region of origin 
rather than asylum”131. A similar situation to that of Bosnia occurred in 1999 in the Serbian 
region of Kosovo, with both scenarios being dealt with in an ad hoc manner by domestic 
immigration law132. The Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) is the legal instrument that 
provides EU temporary protection133 rights for those persons who are part of the mass influx134 
of displaced persons135 as determined by the Council but is not designed to prejudge recognition 
of refugee status under the Geneva Convention. The duration of temporary protection is one 
year, renewable for a further year, in six month steps, as decided by the Council, unless the 
Council decides that the situation in the country of origin permits the safe and durable return of 
those granted temporary protection (Article 6).  
 
There is no right to freedom of movement to another MS, unless that MS has a bilateral 
agreement with the other State, with the host MS ensuring the return of the individual after the 
visit (Article 11). There is a right to a residence permit and visa for the duration of the temporary 
protection in Article 8. A beneficiary of temporary protection can engage in employed and self-
                                                 
131 Anker D., Fitzpatrick J., Shacknove A., “Crisis and Cure: A Reply to Hathaway/Neve and Schuck”, (1998) 11 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 295 at 295. 
132 Kerber K., “Temporary Protection in the European Union: A Chronology”, (1999) 14 Georgetown Immigration 
Law Journal 35. 
133 Article 2(a): “‘temporary protection’ means a procedure of exceptional character to provide, in the event of a 
mass influx or imminent mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who are unable to return to their 
country of origin, immediate and temporary protection to such persons, in particular if there is also a risk that the 
asylum system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its efficient operation, in the interests 
of the persons concerned and other persons requesting protection”. 
134 Article 2(d): “‘mass influx’ means arrival in the Community of a large number of displaced persons, who come 
from a specific country or geographical area, whether their arrival in the Community was spontaneous or aided, for 
example through an evacuation programme”. 
135 Article 2(c): “‘displaced persons’ means third-country nationals or stateless persons who have had to leave their 
country or region of origin, or have been evacuated, in particular in response to an appeal by international 
organisations, and are unable to return in safe and durable conditions because of the situation prevailing in that 
country, who may fall within the scope of Article 1A of the Geneva Convention or other international or national 
instruments giving international protection, in particular: (i) persons who have fled areas of armed conflict or 
endemic violence; (ii) persons at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, systematic or generalised 
violations of their human rights”. 
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employed activities although MSs can prioritise jobs for EU citizens and other legally resident 
TCNs if the labour market warrants it (Article 12). Any person provided with temporary 
protection has the right to claim asylum at any time, although MSs may provide that the status of 
‘asylum-seeker’ shall not run concurrently with that of ‘temporary protection’, whilst the 
application is being processed. At the end of the period of temporary protection, persons will be 
repatriated to their country of origin either voluntarily or by force136. However, these individuals 
retain the right to respect for their human dignity. If the period of temporary protection has not 
ended and the persons have exercised their right to return to their home State, MSs must give 
favourable consideration to requests to return to the host MS depending on the circumstances 
prevailing in the country of origin. 
 
The continued influx of TCNs to the EU and in particular the possibilities for mass influx either 
from military action, for example in Iraq and Afghanistan, or economic or environmental 
degradation, in particular from Africa and Albania, produced concerns over the working of the 
global asylum and refugee system. The UK circulated a “concept paper” within the European 
Council in 2003, after informal intergovernmental discussions with the Dutch and Danish 
governments and within the Council of Ministers137, suggesting proposals to achieve “better 
management of the asylum process globally”138 through improved regional management and 
Transit Processing Centres (TPCs). The improved regional management would result from: the 
prevention of conditions that cause population movement; better regional protection and 
resources; setting quotas for more managed resettlement arrangements from source regions to 
Europe; and, raising awareness and acceptance of State responsibility to accept returns. The 
                                                 
136 Articles 20-23. 
137 Noll G., “Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and Theoretical Issues Raised by Transit Processing Centres and 
Protection Zones”, (2003) 5 EJML 303. 
138 House of Lords EU Select Committee 11th Report of 2003-04, Handling EU Asylum Claims: New Approaches 
Examined, HMSO, 2004, Annex 5 at 54. 
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Commission139 interpreted the UK’s proposal as the development of Regional Protection Areas 
(RPAs) and TPCs that necessitated “effective protection” for claimants of international 
protection140. RPAs would be set up near to an area of population displacement, enabling 
displaced persons a “safe haven” close to their country of origin, whilst TPCs would be situated 
on the transit routes of displaced persons, outside the EU, where they could make an application 
for international protection and wait until it was fully processed. As the House of Lords EU 
Select Committee observes141, at the Thessaloniki Council meeting in June 2003 there was 
strong opposition to these proposals from several MSs such that the UK dropped its ideas on 
TPCs. In parallel with the EU and UK initiatives the UNHCR launched the Convention Plus142 
initiative to improve global refugee protection and the resolution of refugee problems through 
multilateral agreements and the ‘three-prong’ proposal143. This latter proposal envisaged in the 
‘EU prong’, EU based reception centres where claimants would be registered and pre-screened at 
the EU, rather than the national, level. The Commission responded to the debate with a 
Communication144 in 2004 that rejected the idea of any moves towards external processing, 
RPAs and TPCs. This appeared to be conclusive but as Noll observes these proposals for extra-
territorial processing remain on the EU agenda and are “moving targets for analysis, as the 
political debate within the EU and beyond still is in a formative phase”145. The German Interior 
Minister at the Brussels Justice and Home Affairs meeting in July 2004146 raised the issue again 
                                                 
139 Commission Communication towards more accessible, equitable and managed asylum systems, COM(2003) 315 
final at 5. 
140 Ibid. at 6. 
141 Op. Cit. n.138 at 22. 
142 UNHCR, “Convention Plus at a Glance”, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=403b30684, accessed 21 September 2007. 
143 Op. Cit. n.138, Annex 7 at 60. 
144 Commission Communication on the managed entry in the EU of persons in need of international protection and 
enhancement of the protection capacity of the regions of origin: improving access to durable solutions, COM(2004) 
410 final. 
145 Op. cit. n.137 at 303. 
146 Reported by Garlick M., “The EU Discussions on Extraterritorial Processing: Solution or Conundrum?” (2006) 
18 IJRL 601 at 619. 
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and called for ‘safe zones’ or ‘camps’ to be set up in North Africa to process claimants for 
international protection, a suggestion to which the Austrian Interior Minister responded with a 
call for an Eastern European facility to deal with Chechen asylum-seekers. Although no proposal 
was advanced, the German Interior Minister went further still in 2005147 by suggesting the 
interception of asylum-seekers’ vessels in international waters, so that the Geneva Convention 
would not be applicable, and the rejection of full formal asylum assessments for a process of 
screening. The response of the Commission was to issue a Communication proposing the 
establishment of Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs) to “enhance the capacity of areas close 
to regions of origin to protect refugees”148. The chosen pilot RPP was to be set up in the Western 
Newly Independent States (Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus)149 with future RPPs for sub-Saharan 
Africa (Great Lakes and East Africa, centred on Tanzania), North Africa, Afghanistan and the 
Horn of Africa150. It is notable that there are no plans for “camps”, “zones”, or TPCs in the 
Commission Communication151 although there are ongoing discussions with Libya over possible 
sites. 
 
The development of European refugee law is an essential complimentary policy to ensuring the 
free movement of persons (Article 61(a)EC). This evolution, with Article 63EC as the legal base, 
could be viewed optimistically as having a positive impact on refugees by providing a fair and 
efficient assessment of claims, by treating any individual returning to their country of origin with 
dignity and ensuring their safety, and, by the development and democratisation of regions 
                                                 
147 Ibid. at 621. 
148 Commission Communication on regional protection programmes, COM(2005) 388 final. 
149 Ibid. at 6. 
150 Ibid. at 7. 
151 Lynskey O., “Complementing and Completing the Common European Asylum System: A Legal Analysis of the 
Emerging Extraterritorial Elements of EU Refugee Protection Policy”, (2006) 31 ELR 230. 
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beyond the EU that have a propensity to produce asylum-seekers152. Furthermore by harmonising 
the standards required for the qualification of refugee status and introducing the rights to 
subsidiary and temporary protection, common values become standardised across the EU, 
different forms of international protection are introduced to cater for different situations thereby 
raising levels of protection, filling gaps that had been filled in an ad hoc manner by MSs acting 
on their own and ensuring the end to forum shopping153. The rejection of the “accountability 
theory” as favoured by Germany and France154 by including non-State actors as potential 
perpetrators of persecution or serious harm in Article 6 of the Qualifications Directive is a 
welcome higher standard that should provide greater protection for refugees155. Furthermore this 
should ensure that the concerns with the standards of protection in MSs, when asylum-seekers 
are returned through the operation of the Dublin Convention and the Dublin Regulation, are 
silenced.  
 
However, considerable concerns have been raised over the three legislative measures. The first 
involves the compatibility with the Geneva Convention that itself involves a number of issues. 
The first is the definition of “refugee” in the Qualifications Directive in comparison to that in 
Article 1A of the Geneva Convention and the scope of the Directive. The term “refugee” is only 
available for TCNs and stateless persons in Article 2(c) of the Directive, as is also the case for 
those “eligible for subsidiary protection” in Article 2(e), whereas the definition in the Geneva 
Convention applies to “any person”. Therefore EU citizens are excluded from the capacity to 
                                                 
152 Goodwin-Gill G.S., “The Individual Refugee, the 1951 Convention and the Treaty of Amsterdam”, in Op. Cit. 
n.1, 141 at 141. 
153 Boutillon S., “The Interpretation of Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees by the 
European Union: Toward Harmonisation”, (2003) 18 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 111 at 117. 
154 See Op. Cit. n.50-55. 
155 House of Lords EU Select Committee 28th Report of 2001-02, Defining Refugee Status and Those in Need of 
International Protection, HMSO, 2002 at 21. 
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claim refugee status in other EU MSs156, which also applies to subsidiary protection (Article 
2(f)). As Gilbert157 and Boutillon158 observe, Article 1 of the Geneva Convention, through the 
utilisation of Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties159, is non-derogable 
and the exclusion of nationals of MSs would breach Article 3 of the Geneva Convention that 
requires States to apply the Convention’s provisions to refugees without discrimination as to 
inter alia country of origin. It also contravenes Article 42 of the Geneva Convention that 
prohibits reservations to Article 1160. Boutillon161 suggests a reason for this exclusion is that the 
right of free movement for citizens of the Union enables individuals to move to another MS 
without the need to claim refugee status. However, there are limitations with this argument, in 
particular over the transition arrangements of the new MSs, where free movement is limited for 
seven years after accession, and the treatment of the Roma people in some of these new MSs162. 
The second compatibility issue involves the relationship of Article 14(4) and (5) of the 
Qualifications Directive and Article 33(2) of the Geneva Convention. Article 33(1) provides the 
right to, and conditions for, the principle of non-refoulement that MSs must respect (Article 
21(1) Qualifications Directive) and Article 33(2) allows refoulement of refugees on the basis of 
national security and public safety, given effect by Article 21(2) of the Qualifications Directive. 
Article 33(2) does not envisage the withdrawal of, or the refusal to, grant refugee status for an 
individual but simply the possibility of allowing refoulement. Article 14(4) of the Qualifications 
                                                 
156 This complies with Protocol 29 attached to the Treaties, Protocol on Asylum for Nationals of Member States of 
the European Union. 
157 Gilbert G., “Is Europe Living Up to Its Obligations to Refugees?” (2004) 15 EJIL 963 at 975. 
158 Op. Cit. n.153 at 136. 
159 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or International 
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160 Klug A., “Harmonization of Asylum in the European Union – Emergence of an EU Refugee System?” (2004) 47 
GYIL 594 at 600 and Lambert H., “The EU Asylum Qualification Directive, its Impact on the Jurisprudence of the 
United Kingdom and International Law”, (2006) 55 ICLQ 161 at 178. 
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Directive enables MSs to withdraw refugee status and Article 14(5) allows MSs to refuse to 
grant refugee status to individuals on the basis of the reasons in Article 33(2) of the Geneva 
Convention. This is a misreading of Article 33(2) of the Geneva Convention that the Directive 
has interpreted as an exclusion clause for the grant of refugee status but is in fact an exception to 
the principle to non-refoulement of a refugee already granted that status163. Third, although 
Recital 3 provides that the Geneva Convention is the ‘cornerstone of the international legal 
regime for the protection of refugees’ the Qualifications Directive fails to include significant 
elements of the Geneva Convention. Thus Article 4, regarding the freedom to practise religion 
and religious education of refugees’ children, and Articles 12-16, on the rights attached to 
juridical status, are not included in the Directive164. However, Article 16 on the right to access to 
courts is provided for in the Procedures Directive. Fourth, Article 34 of the Geneva Convention, 
compels States, as far as possible, to facilitate the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees, 
swiftly and with the minimum charges and costs. This naturalisation provision has been replaced 
with a general requirement for MSs to provide integration programmes without any reference to 
naturalisation165. Fifth, as Teitgen-Colly notes166, the exclusion clauses to the grant of refugee 
status set out in Article 1F of the Geneva Convention are required to be interpreted restrictively 
as they are exclusions to the general right of international protection167 but they have been 
interpreted broadly by Article 14(3) of the Directive and the wording, in particular in Article 
14(2)(b), has been significantly extended from that in Article 1F. 
 
                                                 
163 Op. Cit. n.160 at 178. See also Teitgen-Colly C., “The European Union and Asylum: An Illusion of Protection”, 
(2006) 43 CMLRev 1503 at 1555. 
164 Ibid. Lambert at 179. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Op. Cit. n.163 at 1557. 
167 Op. Cit. n.47 para.149. The objective of the Handbook is to provide practical guidelines to States but lacks 
binding force. 
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The second concern features the introduction of subsidiary protection status in the Qualifications 
Directive and once again involves a number of issues. The first is that by definition (Article 2(e)) 
subsidiary protection is only to be granted if a person does not qualify for refugee status. There is 
a danger therefore that States will provide claimants with the lower protection, and the 
subsequent lower benefits and rights, rather than the status of refugee. Second, the elements of 
“serious harm” included in Article 15 are an exhaustive list that do not allow any development or 
flexibility of protection for violation of other human rights than those listed in Article 15168. 
Teitgen-Colly169 has also criticised Article 15 for its limited nature and clarity, but it is submitted 
that her criticisms of the imprecise scope of subsidiary protection and serious harm are not 
reflected in the elements of Article 15. Third, the exclusion clause in Article 17 is broader than 
that for refugee status in Article 12 and Article 1F of the Geneva Convention as Article 17(1)(b) 
only requires there be serious reasons for believing that “he or she has committed a serious 
crime” rather than a “serious non-political crime”170. Furthermore Article 17(1)(d) includes the 
Article 33(2) exemption from non-refoulement as an exclusion of protection clause. Article 17(3) 
also enables MSs to exclude individuals from subsidiary protection status if they have carried out 
a crime not included in Article 17(1) that would have been capable of being punished by 
imprisonment in the host MS and they have left their country of origin to escape such 
punishment. There is no parallel to this provision in the Geneva Convention171. 
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The Procedures Directive raises the third concern with a number of further issues as outlined by 
Costello172. The first issue is the diminished standard of the requirement of “sufficient 
protection” in a first country of asylum for Article 26 rather than the higher standard of 
“effective protection”173. Second the safe third country concept is considered to be flawed as 
there should be a requirement that the third country should provide a fair and efficient 
determination procedure and that there must be a meaningful link between the applicant and the 
third country174. More concerning is the concept of European safe third country where no 
examination need be carried out by the MS concerned of the application before the applicant is 
returned to that State. Lists of safe third countries, safe countries of origin and European safe 
third countries mean that it is possible for the applicant to be returned to that country without the 
country being assessed for safety as applicable to the personal circumstances of that individual. 
As Costello observes175 the inevitable consequence of this is chain refoulement and refugees in 
orbit. 
 
The fourth concern is levelled at the Temporary Protection Directive. Temporary protection has 
been described by Fitzpatrick as “like a magic gift, assuming the desired form of its enthusiasts’ 
policy objectives. Simultaneously, it serves as a magic mirror of its observers’ fears”176. This is 
reflected in the three issues that are raised over the Directive. First, the power rests with the 
Council to open a temporary protection scheme177 in which the Council is given a “blank 
                                                 
172 Costello C., “The Asylum Procedures Directive and the Proliferation of Safe Country Practices: Deterrence, 
Deflection and the Dismantling of International Protection?” (2005) 7 EJML 35. 
173 See Legomsky S., “Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The 
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175 Ibid. at 61. 
176 Fitzpatrick J., “Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalised Regime”, (2000) 94 AJIL 279 at 
280. 
177 Op. Cit. n.55 at 211. 
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cheque”178 as to the definition of “mass influx of displaced persons”, even with guidance 
provided by Article 5(4). Second the availability of temporary protection enables States to put 
off assessment of a claim for either refugee or subsidiary protection status. Third, the length of 
protection is finite up to a maximum of two years (Article 4(1))179. Many, if not most, conflicts 
last for a considerably longer period than two years180, raising concerns over decisions on 
individuals after two years and their final destination. 
 
The fifth concern is raised over the concepts of “safe havens”, “camps”, RPAs and TPCs but as 
these proposals have not become concrete legal measures then only a brief outline will be 
provided. The first issue is to who has responsibility for these areas. The Geneva Convention 
requires the Contracting States to process applications for international protection but if TPCs 
are established outside the EU then it is uncertain who would have this responsibility. Second 
there could be a breach of the principle of non-refoulement if a national of a State is returned to a 
TPC or RPA situated within that State. Third, detention within a TPC would likely violate 
Article 31(2) of the Geneva Convention and Article 5(1)ECHR. Finally, the German Interior 
Minister’s suggestion of intercepting applicants for international protection before they enter EU 
MSs’ territorial waters in order to circumvent the principle of non-refoulement in the Geneva 
Convention is likely to be illegal if, as has been cogently argued181, it has jus cogens status and 
would also be, just as importantly, immoral182. 
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There are also concerns that are collective issues that cover all three Directives. First the 
Directives provide minimum standards. The aim is to allow MSs to retain and adopt higher 
levels of protection in areas of their discretion. However, it is difficult to see MSs retaining 
international protection standards higher than those of other MSs as the very presence of a more 
liberal regime is likely to open up that MS to the possibility of increased applications for that 
protection183. Second, the definition of “family member” is considerably narrower than that 
included in Article 2(2) of Dir. 2004/38. As such a spouse met, or a child born, after the 
applicant left the country of origin would not be able to claim protection, neither would a family 
member who arrived in the host MS after the applicant received protection, nor a child who was 
not a minor, unmarried and dependent. Third there is either no right to freedom of movement or 
an extremely limited right and the ability to travel to other States is dependent on the type of 
international protection that the individual enjoys.  
 
4. IMMIGRATION 
 
The third type of TCN whose movement is regulated by the measures implementing Article 
63(3)EC of the AFSJ is the migrant. The relationship between migration and asylum is close, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Haitian refugees on the high seas and turn them back towards Haiti and that the Geneva Convention was only 
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being labelled the ‘migration-asylum nexus’184, and is constituted by the distinction between 
forced and economic migration, and the blurring of this distinction185. This blurring of the 
distinction between asylum-seekers or refugees and immigrants has led to national immigration 
policies treating their international movement as similar186 and erasing the line between 
migration control and refugee protection187 whilst dehumanising immigrants through the use of 
terminology such as “floods” and “invasions”188. The Commission has attempted to steer a 
steady course through these confused waters by developing a distinct Community immigration 
policy that splits immigration into two discrete areas: legal; and, illegal immigration189. 
 
 a. Legal Immigration 
The difference between legal and illegal immigration is difficult to determine with precision. 
However, legal migrants will tend to have obtained the requisite documents for travel before 
entering the EU and retain these during their time in the EU whilst illegal migrants are unlikely 
to hold these genuine documents. Second, they are likely to comply with the requisite admission 
procedures for their entry. Upon their successful entry they will be granted certain rights that 
should be broadly the same as EU nationals190 and facilitate their integration into the host society 
as the essential corollary of admission policies191. To that end the family is an important element 
                                                 
184 Koser K., “New Approaches in Asylum?” (2001) 39 International Migration 85 at 87.  
185 Betts A., “Towards a Mediterranean Solution? Implications for the Region of Origin”, (2006) 18 IJRL 652 at 
655. 
186 Hansen R., “Asylum Policy in the European Union”, (2000) 14 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 779 at 
793. 
187 Feller E., “Asylum, Migration and Refugee Protection: Realities, Myths and the Promise of Things to Come”, 
(2006) 18 IJRL 510 at 515. 
188 Brochman G., “The Current Traps of European Immigration Policies”, Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in 
International Migration and Ethnic Relations, 1/03. 
189 Commission Communication on a Community immigration policy, COM(2000) 757 final. See now the 
Commission Communication on a common immigration policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools, 
COM(2008) 359 final. 
190 Ibid. COM(2000) 757 final at 15. 
191 Ibid. at 16. 
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of integration policies192, in particular the right to family reunification193. It is logical, therefore, 
to analyse these four elements as they apply to the legal immigration of TCNs and in particular 
their freedom of movement. 
1. Community Common Visa Policy194 
Two types of visa for entry of TCNs into Schengenland were introduced in the SIC: the short 
term visa; and, the long term visa, with Regulation 539/2001/EC195 providing lists of third 
countries whose nationals have to be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of 
the Union or need not be in possession of a visa for stays of less than three months. Article 
10(1)SIC required the introduction of a uniform “Schengen short term visa” that could be issued 
for visits not exceeding three months. This was further delineated into travel and transit visas. 
Travel visas would be ‘valid for one or more entries, provided that neither the length of a 
continuous visit nor the total length of successive visits exceeds three months in any half-year, 
from the date of first entry’ (Article 11(1)(a)SIC). Transit visas enabled the holder to pass 
through the MSs’ territory en route to a third country, so long as the transit was less than five 
days (Article 11(1)(b)SIC). Regulation 1683/95/EC196, augmented by Regulation 
333/2002/EC197, lays down a uniform format for these short term visas whilst Regulation 
                                                 
192 Ibid. at 20. 
193 Ibid. at 12. 
194 Meloni A., “The Development of a Common Visa Policy under the Treaty of Amsterdam”, (2005) 42 CMLRev 
1357. 
195 Council Regulation 539/2001/EC listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, O.J. 2001 L81/1, as 
amended by Regulation 2414/2001/EC, O.J. 2001 L327/1, Regulation 453/2003/EC, O.J. 2003 L69/10, Regulation 
851/2005/EC, O.J. 2005 L141/3 and Regulation 1932/2006/EC, O.J. 2007 L29/10. See now the Commission 
proposal for a Regulation listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing 
the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (Codified version), COM(2008) 
761 final. 
196 Council Regulation 1683/95/EC laying down a uniform format for visas, O.J. 1995 L164/1 as amended by 
Regulation 334/2002/EC. 
197 Council Regulation 333/2002/EC on a uniform format for affixing the visa issued by Member States to persons 
holding travel documents not recognised by the Member State drawing up the form, O.J. 2002 L53/4. 
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415/2003/EC198 permits the issuing of transit visas at the EU external borders to an individual 
seaman or groups of seaman. In 2006 the Commission brought forward a proposal199 for a 
Regulation to establish a Community Code on Visas (CCV) so that the Community Common 
Visa Policy and its provisions will be contained in four consolidated measures: Reg. 539/2001; 
Reg. 1683/95; Reg. 333/2002; and, the new CCV Reg. It will provide for a unified visa 
application, examination and processing procedure of short stay visas for stays of not more than 
three months in a six month period (Article 1). TCNs must apply for a visa in their country of 
residence unless they are lawfully resident in another country and have a legitimate reason for 
not applying in their country of residence (Article 4). Among the supporting documents 
necessary for the acquisition of the visa (Article 14), Article 15 will require the visa applicant to 
have travel medical insurance with a minimum amount of €30,000. 
 
Article 18SIC provided that long term visas for stays exceeding three months were to remain 
national visas so long as the person met the criteria for entry to the Schengen area in Article 
5SIC and Regulation 1091/2001/EC200 enables these national long term visas to be used for 
travel between MSs. The long term visa is still regulated by national law as no Community 
legislation has been adopted. 
 
The importance of visas to the right of free movement becomes apparent when considering 
Articles 19-21SIC. Article 19(1) states that ‘[a]liens201 who hold uniform visas and who have 
legally entered the territory of a Contracting Party may move freely within the territories of all 
                                                 
198 Council Regulation 415/2003/EC on the issue of visas at the border, including the issue of such visas to seamen 
in transit, O.J. 2003 L64/1. 
199 Commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and Council establishing a Community Code 
on Visas, COM (2006) 403 final. 
200 Council Regulation 1091/2001/EC on Freedom of Movement with a Long-Stay Visa, O.J. 2001 L150/4. 
201 “Alien” was the term used in Schengen and the SIC that is now replaced with the more correct term TCN. 
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the Contracting Parties during the period of validity of their visas’ unless limited territorially by 
a MS. Articles 20 and 21 enables TCNs, not subject to visa requirements or who hold valid 
residence permits, to move freely within the territories of the Contracting Parties for a maximum 
period of three months during the six months following the date of first entry. The ECJ in Bot202 
held that the term “first entry” refers, not only to the very first entry into Schengen territory, but 
also to any other first entry after the expiry of any new period of six months. However, Article 
24 of the proposed CCV Reg. makes it clear that ‘[m]ere possession of a short stay visa or a 
transit visa does not confer automatic right of entry’ for TCNs. 
 
As Gilbert203 and Guild204 note, visas are complemented by the provisions on carrier sanctions 
that work “in combination to place decision-making about entry back with the State of 
departure”. These carrier sanctions are laid down in Articles 26 and 27SIC, complemented and 
supplemented by three Directives that have the objective of curbing migratory flows and 
combating illegal immigration205. Article 26(1)(a)SIC requires the air, sea or land carrier that 
brought the TCN to the EU to assume responsibility again for that TCN immediately upon the 
refusal of entry to the EU and return that TCN to the third country they came from, or they 
obtained the travel document from or that will certainly admit them. Furthermore the carrier 
must take all the necessary measures to ensure that a TCN travelling by sea or air is in 
possession of the travel documents necessary for entry to the EU (Article 26(1)(b)SIC). Article 
26(2) and (3)SIC require sanctions to be levied against air, sea or land carriers for breaches of 
                                                 
202 Case C-241/05 Bot v. Préfet du Val-de-Marne [2006] ECR I-9627 at para.43. 
203 Op. Cit. n.157 at 971. 
204 Guild E., “Between Persecution and Protection: Refugees and the New European Asylum Policy” (2000) 3 
CYELS 169 at 179. See also Lax V.L., “Must EU Borders have Doors for Refugees? On the Compatibility of 
Schengen Visas and Carriers’ Sanctions with EU Member States’ Obligations to Provide International Protection to 
Refugees”, (2008) 10 EJML 315 and Feller E., “Carrier Sanctions and International Law”, (1999) 1 IJRL 48. 
205 See House of Lords EU Select Committee 5th Report of 2003-04, Fighting Illegal Immigration: Should Carriers 
Carry the Burden? HMSO, 2004. 
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their obligations, whilst Article 27SIC requires the levy of appropriate sanctions against 
individuals for assisting or trying to assist a TCN to illegally enter or reside in the EU for 
financial gain. Directive 2001/51/EC206 supplements Article 26SIC. If a TCN is refused entry in 
transit, then the obligations of carriers remain even if they refuse to take the TCN on board for 
onwards flight to the country of destination or if the State of destination has refused the TCN 
entry and the TCN has been returned to the transit MS (Article 2). The level of sanctions for 
carriers under Article 26(2) and (3) must be a maximum of €5,000 and a minimum of €3,000 per 
person, with a maximum lump sum for each infringement of €500,000 (Article 4). Directive 
2003/110/EC207 specifies in Article 3(1) that the preferred means of returning a TCN by air is by 
a direct flight to the country of destination. However, if this is not reasonably practical then the 
MS can request to use a transit flight through another MS along with assistance during the transit 
(Articles 3(2) and 5(2)). Finally Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/82/EC208 places obligations on 
carriers to transmit in advance (by the end of check-in) information on passengers when they are 
going to enter the territory of a MS at an authorised border crossing point. Where the carrier has 
negligently transmitted incomplete or false data then the MS can fine them a maximum of 
€5,000 or a minimum of €3,000 per journey (Article 4(1)). The duties and sanctions imposed on 
carriers can be objected to on a number of grounds. The first is that a public service obligation, 
being the duty of customs and immigration officials, should not be imposed on private service 
providers209, the transport carriers, and backed up by penalties. As a consequence, internal border 
checks, which was the aim of Schengen to remove, have increased with both national custom 
                                                 
206 Council Directive 2001/51/EC supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement, O.J. 2001 L187/45. 
207 Council Directive 2003/110/EC on assistance in cases of transit for the purposes of removal by air, O.J. 2003 
L321/26. 
208 Council Directive 2004/82/EC on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data, O.J. 2004 L261/24. 
209 Although contracting out responsibilities of the state to private corporations is now quite common, the duties of 
customs and immigration officials would appear to go to the heart of sovereignty and power. 
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police and transport carriers carrying them out, the latter to avoid legal sanctions210. The second 
is that carrier sanctions are likely to act as a block on legitimate attempts by genuine asylum-
seekers or refugees to leave their country of residence as asylum-seekers or refugees, by the 
nature of their desperate situation, do not have the opportunity to obtain the appropriate travel 
documentation before fleeing211. Therefore asylum-seekers and refugees are likely to become 
frustrated, further disenfranchised and desperate, and fall into the hands of organised illegal 
immigration organisations, a situation that the common visa policy is supposedly designed to 
avoid. 
2. Admission Requirements for Entry 
Article 3(1)SIC states that ‘[e]xternal borders may in principle only be crossed at border crossing 
points and during the fixed opening hours’. This general provision required legislative measures 
to be adopted to enable the second element of a Community immigration policy, to provide 
common admission requirements for the entry of TCNs to the Community, to be achieved. The 
first attempt was the proposal for an External Frontiers Convention (the EFC)212, drafted to 
complement both the SIC and the Dublin Convention. Its main premise was that TCNs had no 
right of entry to Community territory unless they satisfied stringent entry conditions in Article 7. 
It envisaged the creation of the uniform Community visa valid for three months, with national 
visas maintained for long term visas (Title VI EFC). TCNs legally resident and settled within a 
MS were to have no right of free movement or intra-Community settlement (Article 9). Instead 
they would be allowed to travel visa-free within the Community for three months, subject to 
registration with the appropriate national authorities either at the border or within three days of 
                                                 
210 Op. Cit. n.205 at 8. 
211 Foblets M.C., “Europe and Its Aliens after Maastricht. The Painful Move to Substantive Harmonisation of 
Member States’ Policies Towards Third Country Nationals, 42 (1994) Am. J. Com. L. 783. 
212 Commission Communication on a proposal for a Decision, based on Article K3 of the Treaty on European 
Union, establishing the Convention on the crossing of the external frontiers of the Member States, COM(1993) 684 
final.   
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arrival. Under the EFC, external borders could only be crossed at specific points and times, with 
the MSs introducing penalties for unauthorised border crossing. However, even after the original 
proposal was heavily amended213 to incorporate three Council Resolutions on the entry 
requirements of TCNs214, the EFC was never signed because of the on-going dispute between 
Spain and the UK over Gibraltar. Interestingly, Article 35 of the revised EFC provided a right to 
freedom of movement to a TCN to take up an offer of employment where there was a vacancy or 
to enrol in a higher education course of study.  
 
The Commission put forward a further proposal in 2001215 concerning the conditions of entry 
and residence of TCNs for employed and self-employed economic activities. For paid 
employment a TCN could be issued with a “residence permit – worker”, valid for three years and 
renewable (Articles 4, 5 and 7). For the first three years it would be restricted to the exercise of 
specific professional or fields of activity and could be restricted to a specific region. After three 
years such restrictions would be lifted (Article 8). Similar arrangements would be laid down for 
the issue of a “residence permit – self-employed permit” for TCNs wishing to exercise activities 
as a self-employed person (Articles 17, 18, 20 and 21). The “residence permit – worker” would 
only be issued if the job vacancy could not be filled by: citizens of the Union; TCN family 
members of a citizen of the Union who had exercised the right of free movement; TCNs with full 
access to the labour market under national law or an Association Agreement; and, TCNs who 
had been working in the MS for the last three years, or three years over the preceding five 
                                                 
213 Commission proposal for a Council Act establishing the Convention on rules for the admission of third-country 
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214 Council Resolution on limitation on admission of third-country nationals to the territory of the Member States for 
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(Article 6). For a self-employed person it would have to be demonstrated that their activities 
would create an employment opportunity for the applicant and would have a beneficial effect on 
employment or economic development in the MS (Article 19). The permits would entitle the 
holder to the minimum of: entry and re-entry to the MS territory; passage through the other MSs’ 
territory; residence; exercise of the activities authorised in the permits; and, equal treatment with 
citizens of the Union with regard to working conditions, access to vocational training, 
recognition of professional qualifications, social security, access to goods and services, and 
freedom to join a trade union (Article 11). A notable absence, reflected in the EFC, was a right to 
freedom of movement within the EU. The proposal, although receiving support from the 
European Parliament, stalled in the Council and so the Commission initiated a debate on the 
subject of the integration of legally resident TCNs in 2003 with a Communication216 followed by 
a Green Paper217, Communication218 and Policy Plan219 in 2005. The Policy Plan proposed five 
new legislative measures: a general Framework Directive to guarantee a common framework of 
rights to all TCNs in legal employment already admitted in a MS, but not yet entitled to long 
term residence status; and, four specific Directives on the conditions of entry and residence for 
highly skilled workers, seasonal workers, and remunerated trainees, and the procedures 
regulating the entry into, the temporary stay and residence of Intra-Corporate Transferees. The 
European Parliamentary Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs220 in January 
2007 called for the introduction of the Framework Directive as a matter of urgency and the 
combination of the four specific Directives into one221. In October 2007 the Commission brought 
                                                 
216 Communication from the Commission on immigration, integration and employment, COM(2003) 336 final. 
217 Commission Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration, COM(2004) 811 final. 
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forward the initial proposals for Directives to implement the Policy Plan. The first proposal is for 
a single application procedure for a single permit for TCNs to reside and work in a MS combined 
with a common set of rights for TCN workers legally residing in a MS222. It is to apply to TCNs 
either working and legally residing in a MS or seeking to do so (Article 3(1)). However, the 
scope does not cover inter alia seasonal workers, applicants for refugee, subsidiary or temporary 
protection status, or those with long-term resident status (Article 3(2)). To obtain the single 
permit the TCN must be able to apply in a single application procedure (Article 4) to a 
competent authority nominated by the MS (Article 5). Under Article 11 the single permit 
provides the minimum rights of entry, re-entry and residence in the MS issuing the single permit, 
that includes a right of free movement within the territory of that MS and a right of passage 
through other MSs in order to exercise these rights. Furthermore the TCN has the right to 
exercise the activities authorised under the single permit and to be informed of the rights linked 
to the permit. There is also the right to equal treatment with nationals of the MS for working 
conditions, membership of a trade union, education and vocational training, recognition of 
qualifications, social security, payment of acquired pensions when moving to a third country, tax 
benefits and access to and supply of goods and services made available to the public (Article 
12(1)). However, these rights of equal treatment must be tempered by the restrictions listed in 
Article 12(2). Discussions are continuing in Council on the wording of the Directive although a 
broad agreement has been reached. It is expected that the Directive will be adopted in the Czech 
Republic’s presidency during the first half of 2009223 
                                                                                                                                                             
Velluti S., “What European Union Strategy for Integrating Migrants? The Role of OMC Soft Mechanisms in the 
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The second proposal for a Directive is on the entry and residence conditions for the employment 
of highly qualified TCNs224, the length of stay being longer than three months (Article 1(a)). 
Article 5 set the criteria for admission with paragraph 1 detailing predominantly the documents 
required (valid work contract or job offer of at least one year, professional qualifications, travel 
documents, sickness insurance) as well as requiring the TCN to fulfil national conditions and not 
to be a threat to public policy, public security or public health. Paragraph 2 set a minimum wage 
requirement that had to be above a national salary threshold and at least three times the minimum 
gross monthly wage set by national law (Article 5(2)(1)). However, where MSs did not have a 
minimum wage the national salary threshold was to be set at least three times the minimum 
income under which the MS’s citizens were entitled to social assistance, or to be in line with 
applicable collective agreements or practices in the relevant occupation branches (Article 
5(2)(2)). The European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs225 
has criticised this formula as not doing justice to the intention of the provision to attract highly 
qualified individuals, which is often indicated by high levels of pay. They suggested the deletion 
of sub-paragraph 2 and amending paragraph 1 so that the national salary threshold must be at 
least 1.7 times average gross pay under national law. The latest compromise position226 provides 
for a relevant salary threshold of at least 1.5 times the average gross annual salary in the MS 
concerned (Article 5(2)) that can be reduced to 1.2 for certain in demand professions. Article 6 
sets derogations for individuals who are less than 30 years of age and holding higher education 
qualifications. The Parliamentary Committee considered this could lead to age-based 
                                                 
224 Commission proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals 
for the purposes of highly qualified employment, COM(2007) 637 final. 
225 PE 409.459v02-00 at 16. 
226 Council Document 16952/08. 
182 
 
discrimination and suggested its deletion227 and in the latest draft this provision this advice has 
been followed. However, the right to entrance to the MS is at the MSs’ discretion and the MS 
can determine the volumes of admission (Article 7). When a TCN fulfils the Article 5 criteria 
and is issued with a positive decision by the competent authority of the MS concerned, they will 
be issued with a Blue Card (Article 8) that entitles the TCN the right to enter, re-enter and reside 
in the MS issuing the Blue Card, or to pass through other MSs to exercise these rights. In the first 
two years of acquisition of a Blue Card, access to the labour market for the TCN concerned will 
be restricted to the exercise of paid employment activities, which meet the Articles 5 criteria 
(Article 13(1)) but after that the TCN may enjoy equal treatment with nationals as regard access 
to highly qualified employment at the MS’s discretion. Article 15 specifies the areas in which a 
holder of a Blue Card will enjoy equal treatment with nationals of the MS, that are similar to 
those in Article 12(1) of the original proposal. A significant right is contained in Article 19, 
which allows a Blue Card holder to move to another MS for the purpose of highly qualified 
employment after eighteen months of legal residence in the first MS. Article 16 provides for the 
family reunification Directive, Directive 2003/86/EC228, to apply but with derogations specified 
in Article 16 that eases the passage for family members to join the Blue Card holder. 
Furthermore Article 21 enables family members to move to another MS with the Blue Card 
holder after two years of legal residence so long as the family was already constituted in the first 
MS. If the family was not constituted in the first MS then Article 16 is to apply (Article 21(4)). 
Finally a Blue Card holder can acquire long-term residence status in accordance with Directive 
2003/109/EC229 after five years of legal and continuous residence within the Community and two 
                                                 
227 Op. Cit. n.225 at 17. 
228 Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, O.J. 2003 L251/12. For a more detailed 
analysis see below. 
229 Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third country nationals who are LTRs, O.J. 2004 L16/44. 
See Skordas A., “Immigration and the Market: The Long-Term Residents Directive”, (2006) 13 Columbia Journal of 
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years of residence in the MS where application is made for long-term residence status 
immediately before the application (Article 17(2)). Partial political agreement has been reached 
between the Parliament and Council on the final Directive but a final decision has yet to be taken 
and appears unlikely until the free movement transition arrangements have expired in 2011. 
 
Two Directives that have been adopted in this area are Directive 2004/114/EC230 and Directive 
2005/71/EC231. The former Directive provides the conditions and procedures for the admission 
of TCNs to the territory of the MSs for a period exceeding three months in order to carry out: 
study; pupil exchange; unremunerated training; or, voluntary service. Articles 12-15 provide for 
the right to a residence permit for at least a year for: a student that is capable of renewal; for no 
more than a year for a school pupil; for the duration of the placement for unremunerated trainees 
to a maximum of a year (renewable only once and exclusively for the time to acquire a 
vocational qualification); and, for a year for volunteers although in exceptional cases this can be 
extended to the duration of the voluntary project. The conditions for the acquisition of the right 
to a residence permit are specific to each category of person and are contained in Articles 7-11, 
with Article 6 providing general conditions applicable to all. Only students are provided with a 
limited right to freedom of movement in Article 8 so that a student who has already been 
admitted as a student in one MS can apply to follow part of the commenced studies, or to 
compliment them with a related course of studies, in another MS. Providing the criteria in Article 
8(1) are met then the second MS must admit the student within a period that does not hamper the 
pursuit of the relevant studies.  
 
                                                 
230 Council Directive 2004/114/EC on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of 
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The latter Directive provides the conditions for the admission of TCN researchers to MSs for 
more than three months to carry out a research project under hosting agreements with research 
organisations (Article 1). A renewable one year residence permit will be issued under Article 8 
so long as the criteria in Articles 5-7 are complied with on application. However, family 
members may join or accompany the TCN researcher at the MS’s discretion and have a right to a 
residence permit for the same duration as the researcher (Article 9), although “family members” 
are not defined. Article 13 provides the right of mobility to a researcher, such that the researcher 
may be admitted to another MS to carry out part of the research there. This right to mobility is a 
highly restricted right of movement that is notably only available for the researcher and not for 
their family members. 
 
The lack of significant legislative measures detailing the entry and residence requirements of 
TCNs entering the Community creates a vacuum in the AFSJ at the Community level that 
continues to be filled by the domestic law of the MSs. The case for Community legislation in this 
area is compelling and has been made on a number of occasions by the Commission in numerous 
Communications issued on immigration policy but the entry of persons, in particular TCNs, to 
the territory of a State is a matter that goes to the heart of the concept of national sovereignty. A 
more alarming development is the lack of, or at best a highly attenuated form of, a right of free 
movement for TCNs who have entered the Community legally. This would appear to be at 
variance to the Tampere Conclusions where it was stated that the lack of this freedom “would be 
in contradiction with Europe’s traditions to deny such freedom to those whose circumstances 
lead them justifiably to seek access to our territory”232. 
3. Long Term Residents 
                                                 
232 Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, SN200/99, 1 at para.3. 
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Directive 2003/109 on the status of Long Term Resident (henceforth LTR) TCNs determines the 
minimum requirements for the grant and withdrawal of LTR status for TCNs, the rights 
associated with such status and rights of residence in other MSs (Article 1). According to Article 
3, the Directive applies to TCNs residing legally in the MS’s territory except those: pursuing 
studies or vocational training; benefiting of temporary protection, subsidiary protection or 
refugee status; being employed on temporary grounds, for the purposes of cross-border services, 
or having their residence permit formally limited as such; and, enjoying diplomatic protection. 
Article 4 specifies that long term residency status must be granted to TCNs who have resided 
legally and continuously in the MS’s territory for five years, so long as they have stable 
resources above the social assistance level of the MS and sickness insurance (Article 5), and was 
applied for with documentary evidence to the appropriate authorities (Article 7). However in 
Article 6, MSs may refuse to grant LTR status on grounds of public policy or public security. 
When the long term residency is granted, it must be permanent, unless withdrawn in accordance 
with Article 9. The LTR has the right to a renewable residence permit valid for at least five years 
(Article 8). According to Article 9(1)(a)-(c) it can be withdrawn if the TCN has acquired the 
status fraudulently, has been expelled, or has left the territories of the EU for a year. 
Consequently LTRs should receive equal treatment with nationals on a range of measures laid 
down in Article 11 that includes free access to the territory of the MS concerned, within national 
legislative limits for reasons of security and access to employment and self-employed activity. 
MSs can expel the LTR but only if they constitute an actual and sufficiently serious threat to 
public policy and public security and a decision must not be taken on economic grounds (Article 
12). There appears to be a possible contradiction in the legal position of a TCN here in that LTR 
status may be refused on the grounds of public policy or public security (Article 6(1)) but 
expulsion can only take place if there is an “actual and sufficiently serious threat” to public 
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policy and public security. Furthermore Article 9(7) provides that a TCN can remain in the MS’s 
territory if there is withdrawal or loss of LTR status if the TCN complies with domestic 
legislation and is not a threat to public policy or public security, but this does not cover the 
refusal of granting LTR status. The factors to be taken into consideration before an expulsion 
decision is taken include the duration of residence, the age of the LTR, the consequences for the 
LTR and family members, and the links with the country of residence or the absence of links 
with the country of origin. The LTR has the right to appeal in a court of law and the right to 
equal treatment as nationals for the grant of legal aid (Article 12(4) and (5)).  
 
LTRs are also provided in Article 14 with the right to exercise the right of residence in another 
MS’s territory for more than three months if exercising an economic activity in an employed or 
self-employed capacity, pursuing studies or vocational training or for other (unspecified) 
purposes. Where the TCN moves to the second MS on the grounds of exercising an economic 
activity in an employed or self-employed capacity, the MS can examine the situation of their 
labour market and apply their national procedures regarding the requirements for filling a 
vacancy or for exercising self-employed activities. As such MSs can give preference to Union 
citizens, TCNs who come within Community Agreements with third countries, and unemployed 
TCNs already lawfully resident in the MS for reasons of labour market policy. MSs can derogate 
from this right through setting quotas for granting the right of residence for TCNs if domestic 
legislation did so when the Directive was adopted. MSs may require that these LTR TCNs 
should have adequate resources not to be a burden on the state and sickness insurance and 
comply with integration measures and attend language courses as set out in national law (Article 
15). As soon as entering the territory of the second MS, or at least within three months, the LTR 
must apply for a residence permit. That second MS may, at its discretion, allow the LTR to 
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submit an application for a residence permit whilst the LTR is still residing in the first MS 
(Article 15(1)). However, as Peers observes233, the right of residence is not dependent on the 
issue of the residence permit as applications for residence can only be refused on the grounds of 
public policy, public security and public health (Articles 17 and 18) and its declaratory nature 
can be inferred from Article 9(6) that specifies that the expiry of the residence permit “shall in 
no case entail withdrawal or loss of LTR status” (emphasis added). A LTR TCN exercising their 
right under Article 14 also has the right to family reunification for his family members under 
Article 16 so that they may join or accompany the TCN, so long as the family was already 
constituted in the first MS. Family members are as defined in Article 4(1) of Directive 2003/86. 
Articles 17 and 18 enable the MSs to refuse applications for residence only where the person 
constitutes a threat to public policy, public security or public health. The analysis by the MS of 
the threat to public health follows a similar analysis for citizens of the Union in Dir. 2004/38 and 
it is submitted is an equivalent provision. For the threat to public policy and public security the 
MS must consider the severity or type of offence or the danger that emanates from the person 
concerned, which is different wording to that in Article 27(2) of Dir. 2004/38 but it is suggested 
would most likely be construed by the ECJ in a similar manner234. The application for residence 
must be processed within four months, with a possibility of a maximum extension of a further 
three months, according to Article 19 and a renewable residence permit must then be issued for 
the individual and family members providing access to the rights outlined in Article 11 so long 
as the criteria for issue have been met. If the application for a residence permit is refused, the 
Directive specifies that the TCN can mount a legal challenge (Article 20(2)) but there is nothing 
in the Directive to indicate the outcome for the TCN. If the residence permit is merely 
                                                 
233 Peers S., “Implementing Equality? The Directive on Long Term Resident Third Country Nationals”, (2004) 29 
ELR 437 at 456. 
234 See Slot P.J., Bulterman M., “Harmonization of Legislation on Migrating EU Citizens and Third Country 
Nationals: Towards a Uniform Evaluation Framework?” (2006) 29 Fordham International Law Journal 747 at 784 
for criticism of this different wording. 
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declaratory then the reasons for refusal can only be for public policy, public security of public 
health. As such the TCN will continue to enjoy long term residency status in the first MS and so 
should be able to return. The position upon return to the first MS may mean though that the TCN 
cannot be expelled from that State as the threat in Article 12 must constitute “an actual and 
sufficiently serious” threat rather than a mere threat. If the long term TCN resident remains in the 
second MS then, on satisfying the same qualifying criteria, the individual can claim the right of 
LTR status in the second MS (Article 23). At that point the TCN will lose LTR status in the first 
MS (Article 9(4)). 
 
The adoption of the LTR Directive is to be welcomed as it provides the strengthening of positive 
rights for TCNs across the Community when compared to their previous weak position. 
Furthermore the introduction of a right of mobility for LTR TCNs beyond the short term, three-
month SIC permitted travel, although significantly less than a right to freedom of movement, is 
an improvement on the previous situation235. However, there are significant faults with the 
Directive. First is the sheer complexity of it, a matter that can confuse the sharpest legal 
analyst236, let alone a TCN without legal training. Second, although Peers argues that any 
ambiguity in the Directive’s text should be resolved in favour of the TCN and family members, 
based on the inclusion of the Tampere Conclusions requirement of equal treatment for LTR 
TCNs in comparison to EU citizens in the Preamble (Recital 2) and that Article 61EC states that 
an objective of the AFSJ is to safeguard the rights of TCNs, this “line of reasoning is not entirely 
                                                 
235 Op. Cit. n.233 at 442. 
236 See Ibid. at 458 where Peers highlights the possibility of the loss of LTR status in the first MS if there is a delay 
in the processing of the residence permit application in the second MS. Although not stated, it is submitted that 
Peers misreads Article 9(1)(c) as meaning that loss will occur if the TCN is absent from the first MS’s territory for a 
period of twelve consecutive months rather than the “territory of the Community”. Article 9(4) provides loss of LTR 
status if absent from the first MS’s territory for six years – a very long delay in processing the permit. 
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obvious”237. It is submitted that the considerable discretion given to the MSs in many provisions, 
as well as the, at times, convoluted, contradictory and often confusing drafting would not 
necessarily see the matter resolved in favour of the TCN. Third, this convoluted, contradictory 
and confusing drafting creates considerable uncertainty as to the meaning and extent of the rights 
granted. Fourth, some terms are undefined, in particular the third ground for residence in a 
second MS in Article 14(2)(c), “other purposes”, and does not specify whether the other 
purposes are to be defined by the TCN, the MS or objectively by the ECJ. Fifth, TCNs’ right to 
equal treatment with nationals (whether these are nationals of the first, second or any MS is not 
specified) in Article 11 can be extensively derogated238 from by MSs. Peers suggests that these 
derogations should be interpreted narrowly239, but the derogations are drafted in such a way to 
give the MSs considerable discretion in this area that may not allow a narrow reading. Sixth, the 
personal scope of the Directive is significantly limited by Article 2(2), and in particularly the 
exclusion of individuals with refugee status, subsidiary protection status and temporary 
protection status is a major concern. This must be analysed in comparison to the Tampere 
Conclusions that set out the guiding principles for the EU institutions when adopting legislation 
implementing the AFSJ at the time that the Directive was adopted. These stated that the EU must 
“ensure fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally on the territory of the MSs”, 
and that an “integration policy should aim at granting them rights and obligations comparable to 
those of EU citizens”. Furthermore there was a call for the “enhancement of non-discrimination 
in economic, social and cultural life” and a development of “measures against racism and 
xenophobia”. It is difficult to see that this Directive provides fair treatment for TCNs when a 
                                                 
237 Halleskov L., “The Long-Term Residents Directive: A Fulfilment of the Tampere Objective of Near-Equality?” 
(2005) 7 EJML 181 at 188. 
238 Boelaert-Suominen S., “Non-EU Nationals and Council Directive 2003/109/EC on the Status of Third-Country 
Nationals who are Long-Term Residents: Five Paces Forward and Possibly Three Paces Back”, (2005) 42 CMLRev 
1011 at 1026. 
239 Op. Cit. n.233 at 443. 
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significant proportion of TCNs are not covered by its provisions and the rights and obligations 
incumbent on TCNs are certainly not comparable to those of EU citizens. However, what is most 
extraordinary is the lack of a provision prohibiting discrimination on the basis of nationality. 
Recital 3 provides that the Directive respects fundamental rights, particularly those recognised in 
the ECHR and the Charter, and Recital 5 tells MSs to give effect to the provisions of the 
Directive without discrimination on the basis of sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
characteristics, language, religion or beliefs, political or other opinions, membership of a 
national minority, fortune, birth, disabilities, age or sexual orientation240, but there is no mention 
of nationality. Boelaert-Suominen241 is optimistic that MSs will not be able to discriminate 
against TCNs on the basis of their nationality, however, such an omission whilst mentioning all 
other forms of discrimination would suggest otherwise. The Tampere Conclusions also made 
clear that a TCN, lawfully resident in a MS and holding a long term resident permit “should be 
granted in that Member State a set of uniform rights which are as near as possible to those 
enjoyed by EU citizens”. The Directive purposefully distinguishes between different classes of 
TCNs, ensures by the significant derogations and provisions with MS discretion that there cannot 
be a uniform set of rights, and the rights are nowhere near those enjoyed by EU citizens. Finally 
the Tampere Conclusions endorsed the aim of the naturalisation of LTR TCNs, a notable 
omission from the LTR Directive. 
 
In June 2007 the Commission put forward a proposal to extend the LTR Directive to TCNs with 
international protection as defined in Article 2(a) of Dir. 2004/83242 that would include TCNs 
                                                 
240 This mirrors Article 21 of the Charter, rather than Article 13EC. 
241 Op. Cit. n.238 at 1028. 
242 Commission proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2003/109/EC to extend its scope to 
beneficiaries of international protection, COM(2007) 298 final. At the November 2008 JHA Council meeting 
agreement amongst all the MSs except one was reached on the text of the Directive and so negotiations were to 
continue (Op. Cit. n.224 at 22). 
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granted refugee and subsidiary protection status. Furthermore the calculation of the five years 
duration of residence for beneficiaries of international protection would commence from when 
the application for protection was lodged. This would go some way to rectifying some of the 
concerns outlined above. 
4. Family Reunification 
Directive 2003/86/EC provides the right to family reunification for TCNs residing lawfully in a 
MS with a residence permit valid for at least a year who have reasonable prospects of obtaining 
the right of permanent residence (Article 3(1)). However Article 3(2) and (3) provides an 
exhaustive list of individuals that the Directive does not apply to: a TCN applying for refugee 
status; a TCN applying for or who has obtained temporary or subsidiary protection status; or, 
family members of a Union citizen. Article 4(1) is the heart of the Directive as it defines family 
members. They include the applicant’s spouse and the minor children of the applicant or his 
spouse, including where one of them has custody and the children are dependent, and that also 
includes adopted children. Minor children must be below the national age of majority and be 
unmarried. Where a minor child over the age of twelve arrives independently of the family, the 
MS may verify if the child meets a condition for integration provided for by its existing 
legislation before allowing entry and residence. Recital 12 explains this limitation as it is 
intended to ‘reflect the children’s capacity for integration at early ages and shall ensure that they 
acquire the necessary education and language skills in school’. The ECJ243 has recently 
interpreted this final paragraph of Article 4(1) and the explanation in Recital 12 in an Article 
                                                 
243 Case C-540/03 European Parliament v. Council [2006] ECR I-5769; noted Arnull A.M., “Family Reunification 
and Fundamental Rights”, (2006) 31 ELR 611, Martin D., “Case Note”, (2007) 9 EJML 144, Lawson R., “Case 
Note”, (2007) 3 EuConst 324, Drywood E., “Giving with One Hand, Taking with the Other: Fundamental Rights, 
Children and the Family Reunification Decision”, (2007) 32 ELR 396 and Bulterman M., “Case Note”, (2008) 45 
CMLRev 245. See also Commission Communication of the report on the application of Directive 2003/86/EC on 
the right to family reunification, COM(2008) 610/3 final. 
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230EC challenge by the European Parliament. The Parliament suggested244 that the reasoning in 
Recital 12 was not convincing with the Council confusing the concepts “condition for 
integration” and “objective of integration”. As one of the most important means of successfully 
integrating a minor child is through family reunification, it was inconsistent to impose a 
condition for integration before the child joined the sponsor that rendered family reunification 
unachievable and negated the right, and as the concept of integration was undefined by the 
Directive MSs could significantly restrict the right to family reunification. This right was 
protected by Article 8(1)ECHR, could only be derogated from by one of the specific conditions 
in Article 8(2)ECHR, that the final paragraph of Article 4(1) did not fall into, and the final 
paragraph of Article 4(1) did not require any weighing of the respective interests at issue and so 
was not justified or proportionate. They further argued that the Directive was contradictory as it 
did not provide for any limitation founded on a condition for integration so far as concerned the 
sponsor’s spouse, was discriminatory as the condition was based exclusively on a child’s age, 
which was not objectively justified and contrary to Article 14ECHR and the standstill clause was 
not as strict as customary standstill clauses. The Court found that the right to respect for family 
right within the meaning of Article 8ECHR was one of the fundamental rights protected in 
Community law245. After investigating the ECtHR case law the ECJ found that Article 8ECHR 
did not provide an individual right to be allowed to enter the territory of a State as MSs retained 
a margin of appreciation when they examined applications for family reunification246. Article 
4(1) of the Directive goes beyond Article 8ECHR by removing the margin of appreciation, 
defining precise positive obligations on MSs and clearly defined rights for individuals247. The 
final paragraph of Article 4(1) simply partially preserved that margin of appreciation for the 
                                                 
244 Ibid. at paras.40-45. 
245 Ibid. at para.52. 
246 Ibid. at para.59. 
247 Ibid. at para.60. 
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MSs, did not breach the right to respect for family life and the Court rejected the Parliament’s 
arguments248. 
 
Article 4(2) gives the MSs’ discretion to authorise the entry and residence of dependent relatives 
in the ascending line of the applicant or spouse without family support in the country of origin, 
and of children of full age of the applicant or spouse who are incapable of supporting themselves 
through ill-health. MSs also have discretion to authorise the entry and residence of the unmarried 
TCN partner of the applicant where there is an evidentially annotated stable long term 
relationship or registered partnership, along with their unmarried minor children, including those 
adopted, and adult unmarried children who are incapable of supporting themselves through ill-
health. MSs can also decide that registered partners can be treated equally as spouses with 
respect to family reunification (Article 4(3)). Article 4(4) prohibits the entry of a spouse if the 
applicant is in a polygamous marriage and the sponsor already has a spouse resident on the MS’s 
territory. Furthermore, the reunification of minor children can be limited in such a situation. 
Paragraph 5 allows MSs to demand the applicant and/or his/her spouse to be a minimum age, up 
to a maximum age of twenty-one, before reunification. This is to ensure better integration and to 
prevent forced marriages. Finally Article 4(6) allows a MS to require applications for family 
reunification of minor children to be submitted before the age of fifteen, if the MSs legislation 
provides for this at the time of the adoption of the Directive. MSs that decide to apply this 
derogation must authorise the entry and residence of these minor children on grounds other than 
family reunification. This latter provision was also questioned by the Parliament249 using a 
similar argument to that used for Article 4(1) and received a similar reply from the Court250. 
 
                                                 
248 Ibid. at paras.61 & 62. 
249 Ibid. at para.77. 
250 Ibid. at para.90. 
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The MS decides whether an application for family reunification should be submitted by the 
sponsor or the family members (Article 5(1)). Article 5(3) requires that the application be made 
when the family members are resident outside the MS’s territory where the sponsor is resident, 
although MSs may accept an application when the family members are already in its territory, in 
appropriate circumstances. “Appropriate circumstances” are not defined. According to Article 6, 
MSs may reject an application for entry and residence for family members, and can withdraw or 
refuse to renew a family member’s residence permit, on the grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health, considering the severity or type of offence committed, the 
considerations in Article 17251 and the dangers that are emanating from the individual (Article 
6(2)). Article 6(3) specifies that the issuing of a residence permit cannot be delayed, nor the 
individual expelled, on the sole ground of illness or disability suffered after the issue of the 
residence permit. When the application is submitted the MS may require the applicant to prove 
that there is adequate and appropriate housing available for the family, the family members are 
covered by sickness insurance, have adequate resources not to be a burden on the state and might 
have to comply with integration measures (Article 7). Article 8 gives the MSs discretion to 
require the applicant to have stayed lawfully in the MS’s territory for not more than two years 
before family reunification. However, where the MS’s legislation on the date of adoption of the 
Directive takes into account its reception capacity, the MS may provide for a waiting period of 
no more than three years between submission of the application and the issue of a residence 
permit to the family members. The European Parliament also questioned this provision in 
                                                 
251 “Member States shall take due account of the nature and solidity of the person's family relationships and the 
duration of his residence in the Member State and of the existence of family, cultural and social ties with his/her 
country of origin where they reject an application, withdraw or refuse to renew a residence permit or decide to order 
the removal of the sponsor or members of his family.” 
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relation to the right to respect for family life252, and once again the Court gave a similar finding 
to that for Article 4(1)253. 
 
The right to reunification for refugees is treated as a special case in Chapter V. Article 9 provides 
the right to reunification, although MSs may confine this to family relationships before the 
refugee’s entry. Article 10(1) defines family members in accordance with Article 4, except that 
the minor children of the refugee, including adopted children, who are dependent on him, are not 
included within this definition. MSs are authorised, however, to provide family reunification of 
other family members not referred to in Article 4 if they are dependent on the refugee (Article 
10(2)). If the refugee is an unaccompanied minor the MS must authorise the entry and residence 
of the first-degree relatives in the direct ascending line for family reunification, or may authorise 
the entry and residence of the legal guardian or any other family member, where the refugee has 
no relatives in the direct ascending line or they cannot be found (Article 10(3)). Article 11 
requires the documentary evidence outlined in Article 5, although if this is not available to prove 
the family relationship, other evidence, determined by national law, should be taken into 
account. A decision rejecting the application for reunification must not be based solely on the 
fact that documentary evidence was not available. Article 12 enables derogations from Articles 7 
and 8. Evidence as required for Article 7 will not be required for a refugee and/or family 
members, unless there is a third country where reunification is possible and with which the 
sponsor and/or family members have special links, or the application for family reunification is 
not submitted within three months of granting refugee status (Article 12(1)). Also derogating 
from Article 8, MSs must not require a period of residence in their territory before authorising 
family reunification (Article 12(2)). 
                                                 
252 Op. Cit. n.243 at para.91 
253 Ibid. at para.97 & 98. 
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Once the right to family reunification has been granted, the MS must authorise the entry of the 
family members, grant them every facility to obtain the requisite visas and must provide a 
renewable residence permit for at least one year (Article 13). Article 14 provides rights to access 
to education, employment and self-employment, vocational guidance, initial and further training 
and retraining, to the same extent as the sponsor. MSs may set conditions for family members 
when exercising employment or self-employment, which can mean that family members are not 
able to work for a maximum of twelve months. MSs may also restrict access to employment or 
self-employment for first-degree relatives in the direct ascending line or adult unmarried 
children. After five years of residence the spouse, unmarried partner or child can claim the right 
to a residence permit independent of the original applicant, although this can be limited to the 
spouse or unmarried partner in the case of the breakdown of the relationship (Article 15(1)). 
Autonomous residence permits may also be issued to adult children and relatives in the direct 
ascending line but without time limit so long as the conditions in Article 4(2) apply, as they may 
in the event of widowhood, divorce, separation or death of first-degree relatives in the direct 
ascending or descending line (Article 15(2) & (3)). Where there are particularly difficult 
circumstances the issue of the autonomous residence permit becomes obligatory (Article 15(4)). 
 
The right to family reunification is a particularly important right to TCNs separated from their 
home, culture and society. Although it does not include a right to freedom of movement, it is an 
essential corollary to that right. As such the Family Reunification Directive is notable for its far-
reaching effect254, extending the right to respect for family life further than that outlined in 
                                                 
254 See Groenendijk K., “Family Reunification as a Right under Community Law”, (2006) 8 EJML 215 for a 
particularly eulogising account of the Directive. 
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Article 8ECHR255, and it must be commended. However, a notable omission in the scope of the 
Directive is for individuals benefiting from subsidiary and temporary protection (Article 2(b) & 
(c))256 that is submitted should be rectified at the earliest opportunity. 
 
 b. Illegal Immigration 
It would appear to be a trite statement that the corollary to legal immigration is illegal 
immigration. However, the concept of illegal immigration is the key area where the concepts of 
asylum/refugee and immigrant become conjoined as it applies to immigrants within the 
Community and also those applicants who have been refused refugee or subsidiary protection 
status, as well as what has become known as “bogus” or “failed” asylum-seekers. There has been 
considerable policy activity in the area of illegal immigration starting with the Commission 
Communication257 on a common policy, a Comprehensive Plan258 to combat illegal immigration 
and trafficking of human beings, a Commission Communication259 on a Community return 
policy following a Green Paper260, a return action programme261, and another Commission 
Communication262 on the development of a common policy. In 2006 the Commission published 
another Communication263 outlining its policy priorities in the area of illegal immigration of 
TCNs. These are: co-operation with third countries; secure external borders; human trafficking; 
secure travel and identity documents; illegal employment; return policy; exchange of 
                                                 
255 Ibid. See Op. Cit. n.12 Lambert for a comprehensive account of the ECtHR case law on Article 8ECHR. 
256 Op. Cit. n.168 at 503. 
257 Commission Communication on a common policy on illegal immigration, COM(2001) 672 final. 
258 Commission proposal for a comprehensive plan to combat illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings in 
the European Union, O.J. 2002 C142/23. 
259 Commission Communication on a Community return policy on illegal residents, COM(2002) 564 final. 
260 Commission Green Paper on a Community return policy on illegal residents, COM(2002) 175 final. 
261 Proposal for a return action programme, Council Document 14673/02. This was approved by the JHA Council on 
28 November 2002. 
262 Commission Communication on the development of a common policy on illegal immigration, smuggling and 
trafficking of human beings, external borders and the return of illegal residents, COM(2003) 323 final. 
263 Commission Communication on policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of third-country 
nationals, COM(2006) 402 final. 
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information; and, carriers’ liability. Much of the debate about policy, and policy development 
involves criminal activity involving illegal immigration, which as Goodwin-Gill observes sees 
asylum-seekers suffering the “imputation of double criminality”264 as they enter the EU illegally 
and invariably consort with criminals to do so. These criminal aspects fall outside the scope of 
this thesis and therefore will not be considered. Furthermore, as the very nature of illegal 
immigration cannot involve the right to freedom of movement, only the policy involving 
movement or the repatriation265 of TCNs will be analysed, which in particular deals with the 
expulsion of TCNs, the return of TCNs to third countries and partnerships between the EU and 
third countries.  
 
Directive 2001/40/EC266 enables the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of TCNs 
in two cases outlined in Article 3. The first is where it is based ‘on a serious and present threat to 
public order or to national security and safety’ if convicted of an offence punishable by at least a 
year in jail or the existence of serious evidence pointing to the commitment or intention to 
commit serious criminal offences. The second is based on the ‘failure to comply with national 
rules on the entry or residence of aliens’. The Directive does not apply to ‘family members of 
citizens of the Union who have exercised their right of free movement’ (Article 1(3)). 
 
Many of the situations involving returns to MSs and third countries are dealt with by the Dublin 
Regulation, the Qualifications Directive and Procedures Directive. However, the Commission 
                                                 
264 Goodwin-Gill G.S., “The International Protection of Refugees: What Future?” (2000) 12 IJRL 1 at 4. 
265 See Hathaway J.C., “The Meaning of Repatriation”, (1997) 9 IJRL 551. 
266 Council Directive 2001/40/EC on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals, 
O.J. 2001 L149/34. See also Council Decision 2004/191/EC setting out the criteria and practical arrangements for 
the compensation of the financial imbalances resulting from the application of Dir. 2001/40, O.J. 2004 L60/55. 
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brought forward a proposal267 with the objective of harmonising MSs’ standards and procedures 
for the return of TCNs staying illegally. The initial proposal saw the return being actioned 
through a two stage process with a return decision served on the TCN by the MS (Article 6) 
followed by the issue of a return order, that could be issued together with the return decision 
(Article 7), and which could also include a re-entry ban of a maximum of five years (Article 9). 
The return decision would have to provide for an appropriate period for voluntary departure268 of 
up to four weeks, unless there was evidence of the possibility of the TCN absconding (Article 
6(2)). To avoid the risk of absconding, certain obligations could be imposed upon the TCN, such 
as regular reporting to the authorities, depositing a financial guarantee, submitting certain 
documents or being required to stay at a certain place. When the removal order was to be 
executed and it necessitated the involvement of coercive measures, these would have to be 
proportionate, not exceed reasonable force, be implemented in accordance with fundamental 
rights and with due respect for the dignity of the TCN concerned (Article 10). A TCN could be 
kept in temporary custody for a maximum of six months where there was a risk of the TCN 
absconding or where less severe measures were considered to be ineffective (Article 14). This 
temporary custody order would be issued by judicial authorities and reviewed at least once a 
month. The TCN would have the right to an effective judicial remedy against return decisions or 
removal orders enabling it to be suspended (Article 12). MSs were obligated to take due account 
of the nature and solidity of the TCN’s family relationships, the duration of stay in the MS, the 
best interests of the child, and the existence of family, cultural and social ties with the country of 
origin (Article 5). 
                                                 
267 Commission proposal for a Directive on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals, COM(2005) 391 final. See Canetta E., “The EU Policy on Return of 
Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals”, (2007) 9 EJML 435. 
268 See van Selm J., “Return Seen from a European Perspective: An Impossible Dream, and Improbable Reality, or 
an Obstruction to Refugee Policy?” (2005) 28 Fordham International Law Journal 1504 who argues that most 
individuals claiming international protection would voluntarily return to their country of origin if it was safe to do so 
and safety could be guaranteed. 
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This draft proposal was considered to be deeply flawed by the House of Lords EU Select 
Committee as it failed to enable “persons to be returned to their country of origin safely and 
humanely, with respect for their human rights and dignity”269. In particular the House of Lords 
called for clearer drafting of the term “illegal stay”270, removal of the upper fixed time limit for 
voluntary returns (Article 6(2))271, application of strict limits on the use of detention272, extension 
and more precise drafting of Article 15 on the conditions of temporary custody to include all 
situations dealing with custody and the needs of vulnerable people273, greater safeguards for the 
treatment of children274, clarification of the legal status of an illegally staying TCN whose 
removal was impossible275, and a limitation on re-entry bans so they applied only to persons 
convicted of a serious criminal offence276. The European Parliamentary Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs produced a report in 2006277 that also suggested the “beefing 
up” of the proposed Directive with increased human rights checks and the establishment of a 
European Parliament Ombudsman for Return in order to ensure the efficient return of illegal 
immigrants with full respect for human rights. However, the Council had difficulties in internal 
negotiations, with the Finnish Presidency issuing a compromise proposal in October 2006278 that 
would have weakened certain aspects of the initial proposal but would have retained the majority 
of the harmonisation and checks and balances. These difficulties culminated in the German 
                                                 
269 House of Lords EU Select Committee 32nd Report of Session 2005-06, Illegal Immigrants: Proposals for a 
Common EU Returns Policy, HMSO, 2006 at 48. 
270 Ibid. at 15. 
271 Ibid. at 22. 
272 Ibid. at 27. 
273 Ibid. at 29-30. 
274 Ibid. at 31-33. 
275 Ibid. at 34. 
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Presidency suggesting a radical alternative279 designed to significantly weaken the proposal with 
the removal of much of the substantive content from Community competence to be retained in 
the hands of the MSs, and the erasure of many of the safeguards to ensure the safety and dignity 
of the TCN concerned. This Returns Directive had to be adopted by the codecision procedure 
and for a considerable period it was difficult to see a compromise position being attained. 
However, at the end of 2007 and in the first half of 2008 considerable effort was made by 
Council, Parliament and Commission to find a solution, with the text finally published in the 
Official Journal in December 2008280. Article 2(1) provides that the scope of the Directive is to 
apply to TCNs illegally staying in the territory of the MSs but paragraph 2 provides considerable 
discretion for MSs to apply broad exclusions to this personnel scope. These include TCNs who 
have been refused entry in accordance with the SBC Article 13 and TCNs who have illegally 
crossed the external border of a MS and not then regularised their stay (Article 2(2)(a)) although 
in accordance with Article 4(4) MSs must ensure certain levels of treatment and protection and 
must respect the principle of non-refoulement. TCNs who are subject to a criminal law sanction 
and TCNs who are subject to extradition procedures (Article 2(2)(b)) can also be excluded from 
the scope of the Directive but they do not enjoy the protection guaranteed in Article 4(4). 
Furthermore, the Returns Directive does not apply to TCNs who enjoy the Community right to 
free movement as defined in the SBC Article 2(5). Definitions are included in Article 3 with 
“TCN” and “illegal stay” logically defined by reference to Article 17EC and Article 2(5) of the 
SBC and the SBC Article 5 respectively. The concept of “return”, that had caused some concern, 
has now been ameliorated. It is now defined such that a TCN can go back, either voluntary or 
enforced, to the TCN’s country of origin or a transit country under Community or bilateral 
                                                 
279 Council Document 6624/07. For commentary see Peers S., “Revising the Proposed EU Expulsion Directive”, 
Statewatch Analysis, http://www.antigone.gr/listpage/community_documents/policy_documents/070419_02.pdf site 
accessed 23 September 2007. 
280 European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member 
States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, O.J. 2008 L348/98. 
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readmission agreements or other arrangements but going back to another third country can only 
happen if the TCN concerned so decides and that third country also agrees to take the TCN. 
Article 4 enables MSs to retain more favourable provisions than those of the Directive if 
Community or individual country bilateral or multilateral agreements with third countries, or the 
Community acquis on immigration and asylum, so specify, or if a MS chooses to do so. When 
implementing the Directive the MSs must take due account of three factors: the best interest of 
the child281; family life282; and, the state of health of the TCN and respect the principle of non-
refoulement283. The Directive dispenses with the original proposal’s two stage returns process. 
Instead Article 6 provides for a return decision to be issued by a MS that can then be enforced in 
accordance with Article 8 unless the TCN voluntary departs the territory of the MS (Article 7). 
The period specified for voluntary departure ranges from seven to thirty days (Article 7(1)), with 
the possibility of the TCN leaving sooner, although this period can be extended depending on 
individual circumstances (Article 7(2))284. If coercive measures are used, as a last resort, for the 
removal of a TCN who resists removal then they must be proportionate, not exceed reasonable 
force, be in accordance with fundamental rights and must respect the dignity and physical 
integrity of the TCN concerned (Article 8(4))285. Article 9 provides for the postponement of the 
removal of the TCN for inter alia humanitarian grounds and to protect the principle of non-
refoulement. The return decision must be accompanied by an entry ban of up to five years if no 
period for voluntary departure has been granted or if the obligation to return has not been 
                                                 
281 Article 5 does not mention the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 but Recital 22 does 
refer to it when considering the best interests of the child that is described as a primary consideration of MSs when 
implementing the Directive. 
282 It is only in Recital 22 that the right to respect for family life, in line with the ECHR, is mentioned as a primary 
consideration of the MSs when implementing the Directive. 
283 Recital 23: “Application of this Directive is without prejudice to the obligations resulting from the Geneva 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 
1967.” 
284 Such as the length of stay, children attending school and other family and social links. 
285 The provisions of the Directive do not refer to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, “Twenty 
Guidelines on Forced Return”, CM(2005)40, although it is mentioned in Recital 3. 
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complied with, and in all other situations a return decision may be accompanied by a five year 
entry ban (Article 11(1)). This entry ban can be extended if the TCN represents a serious threat 
to public policy, public security or to national security (Article 11(2)). Finally, when preparing to 
return or carry out the removal process, and in particular if there is a risk of the TCN absconding 
or if the TCN avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process, then the MS 
can keep the TCN in detention for up to six months, with the possibility of extending this to 
eighteen months (Article 15). 
 
Cooperation with third countries is essential for the effective and efficient operation of a returns 
programme, of which the most important is the negotiation of special bilateral agreements with 
third countries to enable mutual return of illegal immigrants. Bouteillet-Paquet286 traces three 
generations of these agreements: the first generation in the 1960s between MSs to control the 
irregular movement of persons; the second generation in the 1990s with the CEECs; and, now 
the third generation. The Council empowered the Commission to negotiate these third generation 
bilateral readmission agreements287, which it has done with Albania288, Macao289, Sri Lanka290, 
Hong Kong291, Russia292 and the Ukraine293. Negotiations with Pakistan, Morocco294, and Turkey 
                                                 
286 Bouteillet-Paquet D., “Passing the Buck: A Critical Analysis of the Readmission Policy Implemented by the 
European Union and Its Member States”, (2003) 5 EJML 359 at 359. 
287 For critical analysis of readmission agreements in general see Abell N.A., “The Compatibility of Readmission 
Agreements with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees”, (1999) 11 IJRL 60. 
288 Council Decision 2005/809/EC concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community 
and the Republic of Albania on the readmission of persons residing without authorization, O.J. 2005 L304/14. See 
Kruse I., “EU Readmission Policy and its Effects on Transit Countries – The Case of Albania”, (2006) 8 EJML 115. 
289 Council Decision 2004/424/EC concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community 
and the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China on the readmission of persons 
residing without authorisation, O.J. 2004 L143/97. 
290 Council Decision 2005/372/EC concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community 
and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation, 
O.J. 2005 L124/41. 
291 Council Decision 2004/80/EC concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community 
and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China on the 
readmission of persons residing without authorisation, O.J. 2004 L17/23. 
292 Council Decision 2007/341/EC on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and the 
Russian Federation on readmission, O.J. 2007 L129/38. 
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have commenced and are ongoing although Algeria and China have yet to respond positively 
from a request by the Commission to negotiate. The stumbling block on the negotiations of these 
agreements has been the inclusion of a clause not just for the readmission of nationals of the 
third country but also for the readmission of TCNs who have stayed in, or merely transited 
through, the territory of the third country295. These agreements therefore treat third countries not 
just as a safe country of origin but also a safe country of transit296. In July 2006 the Council 
empowered the Commission to negotiate further agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia and in September 2007 the agreements were signed297.  
 
The policy on movement as it applies to illegal immigrants remains predominantly the domain of 
the MSs. The problems with the Returns Directive highlight the difficulties on reaching 
agreement on legislative measures in this area that go to the heart of a nation’s sovereignty and 
for political reasons make it hard to give substantive rights to individuals. The readmission 
agreements are part of the strategy to secure the external frontiers of the EU but as Bouteillet-
Paquet observes298 the second generation agreements did not see great numbers of readmissions, 
did not dissuade human traffickers or organised criminals, and had a detrimental effect on bona 
fide refugees. There is no reason to believe that the third generation agreements are going to be 
different particularly as they do not address the root causes of the reasons for migrant flow of 
poverty, inequality, warfare and human rights violations299 and arguably work solely in the EU’s 
interest. The difficult area of negotiations with Pakistan, Morocco and Turkey remain the 
                                                                                                                                                             
293 Council Document 9312/07. 
294 See Arbi Mrabet E., “Readmission Agreements: The Case of Morocco”, (2003) 5 EJML 379. 
295 See for example Article 3 of the EU-Albania readmission agreement. 
296 Roig A., Huddleston T., “EC Readmission Agreements: A Re-evaluation of the Political Impasse”, (2007) 9 
EJML 363 at 366. 
297 See Council Document 12196/07 (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Council Document 12197/07 (Montenegro), 
Council Document 12199/07 (Macedonia), and Council Document 12202/07 (Serbia). 
298 Op. Cit. n.286 at 365. 
299 Peers S., “Readmission Agreements and EC External Migration Law”, Statewatch Analysis No.17, May 2003, 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/may/readmission.pdf site accessed 23 September 2007. 
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readmission of TCNs who can often have little connection with the country they are returning to. 
The consequences of the readmission agreements therefore are a considerable risk of chain 
refoulement and refugees in orbit but, as recognised in Recital 23 of the Returns Directive the 
MSs’ international human rights obligations must be observed300, in particular the principle of 
non-refoulement in Article 33(1) of the Geneva Convention, that applies to all returnees whether 
enjoying refugee status or not, and Article 3ECHR. In the light of the protection of human rights 
in some countries that the EU has negotiated readmission agreements with and those it is 
negotiating or wishes to negotiate with301, and the instability and novelty of democracy in others, 
then there is a significant risk of the return of persons through the use of readmission agreements 
contravening the principle of non-refoulement. Furthermore the considerable weakening during 
negotiations of the already minimal standards in the Returns Directive is likely to exacerbate this 
situation. 
 
5. FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS 
 
Article 2(1)SIC provided that ‘[i]nternal borders may be crossed at any point without any checks 
on persons being carried out’. This applied to both nationals of Member States, including non-
Schengen States, and TCNs. Regulation 562/2006/EC302, replacing Article 2SIC, ‘provides for 
the absence of border control of persons crossing…internal borders’ and ‘establishes rules 
governing border control of persons crossing…external borders’ (Article 1). Article 3 states that 
                                                 
300 Phuong C. “Minimum Standards for Return Procedures and International Human Rights Law”, (2007) 9 EJML 
105, Legomsky S.H., “Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The 
Meaning of Effective Protection”, (2003) 15 IJRL 567 at 612 and Bradley M., “Back to Basics: The Conditions of 
Just Refugee Returns”, (2008) 21 JRS 285. 
301 See Amnesty International, The State of the World’s Human Rights Report 2007, Amnesty International, 2007 
and Hamood S., “EU-Libya Cooperation on Migration: A Raw Deal for Refugees and Migrants?” (2008) 21 JRS 19. 
302 European Parliament and Council Regulation 562/2006/EC establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), O.J., 2006 L105/1 (henceforth SBC). 
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the SBC applies to anyone crossing the internal or external borders of MSs without prejudice to 
‘(a) the rights of persons enjoying the Community right of free movement303; (b) the rights of 
refugees and persons requesting international protection, in particular as regards non-
refoulement.’ Title II provides detailed conditions and procedures for the crossing of the external 
borders of the EU. Article 5 sets out the entry conditions for TCNs. For stays not exceeding three 
months in a six month period the criteria are: (a) possession of valid travel documents 
authorising them to cross the border; (b) possession of a valid visa, if required by Reg. 539/2001, 
except where they hold a valid residence permit304; (c) they justify the purpose and conditions of 
the intended stay305, and have sufficient means of subsistence306; (d) they are not on the list of 
persons refused entry in the Schengen Information System (henceforth SIS); and (e) they are not 
considered to be a threat to public policy, internal security, public health or the international 
relations of any of the MSs, in particular where no alert has been issued in MSs domestic data 
bases refusing entry on these grounds. Article 5(4) allows three derogations from the strict 
conditions laid down in Article 5(1). First if TCNs hold a residence permit and/or a re-entry visa 
issued by a MS they can transit other MSs’ territories to reach the territory of the MS that issued 
the document. Second if TCNs only fail to fulfil the condition in Article 5(1)(b) but present 
themselves at the border then they can be issued with a border visa in accordance with Reg. 
415/2003. Third TCNs may be authorised by a MS to enter its territory, but only its territory, on 
                                                 
303 Defined in Article 2(5) as (a) “Union citizens within the meaning of Article 17(1) of the Treaty, and third-country 
nationals who are members of the family of a Union citizen exercising his or her right to free movement to whom 
Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States applies; (b) 
third-country nationals and their family members, whatever their nationality, who, under agreements between the 
Community and its Member States, on the one hand, and those third countries, on the other hand, enjoy rights of free 
movement equivalent to those of Union citizens”. 
304 See Article 2(15) for the definition of residence permit and Commission Information, List of residence permits 
referred to in Article 2(15) of the SBC, O.J. 2006 C247/1. 
305 Article 5(2) specifies that Annex 1 sets out a non-exhaustive list of documents that can provide justification for 
the stay. 
306 Article 5(3) specifies the method of calculation for the means of subsistence that each MS must notify to the 
Commission in accordance with Article 34. See Reference amounts for the crossing of the external borders, as 
referred to in Article 5(3) of the SBC, O.J. 2006 C247/19. 
207 
 
humanitarian grounds, on grounds of national interest or because of international obligations, but 
if they are subject to a SIS national alert then the MS must inform other MSs of the decision. As 
a derogation from Reg. 562/2006, Regulation 1931/2006/EC307 creates a local border traffic 
regime at the external land borders of the MSs in order to facilitate the continued movement of 
local populations in border areas but does not establish any free movement rights. 
 
Title III of Reg. 562/2006 deals with internal borders with Chapter I outlining the rules for the 
abolition of internal border controls across the EU. Article 20 states that ‘[i]nternal borders may 
be crossed at any point without a border check on persons, irrespective of their nationality, being 
carried out’ although this does not affect the exercise of police powers by the competent 
authorities of the MSs under national law (Article 21). MSs are also required to remove all road 
traffic obstacles to fluid traffic flow at internal border crossing points, although arrangements 
must be in place to reinstate facilities for checks in the event of reintroducing internal border 
controls (Article 22). Chapter II concerns the temporary reintroduction of internal border 
controls308 with the basic rule, set out in Article 23(1), that a MS may exceptionally reintroduce 
internal border controls where there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security for a 
limited period of no more than thirty days or for the foreseeable duration of the serious threat if 
greater than thirty days309, although the scope and duration must not exceed what is strictly 
necessary to respond to the serious threat. Where the threat demands urgent action then 
according to Article 25 controls may be reintroduced immediately. If the threat persists then the 
reintroduction of controls can be prolonged for renewal periods of up to thirty days, taking into 
                                                 
307 European Parliament and Council Regulation 1931/2006/EC laying down rules on local border traffic at the 
external land borders of the Member States and amending the provisions of the Schengen Convention, O.J. 2006 
L405/1. 
308 See Groenendijk K., “Reinstatement of Controls at the Internal Borders of Europe: Why and Against Whom?” 
(2004) 10 ELJ 150 for an analysis of the position before the introduction of Reg. 562/2006.  
309 Article 24 provides the procedure for the reintroduction of internal border controls. 
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account any new elements (Article 23(2))310. Checks on the MS’s actions have been introduced 
with the MS required to notify the Commission and other MSs as soon as possible under Article 
24(1), the Commission entitled to issue an opinion (Article 24(2)) and consultations to take place 
between the MS planning to reintroduce controls and other MSs and the Commission to organise 
mutual co-operation or examine the proportionality of the measures (Article 24(3)). Furthermore 
the European Parliament is to be kept informed and after three consecutive prolongations of 
controls, the MS must report to the European Parliament on the need for controls, if requested 
(Article 27). The MS reintroducing internal border controls must confirm the date of their lifting 
and at the same time, or soon afterwards, report to the European Parliament, Council and 
Commission outlining, in particular, the operation and effectiveness of the checks (Article 29). 
 
At first blush Reg. 562/2006 provides a general free movement right across the internal borders 
of the EU for all persons, whether they are citizens of the Union or TCNs that appears to 
potentially open up freedom of movement to all and significantly enhance the rights of TCNs. 
However, there is no mention of this right of free movement in the Regulation and on more 
careful examination the actual right is more nuanced, only providing that persons, regardless of 
nationality, may cross the internal borders at any point without border checks being carried out. 
The implication therefore is that free movement rights are provided in other legislative 
instruments (such as Article 18EC and Article 39EC) and restrictions on that freedom of 
movement are also contained in other legislation. As soon as the meaning of the Regulation is 
appreciated then its effect for TCNs diminishes significantly because the restrictions in the other 
legislation analysed above will be retained.  
 
                                                 
310 Article 26 provides the procedure for prolonging internal border controls. 
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6. THE JURISDICTION OF THE ECJ IN TITLE IV 
 
It is obvious from the preceding analysis that Title IV of the EC Treaty has seen an explosion in 
the adoption of legislative measures. Furthermore, the AFSJ is a new area of competence for the 
Community with many new terms, rights and obligations that will require interpretation by the 
Community and national institutions including courts and tribunals. In order to ensure the 
uniform interpretation of these provisions and to clarify the law, it is essential that courts or 
tribunals of MSs should be able to make a preliminary reference to the ECJ at the earliest 
opportunity311. This becomes even more essential when it is considered that the legal measures 
involved affect some of the most vulnerable individuals in society.  
 
Article 68EC first extends the jurisdiction of the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling under Article 
234 to Title IV but then goes on to severely limit the ECJ’s oversight in this area312. Article 
68(1)EC provides that national courts of last resort must seek a ruling on the interpretation of 
Title IV, or on the validity or interpretation of measures based on Title IV, if it considers that a 
decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment. However, lower courts are 
excluded from seeking such a ruling. Advocate General Fennelly313, writing extra-judicially on 
the subject, highlights the problems that may be encountered in some cases. Lower courts will 
retain the right to request a preliminary ruling on all aspects of the EC Treaty except Title IV. 
Thus a national court can refer a question on Article 14EC or legislative measures adopted under 
Article 14(3)EC concerning the free movement of persons but would not be able to make a 
                                                 
311 For a detailed analysis of the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the AFSJ see Hatzopoulos V., “With or Without 
You…Judging Politically in the Field of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, (2008) 33 ELR 44. 
312 See Arnull A., “Taming the Beast? The Treaty of Amsterdam and the Court of Justice”, in Op. Cit. n.27, 109 at 
115. 
313 Fennelly N., “The Area of “Freedom, Security and Justice” and the European Court of Justice – A Personal 
View”, (2000) 49 ICLQ 1 at 5. 
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reference questioning Article 61(a)EC or legislative measures adopted pursuant to that provision 
that also covers free movement of persons. The position is complicated further by the Protocols 
attached to the Treaties where the UK, Ireland and Denmark have various opt-outs, opt-ins and 
the ability to opt-in in an area where they have an opt-out. The outcome is that the free 
movement of persons could be interpreted in different ways by courts in the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark, or other MSs’ courts, or by the ECJ.  
 
Article 68(2)EC goes on to limit the ECJ’s jurisdiction further. It excludes the ECJ from having 
any jurisdiction to rule on any measure or decision taken pursuant to Article 62(1)EC relating to 
the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security. This is a curious 
provision as Article 62(1)EC does not mention law and order or internal security, merely the 
abolition of internal borders in accordance with Article 14EC for EU citizens and TCNs. 
Advocate General Fennelly314 suggests that at first blush it could be considered that there was an 
error in transcription315 and that the reference to Article 62(1)EC should refer to Article 64(1)EC. 
This would be logical as Article 64(1)EC refers directly to law and order and internal security. 
However, excluding ECJ jurisdiction from an area of competence already reserved exclusively to 
the MSs does not make sense and the English and French versions of the original Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the consolidated EC Treaty and the version printed in the Official Journal maintain 
the identical provision. Furthermore, the Treaty of Nice did not correct the “error” if it was an 
error. Advocate General Fennelly concludes that at the very least the “drafting lacks clarity”316. 
 
                                                 
314 Ibid. 
315 As suggested by Guild E., Peers S., “Deference or Defiance? The Court of Justice’s Jurisdiction over 
Immigration and Asylum” in Op. Cit. n.1, 273 at 279. 
316 Ibid. at 6. 
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Article 68(3)EC also allows the Council, Commission or a MS to request the ECJ to provide an 
interpretative ruling on Title IV or implementing measures of Title IV.  
 
The European Parliament was consulted during the process of adoption of Decision 
2004/927/EC317, which extended the co-decision making procedure in Title IV, and proposed the 
removal of limitations under Article 68EC by the abolition of Article 68(1) and (2)318, which the 
Council ignored. The matter was raised again by the Commission in a Communication in 
2006319. In a closely reasoned explanatory section the Commission made out a case for 
abolishing Article 68 which was then proposed in a draft Decision. This has been discussed at 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting on 24 July 2006320 and gained the approval of the 
European Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs321 but it has not advanced any further yet. 
This is to be regretted as limitations on the jurisdiction of the ECJ impinge significantly on the 
efficacy of EU law, its uniformity and the ability of individuals to realise their rights322. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty will remove the limitations on the ECJ’s jurisdiction to interpret measures in 
this area of the new Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The move is a significant 
advancement for the efficiency and uniformity of the law and for individuals, in particular TCNs, 
to be able to clarify their rights and position within the Union. 
 
                                                 
317 Council Decision 2004/927/EC providing for certain areas covered by Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community to be governed by the procedure laid down in Article 251 of that Treaty, O.J. 
2004 L396/45 Article 1. 
318 European Parliament Document P6_TA(2004)0105. 
319 Commission Communication on adaptation of the provisions of Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community relating to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice with a view to ensuring more effective judicial 
protection, COM(2006) 346 final. 
320 Council Document 11556/06. 
321 European Parliament Document A6-0082/2007. 
322 For an alternative viewpoint see Komarek J., “In the Court(s) We Trust? On the Need for Hierarchy and 
Differentiation in the Preliminary Ruling Procedure”, (2007) 32 ELR 467. 
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7. THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT 
 
The remnants of the old Title VI TEU that did not concern the free movement of persons 
remained in the new Title VI after the Treaty of Amsterdam, renamed Provisions on Police and 
Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters. These provisions were considered to be in 
juxtaposition with the ‘directly related flanking measures’ of Article 61(a)EC and, although they 
did not provide additional direct rights for citizens of the Union or TCNs, they did impinge 
directly on an individual’s freedoms. As such the jurisdiction of the ECJ over Title VI TEU, as 
outlined in Article 35TEU, was even more constrained than under Article 68EC. Article 35(1) 
empowered the ECJ to give preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of legislative 
measures adopted under Title VI TEU although for the Court to have this jurisdiction Article 
35(2)TEU required MSs to make a declaration to that effect and to state whether the ability to 
refer was limited to the highest national court323 or was extended to any court or tribunal324. Any 
MS though, whether they have made a declaration of not, could submit statements of case or 
written observations to the Court (Article 35(4)) and MSs or the Commission could ask the ECJ 
to review legislation on the same grounds and within the same time limit as Article 230EC. 
 
The first case to be heard in the ECJ on the interpretation of a Title VI Framework Decision325, 
was the case of Pupino326, described as “remarkable” by Peers327. The Framework Decision 
                                                 
323 Council Information concerning the declarations the declarations by the French Republic and the Republic of 
Hungary on their acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on the acts 
referred to in Article 35 of the Treaty on European Union, O.J. 2005 C318/1 and L327/19. Declarations have made 
to this effect by Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Holland, Austria, 
Portugal, Finland and Sweden. 
324 Ibid. Declarations have been made to this effect by Spain and Hungary. 
325 Article 34(2)(b) provides that a Framework Directive “shall be binding upon the Member States as to the result to 
be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. They shall not entail direct 
effect.” 
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involved was the Victims Decision328, the details of which are outside the scope of this thesis. 
Mrs Pupino was an Italian nursery school teacher charged under Italian criminal law with the 
“misuse of disciplinary measures” against some of her pupils who were aged less than five years 
old. These amounted to striking them regularly, threatening to give them tranquilisers and 
sticking plaster over their mouths, preventing them from going to the toilet and inflicting serious 
injuries by hitting a pupil and causing swelling to the forehead. The Public Prosecutor asked the 
judge, during pre-trial procedures, to take pre-trial evidence from the children using a “special 
inquiry procedure”. The aim of this procedure was to protect the dignity, modesty and character 
of the minor witnesses and to secure the authenticity of their evidence. However, Italian law only 
allowed this special procedure for certain closed categories of case, all of them involving sexual 
offences or offences with a sexual background. Mrs Pupino successfully argued that her case did 
not fall into these categories and the judge referred the case to the ECJ questioning the 
compatibility of the Italian closed category of cases and the Victims Decision, especially as the 
national court must “interpret its national law in the light of the letter and the spirit of 
Community provisions”329. The Court first noted that the wording of Article 34(2)(b)TEU is very 
closely inspired by Article 249(3)EC, concerning Directives, and this identical binding character 
of Framework Decisions and Directives creates an obligation to interpret national law in 
conformity330. This principle of indirect effect331 is not invalidated by the jurisdiction of the ECJ 
being less extensive under Title VI than under the EC Treaty by virtue of Article 35TEU or by 
                                                                                                                                                             
326 Case C-105/03 Criminal Proceedings against Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285; noted Fletcher M., “Extending 
“Indirect Effect” to the Third pillar: The Significance of Pupino”, (2005) 30 ELR 862 and Spaventa E., “Opening 
Pandora’s Box: Some Reflections on the Constitutional Effects of the Decision in Pupino”, (2007) 3 EuConst 5. 
327 Peers S., “Salvation Outside the Church: Judicial Protection in the Third Pillar after the Pupino and Segi 
Judgments”, (2007) 44 CMLRev 883 at 909. 
328 Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings, O.J. 2001 
L82/1. 
329 Op. Cit. n.326 at para.18. 
330 Ibid. at paras.33 & 34. 
331 For the same principle utilised in judgments of the ECJ in the First Pillar see Case 14/83 von Colson [1984] ECR 
1891, Case 106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR 4135 and Joined Cases C-397-403/01 Pfeiffer [2004] ECR I-8835. See 
Preschal S., Directives in EC Law, 2nd Ed., OUP, 2005, Ch.8 on the principle of indirect effect. 
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the fact that there is no complete system of action and procedures to ensure the legality of the 
acts of the institutions in the context of Title VI332. The Court found that it was perfectly 
comprehensible that the authors of the TEU should have considered it useful to provide legal 
instruments in Title VI with similar effects to those in the EC Treaty to contribute effectively to 
the pursuit of the Union’s objectives, notwithstanding the degree of integration envisaged by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe within the meaning of Article 1TEU333. The Court confirmed its importance to give 
preliminary rulings under Article 35TEU because of the MS’s ability to refer statements or 
written observations to the ECJ under Article 35(4)TEU even if they had not made a declaration 
as to jurisdiction under Article 35(2) and this jurisdiction would be deprived of most of its useful 
effect if an individual could not obtain a conforming interpretation of national law with 
Framework Decisions before the national courts334. The Court observed that the principle of 
loyal co-operation in Article 10EC applied just as equally to Title VI, which is entirely based on 
co-operation between the MSs and the institutions, as it did to the EC Treaty, as it was required 
for the Union to carry out its task efficiently335. The Court concluded “that the principle of 
conforming interpretation is binding in relation to Framework Decisions adopted in the context 
of Title VI of the [TEU]. When applying national law, the national court that is called upon to 
interpret it must do so as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the 
Framework Decision in order to attain the result which it pursues and thus comply with Article 
34(2)(b)TEU”336. The Court went on to note the limitations to the principle of indirect effect 
                                                 
332 Op. Cit. n.326 at para.35. 
333 Ibid. at para.36. 
334 Ibid. at paras.37 & 38. 
335 Ibid. at para.42. 
336 Ibid. at para.43. 
215 
 
already provided in Community case law. The judgment in Pupino has recently been confirmed 
in the case Dell’Orto337. 
 
Most of the provisions adopted under Title VI TEU do not affect free movement of persons 
directly, except for the EAW Framework Decision338. This legislative measure was adopted to 
enable suspected offenders to be extradited or surrendered between MSs and therefore limits an 
individual’s freedom of movement by imposing movement on that person between MSs. The 
EAW is defined in Article 1(1) as ‘a judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view to 
the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes of 
conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order’. It is to 
be executed on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition339, a high level of confidence 
between MSs (Recital 10) and in accordance with the EAW Framework Decision. Article 2(1) 
provides that the EAW may be issued for acts punishable by the law of the issuing MS by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 12 months or, where a 
sentence has been passed or a detention order has been made, for sentences of at least four 
months. If, however, the offences listed in Article 2(2) are punishable in the issuing MS by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years and as they 
are defined by the law of the issuing MS, then there is a mandatory requirement to surrender the 
suspected criminal under the terms of the EAW Framework Decision and without verifying the 
double criminality of the act. The list of offences in Article 2(2) is exhaustive but extensive, 
                                                 
337 Case C-467/05 Criminal Proceedings against Dell’Orto [2007] ECR I-5557. See also Case C-296/08PPU 
Santesteban Goicoechea [2008] 3 CMLR 40. 
338 See Council Document 5598/08 involving an initiative by MSs to extend the scope of the EAW Framework 
Decision to criminal judgments given in absentia. 
339 On mutual recognition see in particular Peers S., “Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the European Union: 
Has the Council got it Wrong?” (2004) 41 CMLRev 5, Mitsilegas V., “The Constitutional Implications of Mutual 
Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU”, (2006) 43 CMLRev 1277, and Bantekas I., “The Principle of Mutual 
Recognition in EU Criminal Law”, (2007) 32 ELR 365. 
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although if the offence is not covered, then surrender of the suspect may still occur if the act 
constitutes an offence under the law of the executing MS, whatever the constituent elements or 
however it is described (Article 2(4)). Grounds for non-execution of the EAW are outlined in 
Articles 3 and 4, with Article 3 providing the mandatory grounds and Article 4 at the MSs’ 
discretion. The mandatory grounds are: where there is an amnesty for the offence in the 
executing MS; a limited form of the ne bis in idem principle, where the requested person has 
been sentenced340; or, where the subject of the EAW is below the age of criminal responsibility 
under the law of the executing State. The Article 4 grounds can be included in domestic law 
when transposing the EAW Framework Decision at the MS’s discretion and are: double 
criminality outside the Article 2(2) offences; ongoing proceedings for the same offences in the 
executing State; the full ne bis in idem principle; the offence is committed in whole or in part in 
the executing MS’s territory; and, the offence is committed outside the issuing MS’s territory 
and the executing MS’s law does not allow prosecution for that offence when committed outside 
its territory341. Article 5 provides a discretionary list of guarantees that the issuing MS may 
provide. Chapter 2 details the surrender procedures and contains a number of rights for the 
requested person including a right to information on the EAW and its contents (Article 11) and 
the possibility of consenting to surrender (Article 13), as well as a right to legal assistance and an 
                                                 
340 This has been considered and expanded upon by the ECJ with reference to Articles 54 and 55SIC in Joined Cases 
C-187 & 385/01 Gözütok and Brügge [2003] ECR I-1345 (noted Fletcher M., “Some Developments to the ne bis in 
idem Principle in the European Union”, (2003) 66 MLR 769 and Tchorbadjiyska A., “Case Note”, (2004) 10 
Columbia Journal of European Law 549), Case C-469/03 Miraglia [2005] ECR I-2009, Case C-436/04 van Esbroek 
[2006] ECR I-2333, Case C-467/04 Gasparini [2006] ECR I-9199, Case C-150/05 van Straaten v. Holland & Italy 
[2006] ECR I-9327, Case C-288/05 Kretzinger [2007] ECR I-6441, Case C-367/05 Kraaijenbrink [2007] ECR I-
6619 and Case C-297/07 Bourquain, judgment of 11 December 2008, nyr. For analysis of the ne bis in idem 
principle, see Peers S., “Double Jeopardy and EU Law: Time for a Change?” (2006) 8 Eur JL Reform 199. An 
analysis of the concept is outside the scope of this thesis. 
341 The terms ‘staying’ and ‘resident’ utilised in Article 4(6) have recently been interpreted by the ECJ in Case C-
66/08 Kozlowski [2008] 3 CMLR 26; noted Fichera M., “Case Note”, (2009) 46 CMLRev 241. Both were 
considered to be Community terms requiring uniform interpretation (para.43) with ‘reception’ meaning that the 
individual has “established his actual place of residence in the executing Member State” and ‘staying’ the 
acquisition “following a stable period of presence in that State, certain connections with that State which are of a 
similar degree to those resulting from residence” (para.46). The Court went on to determine those connections as “in 
particular, the length, nature and conditions of his presence and the family and economic connections which that 
person has with the executing Member State” (para.48). 
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interpreter, and a judicial hearing if the person does not consent to surrender (Article 14). It is the 
executing judicial authority that decides whether the person is to be surrendered and to reach 
such a decision then it can call for supporting information from the issuing MS (Article 15). 
Article 17 sets out the time limits for the execution of the EAW, with a requirement that it be 
dealt with and executed as a matter of urgency. If a person has consented to surrender a decision 
on execution should be given within ten days after the consent was given whilst in other cases 
the time limit is sixty days and in exceptional circumstances both time limits may be extended a 
further thirty days. Article 19 provides the requested person with the right to be heard before a 
judicial authority, not necessarily the executing judicial authority, pending the decision to 
execute the EAW. The time limits for surrender are provided for in Article 23. The individual 
should be surrendered as soon as possible on a date agreed between the authorities concerned, 
but should be no later than ten days after the final decision on the execution of the EAW. Where 
circumstances outside the authorities’ control conspire, the time limit can be extended by a 
further ten days and for serious humanitarian reasons, such as endangering the requested 
person’s life or health the surrender may exceptionally be temporarily postponed. When the 
grounds for postponement have passed then a new date should be set and the time limits apply. 
Upon expiry of these time limits and the person is still in custody Article 23(5) orders his 
release.  
 
The MSs had until 31 December 2003 to transpose the EAW into national law, which they all 
did eventually342, although as the Report observes not consistently. It is submitted that the 
national courts must interpret national law consistently with the EAW Framework Decision 
following the judgement in Pupino and the application of the principle of indirect effect should 
                                                 
342 See Commission Report based on Article 34 of the EAW Framework Decision, COM(2006) 8 final. The 
implementing acts of all MSs are available at http://www.eurowarrant.net and http://www.law.uj.edu.pl/~kpk/eaw. 
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enable many inconsistencies to be smoothed out. This appears to be the approach of the UK 
courts as they have attempted to use a purposive approach to interpret the new law343, 
particularly apparent in Dabas, Hilali and Caldarelli where the House of Lords relied on the 
Pupino judgment and considered the purpose of the EAW Framework Decision. Most academic 
commentators were initially positive about the new measure344 and Mackarel concludes that the 
“initial phase of the EAW indicates that the new scheme for surrender in the EU is functioning 
effectively on a practical level”345. However, there have been some major constitutional 
challenges to the EAW in several MSs concerning the extradition of MS nationals346. The first 
case came before the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (the Trybunal Konstytucyjny) in April 
2005347 when the Gdansk Circuit Court asked the Tribunal if the Polish law transposing the 
EAW Framework Decision was compatible with Article 55(1) of the Polish Constitution that 
states ‘[t]he extradition of a Polish citizen shall be prohibited’. The Tribunal found that it was not 
compatible but took advantage of Article 190(3) of the Polish Constitution that allowed the 
                                                 
343 See in particular Office of the King’s Prosecutor, Brussels v. Cando Armas [2006] 2 AC 1, Goatley v. HM 
Advocate [2007] SLT 14, Dabas v. High Court of Justice, Madrid [2007] 2 AC 31, Re Hilali [2008] 2 CMLR 8, 
Pilecki v. Circuit Court of Legnica, Poland [2008] 4 All ER 445 and Caldarelli v. Court of Naples [2009] 1 All ER 
1. See further Mackarel M., “’Surrendering’ the Fugitive – The European Arrest Warrant and the United Kingdom”, 
(2007) 71 Journal of Criminal Law 362 and Padfield N., “The Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in 
England and Wales”, (2007) 3 EuConst 253. 
344 See Wagner W., “Building an Internal Security Community: The Democratic Peace and the Politics of 
Extradition in Western Europe”, (2003) 40 Journal of Peace Research 695, Plachta M., “European Arrest Warrant: 
Revolution in Extradition?” (2003) 11 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 178, Spencer 
J.R., “The European Arrest Warrant”, (2003-2004) 6 CYELS 201, Wouters J., Naert F., “Of Arrest Warrants, 
Terrorist Offences and Extradition Deals: An Appraisal of the EU’s Main Criminal Law Measures Against 
Terrorism after “11 September””, (2004) 41 CMLRev 909, Deen-Racsmány Z., Blekxtoon R., “The Decline of the 
Nationality Exception in European Extradition?” (2005) 13 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice 317. A negative position towards the EAW and the principle of mutual recognition are adopted by Op. Cit. 
n.338 Peers and Alegre S., Leaf M., “Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Co-operation: A Step Too Far Too 
Soon? Case Study – the European Arrest Warrant”, (2004) 10 ELJ 200. 
345 Mackarel M., “The European Arrest Warrant – the Early Years: Implementing and Using the Warrant”, (2007) 
15 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 37 at 63. 
346 For a general overview see Deen-Racsmány Z., “The European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender of Nationals 
Revisited: The Lessons of Constitutional Challenges”, (2006) 14 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 271 and Komárek J., “European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: In Search of 
the Limits of “Contrapunctual Principles””, (2007) 44 CMLRev 9. 
347 Case P1/05 Re Enforcement of a European Arrest Warrant [2006] 1 CMLR 36; noted Lazowski A., “Poland: 
Constitutional Tribunal on the Surrender of Polish Citizens under the European Arrest Warrant”, (2005) 1 EuConst 
569, Kowalik-Bańczyk K., “Should We Polish It Up? The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Idea of Supremacy 
of EU Law”, (2005) 6 German Law Journal 1355 and Leczykiewicz D., “Case Note”, (2006) 43 CMLRev 1181.  
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binding effect of the judgment to be delayed for eighteen months, until 6 November 2006. A new 
Article 55 was adopted on 7 November 2006 that enabled Polish nationals to be extradited but as 
Lazowski notes348 the revised Article 55 appears to be contrary to the EAW Framework Decision 
as it requires full protection of the principle of double criminality.  
 
The second successful constitutional challenge came before the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (the Bundesverfassungsgericht (henceforth BVerfG)) in July 2005349. A German national 
opposed his extradition to Spain through an EAW issued by Spain on the basis that the German 
EAW implementing legislation350 was contrary to Article 16(2) and Article 19(4) of the Basic 
Law. Article 16(2)351 of the German Basic Law had been amended to enable German citizens to 
be extradited to EU MSs so long as ‘constitutional principles are observed’. The BVerfG found 
that the right to remain in the citizen’s legal system in the first sentence of Article 16(2) was of 
high constitutional importance and that it could only be derogated from in accordance with the 
Article 16(2) proviso in the second sentence. This proviso was not unconstitutional as it 
complied with other provisions of the Basic Law. When the legislator implemented the EAW 
into German law it had to ensure not only that the objective of the EAW Framework Decision 
was included but also that the legislation was proportionate to the proviso. Furthermore the rule 
                                                 
348 Lazowski A., “Conformity of the Accession Treaty with the Polish Constitution. Decision of 11 May 2005”, 
(2007) 3 EuConst 148 at 160. 
349 Re Constitutionality of German Law Implementing the Framework Decision on a European Arrest Warrant 
(2BvR 2236/04) [2006] 1 CMLR 16; noted Mölders S., “European Arrest Warrant is Void – The Decision of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court of 18 July 2005”, (2005) 7 German Law Journal 45, Tomuschat C., 
“Inconsistencies – The German Federal Constitutional Court on the European Arrest Warrant”, (2006) 2 EuConst 
209, Parga A.H., “Case Note” (2006) 43 CMLRev 583 and Nohlen N., “Germany: The European Arrest Warrant 
Case”, (2008) 6 IJCL 153. See also Satzger H., Pohl T., “The German Constitutional Court and the European Arrest 
Warrant: ‘Cryptic Signals’ from Karlsruhe”, (2006) 4 JICC 686 and Lebeck C., “National Constitutional Control 
and the Limits of European Integration – the European Arrest Warrant in the German Federal Constitutional Court”, 
[2007] PL 23. 
350 European Arrest Warrant Act 2004 [2004] BGB1.I 1748. 
351 “(2) No German may be extradited to a foreign country. A different regulation to cover extradition to a Member 
State of the European Union or to an international court of law may be laid down by law, provided that 
constitutional principles are observed.” The second sentence was added in 2000 to enable German citizens to be 
extradited to stand trial at the International Criminal Court. 
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of law had to be guaranteed in the MS where the suspect was to be extradited and the 
implementation had to respect all other provisions of the Basic Law. These considerations meant 
that for the implementing legislation to be constitutional, it had to take account of the 
opportunities for discretion outlined in Article 4 of the EAW Framework Decision, which it did 
not do, so that the proviso would be proportionate to the constitutional right352. Furthermore, the 
BVerfG found that the lack of judicial review in the German EAW law was contrary to the right 
to recourse to the courts in Article 19(4) of the Basic Law353. For inter alia these reasons, the 
BVerfG found the German EAW law to be void in its entirety. Thus German citizens were 
unable to be extradited until the new implementing legislation was adopted on 20 July 2006354, 
which incorporates all the recommendations of the BVerfG355. In a second BVerfG judgment356 
on the extradition of a Danish citizen to Spain, the Court confirmed the first judgment, and 
utilised the judgment in Pupino to enable the German authorities to refer directly to the EAW 
Framework Decision, even though a Framework Decision cannot have direct effect and there 
was no German legislation implementing it. 
 
The third successful challenge to national EAW implementing legislation came from the 
Supreme Court of Cyprus (SCC) on 7 November 2005357 when it upheld a judgement of the 
Limassol District Court to refuse extradition of a Cypriot national to the UK. Appendix D, 
Article 14 of the Constitution of Cyprus states that ‘[n]o citizen shall be banished or excluded 
from the Republic under any circumstances’. The SCC was unable to locate a provision of the 
                                                 
352 Op. Cit. n.349 at paras.70-95. 
353 Ibid. at paras.101-107. 
354 European Arrest Warrant Act 2006, [2006] BGB1.I 1721. 
355 Sinn A., Wörner L., “The European Arrest Warrant and Its Implementation in Germany – Its Constitutionality, 
Laws and Current Developments”, [2007] ZIS 204 at 211. 
356 Decision of the German Constitutional Court of 24 November 2005, 2 BvR 1667/05 (no English translation); 
noted Ibid. at 208. 
357 Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus v. Konstantinou [2007] 3 CMLR 42. 
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Constitution that provided a legal base for the arrest and surrender of a Cypriot national, as 
Appendix D, Article 11 provides an exhaustive list of circumstances when a person can be 
arrested and only the arrest for extradition is mentioned in Article 11(2) with regard to aliens. 
Therefore, the Constitution could not be interpreted in accordance with Pupino to give effect to 
the EAW Framework Decision. Furthermore, in the SCC’s opinion, the fact that Framework 
Decisions do not have direct effect meant that Framework Decisions do not have supremacy over 
national constitutions. The Cypriot government moved swiftly following the judgment and 
amended the Constitution with a new Appendix D, Article 11 that enables Cypriot nationals to 
be arrested for extradition to another EU MS but is time limited to 1 May 2004, the date of the 
Cypriot accession to the Union. 
 
There have also been unsuccessful challenges in Greece358, the Czech Republic359 and Ireland360. 
However, a further problem arose in Greece, where Article 11(f) of the Greek implementing 
legislation prohibited the extradition of a Greek national if the warrant was to enforce a custodial 
sentence imposed by final decision of another Member State’s criminal courts, as allowed by 
Article 4(6)EAW. The provision required the executing judicial authority to order sentence to be 
carried out in the Greek prison system which the Court of Appeal of Athens has complied 
with361. In Belgium the authorities brought an action for annulment of the EAW Framework 
Decision before the ECJ on the grounds that the EAW ought to have been implemented by a 
                                                 
358 Re Execution of a German Arrest Warrant: Tsokas and Another [2007] 3 CMLR 24. The Supreme Court of 
Greece nevertheless quashed the orders for extradition in this case because of Germany annulling the national 
implementing EAW legislation, thereby creating direct conflict with the principle of reciprocity. For an alternative 
approach to this problem see the UK case of Oliver v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 3 CMLR 
46. 
359 Re Constitutionality of Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant [2007] 3 CMLR 24. 
360 Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v. Stapleton [2007] IESC 30. 
361 Re Enforcement of a European Arrest Warrant Against Tzoannos [2008] 2 CMLR 38. 
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Convention rather than a Framework Decision362 as Article 34(2)(b)TEU states that Framework 
Decisions may only be adopted for the approximation of the laws and regulations of the MSs. 
The Court quickly rejected this as, in the ECJ’s view, the EAW Framework Decision did 
precisely what a Framework Decision was supposed to do363. The Belgian court also questioned 
whether the EAW Framework Decision was valid as Article 2(2) dispensed with verification of 
the principle of double criminality and therefore allegedly breached Article 6(2)TEU over the 
fundamental principles of the legality of criminal offences and penalties and of equality and non-
discrimination, as reaffirmed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights364. The ECJ held that the 
EAW Framework Decision did not harmonise the MSs criminal offences or penalties and so the 
definition of both remained within the competences of the MSs and the EAW Framework 
Decision did not breach Article 6(2)TEU365. 
 
The EAW Framework Decision and the MSs’ constitutional courts’ interpretation of it, raise a 
number of concerns over EU law in general and an individual’s rights that impinge on freedom 
of movement. The Polish constitutional tribunal’s judgment appears to be a rational result 
considering the wording of Article 55 of the Polish Constitution at the time, the fact that the 
Pupino case had yet to be decided and the suspension of the judgment for eighteen months to 
enable new legislation to be passed. However, the resulting amendment to Article 55 appears to 
contravene Article 2(2) of the EAW Framework Decision that could see further legal challenges. 
The two German BVerfG judgments raise several points of concern. The first is the failure to 
                                                 
362 Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerrad [2007] ECR I-3633; noted 
Janssens C., “Case Note”, (2007) 14 Columbia Journal of European Law 169 and Sarmiento D., “The European 
Arrest Warrant and the Quest for Constitutional Coherence”, (2008) 6 IJCL 171. See also Hinarejos A., “Recent 
Human Rights Developments in the EU Courts: The Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Arrest Warrant 
and Terror Lists”, (2007) 7 HRLR 793 and Leczykiewicz D., “Constitutional Conflicts and the Third Pillar”, (2008) 
33 ELR 230. 
363 Ibid. at para.30. 
364 Ibid. at paras.45 & 46. 
365 Ibid. at paras.52-54 & 57-60. 
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refer in the first case to the judgment of the ECJ in Pupino that had been given over a month 
earlier, except in the dissenting Opinion of Judge Gerhardt366. Parga367 argues persuasively that 
this should have featured strongly and would, if interpreted in the correct manner, have resulted 
in a different finding. Second, the use of Pupino by the BVerfG in the second case, even though 
the first judgment was confirmed, led to an unusual conclusion that is difficult to support on the 
basis of EU law. Framework Decisions do not have direct effect and therefore a national 
authority cannot refer to it directly without implementing legislation. There was no 
implementing legislation in force, as the first judgment had declared it void in its entirety, and so 
the Pupino judgment should not have been able to bite. Third, the result of the two cases appears 
to have seen a difference in the treatment of the two individuals, both notably citizens of the 
Union, purely on the basis of their nationality, discrimination that is prohibited by Article 12EC. 
Fourth, Germany had made a declaration, as Arnull notes368, on the jurisdiction of the ECJ in 
accordance with Article 35TEU that the highest court in the land could make a reference to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling. The BVerfG is the highest court in Germany and, it would appear 
from the judgment, making a reference does not appear to have been considered by the court. 
The Supreme Court of Cyprus’ judgment would at first blush appear to be logical. The 
Constitution, as worded at the time, did not enable the extradition of a Cypriot national and was 
incapable of being interpreted in line with Pupino and so therefore the individual could not be 
extradited. However, the finding that as a Framework Decision was not directly effective so that 
it could not have supremacy over national constitutions muddles the separate and distinct 
principles of direct effect and primacy. Direct effect simply means that an individual can enforce 
their individual rights, as provided in European law, in their national courts so long as the 
                                                 
366 Op. Cit. n.349, Opinion of Judge Gerhardt at para.88. 
367 Op. Cit. n.349 Parga at 586-590. 
368 Arnull A., “Arrested Development”, (2005) 30 ELR 605 at 606. 
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provision is clear, precise, unconditional369 and, in the case of Directives, and it is submitted 
Framework Decisions after the judgment in Pupino, has passed the transposition date370. The 
principle of supremacy, or primacy, provides simply that European law takes precedence over 
domestic law371 that includes national constitutional law372. It is submitted that the Cypriot court 
confused itself on this issue and thus interpreted European law incorrectly. 
 
The position of the individual vis-à-vis the EAW also provides some concerns. First as the 
partial abolition of the principle of double criminality has been held by the ECJ not to be in 
breach of fundamental rights as the EAW Framework Decision did not harmonise the definition 
of criminal offences or penalties and so they remain within the competence of the MSs, the fact 
that they do remain within the competence of the MSs raises the possibility of a challenge before 
the ECtHR373. Second as the list of offences in Article 2(2) is extensive, can be added to at the 
MS’s discretion (Article 2(1) allows MSs to create disproportionate sentences for minor crimes 
that would bring the offence within the EAW Framework Decision), and is defined in domestic 
legislation then there is no uniformity across the EU leading to the possibility of MSs increasing 
the severity of criminal sanctions for offences in order to avoid forum shopping. Third, the 
                                                 
369 Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337. 
370 Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti [1979] ECR 1629. 
371 Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
372 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr [1970] ECR 1125. 
373 See Matthews v. UK (1999) 28 EHRR 361; noted Reid A.S., Doherty M., “Voting Rights for the European 
Parliament: Whose Responsibility?” [1999] EHRLR 420, Schermers H.G., “Case Note”, (1999) 36 CMLRev 673, 
Canor I., “Primus Inter Pares. Who is the Ultimate Guardian of Fundamental Rights in Europe?” (2000) 25 ELR 3, 
King T., “Ensuring Human Rights Review of Intergovernmental Acts in Europe”, (2000) 25 ELR 79 and Bosphorus 
Airlines v. Ireland (2006) 42 EHRR 1; noted Banner C., Thomson A., “Human Rights Review of State Acts 
Performed in Compliance with EC Law”, [2005] EHRLR 649, Costello C., “The Bosphorus Ruling of the European 
Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe”, (2006) 6 HRLR 87, Douglas-Scott 
S., “Case Note”, (2006) 43 CMLRev 243, Parga A.H., “Bosphorus v. Ireland and the Protection of Fundamental 
Rights in Europe”, (2006) 31 ELR 251, Eckes C., “Does the European Court of Human Rights Provide Protection 
from the European Community?” (2007) 13 EPL 47. The ECtHR in Matthews found that although it was not able to 
examine Community law directly, because the MSs had transferred some sovereignty to the Community then they 
retained their responsibility for it and so the ECtHR was able to consider EU law indirectly. In Bosphorus the 
ECtHR held that although there was a presumption of equivalent human rights protection between the EU’s 
fundamental rights and the ECHR, this presumption could be rebutted depending on the circumstances of a 
particular case where the protection of the rights in the ECHR was “manifestly deficient” (at para.156). 
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restrictions on the right of freedom of movement for citizens of the Union and their family 
members are laid down in Chapter VI of Dir. 2004/38 that the ECJ has interpreted narrowly as 
they derogate from the general right of freedom of movement (see Chapter III of this thesis). 
Although the EAW Framework Decision does not mention Dir. 2004/38, nor the case law on 
restrictions to the right of free movement, as the execution of an EAW will restrict an 
individual’s right to entry and residence in a MS then it submitted that there is a possibility to 
challenge the execution of an EAW through Chapter VI of Dir. 2004/38. Fourth, although there 
is a general reference to Article 6(2)TEU in Article 1(3) and Recital 12 provides that the 
Framework Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by 
Article 6TEU and reflected in the Charter, in particular Chapter VI entitled “Justice”, there is no 
explicit reference to the ECHR or the individual provisions of the ECHR, in particular Article 
5ECHR the right to liberty and security of the person and Article 6ECHR on the right to a fair 
trial, within the text of the EAW Framework Decision374. It could be argued that by providing 
interpretive guidance in Recital 12 and as Chapter VI of the Charter contains Article 47 on the 
right to an effective remedy and fair trial then there is no need to specify the ECHR itself or any 
provision of it. However, by highlighting Chapter VI of the Charter the Framework Decision 
creates a rod for its own back as the partial abolition of the non bis in idem principle in Article 
2(2) would appear to contravene Article 50375 of the Charter that prohibits a person being tried 
and punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence. Fifth, there is disunity 
over the jurisdiction of the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the EAW 
Framework Decision or its validity, as some States have not given the declaration required in 
Article 35TEU, some have but have then limited references to the highest court in the land, and 
                                                 
374 Douglas-Scott S., “The Rule of Law in the European Union – Putting the Security into the “Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice””, (2004) 29 ELR 219 at 226. 
375 “No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence for which he or she 
has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law.” 
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some have enabled any court or tribunal to make a reference. The failure to provide an ECJ 
jurisdiction clause in the Framework Decision is likely to lead to a lack of uniformity in the law 
with possible contradictory national court judgments, legal uncertainty, opacity, and 
incongruence between the law as specified in the EAW Framework Decision and the twenty-
seven ways of interpreting it. As Douglas-Scott observes376, this does not bode well for the 
principle of mutual trust and recognition which the EAW Framework Decision is built on and 
which is intended to operate as the cornerstone of the AFSJ. Finally the time limits377 in the 
Framework Decision are notably short and, although the EAW Framework Decision does not 
expressly limit the right to appeal, such short time limits are likely to put grave impediments in 
the way of access to the full judicial process for cases that can often be highly complex in nature. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty moves the majority of Title VI of the TEU from pillar three into pillar one, 
extends the ECJ’s jurisdiction to its full competence in Article 234EC and removes any 
distinction between decision making under pillar three and pillar one. It is uncertain yet whether 
the EAW Framework Decision will be given effect as a Directive or if a new instrument will 
have to be adopted. Whatever the answer the result will standardise the juridical issues, creating 
uniformity and removing legal uncertainty. However, giving full legal affect to the Charter may 
see legal challenges to the EAW Framework Decision or the issuing of EAWs on the basis of 
Article 50 of the Charter and when the Union accedes to the ECHR, similar challenges may 
result through Articles 5 and 6ECHR.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
                                                 
376 Op. Cit. n.374 at 227. 
377 Ibid. at 226. 
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The free movement rights of TCNs under Title IV of the EC Treaty are highly restrictive. It can 
be argued that there is a hierarchy of TCNs under Title IV ranging from LTR TCNs, with a right 
to move to a second EU MS under limited circumstances, to asylum-seekers and illegal 
immigrants, who have no right to free movement and even their freedom itself can be curtailed. 
Even within the single policy area of international protection TCNs are treated differently 
according to their status so that refugees have a right to travel, beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection can travel if there are serious humanitarian reasons for their presence in another MS 
and individuals with temporary protection without a right of travel. It is difficult to see how an 
area of freedom, security and justice applies either freedom or justice to TCNs. The requirement 
now is to examine this structure of legal rules through the lens of legal rationality. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
LEGAL RATIONALITY 
 
1. FORMAL LEGAL RATIONALITY 
 
The abstract evaluation of formal legal irrationality provides for three possible ways in which 
legal doctrine can be contradictory. The analysis in this section will consider all three 
permutations for the legislative instrument studied before setting the conclusion on formal 
rationality within the policy context for practical recommendations and suggestions to be 
addressed. 
 
The first area of concern is that between international law commitments and the Dublin 
Regulation1. This enables an asylum-seeker to be returned to another MS without assessing the 
merits of the asylum-seeker’s case as there is an automatic presumption in Recital 2 that all MSs 
are safe for the return of asylum applicants, in contravention of Article 13ECHR2. Furthermore it 
is assumed that MSs do not return asylum-seekers or refugee applicants to third countries in 
breach of their Geneva Convention commitments even though there is evidence to the contrary3. 
Elements of the Dublin Regulation that have been carried over from the Dublin Convention also 
cause contradictory concerns. Article 3(3) of the Dublin Regulation allows MSs to send an 
asylum-seeker, pursuant to the national legislation, to a third country, so long as it is in 
                                                 
1 Council Regulation 343/2003/EC establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, 
O.J. 2003 L50/1. 
2 Javed Nasseri v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 1 All ER 411 at para.19. 
3 Ibid. Also see Kok L., The Dublin II Regulation, UNHCR, 2006 at 2. 
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compliance with the Geneva Convention. However, when this is married together with bilateral 
readmission agreements between MSs and third countries and the readmission agreements 
negotiated by the Commission on behalf of the Community with third countries then problems 
are produced. Community readmission agreements include a clause requiring the third country to 
take back a non-national TCN even if they only transited through that third country. This in turn 
has seen Community neighbour third countries either signing their own bilateral agreements with 
other third countries or having a policy to hand on any returnees. Directive 2005/854 provides a 
definition of a safe third country (Article 27) and a European safe third country (Article 36), and 
the compiling of lists of both (Article 29 and Article 36(3) respectively). The compilation of lists 
indicates that if a State appears on that list then it will be safe and therefore a full examination of 
the application will not be required. That is taken further by the European safe third country 
concept that enables a MS to waive the requirement of any examination for the return of a TCN 
to one of these States. The combined effect of the Dublin Regulation, readmission agreements 
and Directive 2005/85 is chain refoulement, refugees in orbit and the contravention of a State’s 
international obligations as set out in Article 33(1) of the Geneva Convention and Articles 3 and 
13ECHR. 
 
The factors affecting policy formation surrounding the State responsible for assessing an asylum 
claim provide a difficult matrix of issues. The first is the legal factor where there is no 
international legal principle that a country should allow access to entry or residence on its 
territory and thus it a question of national sovereignty whether a State allows an asylum-seeker’s 
entry or not. However, MSs have entered into international obligations based on treaties or 
conventions, which must be respected, and in particular the Geneva Convention. Although the 
                                                 
4 Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status, O.J. 2005 L326/13. 
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EU itself has not signed or ratified the Geneva Convention, the Tampere Conclusions5 have 
obligated the EU to a full commitment “to the obligations of the Geneva Refugee Convention 
and other relevant human rights instruments”, which is reflected in Recital 2 of the Dublin 
Regulation that is “based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention”. On 
the economic side there is little economic value to allowing asylum-seekers to remain in a host 
MS, unless it is considered that that asylum-seeker would be able to contribute significantly to 
the economy, and indeed an influx of asylum-seekers is considered to be a burden on the State 
and in particular the social welfare systems of the State. As such a key factor of policy formation 
is to redistribute the unequal burden6 of asylum-seekers across the EU7 for which the Dublin 
Regulation is a key instrument. However, the effectiveness of the Dublin Regulation as a burden 
sharing mechanism has been called into question by Thielemann8 especially as burdens are 
particularly high on the States with the EU’s eastern and southern external borders that 
correspond to the currently less prosperous MSs of the Union9. The third element of policy 
formation over the Dublin Regulation is that involving status that can also engage a cultural 
element. An asylum-seeker is classified as an alien upon entry with few opportunities to improve 
that position. This status is also not ameliorated by suspicion of the native population, fuelled by 
tabloid newspaper reporting and based on fear of the outsider. Finally with large numbers of 
asylum-seekers originating from Africa, Iraq or Afghanistan there is concern over national rather 
than human security with a perceived threat from terrorism. To remove the contradictions with 
international law in the Dublin Regulation it is suggested that there should be a positive 
requirement for the application of an asylum-seeker when he or she has entered the EU to be 
                                                 
5 Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, SN200/99, 1 at para.4. 
6 See Noll G., “Risky Games? A Theoretical Approach to Burden-Sharing in the Asylum Field”, (2003) 16 JRS 236, 
Thielemann E.R., “Between Interests and Norms: Explaining Burden-Sharing in the European Union”, (2003) 16 
JRS 253. 
7 Costello C., “The Asylum Procedures Directive and the Proliferation of Safe Country Practices: Deterrence, 
Deflection and the Dismantling of International Protection?” (2005) 7 EJML 35 at 38. 
8 Thielemann E.R., “Why Asylum Policy Harmonisation Undermines Refugee Burden-Sharing”, (2004) 6 EJML 47 
at 58. 
9 ECRE, “Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered”, March 2008, 
http://www.ecre.org/files/Sharing%20Responsibility_Dublin%20Reconsidered.pdf, at 12.  
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considered by one MS.  The second recommendation is that all MSs must ensure their 
procedures for assessing asylum applications comply with international legal provisions. This 
would still allow MSs to return failed asylum-seekers to safe third countries or to accept EU MSs 
as safe countries. However, this would also require a third change, to remove Article 36 of 
Directive 2005/85 on automatic European safe countries without assessment. 
 
The Receptions Directive10 also raises cause for concern. When asylum-seekers apply for asylum 
the MS, according to Article 13(1), must grant the right to material reception conditions from 
when their asylum applications are made, to ensure a standard of living that is adequate for the 
health of the applicant and is capable of ensuring their subsistence (Article 13(2)), the aim being 
to secure the human dignity of the asylum-seeker11. These material reception conditions include 
housing, food and clothing, provided in kind, or as financial allowances or in vouchers, and a 
daily expenses allowance (Article 2(j)). However, MSs can make the provision of the material 
reception conditions subject to actual residence by the applicants in a specific place, as 
determined by the MS (Article 7(4)). Furthermore, they may be reduced or withdrawn where the 
asylum-seeker inter alia abandons the subscribed place of residence without informing the 
competent authorities, or without gaining permission if the move had been requested (Article 
16(1)(a)). The only benefit that the MSs cannot withdraw is an asylum-seeker’s access to 
emergency health care (Article 16(4)). It should be noted from the outset that the standards 
outlined are the minimum12 required and MSs can choose to retain higher standards (Article 4). 
However, these minimum norms are markedly “minimum”13 and MSs have the option to lower 
                                                 
10 Council Directive 2003/9/EC laying down the minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, O.J. 2003 
L31/18. 
11 See the Explanatory Memorandum in the Commission proposal for a Council Directive laying down the minimum 
standards for the reception of asylum seekers, COM(2001) 181 final at 3, 4, 15 and 16.  
12 Kuijper P.J., “The Evolution of the Third Pillar from Maastricht to the European Constitution: Institutional 
Aspects”, (2004) 41 CMLRev 609 at 614 notes that a minimum standards Directive “does exactly what the title 
announces, namely laying down rather minimal standards”. 
13 O’Keefe D., “Can the Leopard Change its Spots? Visas, Immigration and Asylum Following Amsterdam” in 
O’Keefe D., Twomey P., Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty, Hart Publishing, 1999, 271 at 272. 
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them further if the asylum-seeker is found to be in breach of the Directive’s requirements. As the 
material reception conditions are supposedly the minimum standards required to enable an 
asylum-seeker to retain his or her human dignity, their withdrawal must therefore treat a human 
being as being less than human. Such a position appears to be in contradiction to Article 1 of the 
UDHR, which provides that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” as 
read in accordance with the first recital, “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world”. 
 
The policy factors here are slightly different to those involving the Dublin Regulation as they 
involve rights of TCNs when they have been granted entry into the Union. However, they still 
deal with asylum-seekers and as such the elements discussed above will be relevant here. The 
legal element centres on the position of the UDHR in the framework of international human 
rights law. The UDHR is merely a declaratory or aspirational document without legal force and 
as such it could be dismissed as irrelevant. However, the Charter of Fundamental Rights has 
taken the UDHR’s provision on human dignity and included it in Article 1 that reads “[h]uman 
dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.” This is given added urgency in the 
Explanations of the Charter14 where it states that “[t]he dignity of the human person is not only a 
fundamental right in itself but constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights” with human 
dignity also being recognised as a protectable principle through fundamental rights by the ECJ15. 
This then also plays out with the human rights element of policy formation as TCNs resident in 
the EU should have their human rights protected. Furthermore when security is considered from 
the human security dimension then it should be imperative to maintain the minimum reception 
conditions to maintain a human beings minimum human dignity. The suggestion for the removal 
                                                 
14 Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, O.J. 2007 C303/17. 
15 Case C-377/98 Netherlands v. European Parliament & Council [2001] ECR I-7079, paras.70-77. 
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of the contradiction is, as always for formal rationality, a value-neutral recommendation, 
although when viewing the concept of human dignity it takes on a concealed value-laden mantle. 
Therefore MSs should not be allowed to remove the minimum reception conditions in any 
circumstances. 
 
The Refugees Qualifications Directive16 also provides contradictions between Community and 
international law. Article 1A of the Geneva Convention enables refugee status to be claimed by 
“any person” but Article 2(c) and (e) of the Qualifications Directive restrict this to TCNs and 
stateless persons in contravention of the Geneva Convention’s Articles 3, that requires States to 
apply the Convention’s provisions to refugees without discrimination as to country of origin, and 
42, that prohibits reservations to Article 1. Second, Article 33(1) of the Geneva Convention 
provides the right to, and the conditions for, the principle of non-refoulement with exceptions in 
Article 33(2). Article 33(2) does not authorise States to withdraw or refuse to grant refugee 
status but simply to allow refoulement in extreme circumstances. This is given effect by Article 
21 of the Qualifications Directive but then Article 14(4) enables MSs to withdraw refugee status 
and Article 14(5) sanctions MSs to refuse to grant refugee status for the reasons in Article 33(2). 
The criteria, that make up an exhaustive list, for cessation and exclusion from refugee status are 
provided for in Article 1C-F of the Geneva Convention and do not include the elements in 
Article 33(2). Furthermore the exhaustive list of exclusion clauses in Article 1F of the Geneva 
Convention has been extended by Article 14(2)(b) and (3) of the Qualifications Directive. Third 
these exclusion clauses have been extended in Article 17 for subsidiary protection so that a 
“serious non-political crime” is replaced with a “crime”, Article 33(2) elements are included and 
an additional exclusion added when other crimes capable of being punished by imprisonment in 
the host MS are committed or the applicant has left the country of origin to escape such 
                                                 
16 Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or 
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted, O.J. 2004 L304/12 Article 1. 
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punishment. This latter clause has no equivalent in the Geneva Convention. Fourth the Article 34 
naturalisation provision of the Geneva Convention has been replaced with a requirement for MSs 
to provide integration programmes. 
 
The elements that make up the policy formation framework for the Qualifications Directive 
again involve the legal status of international law, in particular that of the Geneva Convention, as 
it did for the Dublin Regulation. This time the Qualifications Directive in Recital 2 calls for a 
“full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention” and a recognition in Recital 3 that the 
Geneva Convention provides “the cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection 
of refugees”. However, as Storey17 notes the aim of the Directive is not to override the Geneva 
Convention but to provide detail not included in that international treaty, although it is submitted 
that it fails to delineate this. A further legal element is the objective of ensuring a minimum level 
of international protection being available in all the MSs without disparities before advancing to 
full harmonisation18. Finally on the legal element is the position of national sovereignty 
particularly when it comes to the granting of nationality to TCNs, a matter that remains firmly 
within the competence of the MSs. The second factor is economic as the Directive aims to assist 
the creation of the internal market by limiting “the secondary movements of applicants for 
asylum between Member States”. Two further interlinked factors are the protection of human 
rights and the question of status. The Geneva Convention provides the basis for international 
protection as discussed above but the Qualifications Directive has an additional aim of 
introducing subsidiary international protection, not to co-ordinate or harmonise such protection 
already found in MSs’ domestic law19 but to introduce a new right that compliments protection 
on the basis of refugee status. Thus status is an essential element for determining the rights that 
                                                 
17 Storey H., “EU Refugee Qualification Directive: a Brave New World?” (2008) 20 IJRL 1 at 8. 
18 Commission proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection, 
COM(2001) 510 final at 6. 
19 McAdam J., Complimentary Protection in International Refugee Law, OUP, 2007 at 55. 
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then flow from the granting of it. From these elements underpinning policy formation it can be 
acknowledged that there is much to welcome in the Qualifications Directive but formal 
rationality is not concerned with this, rather it only requires contradictions in the law to be 
removed. It is recommended therefore that the Directive’s personal scope should be opened to all 
persons without restriction and Articles 14 and 17 should be amended to comply with Article 
33(2) of the Geneva Convention. The commitment to provide integration rather naturalisation 
programmes in Article 33 of the Qualifications Directive, that as required by Article 34 of the 
Geneva Convention, is probably as far as the competences of the EU will allow. 
 
The Temporary Protection Directive20 enables MSs in certain situations to provide for groups of 
persons with certain characteristics to be provided with a form of international protection 
significantly lower than full refugee or even subsidiary protection status. This is the case even if 
these individuals could establish the criteria to be classed as refugees or beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection. Thus it enables MSs to circumvent their international legal obligations, at 
least temporarily, and again appears to be contradictory. However, there is a tension here 
between the protection of refugees and providing another layer of international protection for a 
mass influx of displaced persons, which would only have been in place before through ad hoc 
MS action. As such the Temporary Protection Directive does not appear to create a contradictory 
position with international law. 
 
The numerous proposals for RPAs and TPCs further appear to create problems with international 
law. If these “camps” were situated in third countries outside the EU then the MSs would appear 
to relinquish their international protection obligations. Indeed if a TCN applied for refugee status 
in the territory of a MS and was then removed to a camp in another country outside the EU then 
                                                 
20 Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass 
influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving 
such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, O.J. 2001 L212/12. 
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there would appear to be contravention of a number of the provisions of the Geneva Convention. 
First it appears to violate Article 3 on the prohibition of discrimination as to race, religion or 
country of origin, especially if this was because the applicant originated from a specific State, 
possibly included on a list of such States. Second Article 31(1) requires Contracting States not to 
impose penalties on applicants who enter the country illegally provided they present themselves 
without delay and with good reason for the illegal entry. Third Article 31(2) obligates States not 
to impose restrictions to the movement of applicants other than those that are necessary. Another 
proposal to turn asylum-seekers or refugees back on the high seas before entering MS territorial 
waters also appears to contradict the principle of non-refoulement, if, as it has been cogently 
argued, it has jus cogens status. 
 
The major factor involved in policy formation here is the political belief that if TCNs do not 
enter the territory of a host State or indeed the EU then legal obligations under the Geneva 
Convention would not be engaged and a TCN could not claim the status of international 
protection or be granted asylum. This would provide economic benefits as TCNs could be 
‘processed’ outside the territory thereby enabling careful selection on the basis of ability, 
significant savings on the reception and treatment of TCNs within the MSs and easing of 
potential pressures on the social welfare systems of the MSs. Furthermore large influxes of 
TCNs could be controlled from outside the region thereby regulating cultural and national 
security effects. However, this must be weighed against the legal and human rights obligations in 
Article 3, 31 and 33 of the Geneva Convention, the consideration of human security when 
determining international protection. Setting the abstract finding of contradiction between EU 
proposals and international law within the policy context it can be seen that although there can 
be considerable economic advantages over the policy these do not alleviate the incongruity. 
Therefore a policy of running RPAs and TPCs could fulfil the requirements of formal rationality 
237 
 
if it applied merely to economic migrants but did not impinge on international protection. Such a 
policy could not include turning asylum-seekers or refugees back on the high seas. 
 
The EAW Framework Decision21 provides some concerns for formal rationality. The first lies 
with the contradiction between EU law and another legal doctrinal instrument, this time Articles 
5 and 6ECHR. Article 2(2) of the EAW Framework Decision partially abolishing the principle of 
non bis in idem has been held by the ECJ22 to be valid and not violate fundamental rights as the 
definition of criminal offences and penalties remain within the competence of the MSs. 
However, Article 2(2) of the EAW Framework Decision imports the partial abolition of the 
principle of double criminality into national law, leaving MSs no discretion over its adoption, 
and so could be open to challenge before the ECtHR23. As such there would appear to be 
contradiction between the EAW Framework Decision and the ECHR. 
 
Furthermore possible contradiction appears to exist between doctrinal positions of EU law. The 
EAW Framework Decision enables individuals to be removed, through either extradition or 
surrender, to another MS. Directive 2004/3824, Chapter VI provides the restrictions that MSs 
may apply on the freedom of movement of Union citizens and their family members, regardless 
of nationality (Article 27), with specific protections against expulsion (Article 28) and 
procedural safeguards (Article 31). At first blush these three provisions appear to provide 
significantly higher standards for individuals than the EAW Framework Decision, and thus there 
would appear to be contradiction between the two. However, although the two instruments 
appear to deal with similar situations they actually regulate alternative scenarios with Directive 
2004/38 governing expulsion from the host MS territory on the basis of public order, health or 
                                                 
21 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States, O.J. 2002 L190/1. 
22 Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerrad [2007] ECR I-3633. 
23 See Matthews v. UK (1999) 28 EHRR 361 and Bosphorus Airlines v. Ireland (2006) 42 EHRR 1. 
24 European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, O.J. 2004 L158/77. 
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security and the EAW controlling extradition or surrender to another MS for the purposes of 
criminal prosecution. Therefore as they regulate different situations there is tension between the 
policies of expulsion, and restriction of free movement, and extradition but not contradiction. 
The second situation also involves the EAW Framework Decision and the partial abolition of the 
non bis in idem principle in Article 2(2). This appears to contravene the requirement in Article 
50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights that prohibits a person being tried and punished twice in 
criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence. An individual could be tried and convicted 
in one MS before then being extradited under Article 2(2) to another MS to be tried for the same 
offence on the same facts. Thus there is a contradiction between two legal instruments, albeit that 
the Charter for now is not legally binding, but more so that the contradiction is between the 
EAW Framework Decision and a fundamental right. 
 
The factors supporting the policy formation of the EAW Framework Decision are slightly 
different to those, associated with immigration, that have been considered so far. The first 
element for policy formation was endorsed at Tampere and entitled mutual recognition of 
judicial decisions25. This concerns the mutual trust between the judicial authorities of MSs, 
which forms the cornerstone of judicial co-operation, and the mutual assumption that the MSs’ 
criminal justice systems conform to the standards of the ECHR. The second element is the issue 
of security as it was the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 that 
precipitated the Commission to bring forward the proposal for the EAW Framework Decision. 
This question of security manifested itself in a desire for a single procedure to replace traditional 
extradition within the EU, to speed up the transfer of suspects between MSs and remove the 
political dimension in extradition. Setting the abstract conclusions within the context of these 
policy factors it is submitted that the contradictions identified melt into either insignificance or 
                                                 
25 Op. Cit. n.5, 8 at para.33. 
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irrelevance. As such the contrary positions can be viewed as tensions between doctrines 
positions. 
 
The Long Term Residents Directive26 and the principle of non-discrimination cause concerns 
over contradiction between doctrinal positions within EU law. Recital 5 of the LTR Directive 
instructs MSs to give effect to the provisions of the LTR Directive without discrimination, with a 
considerable list of areas of non-discrimination. However, discrimination on the basis of 
nationality is a marked absentee from this list, which appears to allow MSs to adopt the Directive 
without considering the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality. The result of 
this position enables a MS to enact legislation to give effect to the LTR Directive whilst 
discriminating against TCNs on the basis of their nationality, a clear contradiction with Article 
12EC.  
 
The policy on rights for long term residents was outlined at the Tampere Council meeting in 
1999 that stated that the EU must “ensure fair treatment of third country nationals who reside 
legally on the territory of the MSs”, that an “integration policy should aim at granting them 
rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens”27 and TCNs “should be granted in that 
Member State a set of uniform rights which are as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU 
citizens”28. The LTR Directive distinguishes between different classes of TCNs, in particular it 
excludes all those with international protection from its scope, thereby ensuring that there is no 
uniform set of rights. Furthermore the rights and obligations are significantly less than EU 
citizens, reduced still further by authorising the MSs to limit or restrict the general principle of 
equal treatment with MS nationals in specified areas (Article 11). If there is a right to equal 
treatment with nationals of the host MS then that principle is not a right to equality if it can be 
                                                 
26 Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third country nationals who are LTRs, O.J. 2004 L16/44. 
27 Op. Cit. n.5, 5 at para.18. 
28 Ibid. at para.21. 
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limited against the rights available to the comparator. Thus there is no fair treatment of all TCNs 
legally resident on the MSs’ territories, and a succession of internal contradictions. 
 
The factors affecting policy for LTR TCNs can be viewed partially from the Tampere 
Conclusions as discussed above. However, the elements involved in policy formation identified 
in Chapter II can also provide a valuable policy matrix in which to site the abstract conclusions 
of formal rationality. The first is the legal element. It is stating the obvious that LTR TCNs have 
already entered the EU, in particular their host MS, and are legally resident there and so any free 
movement questions from third countries are not relevant. However, internal free movement of 
persons is an area on the policy agenda. Article 13(1) of the UDHR states that “[e]veryone has 
the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State”29 but the EU is 
a collection of States rather than a single State and from this perspective the EU does not fall 
within Article 13(1) UDHR. From an alternative position though, Article 13(1) could also be 
viewed as classifying “State” as a political entity, in comparison to Article 13(2) that utilises the 
term “country” and as the EU is the regional political entity that regulates free movement of 
persons then the EU should be classified as “State” for the purposes of Article 13(1). This though 
impinges on the question of national sovereignty and the right of a State to control who enters 
that territory. Furthermore the nationalisation of TCNs remains solely within the competence of 
the MSs30, even though the Tampere Conclusions endorsed “the objective that long-term legally 
resident third-country nationals be offered the opportunity to obtain the nationality of the 
Member State in which they are resident”31. The second element is taken from the economic 
perspective. The rationale of free movement of persons, and the internal market, is that 
individuals as labour are construed as factors of production that should be able to move within 
                                                 
29 See also Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and Article 2(1) of 
Protocol 4 to the ECHR. 
30 Commission proposal for a Council Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term 
residents, COM(2001) 127 final at 8. 
31 Op. Cit. n.5, 5 at para.21. 
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the single market to be able to exploit openings for labour and to ensure that supply matches 
demand as far as possible. LTR TCNs are valuable components of the labour force who, because 
they have moved once already from a third country, maybe be more willing than citizens of the 
EU to move within the Union’s territorial borders32. Furthermore with the need to attract 
immigration into the EU in the future the attractiveness of being able to move and choose where 
to settle in the EU may encourage this immigration33. The economic factor is further 
strengthened by restricting such free movement to economically active individuals and their 
families. The third factor for policy formation towards LTR TCNs is that of status. As 
highlighted above, the Tampere Conclusions speak of a uniform set of rights granted to LTR 
TCNs that are as comparable and as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens to enable 
integration. This objective then equates the status of LTR TCNs with citizens but the reality of 
the free movement rights granted belies this aim. Thus the classification model could be 
considered equivalent to that of worker or alien34 that as Peers points out the former would 
damage the objectives of EU immigration law and the latter would damage the internal market35. 
However, a further alternative would be to devise a new status, a status appropriate to the 
objectives in the Tampere Conclusions and the economic reality of globalisation and a status that 
could be equated to that of denizenship36 or quasi-citizenship37 that provides a status for TCNs 
between alien and citizen that could enable convergence with citizenship to take place over time. 
Setting the abstract findings of formal rationality within the polity context allows 
recommendations that can ease the contradictions identified. First the LTR TCN Directive 
should cover all forms of discrimination, thereby eliminating contradiction between doctrinal 
                                                 
32 Op. Cit. n.30 at 8. 
33 Ibid. at 9. 
34 Peers S., “Aliens, Workers, Citizens or Humans? Models for Community Immigration Law” in Guild E., Harlow 
C., (Eds.), Implementing Amsterdam: Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law, Hart Publishing, 2001 at 291. 
35 Ibid. at 307. 
36 Hammar T., Democracy and the Nation State, Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World of International 
Migration, Avebury, 1990. 
37 Castles S., Davison A., Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging, Macmillan Press, 
2000 at 94. 
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positions and enhancing the attainment of the Tampere Conclusions. Second the Directive should 
be extended to cover all TCNs38. Third the ability of the MSs to limit or restrict the general 
principle of equal treatment in Article 11 should be removed. Finally to remove all 
contradictions and comply with the objectives in the Tampere Conclusions, the right to freedom 
of movement should be introduced after a set period of legal residence in a host MS. 
 
The freedom of movement and restrictions applied to TCNs, whether they are asylum-seekers or 
applicants for refugee status, creates concern over possible contradictions for formal rationality 
(the question of contradictions between the free movement of persons and LTR TCNs is 
discussed above). The AFSJ is designed to create a single territorial area with a common policy 
that regulates asylum, refugees and immigration. With the adoption of Regulation 562/200639, 
applicable to all persons, whether citizens of the Union of TCNs, the Community has removed 
internal border controls between MSs. It is suggested that this creates a new territory capable of 
being labelled as “Schengenland” that, as there are common asylum and immigration policies 
and no internal border controls, should entail freedom of movement in “Schengenland”. 
However, the Receptions Directive and the Temporary Protection Directive do not provide for 
any free movement right between the MSs for asylum-seekers or beneficiaries of temporary 
protection and even freedom of movement in a MS for an asylum-seeker can be curtailed to an 
area assigned to them by the MS or, if necessary, confinement to a particular place. The 
Qualifications Directive does not provide any freedom of movement between MSs whilst the 
application is being processed, or indeed upon the grant of refugee or subsidiary protection 
status, although there is a right of free movement in the host MS. It does enable refugees, once 
the status is granted, to be issued with travel documents to allow travel outside the host MS 
                                                 
38 Commission proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2003/109/EC to extend its scope to 
beneficiaries of international protection, COM(2007) 298 final. 
39 European Parliament and Council Regulation 562/2006/EC establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across borders, O.J., 2006 L105/1. 
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territory, and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection are entitled to a national passport if their 
presence is required for compelling humanitarian reasons in another State. Article 26 of the 
Geneva Convention specifies that Contracting States must ‘accord to refugees lawfully in its 
territory the right to choose their place of residence to move freely within its territory, subject to 
any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances’. This right of free 
movement is lacking within Schengenland and the right of residence is only available in the host 
MS that conferred refugee status (Article 24 Qualifications Directive). It could be argued that the 
MSs are the Contracting States of the Geneva Convention and therefore limiting free movement 
to a MS is in line with these international obligations. However, the MSs have chosen to pool 
their sovereignty in this area, and as they have transferred competence to the Community in the 
area of refugee law so, it is submitted, their international obligations should now be those of the 
EU. Indeed Article 20 of the Qualifications Directive, that provides the general rules for the 
application of Chapter VII entitled “Content of International Protection” and in which Article 24 
on residence permits and Article 32 on freedom of movement in the Member State are contained, 
states that Chapter VII is without prejudice to the rights laid down in the Geneva Convention. It 
is submitted therefore that the lack of EU free movement rights for refugees or, at least, the right 
to choose a place of residence, violates Article 26 of the Geneva Convention. The alternative 
argument to this of course is that the MSs have retained their sovereignty to determine entry to 
their national territory. On that basis there is no contradiction with international law. 
 
There are also restrictions on the freedom of movement that appear to produce contradictions 
with the SBC, especially over the removal of internal border controls, and freedom to travel. The 
removal of internal border controls means that any person, whether a TCN or a citizen of the 
Union, is able to cross the EU’s internal borders without having their travel documents checked. 
Freedom of movement, however, is heavily curtailed for TCNs, especially if they are asylum-
seekers or beneficiaries of certain international protection and thus appearing to contradict the 
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removal of internal borders. It is submitted though that this is a situation where the apparent 
contradiction is actually tension as the SBC deals with a specific issue and does not go out of its 
way to put limitations on the right to freedom of movement. The second situation concerns the 
apparent contradiction between the right to free movement specified in Article 61(a)EC, that 
appears to be a general right applicable to all, the SBC removing internal border controls and the 
common visa policy that limits the right to travel between MSs for TCNs to a maximum of three 
months with a short term visa. However, on closer reflection these contradictions are indeed 
tensions with a general free movement principle, a limited freedom to travel for TCNs and no 
checks required on these persons at internal borders. 
 
Finally a contradiction is detected within the principle of the freedom of movement of persons, a 
stand alone principle that provides a freedom to persons that is not limited by any notions of 
citizens of the EU, TCNs or specific groups of TCNs (see Chapter II for a discussion on the 
general right to free movement). However, this general principle applicable to all within the 
territorial borders of the EU, rather than as a global right, has been limited to citizens of the EU 
and their family members, with a significant curtailment of the principle for TCNs by a number 
of legal instruments identified above. Of course this curtailment, and the adoption of the 
legislative measures for that purpose, is a legitimate process of law making. However, this does 
not stop the contradiction from being evident. 
 
The elements of policy formation regarding freedom of movement have already been analysed in 
Chapter II and in the current Chapter and it is not intended to expand further upon those here 
except to point out that the most significant factor in the formation of policy towards free 
movement for TCNs has been the question of national sovereignty. Much of the legislation 
making power has been transferred by the MSs to the EU but the decision taking power over 
freedom of movement for TCNs is retained by the MSs. It could therefore be argued that as it is 
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the MSs that retain operational control of decisions affecting refugees and asylum-seekers then 
freedom of movement should still only operate within the host MS. When this is added to the 
mix then the contradiction between free movement and international law can be reformulated as 
a matter that lies purely within the competence of the MSs, although this can be contested. 
Furthermore the MSs, quite legitimately from this perspective, have retained control over the 
entry of TCNs into their territory. The difficulty with assessing the policy context surrounding 
freedom of movement for TCNs within the EU is its inherent complexity. However, if the matter 
is simplified to asking the question do the limitations on freedom of movement contradict the 
objectives specified in the Tampere Conclusions then this provides the obviously useful insight 
that of course they do. The difficulty then shifts to making suggestions how to remove this 
contradiction. It must be remembered here that formal rationality is value-neutral and thus the 
aim of the Tampere Conclusions to improve the lot of TCNs is not to be considered. Therefore it 
could be suggested that merely rescinding the Tampere Conclusions would remove the 
contradiction. It could be argued that this has, to some extent, already been achieved with the 
Hague Programme that emphasised security as the dominant objective of the AFSJ. However, to 
do this would create significant problems for the other elements of policy formation including 
the economic, security (when viewed as human security), status, human rights and cultural. Thus 
the logical step for the EU, and for the best interests of the MSs, as well as for TCNs, would be 
to loosen the MSs’ control of free movement and entry to a MS’s national territory for TCNs so 
that free movement can be granted in progressive stages depending on the status of the TCN, 
with appropriate controls relaxed as the TCN passes through those stages. 
 
2. INSTRUMENTAL LEGAL RATIONALITY 
 
As it has been observed in Chapter I and Chapter IV, instrumental legal rationality consists of 
two elements: generic; and, specific instrumental rationality. The eight Fullerian factors need to 
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be fulfilled for law to satisfy generic instrumental rationality, or reflect the rule of law, whilst 
specific instrumental rationality provides the sufficiency to the necessary generic elements, 
asking for the legal officials to use appropriate means to achieve specific aims. As with formal 
rationality, issues will be analysed under instrumental rationality in an abstract manner, before 
siting them in their specific policy context to provide useful insights. 
 
The first matter of concern involves the LTR Directive and a number of the issues of 
instrumental rationality. The law of the AFSJ since its introduction by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
has evolved very rapidly, raising concerns over the constancy of the law and through its 
complexity, its clarity. The LTR Directive is designed to provide details of the acquisition of 
LTR status for TCNs and the associated rights. However, its complexity is such that it has 
confused even the most acute legal brains40. The result is that this complexity creates confusion 
and thus problems for the clarity requirement of generic instrumental rationality. Specific 
instrumental rationality consists of three elements, one of which requires that legislative officials 
to promote legitimate ends or goals in a good faith manner or attempt. The goals and objectives 
for TCNs, and LTR TCNs in particular, were contained in the Tampere Conclusions. The LTR 
Directive noted in Recital 2 that the objectives contained in the Tampere Conclusions were to 
approximate the status of LTR TCNs to those of nationals of the MSs and to provide a uniform 
set of rights that were as near as possible to those of EU citizens. However, the failure to include 
TCNs who had obtained international protection, the ability of MSs to derogate from the 
principle of equal treatment in Article 11 and a very limited form of free movement means, it is 
submitted, that the LTR Directive does not come close to meeting the aims of Tampere. The 
question then is to determine if those goals and objectives were promoted in a good faith manner 
or attempt. The legislative history would suggest that this was not the case as the final Directive 
                                                 
40 Peers S., “Implementing Equality? The Directive on Long Term Resident Third Country Nationals”, (2004) 29 
ELR 437 at 458. 
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is a considerably watered down version of the original Commission proposal that aimed to 
implement the Tampere Conclusions and so the Directive is incongruent means to implement the 
aims underlining the policy formation.  
 
The factors dealing with formation of policy for the LTR Directive have been detailed above and 
the complexity of the legislation reflects the complexity of the policy matrix. However, this does 
not condone the over-complexity evident, that impinges especially on the position of LTR 
TCNs. Moreover the failure to fulfil the objectives of the Tampere Conclusions, viewed in a 
purely value-neutral manner as required by instrumental rationality undermines the rule of law 
itself.  It is suggested that the Directive needs to be amended so that it is congruent with the aims 
of the Tampere Conclusions and for its simplification for the benefit of TCNs and academic 
commentators. 
 
The second issue of difficulty lies with a TCN claiming international protection in a MS and 
generality of the law, so that the authorities must apply the law consistently and treat individuals 
in similar positions equally and that like cases are treated alike. It has been claimed by 
McAdam41 that anyone claiming international protection should be treated in the same manner, 
whether they are asylum-seekers, refugees or beneficiaries of subsidiary or temporary protection. 
In particular they should be treated with dignity, their human rights respected and provided with 
a haven until their applications are assessed. However, claimants of international protection are 
treated in different ways in the AFSJ depending on whether they are classified as asylum-
seekers, refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary or temporary protection, or economic immigrants 
and depending in which State an application is made. As such there appears to be a failure of the 
generality of the law as individuals in similar positions may be assessed and granted alternative 
                                                 
41 Op. Cit. n.19 at 90 and McAdam J., “The European Union Qualification Directive: The Creation of a Subsidiary 
Protection Regime”, (2005) 18 IJRL 461 at 497. 
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status that can lead to different treatment. This is even more marked across the different MSs as 
the legislative instruments are Directives with considerable discretion for implementation by the 
MSs. Furthermore Recital 3 of the Qualifications Directive states that the Geneva Convention is 
the cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees but as examined 
in Chapter V the Directive is incongruent with this aim as the legislative provisions do not 
comply with the Geneva Convention. 
 
The factors involved with policy formation for international protection are correctly stated by 
Recital 3 of the Qualifications Directive to be dominated by the requirements of the Geneva 
Convention. Thus for claims for refugee status the treatment of TCNs must regulated by the 
provisions of the Geneva Convention. The incongruence of the Qualifications Directive with the 
Geneva Convention should be rectified by amending the Directive as soon as possible. However, 
the claim by McAdam that all claimants for international protection should be treated equally is 
not as clear cut. The first thing to note is the Qualifications Directive is a welcome legal 
instrument as it provides complimentary protection to TCNs who do not satisfy the criteria for 
refugee status. As such the Geneva Convention does not cover the international legal regulation 
of these individuals, and a similar stance can be fashioned for the Temporary protection 
Directive. Therefore an individual whose circumstances enable them to be classified as a refugee 
claimant is not the same as someone who can only claim subsidiary protection, or temporary 
protection. The different status that the individual can establish means that not all international 
protection is alike and therefore it is incorrect to claim there is a lack of generality here in the 
law. 
 
The third issue is the difficulty for generic and specific instrumental rationality with determining 
the country responsible for assessing an asylum application initially under the Dublin 
Convention but now in the Dublin Regulation. For generic instrumental rationality the law as 
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officially declared should be congruent with the law as administered in practice. The reported 
practices of the national authorities42 create significant incongruences with the law as officially 
declared in the Dublin Regulation, thereby producing a major conflict in the rule of law. The 
second factor in specific instrumental rationality is the use of the most effective legal technique 
to achieve societal ends by legal officials, ensuring that the function of the legal act matches its 
effect. As outlined in Chapter V, the Dublin Convention did not satisfy this requirement, and 
although the Dublin Regulation is an improvement, it is submitted that many of the inherent 
weaknesses of the Dublin Convention are carried over into the Dublin Regulation. 
 
The elements associated with policy formation for the Dublin Regulation are spelt out above in 
the section on formal rationality. It is obvious from the evolution of the Dublin Regulation from 
the Dublin Convention that the principles that it utilises are considered to be essential to achieve 
the policy objectives that the MSs and the Commission have set for it. However, the major 
problem that must be overcome is the one identified by Blake43 about the Dublin Convention 
and supported by Kok44 on the Dublin Regulation in that it simply does not work. It is suggested 
therefore that significant investment is made in the national authorities running the national 
apparatus by the MSs. This however will not be enough to rectify the worries over the rule of 
law. There must also be a significant expansion in a supranational supervision of the national 
authorities to encompass the impartation of best practice, training of officials, the reliable 
collection of comprehensive statistics and an effective database on circumstances, particularly 
human rights abuses, in third countries. 
 
                                                 
42 Op. Cit. n.3 Kok. 
43 Blake N., “The Dublin Convention and Rights of Asylum Seekers in the European Union” in Guild E., Harlow C. 
(Eds.), Implementing Amsterdam: Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law, Hart Publishing, 2001 95 at 95. 
44 Op. Cit. n.3. 
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The fourth issue involves the Protocols on Article 14EC, Title IV of the EC Treaty and 
Schengen that created the opt outs for the UK and Ireland from the removal of internal border 
controls and Title IV of the EC Treaty unless they opt in, and the complex position of Denmark 
following negotiation of its own Protocol at the Treaty of Amsterdam. The result of such 
complexity apart from a lack of clarity means that the law will be applied inconsistently. 
Furthermore cases in these States will be treated differently to those in the Schengenland States 
even where the factual position is exactly the same and are thus “like” cases. These problematic 
consequences become even clearer when considering the jurisdiction of the ECJ to give a 
preliminary ruling under Article 35TEU, as some MSs’ courts will not be able to make a 
reference to the ECJ, some MSs’ courts will be able to make a reference depending on the needs 
of the case, and some MSs’ courts will only be able to make a reference if it is the highest court 
in the land. Even in the latter situation this court might decide not to make a reference and 
decide to apply the law according to its own national rules45. This is also evident from Article 
68EC where the jurisdiction of the Court is also curtailed. Where there is confusion over when a 
preliminary reference to the ECJ can be made, national courts, sometimes at the same level and 
in the same country, can come to inconsistent judgments46 that also lack logic and generality. 
 
The policy factors involved here are, as with most issues involving migration, complex and 
entangled. The first element is legal as the UK, Ireland and Denmark have not transferred their 
sovereignty over the matters covered to the EU and therefore they remain competence to 
determine their own law in this area. As such the UK and Ireland are able to opt-in to the 
measures that they choose, whereas Denmark opts in not at a supranational level but at an 
international level. It can be argued therefore that although situations may arise that appear on 
                                                 
45 See Re Constitutionality of German Law Implementing the Framework Decision on a European Arrest Warrant 
(2BvR 2236/04) [2006] 1 CMLR 16. 
46 Ibid. and decision of the German Constitutional Court of 24 November 2005, 2 BvR 1667/05 (no English 
translation) 
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the facts to be the same, they cannot be, as these MSs have retained their sovereignty in this area 
in comparison to the Schengen States. However, this does not negate the problem with the lack 
of generality of the judgments from the ECJ under Articles 35TEU and 68EC and it is submitted 
the lack of generality over rulings for the UK, Ireland and Denmark. The logical suggestion to 
ensure that the rule of law is applied is for the limitations to the ECJ’s jurisdiction to be 
removed, a positive outcome reflected partially in the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.  Article 
275TFEU continues to deny jurisdiction to the ECJ over the common foreign and security policy 
but Art 276TEU provides the Court with jurisdiction over the AFSJ except for operational police 
matters and questions over national security. 
 
The fifth issue concerns inconsistency between the EAW Framework Decision and its 
application by MSs’ national courts such that the third element of specific instrumental 
rationality, that considers the judiciary’s different ideologies and personal agendas when 
interpreting the law, is engaged. It is not unreasonable to acknowledge that the judges of the ECJ 
comply with this element when utilising their teleological approach to interpretation. However, 
the different interpretations of the EAW Framework Decision and national implementing 
measures, by national judges, suggests that this is an area of concern when there is little 
guidance provided by the ECJ. This is not a criticism of the ECJ but of the legislative measures 
that limit the jurisdiction of the Court and thereby create the possibility of interpretative 
problems. This concern is particularly evident when interpreting the principle of supremacy47. 
This situation will only be resolved when the ECJ has comprehensive jurisdiction (see above). 
 
The final issue involving a series of instruments that causes concern for the specific instrumental 
rationality requirement that the most effective legal techniques are used to achieve societal ends 
                                                 
47 See Albi A., “Supremacy of EC Law in the New Member States: Bringing Parliaments into the Equation of ‘Co-
operative Constitutionalism’”, (2007) 3 Eu Const LR 25. 
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by legal officials, are the common visa policy and carrier sanctions and their effect on illegal 
immigration. One of the targeted areas of Community policy on illegal immigration is human 
smuggling and trafficking48. However, the common visa policy and carrier sanctions force 
asylum-seekers or those claiming international protection, the majority being desperate people in 
desperate circumstances, into the arms of the human smugglers to elicit their illegal entry into 
the EU. Thus asylum becomes criminalised even though it is included as a fundamental right in 
Article 18 of the Charter. 
 
The question of criminality and the policy characteristics associated with it are not part of the 
subject of this thesis. However, a brief word must be said on this issue as it does impinge upon 
the rule of law. The first element is a legal one, namely that Article 31 of the Geneva 
Convention requires those entering the territory to claim refugee status to not be criminalised by 
having penalties imposed upon them for crossing the nation’s borders. Furthermore Article 18 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides that a “right to asylum shall be guaranteed with 
respect to the rules of the Geneva Convention”. The strengthening of the external borders of the 
EU and elongating the supply lines of asylum through carrier sanctions and common visa policy 
simply means that more asylum-seekers become involved in human trafficking, the elimination 
of which is an EU objective. The policy of criminalising the asylum supply chain undermines 
the aim of eliminating human trafficking. A suggestion made by Goodwin-Gill49 is to 
decriminalise the asylum system, thereby removing the supply of human beings into the arms of 
the human  traffickers. The consequence would be to treat asylum-seekers humanely and remove 
the modern form of human slavery. 
 
 
                                                 
48 See Commission Communication on policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of third-country 
nationals, COM(2006) 402 final. 
49 Goodwin-Gill G.S., “The International Protection of Refugees: What Future?” (2000) 12 IJRL 1 at 6. 
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3. SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL RATIONALITY 
 
Substantive rationality requires that all rules of law must be based on good reasons so that legal 
doctrine can be sustained on plausible empirical facts and that the underlying principle can be 
justifiable or legitimate. Such justification takes place through the application of standards of 
fairness recognised by the community. As fairness is value-laden then the standards envisaged 
must be moral through the application of human rights norms within the Community. Such 
human rights norms are possessed by individuals on the basis of their innate humanity. 
 
The position of TCNs in the AFSJ is disturbing when considered against human rights norms. 
The violation of both the Geneva Convention and the ECHR by the legislative instruments that 
have been adopted, and the accompanying practices of chain refoulement, refugees in orbit and 
possible breaches of individual human rights that the formulated instruments and policies, if not 
encourage, then at least condone, signify a marked lack of regard for TCNs as human beings 
with innate human rights. The material reception conditions in the Receptions Directive50 are 
designated as the minimum required to ensure the dignity of the asylum-seeker (Article 13). 
However the MSs are authorised to withdraw the material reception conditions, except for 
emergency medical care, in the event of digressions by a TCN, that can include the TCN 
exercising his freedom of movement. This means that the withdrawal of the minimum reception 
conditions must breach the statement that “[h]uman dignity is inviolable” (Article 1 Charter) and 
could lead to the risk of the individual becoming destitute in breach of Article 3ECHR51. As 
Article 1 of the Charter goes on to hold that human dignity must be respected and protected then 
it is difficult to see how this provision satisfies human rights norms. Indeed the effect is to treat 
                                                 
50 Council Directive 2003/9/EC laying down the minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, O.J. 2003 
L31/18 Article 3. 
51 See R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Limbuela, Tesema & Adam [2006] 1 AC 396; 
noted Mackenzie A., “Case Comment”, [2006] EHRLR 67 and Hardiman-McCartney A., “Absolutely Right: 
Providing Asylum Seekers with Food and Shelter under Article 3”, (2006) 65 CLJ 4. 
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TCNs, or more particularly asylum-seekers, as less than human. This dehumanisation of TCNs 
can be characterised in the amalgamation of the term asylum/refugee and immigration, in 
particular when dealing with illegal immigration and the return of “illegal” immigrants to third 
countries, and the utilisation of the terms “flood”, “swamped” or “invasion” in common parlance 
to describe immigration. The result is the failure not only to protect the human rights of TCNs 
but to fail to respect their human rights or even their humanity. This violates the requirements of 
substantive rationality where human rights of individuals must be protected through the human 
rights norms of the Community.  
 
As has been established already the central tenet of substantive rationality is value-laden. The 
difference that substantive rationality makes when compared to formal or instrumental rationality 
is that the value-laden nature of the concept requires the improvement of the position of TCNs as 
a voluntary commitment made by the MSs at the European Council meeting at Tampere in 1999. 
The suggestion then from this voluntary commitment must be to establish a human rights regime 
for the EU that is comprehensive in coverage of both material and personal scope that treats 
TCNs as human beings with human rights and not as dehumanised people. The danger here is 
apparent and can be traced back to the foundations of the EU in the human rights atrocities of the 
Second World War. The current lack of legal effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 
inability of the Community or the Union to accede to the ECHR52 exacerbates the situation and 
fails to provide the necessary framework for the protection of human beings as innate human 
beings. Through the Lisbon Treaty giving legal effect to the Charter (Article 6(1)TEU), as well 
as providing authority for the EU to accede to the ECHR (Article 6(2)TEU) then this will go 
some way to alleviating this human rights lacuna. However, it may take some time before the 
effects are felt in a change in legislative attitude. 
 
                                                 
52 See Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
The evaluation of the legislative instruments adopted under the AFSJ establishes that there are 
failings of formal, instrumental and substantive legal rationality, that are further emphasised 
when those findings are positioned within the policy matrix. The significant themes that emerge 
can be grouped under four major headings: discrimination; international law; human rights; and, 
Tampere Conclusions, the lack of legal rationality in each call into question the political 
legitimacy of the EU polity itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 4 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
FREE MOVEMENT RIGHTS BASED ON ASSOCIATION 
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE EC AND THIRD COUNTRIES 
 
The thesis, as constructed in preceding chapters, has examined the rights of TCNs that flow 
directly from the EC Treaty and legislative measures implementing the provisions of it. The 
Community has also concluded a large number of international agreements with an array of third 
countries, some of which grant direct rights to the nationals of those third countries. These rights 
do not flow directly from the EC Treaty but indirectly through an agreement negotiated with a 
legal base in the EC Treaty.  There is no uniform rationale that applies to the negotiation of these 
agreements as each are entered into for reasons specific to that State and its relationship with the 
EU. Thus an agreement could be concluded with a European State with the aim of eventually 
acceding to the Union, or the State concerned might not satisfy the criteria for accession to the 
EU1 but is strategically important because of its geographical, cultural or historical relationship 
with the EU, a group of States in the EU or just a single EU MS. It is not the aim of this thesis to 
carry out a definitive analysis of all these agreements2, but to investigate a number of them and 
to highlight the disparities within them for the right of free movement for TCNs. Therefore this 
chapter will briefly outline the procedural aspects of agreement formation and the interpretative 
principals of the ECJ before analysing the different agreements in a roughly descending 
hierarchical order of free movement rights. 
                                                 
1 Article 49TEU states that “[a]ny European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to 
become a member of the Union.” 
2 See Martin D., Guild E., Free Movement of Persons in the European Union, Butterworths, 1996 and Rogers N., 
Scannell R., Free Movement of Persons in the Enlarged European Union, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005. 
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1. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENTS 
 
Article 281EC provides the Community with legal personality. As such Article 310EC gives the 
Community specific external competence to conclude ‘association’ agreements with third 
countries that include “reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure”. 
Article 300EC lays down the procedure that applies for the conclusion and implementation of 
agreements concluded under Article 310EC that will be binding both on Community institutions 
and MSs3. The provisions of these agreements form an integral part of the Community legal 
system4 and the ECJ has jurisdiction to interpret them in order to ensure uniform application 
throughout the Community5. They have been interpreted by the ECJ on a significant number of 
occasions, with the frequency of referrals over the free movement of persons provisions 
increasing as Community immigration has become more attractive. However, even where the 
terms used in an agreement are the same as those used in the EC Treaty, the understanding of 
such terms in the EC Treaty may not be directly transposed onto those of the international 
agreement, as the purpose, objective and spirit of the agreement may be different6. The four 
categories of agreement to be analysed provide different levels of free movement rights that, 
initially appears to depend only on the nationality of the individual concerned. However, this is 
merely one of the factors that is dependent on the purpose and objective of the agreement. 
 
2. AGREEMENT ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA7 
 
                                                 
3 Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641 at para.11. 
4 Case 181/73 Haegeman v. Belgium [1974] ECR 449 at 459; Ibid. at para.13. See Cheyne I., “International 
Agreements and the European Community Legal System”, (1994) 19 ELR 581. 
5 Ibid. at para.14. See Karayigit M.T., “Why and to What Extent a Common Interpretative Position for Mixed 
Agreements?” (2006) 11 EFAR 445. 
6 Case 270/80 Polydor Ltd. and RSO Records Inc. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd. and Simons Records Ltd. [1982] 
ECR 329 at paras.15-18. 
7 O.J. 1994 L1 and Decision 1/95, O.J. 1995 L86/58 on Liechtenstein accession. 
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The EEA Agreement is, to date, the most ambitious Association Agreement concluded by the 
Community and MSs with third countries under Article 310EC8. Initially concluded with 
Austria, Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Iceland in October 1991 and coming into force on 1 
January 1994, the first three countries subsequently joined the Community, whilst Liechtenstein 
signed up to the EEA Agreement. Therefore the nationals of Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein 
remain subject to the provisions of the EEA Agreement. Nationals of Austria, Sweden and 
Finland who remain in those countries and who wish to enforce their EEA rights that arose 
before accession to the Community must bring an action in their national courts that then refer 
questions to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court9, rather than the ECJ. 
Substantively Article 1(2)EEA specifies the four freedoms, including the free movement of 
persons, as objectives of the EEA that are implemented by the provisions in Part III, entitled 
‘Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital’. Although the wording of these measures is 
slightly different to that of the EC Treaty it is submitted that such differences are inconsequential 
and are necessitated by a requirement to set in place the free movement of persons without 
subsequent implementing legislation. Thus nationals of EEA MSs have the same rights to free 
movement of workers, social security10, freedom of establishment11, and freedom to provide 
services12 as those of citizens of the Union throughout the EEA. Furthermore Article 4EEA 
prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality in the same words as that of Article 12EC. 
 
The EEA Agreement is built on two pillars of equal standing: the EC pillar; and, the EFTA 
pillar. To resolve disputes between these pillars, and the pillars and MSs, the original plan was to 
                                                 
8 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079 at para.2. 
9 Case C-321/97 Ulla-Brith Andersson and Susanne WÊakerÊas-Anderson v. Swedish State [1999] ECR I-3551 at 
paras.28-31. 
10 Case E-3/04 Athanasios v. Norway [2004] EFTA Court Report 97. 
11 Case E-3/98 Rainford-Towning v. Liechtenstein [1998] EFTA Court Report 205, Case E-2/01 Pucher v. 
Liechtenstein [2002] EFTA Court Report 44, Case E-8/04 EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Liechtenstein [2005] 
EFTA Court Report 48, Case E-1/06 EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Norway [2007] EFTA Court Report 7 and 
Case E-3/06 Ladbrokes Ltd. v. Norway [2007] EFTA Court Report 86. 
12 Case E-1/03 EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland [2003] EFTA Court Report 143. See also Case E-1/07 
Criminal Proceedings Against A [2007] EFTA Court Report 245. 
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create an EEA Court staffed by three judges from the EFTA States and two ECJ judges13. 
However, the ECJ rejected this approach in Opinion 1/9114 and so the EFTA court was created15 
to rule on matters dealing with the EFTA pillar. This reformulation of the Court structure won 
approval from the ECJ in Opinion 1/9216. 
 
The aim of the EEA Agreement, as laid down in Article 1(1), is to create a dynamic and 
homogenous EEA supported by the twin pillars of the EC and EFTA. As Forman17 notes this is 
based on a free trade agreement although both the CFI and the EFTA Court has subsequently 
concluded that it is one stage further than this18 although it is not a customs union and has no 
external competence. Indeed the EFTA Court in Sveinbjörnsdóttir19 has concluded that the “EEA 
Agreement is an international treaty sui generis which contains a distinct legal order of its own” 
although there has been no “transfer of legislative powers”20. On the basis of the latter point the 
ECJ in Opinion 1/9121 inferred that the principles of primacy and direct effect did not apply to 
the EEA Agreement when applied in the Community or the EFTA States. However, since then 
the CFI in Opel Austria22 has found a provision in the EEA Agreement to be sufficiently clear, 
precise and unconditional to have direct effect in the Community and in its first ruling the EFTA 
                                                 
13 Baudenbacher C., “The EFTA Court – An Example of the Judicialisation of International Economic Law”, (2003) 
28 ELR 880 at 881 and “The EFTA Court: An Actor in the European Judicial Dialogue”, (2005) 28 Fordham 
International Law Journal 353. 
14 Op. Cit. n.8 at para.51. See Brandtner B., “The Drama of the ‘EEA’: Comments on Opinions 1/91 and 1/92” 
(1992) 3 EJIL 300 for a full analysis of Opinion 1/91. 
15 EEA Agreement Article 108(2) and Part IV of the Surveillance and Court Agreement (SCA), O.J. 1994 L344/3. 
16 Opinion 1/92 [1992] ECR I-2821. 
17 Forman J., “The EEA Agreement Five Years On: Dynamic Homogeneity in Practice and its Implementation by 
the Two EEA Courts”, (1999) 36 CMLRev 751 at 755. 
18 Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v. Council of the European Union [1997] ECR II-39 at para.107 “the EEA 
Agreement involves a high degree of integration, with objectives which exceed those of a mere free trade 
agreement”; Case E-2/97 Mag Instrument Inc. v. California Trading Company (Maglite) [1997] EFTA Court Report 
127 at para.27 “the aim of the EEA Agreement…is to create a fundamentally improved free trade area”; Case E-
9/97 Erla Maria Sveinbjörnsdóttir v. Iceland [1998] EFTA Court Report 95 at para.59 “the EEA 
Agreement…establish[es]…an enhanced free trade area”; noted Eyjólfsson M., “Case Note”, (2000) 37 CMLRev 
191. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. at para.63. 
21 Op. Cit. n.8 at paras.20-22. 
22 Op. Cit. n.18 T-115/94 at para. 102. 
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Court in Restamark23 found that Article 16EEA was unconditional and sufficiently precise for 
Protocol 3524 to apply25. Furthermore the EFTA Court in Sveinbjörnsdóttir26 has held that the 
principle of state liability is applicable in EFTA States. Much academic debate has surrounded 
the context of primacy and direct effect within the EEA27. It is submitted that for the EEA 
Agreement to achieve its objectives throughout the EEA, the provisions must be capable of being 
relied on by individuals in their own national courts. The ruling in Sveinbjörnsdóttir and two 
Recitals of the Preamble supports this supposition. First, Recital 8 stresses the importance of the 
individuals’ role in the EEA “through the exercise of the rights conferred upon them by this 
Agreement and through the judicial defence of these rights”. Second, Recital 15 determines that 
there is to be equal treatment of individuals with regard to the four freedoms. Thus for 
individuals to enforce their rights the EEA Agreement must create a new legal order in which it 
has primacy over national law and individuals in national courts may rely on provisions within it. 
The EFTA Court has confirmed this position in Einarsson28 and examined the criteria for state 
liability in Karlsson29. 
 
Although some of the terms used in the EEA Agreement are identically worded to those used in 
the EC Treaty, the understanding of such terms in the EC Treaty may not be directly transposed 
onto those of this international agreement. Rather, as with the other Association Agreements 
                                                 
23 Case E-1/94 Ravintoloitsijain Lüton Kustannus Oy Restamark [1994] EFTA Court Report 1 at para.80. 
24 Protocol 35 to the EEA Agreement requires EFTA States to introduce a statutory provision to the effect that 
implemented EEA rules are to take primacy over conflicting domestic statutory provisions. 
25 The Court did not actually state that Article 16 had direct effect. 
26 Op. Cit. n.8 Case E-9/97 at para. 63. 
27 Those against include Laredo A.T., “The EEA Agreement: an Overall View”, (1992) 29 CMLRev 1199 at 1206; 
Cremona M., “The “Dynamic and Homogenous” EEA: Byzantine Structures and Variable Geometry”, (1994) 19 
ELR 508 at 519-522. Those for include van Gerven W., “The Genesis of EEA Law and the Principles of Primacy 
and Direct Effect” (1993) 16 Fordham International Law Journal 955 at 967-989; Sevon L., Johansson M., “The 
Protection of the Rights of Individuals under the EEA Agreement”, (1999) 24 ELR 373. Those sitting on the fence 
include O’Keefe D., “The Agreement on the European Economic Area” (1992) 19(1) LIEI 1; Op. Cit. n.17. 
28 Case E-1/01 Einarsson v. Iceland [2002] EFTA Court Report 1 at paras.53-55. See also Op. Cit. n.12 Case E-1/07 
at paras.37-39. 
29 Case E-4/01 Karlsson v, Iceland [2002] EFTA Court Report 240. See Graver H.P., “Mission Impossible: 
Supranationality and National Legal Autonomy in the EEA Agreement”, (2002) 7 EFAR 73. See also Case E-8/07 
Nguyen v. Norway, judgment of 20 June 2008, nyr. 
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already discussed, the purpose, objective and spirit of the agreement must first be considered30. 
However, under Article 6EEA, if the provisions of the EEA Agreement are identically worded to 
those of the EC Treaty then they will be interpreted in accordance with the ECJ’s jurisprudence 
given prior to the signature of the Agreement31. Furthermore there is a need to ensure that the 
provisions of the EEA Agreement that are identical in substance to the EC Treaty are interpreted 
uniformly32. However, as there is no requirement to follow the jurisprudence decided after the 
date of signature, then the Polydor formula will continue to apply. A court or tribunal of an 
EFTA State is entitled to make a preliminary reference to the EFTA Court for interpretation of 
the EEA Agreement, although national law can limit this to a court or tribunal from which there 
is no judicial remedy (Article 34SCA). However, to ensure the uniformity of the application of 
EC law, Protocol 34 to the EEA Agreement enables a court or tribunal of an EFTA State to make 
a preliminary reference to the ECJ for interpretation where the provisions of the EEA Agreement 
and the EC Treaty are identically worded. 
 
The EEA Agreement extends much of the Community legislation and protection of that 
legislation to certain third countries without the obligation on these States to join the Union. In 
particular rights to freedom of movement are identical for EEA nationals as they are for EU 
citizens. This appears to be a remarkable situation considering that the three countries involved 
are not MSs of the Union and indeed the citizens of Norway have rejected the chance to join the 
Union twice in referenda in 1972 and 1994. However, the EEA Agreement remains limited to the 
creation of an EFTA between the EEA States and the EU and the EFTA States are isolated from 
the decision-making process of EC legislation. It can be argued that the States involved are 
integral European States that historically should be integrated as fully as possible into the “ever 
                                                 
30 Ibid. at para.14; Op. Cit. n.6. 
31 Case C-286/02 Bellio F.Illi Srl v. Prefettura di Treviso [2004] ECR I-3465 at para.34 
32 See Case C-452/01 Ospelt v. Schlössle Weissenberg Familienstiftung [2003] ECR I-9743 at para.29, E-1/03 
EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland [2003] EFTA Court Report 143 at para.27. See also Ibid. at para.34 and 
Case C-471/04 Finanzamt Offenbach am Main-Land v. Keller Holding [2006] ECR I-2107 at para.48. 
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closer Union amongst the peoples of Europe” and as they are reasonably small then it is probably 
in the best interests of the Union and the EFTA States. On the other hand they have chosen 
positively not to join the Union and it must be questioned why their citizens should receive the 
same free movement rights as EU citizens. 
 
3. EEC-TURKEY ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT AND COUNCIL DECISIONS33 
 
The EEC-Turkey Association Agreement or ‘Ankara’ Agreement was concluded in 196334 with 
the aim of establishing a customs union35 as a preliminary to Turkey’s membership of the 
Community36. Article 6 empowered an Association Council to take appropriate measures for the 
fulfilment of the Agreement’s obligations. The resulting Decisions of the Association Council 
are international legal instruments that must be brought within Community law by the enactment 
of implementing Community legislation, usually in the form of a Regulation. Article 12 – 14 
envisaged that the Contracting Parties would be guided by the EC Treaty’s provisions on the free 
movement of workers, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services in order to 
secure progressively freedom of movement of workers and abolish restrictions on freedoms of 
establishment and provision of services.  
 
In 1970 a Protocol37 was added to the Agreement that set out arrangements and the timescale for 
the establishment of the customs union. Article 9 set out the principle of non-discrimination on 
                                                 
33 For full details and analysis see Rogers N., A Practitioners’ Guide to the EC-Turkey Association Agreement, 
Kluwer Law International, 2000; Cicekli B., “The Rights of Turkish Migrants in Europe Under International Law 
and EU Law”, (1999) 33 IMR 300. 
34 Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, O.J. 1973 
C113/2. 
35 Ibid. Articles 2 and 10. 
36 Ibid. Recital 4 of the Preamble and Article 28. 
37 Additional Protocol, O.J. 1973 C113/18. 
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the basis of nationality, that referred to Article [12]EC (ex-Art.7EEC). In Sema Sürül38, the ECJ 
appeared to give a wide interpretation to the provision, equating it with ex-Article 7EEC. 
Advocate General La Pergola, in his second Opinion in the case, suggested that Article 9 had 
direct effect39. Although the ECJ by inference agreed with the Advocate General40 it did not 
comment directly on this matter. Advocate General Colomer in Kochak41 noted that Article 9 
was similar to ex-Article 7EEC in that it only applied where there was no more specific non-
discrimination rule. This was confirmed by the ECJ in Öztürk42 although the matter of the direct 
effect of Article 9 remains to be judicially confirmed. 
 
Other provisions included a standstill clause for services and establishment in Article 41(1) that 
the ECJ in Savas43 declared was directly effective. The Court made it clear that Article 41(1) 
“precludes a MS from adopting any new measure having the object or effect of making the 
establishment, and, as a corollary, the residence of a Turkish national in its territory subject to 
stricter conditions than those which applied at the time when the Additional Protocol entered into 
force with regard to the MS concerned”44. In Abatay45 the Court held that the same interpretation 
applied to the freedom to provide services. However, Article 41(1) did not encroach upon the 
competence of the MSs to regulate entry to their territory and conditions for taking up first 
employment. Article 41(1) regulated the situation where Turkish workers were already 
integrated into the work force46. In Tum and Dari47 two men claimed asylum in the UK and were 
                                                 
38 Case C-262/96 Sema Sürül v. Bundestantalt für Arbeit [1999] ECR I-2685 at para.64; noted Verschueren H., “The 
Sürül Judgment: Equal Treatment for Turkish Workers in Matters of Social Security”, (1999) 1 EJML 371. 
39 Ibid. at p.2729-2733. 
40 Op. Cit. n.38 at para.68. 
41 Joined Cases C-102 & 211/98 Ibrahim Kocak v. Landesversicherungsanstalt Oberfranken und Mittelfranken and 
Ramazan Örs v. Bundesknappschaft [2000] ECR I-1287 at 1298. 
42 Case C-373/02 Sarah Öztürk v. Pensionsversicherungsanstalt der Arbeiter [2004] ECR I-3605 at para.49. 
43 Case C-37/98 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Abdulnasir Savas [2000] ECR I-2927 at 
paras.46-54. See Ott A., “The Savas Case – Analogies between Turkish Self-Employed and Workers?” (2000) 2 
EJML 445. 
44 Ibid. at para.69. 
45 Joined Cases C-317 & 369/01 Erin Abatay & Nadi Sahin v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [2003] ECR I-12301 at 
paras.66-68. 
46 Op. Cit. n.43 at para.58 and Ibid. at para.63. 
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restricted or prohibited from taking employment. They both set up businesses in the UK and 
applied to enter the UK, after their asylum applications were rejected, in a self-employed 
capacity. In Advocate General Geelhoed’s Opinion48 the rules applicable to entry of Turkish 
nationals onto the territory of a MS remained exclusively within the competence of the MSs. 
Thus the UK rules fell outside the material scope of Article 41(1) and the UK was free to adapt, 
liberalise or make more restrictive these entry rules49. Rogers50 criticised this Opinion as 
appearing to undermine the ECJ’s judgment in Savas. The ECJ delivered its judgment on 20 
September 2007 and began first by stating that Mr Tum and Mr Dari were regarded, by national 
legislation, as not having entered the UK, as their physical presence on the UK’s territory did not 
amount to actual clearance for entry to the UK51. The Court then reaffirmed its previous case law 
on Article 41(1)52 before holding that the previous case law did not refer expressly to the first 
admission of Turkish nationals into the territory of the host MS53 and the ECJ in Savas and 
Abatay had not ruled on this issue as the two men in these cases had actually entered the territory 
of the MSs concerned54. Returning to that previous case law, the Court found that the ‘standstill’ 
clause in Article 41(1), and Article 41(1) itself, was incapable of conferring upon a Turkish 
national a right of establishment, a corollary right of residence or a right of first entry into the 
territory of a MS but it prohibited MSs from introducing any new measures that would either 
have the objective or the effect of making the establishment of Turkish nationals subject to 
stricter conditions that those in force at the time that the Protocol came into force in the MS, 
which for the UK was 1 January 197355. The ECJ concluded this part of the judgment by holding 
                                                                                                                                                             
47 Case C-16/05 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Veli Tum and Mehmet Dari [2007] ECR 
I-7415. 
48 Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Ibid. 
49 Ibid. at para.59. This appears to be in line with the reasoning of LJ Sedley in R (on the Application of A) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 3 CMLR 14 at para.12. 
50 Rogers N., “Turkish Association Agreement Applications – A Myriad of Problems and Some Solutions”, (2006) 
20 Journal of Immigration Asylum and Nationality Law 283 at 286. 
51 Op. Cit. n.47 at para.45 
52 Ibid. at paras.46-49. 
53 Ibid. at para.50. 
54 Ibid. at para.51. 
55 Ibid. at paras.52-53. 
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that Article 41(1) did not have the effect of conferring on Turkish nationals a right of entry into 
the territory of a MS, as no such positive right could be inferred from Community rules currently 
applicable, and it remained governed by national rules. Therefore the ‘standstill’ clause did not 
operate in the same way as a substantive rule by rendering inapplicable the law it replaced but 
operated as a quasi-procedural law that stipulated, on a temporary basis, the MS’s legislative 
provisions that must be referred to when assessing the freedom of establishment of a Turkish 
national in a MS56. The Court dismissed the UK’s assertion that the ‘standstill’ clause called into 
question the competence of a MS to conduct its national immigration policy as it simply limited 
MSs’ room to manoeuvre not undermined their sovereign competence in respect of aliens. The 
Court also pointed out that Article 41(1) refers in a general way to new restrictions inter alia on 
the freedom of establishment, so does not restrict its scope of application, like Article 13 of 
Decision 1/80, and ensures that no further obstructions to the gradual implementation of freedom 
of establishment are adopted. Thus the ‘standstill’ clause is also applicable to rules relating to the 
first admission of Turkish nationals into a MS where they intend to exercise their freedom of 
establishment, and it is irrelevant whether the Turkish national is legally resident or not at the 
time of the application for establishment57. Finally the ECJ rejected the UK argument that 
allowing failed asylum-seekers to rely on Article 41(1) was tantamount to endorsing fraud or 
abuse, as there was no evidence that Mr Tum or Mr Dari were acting fraudulently, were using 
the ‘standstill’ clause with the sole aim of wrongfully benefiting from advantages provided for 
by Community law, the protection of a legitimate national interest, such as public policy, public 
security or public health, was at issue or the scope of Article 41(1) was restricted by excluding 
failed asylum-seekers58. 
 
                                                 
56 Ibid. at paras.54-55. 
57 Ibid. at paras.59-63. 
58 Ibid. at paras.64-68. 
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The judgment in Tum and Dari confirms the previous case law on Article 41(1) and significantly 
extends the ‘standstill’ provision in Article 41(1) to rules on the first admission of Turkish 
nationals to a MS’s territory. The Court notably does not follow Advocate General Geelhoed’s 
Opinion and instead forges a teleological path advocated by Rogers59. The implications are that 
the rules on first entry to a MS must be those that were in place at the time of the Protocol taking 
effect in the MS concerned, which in the UK’s case would be 1 January 1973, when the Turkish 
national applies to exercise the right to freedom of establishment60. This must also be the case if 
a Turkish national is exercising the freedom to provide services as Article 41(1) also covers 
services but does not apply to the free movement of workers. For workers there is no standstill 
clause in the Protocol and Article 13 of Decision 1/80 only provides a standstill on the conditions 
of access to employment. Furthermore because Article 41(1) is not limited like Article 13 is to 
“legally resident and employed” workers and their families then the legality of the entry of the 
Turkish national cannot be taken into consideration when assessing the application to exercise 
the right of freedom of establishment, or to provide services. Finally so long as a failed Turkish 
asylum-seeker does not claim the right to freedom of establishment fraudulently then the fact 
that their asylum application has been rejected cannot be used as evidence of fraud or abuse of 
the system. In effect the ECJ is refusing to criminalise asylum-seekers. However, in a series of 
cases61 before UK courts the failure of an asylum claim has been considered to be an aspect of 
fraud or abuse with ‘false’ asylum applications being equated with fraud62. This appears contrary 
to the position taken by the ECJ in Tum and Dari.  
 
                                                 
59 Op. Cit. n.50. 
60 This implication is applied in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Aldogan [2007] EWHC 
2586 (Admin) at para.14. 
61 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Taskale [2006] EWHC 712 (Admin), R. v. Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, ex parte Aksoy [2006] EWHC 1487 (Admin) and R. v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, ex parte Temiz [2006] EWHC 2450 (Admin). 
62 IY (Ankara Agreement – Fraud and Abuse) Turkey [2008] UKAIT 81 at para.32. 
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Article 41(2) states a requirement for the Association Council to adopt measures for the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment and provision of services. No 
such measures have yet been adopted and the Court has held that Article 41(2) does not have 
direct effect63. 
 
The first chapter of Title II of the Protocol set out provisions for workers. Article 36 fixed a 
timescale of between twelve and twenty-two years from the date of the Ankara Agreement (30 
November 1974 to 30 November 1986) to secure freedom of movement of workers in 
accordance with Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement. The Association Council was mandated to 
decide on the rules to achieve this objective. Moreover, Turkish workers employed in a MS were 
not to be discriminated against, over conditions of work and remuneration, when compared to 
workers who were nationals of MSs64. Article 38 allowed the Association Council to make 
recommendations to the MSs over matters including residence and work permits to facilitate 
Turkish workers’ employment in MSs, while Article 39 envisaged the adoption of social security 
measures for Turkish workers by the Association Council within a year of the Protocol coming 
into force. The Association Council has adopted a number of Decisions to implement the 
provisions in the Ankara Agreement and Additional Protocol. 
 
In Demirel65 the ECJ considered the Ankara Agreement and Additional Protocol for the first 
time and held that, as in Haegeman66, they were an integral part of Community law and as such 
the ECJ had jurisdiction to interpret them67, particularly in respect of the freedom of movement 
of workers68. This was extended to Association Council Decisions in Sevince69. However Article 
                                                 
63 Op. Cit. n.47 at para.62. 
64 Article 37. 
65 Case 12/86 Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719; noted Neuwahl N., “Freedom of 
Movement for Workers under the EEC Treaty Association Agreement”, (1988) 13 ELR 360. 
66 Op. Cit. n.4 Case 181/73. 
67 Op. Cit. n.65 at para.7. 
68 Ibid. at para.12. 
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12 of the Agreement and Article 36 of the Protocol were held in Demirel to set out a programme 
and not be sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to be directly effective70. The ECJ has yet 
to rule on the expiry of the full implementation of freedom of movement for workers timescale, 
although Advocate General Darmon, in his Opinion in Demirel71, believed it had no legal 
implications of binding effect. 
 
No provisions in the Ankara Agreement, the Additional Protocol or the Association Council 
decisions establish a right of entry for Turkish nationals. Thus a MS may regulate the entry of 
Turkish workers to their territory, and the conditions under which they may take up their first 
employment72. It is notable, unlike in Tum and Dari, that there is no equivalent ‘standstill’ clause 
for the free movement of workers to Article 41(1) for freedom of establishment so MSs can 
introduce new restrictive measures for the first entry of Turkish workers. 
 
The first Association Council Decision relevant to the question of the free movement of workers 
was Decision 2/7673, adopted as a first step with duration of four years. Under Article 2, a 
Turkish worker who had been in legal employment for three years in a MS, could respond to an 
offer of employment from an employer in the same occupation, subject to the priority of 
nationals of MSs. Furthermore, after five years of legal employment in a MS, a Turkish worker 
was free to take any paid employment in the MS without limitation. Article 5 established an 
employment hierarchy of nationals of MSs, Turkish workers and then other TCNs. The standstill 
provisions of Article 7 prohibited MSs from introducing new restrictions on legally resident and 
employed workers’ conditions of access to employment. 
                                                                                                                                                             
69 Case C-192/89 S.Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1990] ECR I-3461 at paras.7-12. 
70Op. Cit. n.65 at para.23. 
71 Ibid. at 3744. 
72 Case C-237/91 Kazim Kus v. Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden [1992] ECR I-6781, noted Burrows N., “The Rights of 
Turkish Workers in the MSs”, (1994) 19 ELR 305 and Weber A., “Case Note”, (1994) 31 CMLRev 423. See also 
Lichtenberg H., “The Rights of Turkish Workers in Community Law”, (1995) 24 ILJ 90. 
73 See Op. Cit. n.33 Rogers at 53. 
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Decision 2/76 was replaced on 1 December 1980 by Decision 1/80 that is unconstrained by a 
time limit on applicability. The provisions constitute “one stage further…towards securing 
freedom of movement for workers” and to achieve this aim it is “essential to transpose…the 
principles in Articles [39, 40 and 41] of the Treaty to Turkish workers who enjoy the rights 
conferred by Decision 1/80”74. Various provisions of Decision 1/80 have consistently been held 
to be directly effective75 and capable of establishing rights for Turkish nationals resident in MSs’ 
territory. 
 
Article 6 was the first provision of Decision 1/80 to be considered by the ECJ and has repeatedly 
been held to be capable of having direct effect76. A Turkish national may obtain rights by 
satisfying three main conditions77: being a worker and in legal employment; being duly 
registered as belonging to the labour force; and, being legally employed for one of three 
specified time periods. No definition of ‘worker’ is provided but the ECJ has equated the concept 
of a ‘Turkish worker’ with that of ‘Community worker’78. Thus in Kurz79 the Court found that 
“any person who, even in the course of vocational training and whatever the legal context of that 
training, pursues a genuine and effective economic activity for and under the direction of an 
employer and on that basis receives remuneration which can be perceived as the consideration 
for that activity must be regarded as a worker for the purposes of Community law”. If a Turkish 
national enters the host Member State for another purpose but then takes up employment and 
satisfies the second and third conditions then they can rely on Article 6(1)80. ‘Legal employment’ 
                                                 
74 Case C-434/93 Ahmet Bozkurt v. Statssecretaris van Justitie [1995] ECR I-1475 at paras.19-20, noted Peers S., 
“Case Note”, (1996) 33 CMLRev 103. 
75 Op. Cit. n.69 at para.21. 
76 Op. Cit. n.69 at para.26; Op. Cit. n.70 at para.35. 
77 See Op. Cit. n.33 Rogers at 17. 
78 Case C-1/97 Mehmet Birden v. Stadtgemeinde Bremen [1998] ECR I-7747 at paras.24-25; noted Martin D., 
“Case Note”, (1999) 1 EJML 151. 
79 Case C-188/00 Bülent Kurz, né Yüce v. Land Baden-Württemberg [2002] ECR I-10691 at para.34. 
80 Case C-294/06 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Payir [2008] ECR I-203 at para.38. 
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is a Community concept that must be “defined objectively and uniformly in the light of the spirit 
and the purpose of the provision”81. “The legality of employment…must be determined in the 
light of the legislation of the host State governing the conditions under which the Turkish worker 
entered the national territory and is employed there”82. It has consistently been held to 
“presuppose a stable and secure situation as a member of the labour force”83, thus “there must be 
an undisputed right of residence, for any dispute as to that right must lead to instability in the 
worker’s situation”84. As such the worker must not have entered the MS on false documentation, 
nor have entered employment fraudulently85. However, having legally entered the MS, taken up 
employment, and completed one of the time requirements in Article 6(1), a MS cannot limit the 
rights obtained under this provision, even where these limitations were a precondition for the 
issue of a residence permit86. Indeed the issuing of a residence or work permit is purely 
administrative, not a condition precedent87, and legal employment in a MS implies a right of 
residence, as without it Article 6(1) would be deprived of all effect88. Where a Turkish worker 
requires the time from refusal of a residence permit to his appeal hearing to bring him within 
Article 6(1), he will be considered to have failed to meet the requirements of ‘legal 
employment’89. Thus he must find legal employment before his application for a residence 
permit has been determined. 
 
‘Being duly registered as belonging to the labour force’ has no equivalent meaning for 
Community workers, as it does not appear in the EC Treaty. To satisfy this criterion three further 
conditions are required. First the worker must be in an employment relationship or available for 
                                                 
81 Case C-98/96 Kasim Ertanir v. Land Hessen [1997] ECR I-5179 at para.59; noted Brinkman G., ”Case Note”, 
(1999) 1 EJML 131. 
82 Op. Cit. n.74 at para.27. 
83 Op. Cit. n.78 at para.30. 
84 Op. Cit. n.33 Rogers at 19. 
85 Case C-285/95 Suat Kol v. Land Berlin [1997] ECR I-3069. 
86 Case C-36/96 Faik Günaydin v. Freistaat Bayern [1997] ECR I-5143 paras.37-39, and Op. Cit. n.78 at para.56; 
noted Brinkman, Op. Cit. n.81. 
87 Op. Cit. n.74 at para.29. 
88 Op. Cit. n.78 at para.20. 
89 Op. Cit. n.69 at para.32 and Op. Cit. n.72 at para.15. 
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work. The ECJ has interpreted the first section of this requirement broadly and in line with the 
meaning of ‘worker’ and ‘employed person’ in Community jurisprudence90. However, where the 
Turkish worker “has definitely ceased to belong to the labour force of a MS”, either by reaching 
retirement age or becoming totally and permanently incapacitated for work, then the rights 
obtained under Article 6(1) are forfeited, including the right of residence91. The right of 
residence that he claims has no link even with future employment92. Where the worker is 
temporarily incapacitated, then providing the break remains temporary, it will not affect his 
fitness to continue to exercise his right to work. This may include a short provision of prison 
detention93. Second the worker must be engaged in employment which can be located within the 
territory of the MS or retain a sufficiently close link with that territory. The ECJ has held that 
this is a matter for national courts to determine. However, three non-exhaustive factors can be 
taken into account: where the worker was hired; the territory on which the paid employment was 
based; and, the applicable national legislation in the field of employment and social security 
law94. Third the worker must have completed the formalities applicable under national law. 
 
The third main condition for qualification for direct rights is the fulfilment of specific time 
periods of legal employment. Article 6(1) first indent provides for the renewal of the Turkish 
worker’s work permit when he has been legally employed with the same employer95 for one 
year. The second indent establishes that the Turkish worker may, after three years legal 
employment, change employers and respond to any offer of employment “for the same 
occupation”. As yet there is no ECJ jurisprudence on the meaning of this latter term. The third 
indent entitles the Turkish worker, after four years of legal employment, to free access to any 
                                                 
90 See Case 53/81 Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] ECR 1035; Case 139/85 Kempf v. Staatssecretaris 
van Justitie [1986] ECR 1741; Case C-292/89 R v. IAT ex parte Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745. 
91 Op. Cit. n.74 at para.39. 
92 Ibid. at para.40. 
93 Case C-340/97 Ömer Nazli and Others v. Stadt Nürnberg [2000] ECR I-957 at paras.37-42. 
94 Op. Cit. n.74 at paras.23-24. 
95 See Case C-386/95 Süleyman Eker v. Land Baden-Württemberg [1997] ECR I-2697. 
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paid employment in that MS. In the case of Kurz96 where Mr Kurz had entered Germany on a 
visa only for the purpose of vocational training which had subsequently been amended to 
vocational training with a specific employer and he had then worked for that employer for an 
uninterrupted period of greater than four years, he enjoyed the right of free access to any paid 
employment and a corresponding right of residence. Furthermore if a Turkish worker 
subsequently becomes unemployed, he may claim an extension to his residence authorisation to 
exercise his right of free access to any paid employment of his choice “not only by responding to 
job offers actually made but also by seeking a new job over a reasonable period”97 
 
Article 6(2) provides for periods of annual holidays, maternity leave, absence caused by 
accidents at work or short illnesses to be treated as legal employment, to which the ECJ has 
added short periods without a valid residence or work permit98. In Sedef99 the Court found that 
periods of unemployment that were due to breaks between individual fixed-term contracts of 
employment in the merchant navy were not under the control of Mr Sedef and therefore were the 
same kind of interruptions in employment laid down in Article 6(2)100. Long absences due to 
sickness or periods of involuntary unemployment are not treated as legal employment, but rights 
already obtained as the result of previous employment are not affected. Article 6(2) only applies 
whilst Article 6(1) applies restrictions to employment101. Once a Turkish worker has satisfied the 
conditions laid down in Article 6(1) third indent then Article 6(2) becomes redundant. In that 
situation national authorities can only restrict the rights provided for by the third indent of 
Article 6(1) on the basis of Article 14(1)102, to be considered below. 
 
                                                 
96 Op. Cit. n. 79 at para.58. 
97 Ibid. para.59. See also Case C-171/95 Recep Tetik v. Land Berlin [1997] ECR I-329 at para.48. 
98 Op. Cit. n.80. 
99 Case C-230/03 Mehmet Sedef v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2006] ECR I-157. 
100 Ibid. at para.55. 
101 Case C-383/03 Ergül Dogan v. Sicherheitsdirektion für das Bundesland Vorarlberg [2005] ECR I-6237 at 
para.16. 
102 Ibid. at para.23. 
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As with Article 6, the ECJ has consistently found Article 7 to be sufficiently clear, precise and 
unconditional to have direct effect within the MSs103. Decision 1/80 does not specify a 
nationality condition for family members and therefore family members of a Turkish worker 
may, it appears, obtain the rights of Article 7 regardless of nationality. There is no right to family 
reunification, as the entry of a Turkish worker’s family to the territory of a MS is dependent on 
domestic law, subject to the observance of fundamental rights and in particular Article 
8ECHR104. However, the Court has found that the aim of Article 7 is “to create conditions 
conducive to family unity in the host MS, first by enabling family members to be with the 
migrant worker and then after some time by consolidating their position there by granting them 
the right to obtain employment in that State”105. To achieve this, Article 7(1) provides 
employment rights directly to family members of the Turkish worker after a specific time of 
residence, which domestic law may require to be evidenced by cohabitation with the worker106. 
It would appear then that there is an implied right of residence107, with residence and work 
permits having only administrative application108. Thus a member of a Turkish workers’ family 
can respond to any employment offer after three years of legal residence, subject to the priority 
of a Community worker, and without any conditions attached to residence109. That legal 
residence will not depend on the worker being employed for those three years, only that the 
worker continues to be duly registered as belonging to the labour force of the host MS for the 
whole period110. Furthermore, after five years of legal residence they have free access to any paid 
employment of their choice, again without any conditions attached relating to residence111. As 
                                                 
103 Case C-355/93 Hayriye Eroglu v. Land Baden-Württemburg [1994] ECR I-5113 at para.17, noted Zuleeg M., 
“Case Note”, (1996) 33 CMLRev 93; Case C-351/95 Selma Kadiman v. Freistaat Bayern [1997] ECR I-2133 at 
para.28. 
104 Case C-325/05 Ismail Derin v. Landkreis Darmstadt-Dieburg [2007] ECR I-6495 at para.64. 
105 Case C-275/02 Engin Ayaz v. Land Baden-Württemberg [2004] ECR I-8765 at para.41. See also Ibid. Case C-
351/95 at paras. 34-36. 
106 Ibid. at para.40. 
107 Op. Cit. n.103 Case C-355/93 at para.20. 
108 Case C-329/97 Sezgin Ergat v. Stadt Ulm [2000] ECR I-1487 at para.61. 
109 Case C-373/03 Ceyhun Aydinli v. Land Baden-Württemburg [2005] ECR I-6181 at para.24. 
110 Case C-337/07 Altun v. Stadt Böblingen, judgment of 18 December 2008, nyr at para.32. 
111 Case C-453/07 Er v. Wetteraukreis [2008] 1 CMLR 6 at para.28. 
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noted above there is no definition of “family member” provided in Article 7 but the Court has 
held112 that the aim of Article 7 is the same objective as that pursued by Article 10(1) of Reg. 
1612/68113 and as now provided for in Article 2(2) of Dir. 2004/38114. Therefore “family 
member” in Article 7 is likely to have an analogous definition as to that in Article 2(2) of Dir. 
2004/38115. However, where the spouse has been granted a right of entry for the purpose of 
family unity, then a period of co-habitation outside of wedlock must be aggregated to that of 
marriage to establish the appropriate length of residence116. Under Article 7(2), the children of 
such workers, having completed a course of vocational training in the MS, may take up any 
employment in the Host State without a length of residence requirement, so long as a parent has 
been legally resident there for at least three years. In Akman117, the ECJ held that the objectives 
of the two paragraphs in Article 7 were different. Article 7(1) was to facilitate family 
reunification and thus only intended to benefit family members authorised to join the Turkish 
worker. Article 7(2) was a more favourable provision than the first, aiming to provide specific 
treatment for children as opposed to other members of the family in order to assist the objective 
of the free movement of Turkish workers118. As Peers notes119, this gives children of Turkish 
workers two bites of the cherry. The first is where they fail to complete their vocational training, 
or a parent has yet to complete three years employment. In this situation, they may have rights 
under Article 7(1), subject to compliance with its provisions. However, where children are born 
                                                 
112 Op. Cit. n.105 at para.42 
113 Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, O.J.Sp.Ed. 1968 
L257/2. 
114 European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the MSs, O.J. 2004 L158/77. 
115 See Op. Cit. n.105 where a Turkish worker’s stepson was considered to be a family member. 
116 Case C-65/98 Safet Eyüp v. Landesgeschaftstelle des Arbeitsmarktservice Vorarlberg [2000] ECR I-4747 at 
paras.36-38. This appears to go further than the Community concept of “spouse” that only applies to marital 
relationships (Case 59/85 Netherlands v. Reed [1986] ECR 1283 at para.15) although this has now been extended in 
Article 2(2) of Dir. 2004/38 and would appear to be in line with this new definition. Advocate General La Pergola, 
at p.4754-4759, had suggested a rethink of the Community definition of the term “spouse” to take into account 
Article 8ECHR jurisprudence and provide rights for cohabitees but the Court did not consider this. 
117 Case C-210/97 Haydar Akman v. Oberkreisdirektor des Rheinisch-Bergischen-Kreises [1998] ECR I- 7519; 
noted Peers S., “Case Note”, (1999) 39 CMLRev 1027 and Martin D., “Case Note”, (1999) 1 EJML 150. 
118 Ibid. at para.38. 
119 Op. Cit. n.117 Peers at 1037. 
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in a MS, they can only obtain rights under Article 7(2). In order to benefit from the provisions of 
Article 7(2), the parent of the child need not still be in employment or even be resident in the 
MS120.  
 
The Court has held that there are only two kinds of restrictions on the rights conferred by Article 
7121. The first is that laid down in Article 14(1), to be considered below, and the second is where 
the individual has left the territory of the host MS for a significant length of time without a 
legitimate reason. A custodial sentence122, or a period of drug rehabilitation123, does not permit 
the rights conferred by Article 7 to be limited.  
 
For some time Article 9 suffered from a lack of judicial interpretation from the ECJ although the 
right created was potentially extensive. The first sentence provides that a Turkish child residing 
legally with its parents in a MS, who are or have been legally employed in that MS “will be 
admitted to courses of general education, apprenticeship and vocational training under the same 
educational entry qualifications as the children of nationals of the MSs”. In Gürol124, the ECJ 
held that this first sentence of Article 9 was directly effective and that a Turkish child who was 
residing legally with his Turkish parents but on commencement of his studies transferred his 
residence to the place of his educational establishment, was meeting the residence conditions laid 
down in Article 9125. Thus the first sentence of Article 9 confers a “right of access without 
discrimination to education and training”126 for a Turkish child living away from his or her 
                                                 
120 Op. Cit. n.117 at paras.47-48. 
121 Case C-467/02 Inan Cetinkaya v. Land Baden-Württemberg [2004] ECR I-10895 at para.36 and Op.Cit.n.109 at 
para.27 for Article 7(1) and Case C-502/04 Ergün Torun v. Stadt Augsburg [2006] ECR I-1563 at para.25 for 
Article 7(2). 
122 Ibid. Case C-502/04 at para.26. See also Case C-325/05 Derin v. Landkreis Darmstadt-Dieburg [2007] ECR I-
6495 at para. 56. 
123 Op. Cit. n.104 at para.28. 
124 Case C-374/03 Gaye Gürol v. Bezirksregierung Köln [2005] ECR I-6199 at paras.20-26. 
125 Ibid. at para.29. 
126 Op. Cit. n.117 Case C-210/97 at para.41. 
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parents with, as Peers suggests127, a right of residence128 at the place of the educational or 
training institute. Furthermore, the personal scope of Article 9 is wider than Article 7(1), 
incorporating the situation envisaged by Article 7(2). However, the right did not appear to 
provide for equal treatment with Community nationals over maintenance grants or tuition fees as 
entry was limited to the “same educational qualifications” rather than the “same conditions”129 as 
laid down in Reg. 1612/68 Article 12130. Moreover, according to the second sentence of Article 
9, Turkish children “may in that MS be eligible to benefit from advantages provided for in 
national legislation” that did not appear to be sufficiently clear, precise or unconditional to 
exercise direct effect. The Court in Gürol interpreted the provision very widely. It found that the 
second sentence of Article 9 was directly effective131 and that where the legislation of a MS 
provides for educational advantages, such as grants, “intended to cover the costs of the student’s 
access to education and maintenance, Turkish nationals may be entitled to them in just the same 
way as the nationals of the MS”132. Although the Court used the word ‘may’ it made it clear that 
a non-discriminatory access for Turkish children to courses of education or training would be 
purely illusory if they were not assured equal rights to advantages such as grants. Furthermore 
the interpretation provided by the ECJ was the only one that made it possible to attain the 
objective laid down in Article 9 to guarantee equal opportunities for both Turkish and MS 
national children in the sphere of education and vocational training133. Finally the Court 
concluded that this right of equal treatment applied even when education was pursued in 
Turkey134. 
 
                                                 
127 Op. Cit. n.117 Peers at 1040. 
128 Cf. Case C-357/89 Raulin v. Netherlands Ministry for Education and Science [1992] ECR I-1027 in Chapter III 
of this thesis. 
129 See Case 9/74 Casagrande v. Landeshaupstatdt Munchen [1974] ECR 773 in Chapter III of this thesis for the 
ECJ’s interpretation of this term. 
130 Peers S., “Towards Equality: Actual and Potential Rights of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union”, 
(1996) 33 CMLRev at 26. 
131 Op. Cit. n.124 at para.43. 
132 Ibid. at para.38. 
133 Ibid. at paras.39 & 40. 
134 Ibid. at para.44. 
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Under Article 10 where a Turkish worker is duly registered as belonging to the labour force135, 
the MS must not discriminate over remuneration and other conditions of work on the basis of 
nationality. Article 10(1) is directly effective136 and when determining the scope of Article 10, 
reference should be made to the equivalent provision of the EC Treaty, namely Article 48(2)137 
and the case law associated with it. Furthermore, although Article 10(1) does not establish a 
principle of free movement of Turkish workers within the Community, once a Turkish worker is 
legally employed within the territory of a MS, Article 10(1) provides a right of equal treatment to 
Turkish workers as regards conditions of work and remuneration to the same extent as Article 
48(2)EC provides for MS nationals138. Article 10(2) also provides that Turkish workers and their 
family members must be granted the same assistance as Community workers from the 
employment services to obtain employment. 
 
Article 13 is a standstill provision that prohibits the MSs and Turkey from introducing new 
restrictions on access to employment conditions applicable to workers and family members139. In 
Sevince140 the ECJ found this standstill clause and Article 7 of Decision 2/76 to be 
“unequivocal” and to have direct effect. Thus a Turkish worker may enjoy the conditions of 
access to employment as they applied on 20 December 1976, as Decision 1/80 simply reiterates 
Decision 2/76 standstill provision for workers. However, family members may only rely on the 
conditions as they stood on 1 December 1980, as they were not incorporated in Decision 2/76. 
Article 13 does not require the acquisition of rights under Articles 6 or 7 and it has been 
suggested that the principal beneficiaries of Article 13 are Turkish workers who do not yet or no 
                                                 
135 See Case C-4/05 Hasan Güzeli v. Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Aachen [2006] ECR I-10279 at para.48 where the 
ECJ held that the term “duly registered as belonging to the labour market of the MS” had the same meaning as that 
laid down in Article 6(1). 
136 Case C-171/01 Wählergruppe Gemeinsam Zajedno/Birlikte Alternative und Grüne GewerkschafterInnen/UG 
[2003] ECR I-4301 at paras.57 & 58. 
137 Ibid. at paras.73 & 74. 
138 Ibid. at para.89. 
139 In Op. Cit. n.43 Joined Cases C-317 & 369/01 at para.70 the ECJ held that the Article 13 standstill clause was to 
have the same meaning as Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol. 
140 Op. Cit. n.69 at paras.18 and 26. 
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longer benefit from Article 6141. Rogers goes on to suggest that it is those who do not enjoy “a 
stable and secure position in the labour force” who would benefit. These would include asylum 
seekers with work permission and a Turkish national married to a settled Turkish worker whose 
marriage ended within a year of legal employment. 
 
Article 14(1) uses almost identical wording to that found in Article 39(3)EC. Thus the provisions 
of Decision 1/80 are to be applied “subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, 
public security or public health” and in Nazli142 the ECJ interpreted the provision analogously to 
Article 39(3)EC143. The concept of public policy therefore presupposes the existence of a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society144. As the 
provision is a derogation from the basic rules laid down in the Agreement, it must be interpreted 
restrictively. Thus a criminal conviction can only justify expulsion if the circumstances leading 
to that conviction are evidence of personal conduct constituting a personal threat to the 
requirements of public policy145. The concept of public policy “presupposes the existence, in 
addition to the perturbation of the social order which any infringement of the law involves, of a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society”146. Thus expulsion of 
a Community or Turkish national is precluded on general preventive grounds in order to deter 
other aliens147. “A Turkish national can be denied, by means of expulsion, the rights which he 
derives from Decision 1/80 only if that measure is justified because his personal conduct 
indicates a specific risk of new and serious prejudice to the requirements of public policy”148. 
Furthermore, as the Court has interpreted Article 14(1) analogously to Article 39(3)EC, it has 
                                                 
141 Op. Cit. n.33 Rogers at 28. 
142 Op. Cit. n.93 at paras.56 & 60. 
143 See Op. Cit. n.6. 
144 Case 30/77 R. v. Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999 at para.35. 
145 Op. Cit. n.93 at para.58. 
146 Case C-349/06 Polat v. Stadt Rüsselsheim [2007] ECR I-8167 at para.34. 
147 Ibid. at para.35; Op. Cit. n.93 at para.59; Case 67/74 Bonsignore v. Stadt Koln [1975] ECR 297 at para.7. 
148 Op. Cit. n.93 at para.61, Op. Cit. n.101 at para.24 and Op. Cit. n.104 at para.74. 
279 
 
also found that the provisions of Dir. 64/221 are to be applied149 to both Turkish workers and 
their family members such that protection must be no lower than that laid down in Articles 8 and 
9 of Dir. 64/221150. Dir. 2004/38 has repealed Dir. 64/221 and Chapter VI of the new Directive 
incorporates similar provisions as the old Directive as well as the ECJ’s case law (see Chapter III 
of this thesis). Although not fully clear that these provisions will apply to Turkish workers and 
their family members, it is submitted that the ECJ would employ Chapter VI of Dir. 2004/38 in 
the same way as Dir. 64/221, especially as this part of the former Directive was adopted with the 
intention of bringing together and updating the previous law. 
 
Article 39 of the Protocol envisaged the Association Council adopting social security measures 
for Turkish workers and their families within a year of the Protocol coming into effect. The 
subject area is highly sensitive politically and so only over a decade later did the Association 
Council belatedly complete their task. As with Reg. 1408/71, Decision 3/80 aims to co-ordinate 
the social security schemes of MSs to enable Turkish workers employed or formerly employed 
in the Community, their family members, and survivors to qualify for benefits. As Peers151 points 
out Decision 3/80 is closely connected to Reg. 1408/71 either by copying large provisions of it or 
incorporating provisions by making reference to it. Reg. 1408/71 required an extremely lengthy 
and detailed implementing measure, namely Reg. 574/72, to give it effect. The Commission 
waited three years before submitting a proposed Regulation to implement Decision 3/80, which 
the Council promptly refused to adopt152. The resulting ECJ case law has proved controversial. 
 
                                                 
149 Op. Cit. n.120 Case C-467/02 at para.44 and Op. Cit. n.146 at para.31 where the Court referred to Article 3 of 
Dir. 64/221. 
150 Case C-136/03 Georg Dörr and Ibrahim Ünul [2005] ECR I-4759 at para.68. 
151 Peers S., “Social Security Equality for Turkish Nationals”, (1999) 24 ELR 624 at 625. 
152 O.J. 1983 C110/19. 
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In Taflan-Met153 the ECJ, on a request for a preliminary ruling, was asked to rule on the 
applicability and direct effect of Decision 3/80 without an implementing measure. The ECJ held 
that on the first point Decisions of the Association Council were binding without any further 
implementing measures. Therefore, Decision 3/80 came into force on the date on which it was 
adopted, 19 September 1980, and the Contracting Parties had been bound by it from that date154. 
However, on the matter of direct effect, the ECJ held that although some provisions of Decision 
3/80 were sufficiently clear and precise, they could not be directly effective until the Council had 
adopted supplementary measures155. It is clear from the judgment, and is suggested by extra-
judicial writing156, that the ECJ intended for no provision of Decision 3/80 to have direct effect. 
Thus even the non-discrimination provision of Article 3(1), guaranteeing equal access for 
Turkish claimants, compared to Community claimants, to their Host State’s security system, was 
not directly effective157.  
 
Three years later in Sema Sürül158 the ECJ was invited to reconsider its judgment in Taflan-Met 
by ruling on the direct effect of Article 3(1). The ECJ first distinguished Taflan-Met by finding 
that the previous ruling had not considered Article 3(1). Indeed it was found that an 
implementing measure was not required to give Article 3(1) direct effect159, it simply being the 
specific enunciation of the non-discrimination principle in Article 9 of the Protocol160, thereby 
enabling it to be relied on by Turkish nationals161. The Court’s interpretation, especially 
                                                 
153 Case C-277/94 Z. Taflan-Met and Others v. Bestuur van de Social Verzekeringsbank and O. Akol v. Bestuur van 
de Algemene Bedrijfsvereniging [1996] ECR I-4085, noted Bulterman M., “Case Note”, (1997) 34 CMLRev 1497, 
and Peers S., “Equality, Free Movement and Social Security”, (1997) 22 ELR 342. 
154 Ibid. at paras.17-21. 
155 Ibid. at para.37. 
156 Edward D., “Direct Effect, the Separation of Powers and the Judicial Enforcement of Obligations” in Scritti in 
Onore di Federico Mancini, Volume II, Guiffre, 1998, 423 at 436-437, quoted in Op. Cit. n.148 Peers at 628. Judge 
Edward’s opinion carries considerable weight, as he was also the Judge-Rapporteur responsible for drafting the 
judgment. 
157 Op. Cit. n.151 at 626. 
158 Op.Cit.n.38. 
159 Ibid. at paras.55-58. 
160 Ibid. at para.68. 
161 Ibid. at para.63. 
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considering the apparent categorical nature of the requirement of implementing measures in 
Taflan-Met, was bold, imaginative and far more in keeping with the spirit of Decision 3/80. The 
ECJ then defined the personal scope of Article 3(1) broadly, equating Decision 3/80 with Reg. 
1408/71 to establish whether Mrs Sürül was a worker or the family member of a worker. As such 
under the case law of Reg. 1408/71162, a person has the status of a worker where he is covered, 
even if only in respect of a single risk, by a social security scheme, irrespective of an 
employment relationship163. Mrs Sürül would also be covered when she was not affiliated to a 
social security scheme as a member of the family of a Turkish worker if Mr Sürül was likewise 
insured for just one risk164. The ECJ then conventionally applied the non-discrimination principle 
to the German requirement for Turkish nationals to produce a residence document to obtain 
social security unlike German nationals165. Finally the ECJ found that as this was the first time 
the ECJ had had to interpret Article 3(1) and because the Taflan-Met judgment may have created 
uncertainty the temporal effect of the judgment would be restricted166. 
 
A Turkish national would appear, therefore, to be able to rely in national courts on the direct 
effect of Article 3(1) but would not be able to rely on other provisions of Decision 3/80 without 
supplementary implementing measures. Indeed Advocate General Colomer has suggested that 
Decision 3/80 Article 3(1) should be interpreted in the same way as Reg. 1408/71 Article 3(1) as 
Article 37 of the Protocol was very similar to Article 39(2)EC167. The position, however, remains 
politically sensitive, which the ECJ is aware of. As such the two explanations that the Court used 
to justify its temporal limitations to judgments in Sürül, appear to be novel adaptations of its 
previous practices. As Peers points out however this reasoning is problematic. The principles 
                                                 
162 Case C-85/96 Maria Martinez Sala v. Freistaate Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691 at para.36; Case C-275/96 Kuusijarvi 
[1998] ECR I-3419 at para.21 (see Chapter III of this thesis). 
163 Op. Cit. n.38 at para.93. 
164 Ibid. at para.94. 
165 Ibid. at paras.101-102. 
166 Ibid. at paras.109-111. 
167 Op. Cit. n.41 at 1298. 
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underlying the two reasons appear to be contradictory in that the first reason justifies a new line 
of case-law by the Court and the second justifies a marked change in direction in existing case-
law. Furthermore the first reason is surprising as the Court is often called upon to interpret 
provisions of Community law for the first time and the second reason, for the first time, justifies 
temporal limitations on the basis of uncertainty “for which the Court is wholly responsible”168. 
Now the ECJ has extended the reasoning for temporal limitations, this practise is likely to 
continue, limiting the rights of Turkish nationals to social security benefits. This ambiguity is 
likely to lead to confusion and uncertainty and, as a direct consequence, an ever-burgeoning case 
law. It is submitted, however, that the outcome in Sürül is to be preferred to that in Taflan-Met. 
 
In Öztürk169 the Court held that a Turkish national who had previously worked and paid old-age 
insurance contributions in Austria, but who had then worked and now resided in Germany, could 
rely on Article 3(1) against the Austrian authorities to secure his entitlement to a pension based 
on the periods of insurance completed by him in Austria. 
 
The Community has enacted Reg. 859/03170 to extend the coverage of Reg. 1408/71 to all TCNs, 
family members and survivors not covered by the latter Regulation’s provisions solely on the 
basis of nationality. However, a cross-border Community nexus must be established before the 
new provisions can bite. Thus Decision 3/80, with its inconsistent case law, will retain its 
importance for those Turkish nationals who only have links with Turkey and the host MS. 
  
4. EEC-MAGHREB AGREEMENTS 
 
                                                 
168 Op. Cit. n.151 at 630. 
169 Case C-373/02 Sakir Öztürk v. Pensionsversicherungsanstadt der Arbeiter [2004] ECR I-3605. 
170 Council Regulation 859/03/EC extending the provisions of Reg. 1408/71/EEC and Reg. 574/72/EEC to nationals 
of third countries who are not already covered by these provisions solely on the ground of their nationality. See 
Chapter III of this thesis. 
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In 1976 the EEC entered into Co-operation Agreements with Algeria171, Morocco172 and 
Tunisia173, the aim of which was laid down in Article 1 of the Agreements to “promote overall 
co-operation between the Contracting Parties” in order to assist the Maghreb countries to 
develop economically and socially. In 1995 the Community negotiated new Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreements (EMAs) with Tunisia174 and Morocco175. The difficult political situation in Algeria 
delayed the negotiations for an EMA with Algeria although a draft EMA was agreed in 
December 2001 so the 1976 Co-operation Agreement continued to apply. The EMA with Algeria 
was finally signed in 2005176. Peers177 states that the EMAs do not substantively alter the rules of 
the Co-operation Agreements relied on by individuals. However, Martin and Guild178 suggest 
that the strengthening of relationships between the parties envisaged in Article 1 might have 
consequences for the interpretation of some of the provisions. It must be pointed out that unlike 
the Ankara Agreement, which had the ultimate objective of Turkish membership of the European 
Union there is no possibility at the present time of any of the three countries becoming members 
of the Union. This is a direct consequence of a candidate country needing to be a ‘European 
State’ as required in Article 49TEU. In 2003 the Commission published a Communication179 on 
the European neighbour countries with the aim of establishing a policy to “develop a zone of 
prosperity and friendly neighbourhood – ‘a ring of friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, 
peaceful and co-operative relations”180. The result is the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP)181. This involves negotiating Action Plans for incorporating a set of agreed priorities for 
                                                 
171 O.J. 1978 L263. 
172 O.J. 1978 L264. 
173 O.J. 1978 L265. 
174 O.J. 1998 L97. 
175 O.J. 2000 L70. 
176 O.J. 2005 L265. 
177 Op. Cit. n.151 at 625. 
178 Op. Cit. n.2 Martin at 282. 
179 Commission Communication on wider Europe – neighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our Eastern 
and Southern neighbours, COM(2003) 104 final. 
180 Ibid. at 4. 
181 Commission Communication on European Neighbourhood Policy: strategy paper, COM(2004) 373 final. See Del 
Sarto R.A., Schumacher T., “From EMP to ENP: What’s at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards 
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action with neighbour countries182. This thesis will examine the EMAs in place with the 
Maghreb States as these are the longest standing of these neighbourhood relationships. The ECJ 
has not directly addressed the question of whether it has jurisdiction to interpret the Agreements, 
simply presuming from its case law that it does183. It is intended to consider the provisions of the 
Tunisia EMA to investigate the rights available to Maghreb nationals and interpret the case law 
relating to all three countries. 
 
Title III entitled ‘Right of Establishment and Services’ has been included by the EMA and was 
not included in the former Co-operation Agreements. Article 31(1) provides for the reciprocal 
right of establishment of a firm in the Contracting Party’s territory and the “liberalisation of the 
provision of services by one Party’s firms to consumers in the other”. Article 3(2) empowers the 
Association Council to make recommendations for achieving this objective. It is submitted that 
this provision does not have direct effect, Article 31(1) simply outlining a programme and 
objective, and Article 31(2) authorising the Association Council to implement supporting 
measures. 
 
The following area in Title VI, called ‘Co-operation in Social and Cultural Matters’, includes 
several Chapters with Chapter 1 dealing with the position of workers. The Agreements provide 
no definition of the term ‘workers’ and it is submitted that it should be defined in line with 
Community jurisprudence184. Article 64(1)185 is a nationality non-discrimination clause 
regarding working conditions, remuneration and dismissal. Dismissal as a third object of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Southern Mediterranean”, (2005) 10 EFAR 17 and Pardo S., Zemer L., “Towards a New Euro-Mediterranean 
Neighbourhood Space”, (2005) 10 EFAR 39 for analysis of the ENP. 
182 Action Plans have been agreed with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, 
Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Negotiations are ongoing with Algeria (expected to be 
concluded later this year), whilst Libya, Syria and Belarus’ negotiations have been suspended awaiting 
developments in those States. Kazakhstan has expressed an interest in the ENP and Russia has opted for an 
alternative arrangement with the formation of the EU-Russia Common spaces. 
183 See Case C-18/90 Office National de l’emploi v. Bahia Kziber [1991] ECR I-199 but see Advocate General van 
Gerven’s Opinion at para.5 for analysis. 
184 Op. Cit. n.90. 
185 Article 64(1) for Morocco and Article 67(1) for Algeria. 
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non-discrimination requirement has been added by the EMA, although this does not apply to 
temporary workers186. Rights under Article 64(1) are attached to the ‘worker’ status of a 
Tunisian national not his ‘nationality’187, so a Tunisian national who is not a worker would not 
be able to take advantage of Article 64(1). The equivalent provision, Article 40, in the old 
Morocco Co-operation Agreement has been interpreted by the ECJ. In El-Yassini188, Mr El-
Yassini entered the UK on a visitor’s permit with a prohibition on employment. In 1990 he 
married a UK national and the restriction prohibiting his employment was removed the following 
year. He took up employment but some time later the couple separated. Mr El-Yassini applied 
for an extension of leave to remain in the UK. The Court189 held that Article 40 was capable of 
having direct effect. However, the ECJ then interpreted the scope very narrowly, in particular 
refusing to apply by analogy the case law of the Ankara Agreement190. Thus the principle of 
equal treatment as regards working conditions and remuneration in Article 40(1) cannot ipso 
facto “have the effect of prohibiting the authorities of the host Member State from refusing to 
extend the residence permit of a Moroccan migrant worker employed on its territory, even 
though such a measure could not, by its very nature, be taken against a national of the Member 
State concerned”191. Furthermore, the national authorities can refuse to extend a residence 
permit, where the initial reason for its issue has expired, even though this may mean the 
employment contract could be terminated early192. However, the ECJ provided an exception with 
an example193. The exception is where the “Member State had granted the Moroccan migrant 
worker specific rights in relation to employment which were more extensive than the rights of 
residence conferred on him”. For example, where a residence permit is issued for a shorter time 
                                                 
186 Article 64(2). 
187 R. v. Director of Labour and Social Security, ex parte Mohamed (Supreme Court of Gibraltar) [1992] 2 CMLR 
481 at para.20. 
188 Case C-416/96 Nour Eddline El-Yassini v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1997] ECR I-1209; 
noted Melis B., “Case Note”, (1999) 36 CMLRev 1357 and Rogers N., “Case Note”, (1999) 1 EJML 365. 
189 Ibid. at paras.27-28. 
190 Ibid. at para.61. 
191 Ibid. at para.46. 
192 Ibid. at paras.62-63. 
193 Ibid. at paras.64-66. 
286 
 
than a work permit, the MS may not refuse to extend the residence permit to cover the temporal 
effect of the work permit, unless it is for the protection of a legitimate national interest. The 
extension of the equality principle in Article 64(1) to dismissal may provide a directly effective 
right to those in a similar position to Mr El-Yassini, thereby allowing the Community case law 
on residence permits to be applied to Maghreb nationals. In Gattoussi194 the ECJ interpreted 
Article 64(1) of the Tunisian EMA in the same manner as Article 40(1) of the Moroccan Co-
operation Agreement although the Court provided the non-exhaustive list of public policy, public 
security and public health as examples of a “legitimate national interest” that were to be 
interpreted in accordance with Community case law195. 
 
Article 65(1) extends the nationality non-discrimination principle to social security, for workers 
and their family members. The ECJ has consistently held this provision, as provided for in the 
corresponding provisions of the Co-operation Agreements with Morocco (Article 65(1)) and 
Algeria (Article 68(1)), to be capable of having direct effect196. This broad interpretation has 
been further extended by the ECJ to the personal and material scope of the provision. The 
personal scope applies first and foremost197 or primarily198 to Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian 
nationals, “which encompasses199 both active workers and those who have left the labour market, 
in particular after reaching the age required for receipt of an old-age pension”200. Furthermore, 
the provision “also applies to members of those workers’ families living with them in the MS in 
which they are or have been employed”201. However, if the worker’s dependent children reside 
outside the Community then neither they, nor the worker may claim social security in the form of 
                                                 
194 Case C-97/05 Mohamed Gattoussi v. Stadt Rüsselsheim [2006] ECR I-11917. 
195 Ibid. at paras.40 & 41. 
196 Op. Cit. n.183 at para.17; Case C-58/93 Zoubir Yousfi v. Belgian State [1994] ECR I-1353 at paras.17-19 (the 
German request for the ECJ to reconsider Kziber was swiftly rejected); Case C-103/94 Zoulika Krid v. CNAVTS 
[1995] ECR I-719 at para.24. 
197 Case C-113/97 Henia Babahenini v. Belgian State [1998] ECR I-183 at para.20. 
198 Case C-126/95 A. Hallouzi-Choho v. Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank [1996] ECR I-4807 at para.22; 
noted Burrows N., “Non-Discrimination and Social Security in Co-operation Agreements”, (1997) 22 ELR 166. 
199 Op. Cit. n.183 at para.27; Op. Cit. n.192 Case C-58/93 at para.21 and Case C-103/94 at para.26. 
200 Op. Cit. n.197. 
201 Ibid. at para.21. 
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study finance202. The persons covered by the provision are different to those covered by Article 2 
of Reg. 1408/71. As such the case law distinguishing between derived family rights and personal 
family rights in the context of Reg. 1408/71 cannot be applied to the EMAs203. The material 
scope of ‘social security’ is considered to bear the equivalent meaning as the identical term used 
in Reg. 1408/71204. This extremely broad interpretation of the personal scope of Article 65(1) has 
received what appears to be a partial reversal in Mesbah205. Mrs Mesbah was the mother-in-law 
of a Moroccan worker, the latter having acquired Belgian nationality by naturalisation and 
thereby enjoying dual nationality. Mrs Mesbah claimed disability allowance on the basis of the 
non-discrimination principle of Article 65(1). The ECJ in convoluted and difficult reasoning 
distinguished and refused to apply by analogy the seminal case of Micheletti206. In Micheletti the 
Court held that when a migrant worker of MS nationality held dual nationality, other MSs were 
not entitled to challenge the worker’s use of his status of national of a MS on the ground that he 
also held the nationality of a non-MS. This constituted an unjustified limitation on his right of 
freedom of movement. However, in Mesbah the Court found that there was no objective of 
creating free movement of Moroccan nationals within the Community but simply to consolidate 
the social security position of workers and their family members207. As such a MS could prevent 
a national from relying on his Moroccan dual nationality to take advantage of the principle of 
equal treatment in Article 65(1) on the sole ground that under domestic legislation the worker is 
considered to be a national of the MS alone. Thus the national court was the appropriate forum to 
apply its domestic law to determine the nationality of the claimant208. As Peers209 suggests, 
allowing the claimant to use his Moroccan nationality would have assisted in consolidating the 
                                                 
202 Case C-33/99 Fahmi & Amado v. Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank [2001] ECR I-2415 at paras.52-58. 
See van der Mei A.P., “Freedom of Movement and Financial Aid for Students”, (2001) 3 EJSS 181. 
203 Op. Cit. n.196 Case C-103/94 at para.39. 
204 Op. Cit. n.196 Case C-58/93 at para.32 and Case C-103/94 at para. 24. See also Case C-23/02 Office national de 
l’emploi v. Mohamed Alami [2003] ECR I-1399 confirming previous case law, in particular Kziber. 
205 Case C-179/98 Belgian State v. Fatna Mesbah [1999] ECR I-7955. 
206 Case C-369/90 M.V. Micheletti and others v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-4239. 
207 Op. Cit. n.205 at para.36. 
208 Ibid. at paras.39-41. 
209 Peers S., ILPA European Update December 1999 at 23. 
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social position of Moroccan workers and their families within the Host State. Thus in 
Community law a national of a MS with dual nationality may rely on his MS nationality to take 
advantage of Community rights but not his non-MS nationality. The ECJ then ruled that the 
phrase ‘member of the family’ was of general application that incorporated relatives in the 
ascending line and was not confined to blood relatives, thereby including in-laws if they in fact 
lived with the worker210. 
 
5. EC-CEEC AGREEMENTS 
 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the escape of the former Communist bloc from 
Soviet influence, the Community and MSs have entered into many Association Agreements with 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC)211. On 1 May 2004 the CEEC States, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia along with Malta 
and Cyprus, joined the EU212, and on 1 January 2007 Bulgaria and Romania acceded to the 
Union213. Although this means the Agreements have little effect for these countries, apart from 
legal situations that arise prior to accession and during the transition arrangements, new 
candidate countries have already emerged in Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, who have entered into Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) with the 
European Communities214. The Croatian SAA entered into force 1 February 2005 and the 
                                                 
210 Op. Cit. n.205 at paras.44-46. 
211 Hungary O.J. 1993 L347; Poland O.J. 1993 L348; Slovak Republic O.J. 1994 L359; Czech Republic O.J. 1994 
L360; Bulgaria O.J. 1994 L358; Romania O.J. 1994 L357; Slovenia O.J. 1996 L344; Latvia O.J. 1998 L26; 
Lithuania O.J. 1998 L51; Estonia O.J. 1998 L68. 
212 O.J. 2003 L236/17. See the following for detailed analysis of the Accession Treaty and transitional arrangements: 
Shuibhne N.N., “Legal Implications of EU Enlargement for the Individual: EU Citizenship and Free Movement of 
Persons”, (2004) 5 ERA Forum 355 at 362; Hillion C., “The European Union is Dead. Long Live the European 
Union…A Commentary on the Treaty of Accession 2003”, (2004) 29 ELR 583; and, Adinolfi A., “Free Movement 
and Access to Work of Citizens of the New MSs: The Transitional Measures”, (2005) 42 CMLRev 469. 
213 O.J. 2005 L157/11. See Lazowski A., “And then they were Twenty-Seven…A Legal Appraisal of the Sixth 
Accession Treaty”, (2007) 44 CMLRev 401. 
214 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their MSs, of the one part, and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part, O.J.2004 L84/13 and Stabilisation and Association 
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Macedonian SAA on 1 April 2004. Albania215, Montenegro216, Serbia217 and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina218 have also signed and ratified SAAs, with the EU MSs219, followed by the EU, 
expecting to ratify during 2009. The SAAs220 that these States have entered into or are likely to 
enter into with the EC possess inherent similarities to the former CEEC Agreements as the 
overall objective of accession is the same, although not included in the body of the SAA, and 
therefore the previous Agreements and the Court’s interpretation of them will continue to wield 
significant influence.  
 
The original CEEC Agreements were predominantly similar with only minor variations although 
a Preamble requirement to “respect the rights of persons belonging to minorities” was inserted 
into the Agreements concluded after those of Hungary and Poland. Therefore, the Polish 
Agreement will be utilised as a blueprint to assess the rights of CEEC nationals in the 
Community. 
 
A major objective, set out in the Preamble, Recital 15, and Article 1, was to integrate the CEECs 
into a ‘new Europe’ but this did not stretch as far as accession to the Community as an aim for 
all the parties, just the CEECs. However, the European Council at the Copenhagen Summit in 
June 1993 also made accession of the CEECs a political commitment of the European Union221. 
On this basis, therefore, the Agreements could have been interpreted by the ECJ in a more liberal 
                                                                                                                                                             
Agreement between the European Communities and their MSs, of the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the 
other part, O.J. 2005 L26/3. 
215 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part, Council Document 8164/06. 
216 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one 
part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part, Council Document 11566/07. 
217 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one 
part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, Council Document 16005/07.  
218 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the 
one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part, Council Document 8226/08. 
219 All the MSs have ratified the Albanian SAA. 
220 See Pippan C., “The Rocky Road to Europe: The EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western 
Balkans and the Principle of Conditionality”, (2004) 9 EFAR 219. 
221 Conclusions of the Presidency, Bull. EC, 6-1993 at 12. 
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manner to Agreements with States that were either unlikely to or could not accede to the Union. 
The ECJ has now given judgment in a number of cases with more pending and it could be argued 
that the Court has followed this interpretation222. It is noticeable that the Macedonian and 
Croatian SAAs do not include this objective in Article 1(2) or the Preamble and so there is a 
possibility of a more limited interpretation by the ECJ. 
 
As with the other Association Agreements considered, apart from the EEA Agreement, there was 
no right of entry for Polish nationals. Domestic law determined entry conditions. MSs also 
controlled initial access to the labour market with legal residents having no legal right to a work 
permit. MSs in accordance with Article 41(3), which was unique to the Poland Agreement, were 
merely obliged to “examine the possibility of granting work permits to Polish nationals already 
having residence permits”. Tourists and visitors were excluded from this possibility. Indeed 
Article 41 provided no rights to Polish nationals, just a policy statement on the desirability of 
bilateral agreements on access to employment between a MS and Poland in Article 41(1) and the 
possibility of the Association Council creating greater access to professional training. The 
Association Council was further limited by Article 42 only granting it the right to introduce 
Recommendations and not Decisions in the second transition stage to full implementation of the 
Association Agreement set out in Article 6, which commenced on 1 February 1999, to improve 
the movement of workers. 
 
Article 37 first indent provided a general nationality non-discrimination provision that, as with 
the Tunisian EMA, was applicable to “working conditions, remuneration or dismissal” for 
legally employed workers. However, this equal treatment was “subject to the conditions and 
modalities applicable in each Member State”. This exception would appear to subordinate the 
                                                 
222 See in particular Case C-162/00 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer [2002] ECR I-10491 
paras.39-45. 
291 
 
principle of equality to the discretionary power of the individual MS. Martin and Guild223 
contended that this could not have been the intention of the Contracting Parties and should be 
read to mean that equal treatment does not have a uniform Community content but was to be 
filled by appropriate national law. As such this provision was likely to be capable of having 
direct effect224. This was the finding in Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer225. Mrs Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer was 
a Polish national, living in Germany and working as a part-time Polish language assistance at the 
University of Bielefeld, employed on a fixed term contract. She claimed that her employment 
contract could not be terminated at the end of its fixed term, as German legislation could not 
justify the imposition of a limit on the duration of that contract. It was argued that as the Court 
had held that this provision could not be applied to Community nationals because of its 
discriminatory character226, the same should be applied in the case of Polish nationals. The ECJ 
held that Article 37(1) was capable of direct effect and the exception could not allow MSs to set 
conditions or discretionary limitations, as that would render it meaningless and deprive it of any 
practical effect227. Indeed the objectives of the Agreement required the interpretation of Article 
39(2)EC to be transposed to Article 37(1). In Kolpak228 a Slovakian handball player employed in 
Germany was able to take advantage of the direct effect of the Slovakian Agreement’s equivalent 
provision (Article 38(1)) so that the handball league’s regulations on the number of non-EU 
players in a team did not apply to him. 
 
                                                 
223 Op. Cit. n.2 Martin at 297. 
224 Cremona M., “Movement of Person, Establishment and Services”, in Maresceau M. (Ed.), Enlarging the 
European Union: Relations between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe, Longman, 1997. 
225 Op. Cit. n.222 at paras.19-30. 
226 Case C-272/92 Spotti v Freistaat Bayern [1993] ECR I-5185. 
227 Op. Cit. n.222 at para.24. 
228 Case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund eV v. Kolpak [2003] ECR I-4135; noted van den Bogaert S., “And 
Another Uppercut from the European Court of justice to Nationality Requirements in Sports Regulations”, (2004) 29 
ELR 267, Ott A., “Case Note”, (2004) 10 Columbia Journal of European Law 379 and Dubey J-P., “Case Note”, 
(2005) 42 CMLRev 499. 
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The second indent of Article 37 authorised the spouse and children of the Polish worker to have 
access to the MS’s labour market whilst the worker was employed so long as the worker was not 
seasonal or covered by a bilateral agreement. 
 
Article 38 contained the social security provisions of the Agreement. There was no general equal 
treatment clause and it only contained three specific benefits: aggregation of time for pensions, 
annuities and medical care; family benefits; and, the ability to transfer benefits. However, the 
Commission proposed a Community position within the Association Council229 on social 
security provisions to bring them into line with the EC-Turkey Association Council Decision 
3/80 and Reg. 1408/71. This proposal was withdrawn by the Commission in 2005 upon 
accession to the EU by the CEECs230. 
 
The provisions on establishment and services were considered to be particularly important by the 
Community as the CEECs offer new and expansive opportunities for business. Article 44(1) and 
(3) required Poland and the MSs of the Community to grant a treatment no less favourable to that 
of their own companies and nationals in the establishment of the other Party’s companies and 
nationals. Furthermore this ‘no less favourable’ treatment was extended to companies and 
nationals already established. In a Declaration annexed to the Final Act the Contracting Parties 
appeared to define ‘no less favourable’ in a similar manner to the non-discrimination principle. 
The boundary between the rights of establishment and movement of workers was stressed in 
Article 44(4)(a)(i), which provided that “self-employment and business undertakings by 
nationals shall not extend to seeking or taking employment in the labour market or confer a right 
of access to the labour market of the other party”. In Gloszczuk231, the Court held that Article 
                                                 
229 COM(1999)675, 676-682, and 684 final. 
230 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the outcome of the 
screening of legislative proposals pending before the legislator, COM(2005) 462 final. 
231 Case C-63/99 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Gloszczuk [2001] ECR I-6369. See also 
Case C-235/99 R v. Secretary of State for the Home department, ex parte Kondova [2001] ECR I-6427 and Case C-
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44(3) was capable of having direct effect, notwithstanding the fact that the MS’s authorities 
remained competent to apply their own national laws and regulations regarding entry, stay and 
establishment, in accordance with Article 58(1)232. This right of establishment meant that there 
must be complementary rights of entry and residence to pursue activities of an industrial or 
commercial character, of craftsmen or of the professions in the MS233. However, from Article 
58(1) they were not absolute privileges as they could be limited in some circumstances by the 
rules of the host MS234. These national rules could not be such as to make the exercise of the 
Article 44(3) rights impossible or excessively difficult235. The Court found that after considering 
the objectives of the Poland Agreement the right of establishment in Article 44(3) was not 
equivalent to that of Article 43EC and so the latter’s case law could not be applied236. The ECJ, 
however, in Jany237 found that the term “economic activities as self-employed persons” in 
Article 44(4)(a)(i) had the same meaning and scope as the “activities as self-employed persons” 
referred to in Article 43EC. 
 
In Gloszczuk, Mr and Mrs Gloszczuk, both Polish nationals, entered the UK as tourists, with 
their entry visa containing an express condition prohibiting them from entering employment or 
engaging in any business or profession in a self-employed capacity. Instead of leaving, as they 
had stated they intended to do to the immigration authorities on entry, they remained, Mrs 
                                                                                                                                                             
257/99 R v. Secretary of state for the Home Department, ex parte Barkoci & Malik [2001] ECR I-6557 for 
corresponding judgments on the Bulgaria and Czech Agreements respectively. Noted Bogusz B., “Regulating the 
Right of Establishment for Accession State Nationals: Reinforcing the “Buffer Zone” or Improving Labour Market 
Flexibility?” (2002) 27 ELR 474, Pedain A., “A Hollow Victory: The ECJ Rules on Direct Effect of Freedom of 
Establishment Provisions in Europe Agreements, (2002) 61 CLJ 284, Pedain A., “’With or Without Me’: The ECJ 
Adopts a Pose of Studied Neutrality Towards EU Enlargement”, (2002) 51 ICLQ 981, van Ooik R., “Freedom of 
Movement of Self-Employed Persons and the Europe Agreements”, (2002) 4 EJML 377, Hillion C., “Case Note”, 
(2003) 40 CMLRev 465. 
232 Ibid. at paras.29-38. Article 58(1) reads “…nothing in the Agreement shall prevent the Parties from applying 
their laws and regulations regarding entry and stay, work, labour conditions and establishment of natural persons, 
and supply of services, provided that, in so doing, they do not apply them in a manner as to nullify or impair the 
benefits accruing to any Party under the terms of a specific provision of this Agreement...”. 
233 Ibid. at para.42.  
234 Ibid. at para.51.  
235 Ibid. at para.56. 
236 Ibid. at paras.47-52. 
237 Case C-268/99 Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2001] ECR I-8615 at paras.32-50. 
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Gloszczuk gave birth to a son and Mr Gloszczuk began working as a self-employed building 
contractor. Mr Gloszczuk applied to claim a right of establishment under Article 44 with Mrs 
Gloszczuk and his son as his family members. The UK was found to be acting legally in having 
immigration rules that required the checking of employment and self-employment visa 
applications before the individual left their home State. However, where in Panayotova238, a 
similar Dutch system required the individual to obtain a temporary residence permit before 
leaving the home State, the ECJ held that the procedural rules for obtaining such a permit must 
not make it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the right of establishment. The Court 
in both Gloszczuk239 and Panayotova240, found that a MS was acting compatibly with Article 
58(1) by rejecting an application under Article 44(3) if the applicant was residing illegally in that 
State by making false representations on initial entry or failing to comply with an express 
condition attached to that initial entry. 
 
Article 52(1) allowed companies or nationals exercising their right of establishment to employ 
key personnel, as defined in Article 52(2), from their home country, for which the personnel 
would receive residence and work permits for the duration of employment. 
 
Article 55 dealt with the supply of services and was considerably less comprehensive than the 
provisions dealing with establishment. Articles 55(1) envisaged the attainment of the free 
movement of services but only “progressively” and after the Parties had taken the “necessary 
steps”. Although clear and precise it was conditional and therefore not directly effective. Article 
55(2) provided for the employment of key personnel or the service provider in the other Party’s 
                                                 
238 Case C-327/02 Panayotova, Kalcheva, Lis, Sopova, Topa, Rusiecka v. Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en 
Integratie [2004] ECR I-11055 at para.26. The case also confirmed the judgement in Gloszczuk. 
239 Op. Cit. n.231 at para.57. 
240 Op. Cit. n.238 at paras.31 & 32. 
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country but only when the liberalisation process of Article 55(1) had been realised. Thus it was 
deprived of direct effect until Article 55(1) was fully applied. 
 
The transition arrangements for the 1 May 2004 and 1 January 2007 accession States created a 
complex structure for the phasing in of rights of free movement of workers applicable to 
nationals of the new MSs. The Treaty of Accession241 (henceforth TA) is a short declaratory 
document that provides in Article 1(2) (Article 2(2) for the Bulgarian and Romanian TA) for the 
Act of Accession242 (henceforth AA) to be an integral part of it. It is the AA that provides the 
detail for the accession and transitional arrangements, the details of the latter then outlined for 
each country in the Annexes. There were no restrictions applied to the right to free movement of 
citizens of the Union in Article 18EC although internal border controls were to be maintained. 
Article 8 of the Schengen protocol required all new MSs to accept the Schengen acquis in full. 
However, Article 3(1)AA provided that only the provisions in Annex I would be binding and 
applicable in the new MSs from the date of accession. The remaining provisions would only 
apply when given effect by a Decision passed by the Council and internal border controls would 
be lifted when a Council Decision verified that all the Schengen acquis was being applied in that 
new MS (Article 3(2)AA)243. The final pieces of the Schengen acquis jigsaw were put in place in 
June244 and December 2007245, enabling the removal of internal land and sea borders on 8 
December 2007 and air borders on 30 March 2008246.   
                                                 
241 Op. Cit. n.212 & 213. 
242 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of 
Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the 
Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which 
the European Union is founded, O.J. 2003 L236/33 and Protocol concerning the conditions and arrangements for 
admission of the republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union, O.J.2005 L157/29. The two Acts of 
Accession are similar and so it is intended to refer to the former unless there are substantial differences. 
243 Op. Cit. n.212 Adinolfi at 472. 
244 Council Decision 2007/471/EC on the application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the 
Schengen Information System in the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic 
of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and 
the Slovak Republic, O.J. 2007 L179/46. 
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The transition measures for each acceding State are set out in the AA’s Annexes, a separate 
Annex for each State. For Cyprus and Malta there were no transition arrangements for the free 
movement of workers into the old EU MSs but Malta could suspend until 30 April 2011 the 
application of Articles 1-6 of Reg. 1612/68 if there were, or possible threats of, disturbances to 
its labour market. For the other new MSs, the CEECS or Accession 8 (henceforth A8 States), the 
Annexes outlined identical provisions for the free movement of workers. A seven year transition 
period for the full implementation of free movement of persons was put in place because of 
concerns over the adequacy of the labour markets in the old MSs to absorb the expected flow of 
migrants from the East. As Currie observes247, national flexibility was the essential factor in the 
transitional arrangements, with MSs given significant discretion to decide unilaterally the length 
and scope of the derogations from the principle of free movement. For the first two years, until 
30 April 2006, MSs could maintain their national measures to regulate access to their labour 
markets for nationals from the former CEECs and derogate from Articles 1-6 of Reg. 1612/78. 
On the basis of a Commission Report248 the Council reviewed those measures before the end of 
the two year period and MSs notified the Commission on their intentions to lift the restrictions, 
ease the restrictions or retain the restrictions until 30 April 2009. Old MSs could even continue 
to apply their restrictions until 30 April 2011 where there were, or there were possible threats of, 
serious disturbances to the labour market. For MSs who decide to open up their labour markets 
fully there is a safeguard clause that enables MSs to request authorisation from the Commission 
to suspend the free movement of workers if there are actual or foreseeable disturbances to their 
labour market, which could seriously threaten the standard of living or level of employment in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
245 Council Decision 2007/801/EC on the full application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in the Czech 
Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the 
Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, O.J. 2007 L323/34. 
246 Ibid. Article 1. 
247 Currie S., “”Free” Movers? The Post-Accession Experience of Accession-8 Migrant Workers in the UK”, (2006) 
31 ELR 207 at 210. 
248 Commission Report on the functioning of the transitional arrangements set out in the Accession Treaty 2003 
(period 1 May 2004-30 April 2006), COM(2006) 48 final. 
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given region or occupation. A standstill clause ensures that no more restrictive measures may be 
introduced than were in place on 1 May 2004. 
 
The transitional arrangements for family members are problematic. If the family member was 
residing with the worker in the EU on 1 May 2004 then the family member would have 
immediate access to the labour market. However, if the family member was not resident with the 
worker on 1 May 2004 then he or she was not able to enter the labour market until they had 
resided with the worker for eighteen months or from 1 May 2007, whichever was earlier. The 
CEEC Agreements did not contain any time limitations for family members entering the labour 
market and it is difficult to see how the AA can impose a more restrictive regime than was in 
place before, particularly when the standstill clause is factored into the equation249. Furthermore 
the Family Reunification Directive250 (see Chapter V of this thesis) authorises MSs to set a time 
limit that must not exceed twelve months for TCN family members of TCN workers to take up 
employment, although the MSs have the discretion to require the worker to have been resident in 
the MS for up to two years. The ECJ has yet to interpret these arrangements but Adinolfi 
suggests251 that, following the case of Peskeloglou252, the Court would be likely to treat any of 
the transition arrangements as derogations from the fundamental right of the free movement of 
workers and interpret such a restriction narrowly. 
 
Bulgaria and Romania’s accession to the Union on 1 January 2007 involve similar transitional 
arrangements to the CEEC States but with the date of the first period ending on 31 December 
                                                 
249 Op. Cit. n.212 Hillion at 598. 
250 Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, O.J. 2003 L251/12, Article 14. 
251 Op. Cit. n.212 Adinolfi at 490. 
252 Case 77/82 Peskeloglou [1983] ECR 1085. 
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2008, the second period on 31 December 2011, full application on 31 December 2013 and the 
family reunification requirement on 31 December 2009253. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The agreements that the Community has entered into with third countries create a divergent 
spread of rights for TCNs that depend in particular on the purpose of the agreement, the 
geographical location of the third country (i.e. is it European) and the long term intentions of the 
third country and the EU. The EEA implementing a free trade area with fellow European States 
that may eventually accede to the Union allows full free movement rights for nationals of EEA 
countries. The Ankara Agreement, EMAs and CEEC Association Agreements do not allow free 
movement of persons either on the entry of the State’s nationals into the EU or within the EU 
when they have been granted access to the MS’s territory, but there are provisions enabling 
access to the labour market and non-discrimination. The later agreements appear to be less 
generous over rights for TCNs than the earlier arrangements, particularly comparing the CEEC 
Association Agreements and the new SAAs with the Ankara Agreement. However, the ECJ has 
interpreted the provisions teleologically and it is possible to discern a more generous approach to 
States that, with the signing of a SAA, are candidate countries. The liberal judgments in 
Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, Gloszczuk and Panayotova involving the CEEC States can be contrasted 
with the restrictive rulings in El-Yassini and Mesbah concerning the EMA Agreements. 
 
The international agreements entered into by the Community with third countries have created 
rights for some TCNs that place these TCNs in a novel position. They do not have the full rights 
of Union citizenship but the rights they do have are targeted towards enabling their market 
                                                 
253 See Traser J., “Who’s Afraid of the EU’s Latest Enlargement? The Impact of Bulgaria and Romania Joining the 
Union on Free Movement of Persons”, ECAS Report, 2008 available at http://www.ecas-
citizens.eu/content/view/84/178, accessed 15 August 2008.  
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access once they have entered the territory of the host MS. They are in effect equivalent to 
‘denizens’254 who acquire ‘market citizenship’255 upon accession to the Union but do not acquire 
full Union citizenship until seven years after accession256. 
 
The structure of legal rationality must now be employed to assess the legitimacy of the 
Community’s policy on internal agreements with third countries and the free movement rights 
for TCNs flowing from them. 
 
 
                                                 
254 Hammer T., Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World of International 
Migration, Avebury, 1990. 
255 Everson M., “The Legacy of the Market Citizen” in Shaw J., More G., New Legal Dynamics of European Union, 
Clarendon Press, 1995 at 73. 
256 Reich N., Harbacevica S., “Citizenship and Family on Trial: A Fairly Optimistic Overview of Recent Court 
Practice with regard to Free Movement of Persons”, (2003) 40 CMLRev 615 at 616 and Reich N., “The 
Constitutional relevance of Citizenship and Free Movement in an Enlarged Union”, (2005) 11 ELJ 675 at 690. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
 
LEGAL RATIONALITY 
 
1. FORMAL LEGAL RATIONALITY 
 
Formal rationality comprises three aspects, the failure of one, in the purely abstract analysis, 
being enough to enable a declaration to be made that the law is formally irrational. The first 
element of formal rationality, that of contradiction of Community law by a legal instrument from 
another legal system, does not appear to be relevant, but the other two factors in formal 
rationality do raise concerns over three specific issues. Once the abstract evaluation has been 
carried out any concerns must be viewed from the factors underpinning policy formation to 
provide useful recommendations and suggestions for improvement. 
 
The first issue surrounds the concept of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, which is 
enshrined in Article 12EC. From the analysis conducted in Chapter VII, there would appear to be 
a contradictory situation between this fundamental right to non-discrimination and the principle 
of free movement of persons in the various agreements. Nationals of EFTA States enjoy the right 
to the free movement of persons but there is no such right for Turkish, Maghreb or for CEEC 
nationals under the CEEC Agreements. Furthermore, the Accession Treaty for the new MSs, 
creates a contradiction between the rights associated with citizens of the Union and those of 
workers. Thus CEEC nationals, as citizens of the Union, are entitled to enjoy the right of 
freedom of movement but this right has been limited for workers by old MSs being able to 
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maintain their national provisions for labour market entry, or indeed sanctioned to adopt new 
highly restrictive measures at the time of accession, that could last for the duration of the seven 
year transition phase. This then appears to limit the right to free movement on the basis of 
nationality, a situation that contradicts the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of 
nationality. It could be argued that this is a situation that provides for tension between principles 
rather than contradiction and this position has some force when the purposes of the various 
agreements are taken into account. However the transition arrangements in the Accession Treaty 
for the CEECs, particularly as distinctions are made for Cyprus and Malta, do contradict the 
principle of freedom of movement. 
 
Further contradictions appear to arise within the principle of non-discrimination itself as the 
scope of the term is defined differently between the different agreements. The EEA Agreement 
prohibits it in the same words as Article 12EC, Article 9 of the EC-Turkey Protocol refers to 
Article [12]EC, whilst the Maghreb Agreements and CEEC Agreements limit the right to 
working conditions, remuneration or dismissal for legally employed workers, before the CEEC 
Agreements ensure that this is “subject to the conditions and modalities applicable in each 
Member State”. As such the general principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality will differ according to the nationality of the TCN, which is an internally 
contradictory position and indeed tautologous. 
 
The policy issues involved here enhance concern over this contradiction rather than ameliorate it. 
Economic factors appear to play off against one another. On one side it is felt that enlargement 
and the use of a form of temporary “guest-worker” under the Association Agreements provides a 
pool of labour for MSs as they require. Furthermore the reciprocal arrangement provides 
opportunities for nationals of the host MS to move to other States where their skills may be in 
demand. This is the logical rationale of the freedom of movement of persons that can also be 
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applied to the freedom of establishment. However, the other side of the argument rests 
predominantly on the cost to the host MS’s social welfare schemes, with the trade-off 
exemplified by the UK’s Accession (Immigration and Worker Registration) Regulations 20041. 
These require CEEC nationals not resident in the UK at the time of accession to have to work in 
the UK for an uninterrupted period of twelve months and be registered as working with an 
authorised employer before they can claim social security2. The latter concern of over-burdening 
social welfare systems can be linked with other factors. The first is culture where the concern is 
that a sudden influx of nationals from new MSs or neighbouring third countries could potentially 
destabilise the host MS’s society. This can be linked with the security issue as this destabilisation 
could feed through into pubic disorder and unrest within the host population. It is submitted that 
these potentially negative factors were greatly exaggerated at the time of accession in 2004 and 
2007, justifying limitations to the freedom of movement of persons. The EU has experienced 
five rounds of expansion now, as detailed in Chapter II, and there is little evidence of such 
problems occurring. It is certainly the case that the “big bang” of ten new MSs joining the EU in 
2004 followed by a further two in 2007 had not been experienced before. Furthermore there was 
a significant imbalance in the average GDP per head of the new countries compared with the 
fifteen they were joining. The suggestions made to try to alleviate the outlined contradictions 
must attempt a careful balancing exercise that may not necessarily be to the benefit of TCNs. 
First, it is submitted that in future accessions to the EU, there should be no difference in 
treatment based on nationality. This could result in all TCNs being treated in the same manner as 
nationals from the CEECs in 2004 and 2007, or indeed greater restrictions on free movement 
than in previous EU expansion, but this would remove the discrimination problem. Second, the 
different agreements should introduce a non-discrimination clause applicable in standard 
situations. Again this could result in a downgrading of some free movement rights for some 
                                                 
1 SI 2004/1219. 
2 See Zalewska v. Department for Social Development (Northern Ireland) [2009] 1 CMLR 24. 
303 
 
TCNs, in particular those of EEA States, but it would ensure the principle of non-discrimination 
was free of contradictions. This could also comply with the element of policy formation that 
considers status, enabling all TCNs to be identified under a standard class. 
 
The second issue centres round the notion of family reunification. The doctrines of family 
reunification and free movement of workers appear to create a contradictory situation. In the 
CEEC Agreements a family member who entered the EU to rejoin the CEEC worker for family 
reunification was able to engage in the labour market immediately, without any time restriction. 
The Accession Treaty for the CEEC States maintains this position for family members already 
resident with the worker on 1 May 2004, or 1 January 2007 for Bulgaria and Romania, but if a 
family member following that date exercises their right to family reunification then they must be 
excluded from access to the labour market for eighteen months or until 30 April 2007, or 31 
December 2009 for Bulgaria and Romania, whichever is earlier. Furthermore Article 14 of the 
Family Reunification Directive, Dir. 2003/863, only authorises MSs to set a time limit that must 
not exceed twelve months for TCN family members of TCN workers to take up employment. 
The scope of the Directive means that it cannot apply to family members of a Union citizen 
(Article 3(3)) and is without prejudice to more favourable positions of agreements between the 
Community and third countries (Article 3(4)(a)). However, it highlights the contradiction 
between the two doctrines of the right to family reunification and the right of access to the labour 
market when TCN family members, and CEEC family members under the CEEC Agreements, 
appear to be in a more favourable position than family members of EU citizens originating from 
the CEEC States. It could be that this contradiction could be ameliorated by the ECJ providing a 
narrow interpretation of the derogations from the right of freedom of movement, or by finding 
that the Accession Treaty’s standstill clause ensures that family members of CEEC nationals 
cannot be placed in a worse position after the Accession Treaty than they were in before under 
                                                 
3 Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, O.J. 2003 L251/12. 
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the CEEC Agreements. There is though, for the moment, a contradiction between doctrines as 
they apply to CEEC nationals. 
 
The contradiction also exists for family members of Turkish workers who have no Community 
right to family reunification in Article 7 of Decision 1/80, have a limited access to the labour 
market after three years and are entitled to full employment rights after five years. This would 
appear to sit uncomfortably with Article 14 of the Family Reunification Directive. It may be the 
case that Article 3(4)(a) works in favour of the Turkish worker and his family members, 
particularly as the Directive applies to TCNs residing lawfully in the territory of the MSs (Article 
1), where a TCN is defined as any person who is not an EU citizen within the meaning of Article 
17(1)EC. However, for Maghreb nationals who have no right to family reunification in the 
EMAs, and no right of access to the employment market, they could now benefit from the 
Directive.  
 
From the discussion above it is clear that there is not only contradiction between two doctrines 
but also a contradictory position within the right to family reunification itself. The right to family 
reunification is now included in the Family Reunification Directive for all TCNs. However, there 
is no right to family reunification in the Ankara Agreement or its implementing Decisions, or in 
the EMAs. It may be that the Directive overrules the specific rules set out for Turkey and the 
Maghreb countries but until the matter comes before the ECJ for interpretation this contradiction 
will remain. 
 
The policy issues surrounding family reunification are predominantly economic, in that a worker 
is likely to feel more at home and thus more productive if he is given close support by his family, 
and cultural, as the focus of society is based on the family. Therefore, most elements of policy 
formation point towards the aim of the reunification of the family whenever a single family 
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member migrates. The reunification of the family would also appear to be a pertinent aim for the 
free movement of persons, particularly from an economic perspective. On that basis it is 
suggested that the contradictions that limit family reunification should be removed and the 
position should be clarified for the benefit of all concerned parties, particularly TCNs. 
 
The third issue of concern lies internally within the area of free movement of persons and arises 
in a number of ways. The national rules regulating first entry to a host MS for Turkish nationals 
may now be contradictory following the judgment in Tum and Dari4. The Ankara Agreement and 
implementing Decisions did not interfere with a MS’s competence to regulate the first entry of 
Turkish nationals into that host MS. There is therefore no right of entry to the EU for a Turkish 
national. However, the criteria that MSs apply will now differ depending on the intent of the 
Turkish national. A Turkish national intending to enter the MS to work will be assessed using the 
criteria in place at the time of his or her application, but a Turkish national intending to enter the 
MS to either exercise the right to freedom of establishment, or the right to provide services, will 
have to be assessed using the criteria for entry in force at the time that the Additional Protocol 
came into force in that MS. Thus there will be two criteria applicable in each MS for an 
assessment of a Turkish national’s entry and will depend on whether the Turkish national is a 
worker or is exercising freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide services. 
 
The second is in the ECJ’s different approaches in the Micheletti5 and Mesbah6 cases that 
actually involve judgment of the same principle. Here, both Mr Micheletti and Mrs Mesbah’s 
son-in-law had dual nationality, with Mr Micheletti claiming an EC right through his MS 
nationality (he also had non-MS nationality) and Mrs Mesbah claiming an EMA right based on 
                                                 
4 Case C-16/05 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Veli Tum and Mehmet Dari [2007] ECR 
I-7415. 
5 Case C-369/90 M.V. Micheletti and others v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-4239. 
6 Case C-179/98 Belgian State v. Fatna Mesbah [1999] ECR I-7955. 
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her son-in-law’s Moroccan nationality (he also had nationality of a MS). Mr Micheletti was able 
to rely on his MS nationality, as to deny it would breach his right to free movement, whilst Mrs 
Mesbah could not rely on her son-in-law’s Moroccan nationality, as there was no right to free 
movement in the EMAs. The right to confer nationality on an individual remains within the 
competence of the MSs but once that nationality is conferred then it is “owned” by that national 
who can then use it as they see fit to claim further rights. It appears contradictory to be able to 
rely on MS nationality to claim an EU right but not be able to rely on non-MS nationality to 
claim a right that is available on the basis of being a non-MS national.  
 
The third concern again lies between judgments of the ECJ and displays a long-running problem 
of the ECJ when dealing with previous case law that it wishes to overrule, the origins of which 
lie in its civil law background. Taflan-Met7 established that Decision 3/80 required 
supplementary measures to be adopted by the Council for any of its provisions to be directly 
effective. The categorical nature of this denial of direct effect was undermined in Sürül8 by first 
claiming that the former case had not considered the provision in question and then finding that 
it did not require an implementing measure to be directly effective. However, the Court in Sürül 
failed to overrule Taflan-Met on this point. Two categorical jurisprudential points therefore 
conflict: implementing measures are required for any provision of Decision 3/80 to be directly 
effective; and, no implementing measure is required for a particular provision to be directly 
effective. 
 
Policy issues here are more nuanced than the previous two issues. The first is the legal position 
as regards EU competence and free movement. It has been established that there is no 
international law right to free movement of persons. This is reflected in the Association 
                                                 
7 Case C-277/94 Z. Taflan-Met and Others v. Bestuur van de Social Verzekeringsbank and O. Akol v. Bestuur van 
de Algemene Bedrijfsvereniging [1996] ECR I-4085. 
8 Case C-262/96 Sema Sürül v. Bundestantalt für Arbeit [1999] ECR I-2685. 
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Agreements that the EU enters into, apart from the EEA Agreement, in that the MSs maintain 
their competence to determine the conditions for first entry from a third country into the host 
MS. The first two issues in this area then provide distinct tensions between principles that could 
only be resolved by MSs further limiting their sovereignty, an unrealistic objective at the present 
time. However, the third issue of contradiction between two judgments of the ECJ is a pure 
conflict without policy factors that could be resolved by overruling Taflan-Met. 
 
2. INSTRUMENTAL LEGAL RATIONALITY 
 
Instrumental rationality consists of two elements, generic and specific rationality. The eight 
elements of the Fullerian procedural principles provide the necessary framework for the action-
guidance of the generic element of instrumental rationality, whilst specific instrumental 
rationality creates sufficiency for this action-guidance. As with formal instrumental rationality 
the abstract analysis raises concerns over three specific matters that will then be examined within 
the appropriate policy context.  
 
The first issue is the complexity of the legislation itself that creates problems for the clarity 
requirement of generic instrumental rationality that, until 2003, was reasonably transparent. The 
adoption of the Family Reunification Directive has created opacity in this field, especially over 
the interaction of the right to family reunification and the rights of entry to the MSs for family 
members from Turkey and the Maghreb. Furthermore the Accession Treaty for the CEEC States 
is a complex and difficult document to comprehend, which, not only needs to be carefully 
interpreted, but also requires knowledge of MSs’ national law to fully appreciate the free 
movement available to CEEC nationals. 
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Many of the factors affecting policy formation identified under formal rationality apply with 
equal force to the complexity issue under instrumental rationality, particularly as it applies to the 
legal questions of national sovereignty, family reunification and free movement of persons, all of 
which must be taken into consideration when adopting legal instruments to give effect to these 
policy elements. However, over-complexity of legislation leads to a situation where those who 
are ruled cannot comprehend or understand the law, a clear difficulty for the rule of law. The 
difficulties are clearly illustrated in the very narrow House of Lords majority ruling in Zalewska 
v. Department for Social Development (Northern Ireland). The economic effects of legislative 
complexity increase financial burdens on all sectors of the economy, be they employers or 
employees, apart from lawyers! It is clearly difficult to change existing legal instruments but 
lessons can be learned for the future. Thus any future EU expansion and new Accession Treaties 
should attempt to provide a clear statement of the legal provisions with derogations plainly stated 
and preferably in a single, manageable document. As for the rights of entry for Turkish and 
Maghreb nationals’ family members in relation to the Family Reunification Directive, it is 
suggested that this could be clarified using soft law and where there is a clear problem then 
amending legislation should be adopted. 
 
The second issue, linked with the first, is the actual wording of the different pieces of legislation 
themselves that impinge on the clarity, non-contradictory, generality and congruence elements of  
generic instrumental rationality. Legal instruments it must be accepted are likely to be complex 
documents often dealing with difficult situations and frequently intractable problems. However, 
from the discussion of the first issue it can be seen that the wording of, in particular, the 
Accession Treaty creates significant layers of intricacy leading to abstruseness. The requirement 
of non-contradiction in instrumental rationality simply requires the laws, cases or doctrines not 
to be contrary to another, without taking into account the distinctions between contradictions and 
tensions in formal rationality. Thus all the inconsistencies of legislative wording outlined above 
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for formal rationality, regardless of tensions between doctrines, are incorporated into the 
assessment of this element of instrumental rationality. The language of the legislation also 
impinges upon the generality of the law where the authorities must apply the law consistently 
and treat individuals in similar positions equally and like cases must be treated alike. This second 
element appears to be satisfied as the agreements apply generally across the Community, thereby 
ensuring that alike cases within different MSs are treated alike, with interpretation of the law 
provided by the ECJ or the EFTA Court for the EEA Agreement. However, for the law to be 
applied consistently under the first part of the generality requirement, it is submitted that 
provisions within different legal instruments using identical or close to identical wording should 
be interpreted in a similar manner. The ECJ has failed to do this, albeit through the accepted 
international legal procedure of considering the purpose of the agreement in question, 
particularly in the cases El-Yassini9 and Mesbah involving the EMA Agreements.  Thus the ECJ 
has introduced inconsistency into the Community legal order in which individuals are treated 
differently even though the different laws relied on are worded identically, or close to 
identically. This then impacts on the congruence of the law as officially declared and its 
compatibility with it as administered. For the law to be administered, such that it is congruent, 
then provisions that are identical or near identical should be interpreted by the ECJ in a similar 
manner. The Court does not do so, as the purpose of the agreement is considered, and thus the 
law appears to be administered incongruently with that officially declared. 
 
For the first two elements of clarity and non-contradiction, the policy issues involved are those 
identified above for complexity and formal rationality. However for generality and congruence 
the main policy factor is the different purposes that underpin the different agreements and in 
particular whether there is the aim of providing freedom of movement, as seen in the EEA 
Agreement, or not, as in the EMA Agreements. It cannot be denied that the interpretative 
                                                 
9 Case C-416/96 Nour Eddline El-Yassini v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1997] ECR I-1209. 
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techniques utilised by the ECJ are perfectly legitimate and recognised by international law but 
this does not surmount the fact that there is inconsistency and incongruence between identically 
or near identically worded legal instruments. It must be made clear that the issue here is value-
free and thus any solution does not necessarily need to consider the impact it has on the 
individuals involved but merely the instrument rationality of the law. Thus a perfectly acceptable 
solution could be to rewrite the clauses of the agreements that have similar or identical language 
to provide clear differences between legal instruments and to reflect clearly the purposes behind 
each one. 
 
The third issue is the difficulties for both generic and specific instrumental rationality created by 
the Council failing to agree to an implementing measure for Decision 3/80. By failing to adopt 
an implementing measure the law fails to satisfy the prospective requirement. Furthermore, the 
law as officially declared again appears to lack congruence with that administered, as evidenced 
in Taflan-Met and Sürül. Although these two problems are important, it is submitted that the 
greater concern here is with the impact on specific instrumental rationality. By failing to adopt 
the implementing measure, the Council has not even attempted to accomplish the required aim in 
Article 39 of the Protocol, thus failing to promote the legitimate ends or goals of the Ankara 
Agreement. Furthermore, the requirement that legal officials must use the most effective legal 
technique to achieve societal goals, thereby ensuring the function of the legal act matches its 
effect, is completely negated by the lack of this implementing measure. 
 
Decision 3/80 was adopted to implement Article 39 of the Protocol with the aim of co-ordinating 
the social security systems of the MSs to enable Turkish workers employed or formerly 
employed in the Community, their family members, and survivors to qualify for social security 
benefits. This was designed to be adopted within twelve months of the Protocol coming into 
force but the Association Council only achieved their task over a decade later. The main policy 
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issue is the obvious one of the MSs desire to protect their social welfare systems from being 
overburdened by Turkish nationals. This is clearly a sensitive political “hot potato”, particularly 
in countries such as Germany and Austria with very high Turkish working populations. 
However, such issues must be considered in the context of the aim of Article 39 of the Protocol 
and the adoption of Decision 3/80 and from a value-neutral perspective. To adopt legislation to 
co-ordinate the MSs social security schemes for Turkish nationals but then to fail to adopt 
legislation to enable these people to claim their rights before the courts clearly creates 
considerable concern for the rule of law that cannot be justified by political expediency. To 
rectify these concerns it is submitted that the implementing legislation should be adopted as soon 
as possible, and for it to be relied on retrospectively. 
 
3. SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL RATIONALITY 
 
Substantive legal rationality requires that all rules of law must be based on good reasons as 
formulated through the concept of practical reason. Legal doctrine should be sustained on 
plausible empirical facts but more importantly the principle underpinning that legal doctrine 
must be legitimate. The set of norms required to underpin all legal instruments and judicial 
reasoning are the human rights norms of the Community as exemplified by the ECHR, and as 
now enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
 
The European Union as specified in Article 6(1)TEU is founded on inter alia, “the principles 
of…respect for human rights…”. Furthermore Article 6(2)TEU goes on to provide that the EU 
shall respect fundamental rights as general principles of Community law, from the sources of the 
ECHR and the constitutional traditions common to the MSs. As such at first blush the law is 
substantively rational as human rights underpin the legal system. However, for the law to be 
fully assessed for substantive rationality, individuals who have their human rights violated 
312 
 
should be able to bring a claim, and the perpetrators of the breach, before the courts of law of the 
legal system that is allegedly violating human rights.  
 
TCNs who can bring themselves within the scope of the international agreements can, it is 
submitted, rely on the Community’s human rights protection through the use of fundamental 
rights as they are brought under the Community legal umbrella10. However, these rights are not 
possessed by the individuals concerned on the basis of their innate humanity but because they 
have established a Community nexus. The Community nexus enables the Community right to be 
claimed under the particular international agreement that then enables a fundamental right claim 
to be advanced. Human rights by their very nature are rights “owned” by human beings on the 
basis of their innate humanity. Thus all human beings resident in a community in which human 
rights norms are protected should be able to claim the benefit of that right without any further 
condition. By making a human right conditional then the norms cannot be protected and the legal 
system cannot be substantively rational. This is exemplified by a TCN of the country covered by 
the agreement, resident in the Community who is unable to bring themselves under the coverage 
of the agreement. They will not therefore be able to establish the required Community nexus and 
will not be able to rely on Community human rights protection11. It may also be the case that any 
TCN within the coverage of the agreements may not be able to establish this Community nexus 
as they have not exercised freedom of movement12, a right not available under the agreements, 
except the EEA Agreement, or within the EC Treaty (see Chapter III of this thesis). 
 
                                                 
10 Only in Case 12/86 Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719 has there been an attempt to 
use the human rights standards of the ECHR, that the ECJ rejected as the case lay outside the Community legal 
domain. 
11 These TCNs might be able to obtain protection for human rights abuses through the legal order of the Member 
State in which they are resident. This, however, does not negate the lack of substantive rationality within the 
Community legal order. 
12 See for example Joined Cases 35 & 36/82 Morson and Jhanjan v. Netherlands [1982] ECR 3723. 
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The situation with substantive rationality is controversial as there are value judgements that 
underlie the concept. It was seen in Chapter I that the protection of human rights as the key 
feature of substantive rationality could be justified and provided legitimate justification for 
legislative requirements. However, it was also acknowledged that the substitution of an 
alternative moral perspective, such as a utilitarian position, for such a value judgement could 
provide a vastly different perspective. Thus there needs to be consideration of this position from 
an established policy stance, with the stance chosen being that of the Tampere Conclusions’ 
voluntary commitment by the EU and its MSs to improve the position of the TCNs. From this 
policy stance, and as Article 6(1)TEU states the EU is founded on respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, then for EU law to be substantively rational it must protect the human 
rights of all human beings resident within the territory of the EU. To do this, individuals must be 
able to bring legal action to sustain any claims to violations of human rights principles, a 
situation that is currently not possible. It is possible that this position is rectified with the 
introduction of the Lisbon Treaty. That provides legal force to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (new Article 6(1)TEU) but more importantly new Article 6(2)TEU directs the EU to 
accede to the ECHR. The result of both provisions is that individuals resident in the EU should 
be able to prosecute their human rights claims within the European Courts, either those in 
Strasbourg or in Luxembourg. However, it remains uncertain to what extent individuals will be 
able to enforce their rights under the Charter of Fundamental Rights before national courts. It is 
submitted that until the Lisbon Treaty comes into force and the EU accedes to the ECHR, the 
law in the area will remain substantively irrational. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
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The findings above of failings in formal, instrumental and substantive legal rationality help 
identify discrimination and human rights as the two significant themes of concern in this area. 
These legal rationality deficiencies call into question the political legitimacy of the EU polity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 5 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Third country nationals are an integral part of the European Union, whose numbers are likely to 
grow over the next fifty years and whose significance, it is submitted, has still not been fully 
realised by the citizens and politicians of the Member States. The lives of TCN residents in the 
EU, just like EU citizens, are regulated by laws, laws adopted by political legislatures whose 
actions must be justified to those who they legislate for. In this thesis, that political legitimacy 
has been analysed by subjecting the laws either adopted or in the process of adoption, to an 
abstract examination utilising the concept of legal rationality and then situating those findings in 
the policy matrix involved in that law’s formation.  
 
The results of this analysis in the three areas assessed paint a disconcerting picture for the 
political legitimacy of the EU with the law being found to be lacking in formal, instrumental and 
substantive rationality. However, once that finding is situated within the policy matrix some 
practical suggestions can be made to attempt to ameliorate these findings. From those findings in 
Chapters IV, VI and VIII it is suggested that a number of themes can be distilled under the four 
broad headings of discrimination, international law, human rights and Tampere Conclusions. 
 
Discrimination on the basis of nationality under Article 12EC is a fundamental right in the 
European Union that is directly effective and providing an enforceable right to individuals. 
Unfortunately the position of TCNs with regard to this fundamental right is highly limited as a 
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Community nexus has to be established for the right to bight. Furthermore the ECJ has managed 
to develop meaningful benefits for EU citizens out of the vague concept of Union citizenship by 
refashioning discrimination as a citizen right. The key to the Court’s case law has been to 
establish the “real link” concept such that the closer the bond there is between the claimant and 
the host MS then the more likely the claimant will be to gain equal access to benefits and social 
welfare systems1. However, the reality for many TCNs is that they move from their home State 
to the EU and develop very strong links with that host State but they are unable to take 
advantage of these because they have no Community nexus. It is suggested that the ECJ returns 
the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality back to a universal right by finding 
that any TCN that falls within the personal scope of a piece of EU legislation should be able to 
rely on Article 12. 
 
International law, and in particular international human rights law, is frequently cited as the basis 
of the legislative measures adopted under the AFSJ2. However, as Chapter V displayed, too 
many pieces of AFSJ legislation pay lip service to this requirement which causes considerable 
problems for legal rationality and legitimacy. The second suggestion simply requires the EU and 
its MSs to comply with their international legal obligations. 
 
The third theme is that of human rights. The very quality of human rights that ensures those 
rights are effective is that they are owned by individuals simply on the basis of their innate 
humanity, which enables an individual to enforce those rights by an action in a court of law. 
However, where an individual can only protect their human rights through establishing a 
sufficiently close relationship with another individual who must then choose to exercise their 
                                                 
1 Dougan M., “Cross-Border Educational Mobility and the Exportation of Student Financial Assistance”, (2008) 33 
ELR 723 at 725. See also O’Brien C., “Real Links, Abstract Links and False Alarms: The Relationship between the 
ECJ’s “Real Link” Case law and National Solidarity”, (2008) 33 ELR 643. 
2 See Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals 
or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted, O.J. 2004 L304/12 Recital 3. 
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own right to freedom of movement, then those persons become subordinated to the will of the 
right holder and the polity as a whole and, as Weiler3 has observed, they become a “thing” 
“which serves the purpose of ensuring free movement”. The danger of course is that such 
individuals with derogated rights, or those with such rights, are classified as less than human and 
treated accordingly. The suggestion then is to extend the protection of human rights, or 
fundamental rights, to all individuals resident in the EU. The Lisbon Treaty, providing legal 
effect to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and competence to the EU to accede to the ECHR 
(Article 6TEU), goes some way to achieving this goal but it is questionable if it enables it fully. 
 
The final theme draws together the three previous points and suggestions whilst emphasising the 
value-laden requirement for political legitimacy of substantive rationality. This is the voluntary 
commitment by the MSs through the EU to improve the position of TCNs as pronounced in the 
Tampere conclusions4 to “ensure fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally on 
the territory of its Member States”5. This improvement was supposed to be based upon the 
principle of non-discrimination, the approximation of the legal status of TCNs to MSs’ nationals, 
a uniform set of rights for LTR TCNs as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens and to 
lead ultimately to the offer of obtaining nationality of the resident MS6. The legislation that has 
been adopted under the AFSJ fails to achieve these goals. It is particularly notable that there is a 
lack of free movement for TCNs between MSs as the MSs have decided to retain competence 
over this matter rather than transfer their sovereignty. It is submitted that this lack of mobility is 
the single most important failing of policy formation by the EU polity for TCNs themselves and 
for the EU itself. As the twenty-first century progresses the question of mobility of TCNs will 
become increasingly important and take on enhanced significance as the lack of labour has a 
                                                 
3 Weiler, J.H.H., “Thou Shalt not Oppress a Stranger: On the Judicial Protection of the Human Rights of non-EC 
Nationals”, (1992) 3 EJIL 65 at 90. 
4 Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, SN200/99. 
5 Ibid. at 5, para.18. 
6 Ibid. at 5, para.21. 
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critical effect on the continued advancement of the EU. It is submitted that it would be better to 
grasp the nettle now and provide for a graduated scheme of free movement than in times of 
crisis. This could easily be achieved by amending the LTR TCN Directive7 and the proposed 
Directive on employment of highly-qualified TCNs8 but relies on political will-power of the 
MSs. 
 
The four themes identified and recommendations made above go to the heart of the legal 
rationality of EU law in this policy area, and in general the legitimacy of the polity. Much 
legislation has been adopted in the AFSJ over a short space of time with the aim of managing 
immigration into the EU and migration flows in the EU. A significant danger here is that the 
effect of such legislation has yet to be assessed and it may be many years before that will be 
possible. Castles9 however provides a warning to the use of migration policies to achieve certain 
aims and objectives when he suggests that they often fail to achieve those objectives or have 
unintended consequences, a situation demonstrated by El-Enany10 over the treatment of refugees. 
It is submitted that these are warnings that the EU polity should heed when it comes to policy 
formation towards TCNs. 
 
The structure of legal rationality proved to be an effective model for analysing a specific area or 
discipline of law when it is positioned within the matrix of factors that make up policy 
formation. It is capable of identifying deficiencies in the legal enterprise and a model can be 
constructed, from the defects, of a rational law. It is also submitted that it can be utilised to 
effectively assess other areas of law and opens up other new arenas for research. 
                                                 
7 Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third country nationals who are LTRs, O.J. 2004 L16/44. 
8 Commission proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals 
for the purposes of highly qualified employment, COM(2007) 637 final and Council Document 16952/08. 
9 Castles S., “Why Migration Policies Fail”, (2004) 27 Ethnic and Racial Studies 205 and Castles S., “The Factors 
that Make and Unmake Migration Policies”, (2004) 38 IMR 852 
10 El-Enany N., “Who is the New European Refugee?” (2008) 33 ELR 313. 
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